Arctic sovereignty is just the beginning.

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The 1993 Nunavut Act defines the territorial boundaries of Nunavut as (s. 3):

(a) all that part of Canada north of the sixtieth parallel of north latitude and east of the boundary described in Schedule 1 that is not within Quebec or Newfoundland; and

(b) the islands in Hudson Bay, James Bay and Ungava Bay that are not within Manitoba, Ontario or Quebec.

Schedule 1 sets out the Western boundary of Nunavut, concluding with "thence North along 110[degrees]00'W longitude to its intersection with the northern limits of Canada...."

The resolution of many of the issues included under the broad rubric of "sovereignty" will play out within, and in some aspects define, or redefine, this area. Nunavut is thus of great strategic significance to Canada, and in some respects, remains a dynamic concept, not yet fully in focus. It appears that focus may sharpen rapidly, in step with the retreat of the Arctic pack ice.

Nunavut does not have a monopoly as the situs of Canadian Arctic sovereignty issues. Not all of the Canadian Arctic archipelago is within Nunavut (although Canada's entitlement to the archipelago is now unchallenged, and that has been the case for some length of time, likely since circa 1930). In addition, not all of the waters within the archipelago are within Nunavut. The westerly sectors of the Northwest Passage (or, perhaps more accurately, the several variants) are outside Nunavut territorial limits.

Issues of claims for extended continental shelves are not confined to Nunavut. And, finalization of the delimitation between Canada and the United States in the Beaufort Sea will not directly impact areas within Nunavut. While many of the Canadian Arctic sovereignty issues extend beyond Nunavut territorial limits, this brief discussion will focus on the Nunavut scenario, and on the Nunavut perspective. It will outline the issues very broadly, and avoid speculation on the eventual terms of resolution.

The Canadian Arctic issue presently having greatest prominence is the extended continental shelf. In 2003, Canada ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereafter referred to by the consensus, if somewhat inelegant, acronym "UNCLOS"). Of the four other nations having Arctic Ocean coastline, three others: Russia; Denmark/ Greenland; and Norway, have also ratified. Only the United States has not, but it is generally expected that it will. UNCLOS allocates rights for the purpose of exploration for and exploitation of natural resources, without restricting global freedom of sea and air navigation--that is, navigation without specific national regulation. It permits submission of a claim within ten years of ratification (thus, for Canada, by 2013), to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, for extension of the continental shelf beyond the normal 200-mile limit. At stake are enormous areas of seabed with hydrocarbon and other resource potential, becoming increasingly more accessible because of the accelerating shrinkage of the polar ice cap. Sea floor geological data are critical to the claims, which must be premised on the areas claimed being extensions of national landmasses.

Russia submitted a claim in 2001, and Norway in 2006. Canada responded to the former claim, but not to the latter. There is a possibility of the eventual Canadian claim overlapping the Russian claim; and, to a much lesser degree, that of Denmark/Greenland. Canada, Russia and Denmark/Greenland are presently conducting sea floor geological research. Of primary interest is the Lomonosov Ridge, an undersea mountain range thought to extend approximately 2,000 kilometres, from a point north of Ellesmere Island/Greenland, across the Arctic Ocean to the vicinity of the Siberian coast. If the Ridge is established to be an extension of the North American continent, it could be the basis of a claim extending beyond the North Pole, to the Eurasian side. The same set of considerations might apply to the Russian position, if the Ridge is established to be attached to the Russian landmass. The prospects of Nunavut-based scientific activity, followed by exploration/exploitation initiatives, and the creation of the necessary support infrastructure, are apparent, as is the immediacy of the timelines: the UNCLOS claim deadline; the accelerating trend of ice cap retreat; and ever more urgent demand for additional hydrocarbon resources.

Of only slightly less urgency than the continental shelf issue is that of the status of the various potential sea navigation routes included under the Northwest Passage label. In recent years, the ramifications of activities in and over the area for North American security have attained an ever more prominent profile. Canada asserts the right to a high degree of control of such activities. The broad consensus is, from both the practical and strategic perspectives, that an extensive ramping-up of Canadian activities and capabilities is essential. These include:

* installation of procedures and the related physical infrastructure for comprehensive monitoring of all navigational activity;

* a significant increase in Canadian maritime capability (military and non-military) both in terms of vessels and harbour facilities;

* the development of extensive navigation safety and search-and-rescue capacity;

* intensive environmental monitoring/protection structures; and

* broad-based utilization of Inuit knowledge and skills in ongoing physical patrol and assessment, both land and sea-based.

Again, it appears the timelines are extremely tight, and the imperatives compelling. The implications for a jurisdiction encompassing an enormous area (20 percent of Canada's land mass), roughly two-thirds of its coastline, and immediately adjacent to vast sea areas either subject to Canadian sovereignty or the subject of specific national interests, but having presently only approximately 30,000 residents, are enormous, and, to a considerable extent, not yet fully quantified.

While not a sovereignty issue, constant environmental monitoring, including, most prominently, constant scrutiny of the reduction of the Arctic ice masses, is of profound and immediate significance for the entire planet. While a considerable amount of study by, and cooperation among "Arctic nations" has occurred, it will be dwarfed by the extent of the scientific activity going forward. Again, Nunavut will necessarily be the physical base for much of the ongoing Canadian initiative. Infrastructural bases for Canadian activities will, in reaction to changing climatic conditions, progressively advance northerly. Again, the demand for Nunavut-based resources, staffing, and, in particular, Inuit skills specific to the Arctic environment, will increase enormously. Cooperative international efforts will expose Nunavut to widespread international influences. The cultural influences, in both directions, and the changes in the ways in which Northerners perceive themselves, will be widespread.

The unfolding of events in the Arctic will likely have a greater impact on Canada's future than any other issue or set of circumstances. Inevitably, there will be an accelerating level of activity and development, far exceeding anything envisaged even a decade ago.

As I recall, on my arrival in Nunavut in October 2002, there was a school of thought that it was conceivable that, by 2050, there might be as much of a couple of months' annual navigational capability through one or another Northwest Passage route. Not ice-free or untroubled, mind, just the physical possibility if there were sufficient motivation. In other quarters, this notion was derided. In neither camp was there any expectation that the Passage would have a high degree of commercial or strategic navigational significance. Clearly, things have changed.

Nunavut, which has seen so much dramatic change in a few decades, will undergo yet another transformation. The outlines of the new manifestation are not readily made out, although it can confidently be predicted that it will occur soon, and with breathtaking speed. Because of the very rapid changes in northern circumstances, it is likely that Inuit environment-specific skills, critical to the survival of a people, but not properly recognized in the past, will re-attain their former prominence and again become widely respected and appreciated. Throughout the Arctic, the capacity for adaptation of seemingly infinitely resilient people will again be demonstrated. Similarly, the Canadian Arctic will complete its transformation from afterthought to centre stage.

Nunavut is just ten years old as a discrete political entity, and thus is still establishing its place in Canada. Now, the irresistible tide of events--momentous, epochal events--will require it and its people to combine that process, one ordinarily evolving over generations, with adapting to the most profound of changes in the physical and global-political environments. The course of those changes is largely unknown, but the changes are certain to be breathtakingly rapid. It will be quite a ride.

Brian Lannan has worked in various sectors of Nunavut land administration since 2002.