Arab-Israeli Negotiations Vs Confrontation: Hizbollah's Wrong Message.

*** It All Boils Down To Only One Peace Deal This Year: It Will Be Either For Arafat Or For Assad

*** The Situation Is Extremely Delicate For All, Including Hizbollah Which May Fall Into A Trap The Syrians Don't Like But They May Have No Alternative

*** The Palestinians Could Have Shot Themselves In The Foot By Insisting On 'All Or No Deal'

*** For Barak, A Golan Deal Is Less Deadly

NICOSIA - According to Hizbollah, the message from Israel's retreat out of the "security zone" it occupied in south Lebanon is clear: the Jewish state only understands the language of force, and the only way to recover Arab lands occupied by the Jews is through force. Hizbollah expects its success in pushing out the Israelis to become a rallying call to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, who are now being offered more than 80% of their territories by Israel as part of a final settlement.

However, senior Western and Arab diplomats in the region have told APS that such an interpretation of Hizbollah's success would be a mistake. With internal politics in Israel apparently in turmoil, they agree that there may be a temptation among some Palestinian factions to apply the Hizbollah's tactics. Indeed, if Syria adapts a similar viewpoint for the Golan Heights, south Lebanon could once again become a hot zone - with Palestinian guerrillas (instead of Hizbollah fighters) active against northern Israel. But the diplomats pointed out several reasons why Hizbollah's generalisation is wrong, as follows:

1. While south Lebanon was a "buffer" for Israel, that is not the case with either the West Bank or the Golan Heights, with the latter having been annexed. Unlike south Lebanon, both the West Bank and the Golan contain Jewish settlements, thus affecting internal political complexities in Israel to a degree that the retreat from south Lebanon did not. Equally important, the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon has eased the international pressure on Israel to deliver something in terms of the peace process. Israel's decision to move out of Lebanon was seen in a highly positive light by global public opinion. This gives the Israelis much more room for manoeuvre against the Syrians and greater flexibility in dealing with the Palestinians.

The decision to pull Israeli troops out of Lebanon was a highly popular one domestically for Israeli Premier Ehud Barak, no doubt because of the casualty rate caused by Hizbollah but also because most Israelis felt they were "occupiers" and therefore morally wrong. Opinion polls have estimated that some 75% of the Israeli people supported the withdrawal. By contrast, despite the bomb blasts carried out by Hamas within Israel itself in recent years there has been no similar popular drive for a total retreat from the West Bank. In fact, there is strong resistance to ceding territory to the Palestinians. For the Israelis, psychologically, the West Bank and the Golan are completely different than south Lebanon.

2. Following the Israeli retreat from Lebanon, the ground situation has changed. The level and intensity of pressure on Israel to deliver new results on the peace front has declined. With Hizbollah no longer able to justify attacks on northern Israel, the peace initiative has shifted to Barak. Having delivered what appears so far to be a peaceful northern Israeli border, Barak can choose whom he will deal with next - i.e. either Syrian President Hafez Al Assad or Palestinian President Yasser Arafat. His choice will be vital, because (a) it will satisfy the US if either one of the Syrian or Palestinian tracks generate positive results, and (b) whoever Barak chooses not to deal with will be the loser because the next US president will take some time to settle down.

A deal with Syria, provided Damascus agrees to take back the Golan with the Hama lake-Galilee shoreline exchange, would be clean and relatively easy to implement. By comparison, a deal with the Palestinians involves the question of Jerusalem on which neither side has yet shown any inclination to compromise. There is also the issue of the Jewish settlements, the nature of the final settlement, etc. A deal with Syria could face problems as well, because Barak had pledged to hold a referendum to get public approval for a withdrawal from the Golan. Judging by the latest political developments in Israel that may prove tricky. The Knesset's vote on June 7 in favour of a bill calling for early elections indicated Barak's coalition partners' dissatisfaction with his aloof style of leadership. The bill has to face three more readings, and Barak may succeed in pacifying his coalition members, but it would not allow him much time to negotiate with either Syria or the Palestinians. For their part, the Assad and Arafat may prefer to wait out the horse-trading by the Israeli parties.

3. Assad was unprepared for Barak's tactics. Syria did not expect Israel to fulfill its pledge to pull out of Lebanon unilaterally, and it did not expect the Israelis to go out so quickly. The move, typical of Barak who had a reputation as a somewhat unconventional tactician in the military, effectively removed the pressure lever in Syrian hands, i.e. the Hizbollah. Syria faces a tough choice: allow the Palestinian groups in south Lebanon to attack across the northern Israeli frontier or to let peace prevail on the border. Assad seems to have chosen the latter for two reasons.

First it demonstrates to the Israelis that they could have peace if they return occupied lands. Secondly, Barak has promised massive retaliation for any attack on Israel. This could mean humiliation for 35,000 Syrian troops based in Lebanon, and perhaps for military or infrastructure targets in Syria itself. The Syrian military is in no position to combat a lightning Israeli air assault. Apart from seriously damaging Assad's prospects for a positive legacy, Damascus knows that in such a scenario hardliners in Israel and the US would seek to turn Syria into another Iraq. Assad is also well aware that Syria cannot afford such a confrontation at a time of internal changes, with Bashar seeking to establish his authority through the anti-corruption campaign, among other things. The campaign has already targeted high ranking figures, with former premier Mahmoud Al Zohbi having committed suicide after he got a police summons on May 21. On June 6, there were reports that former chief of armed forces Gen. Hikmat Al Shahabi may also face charges.

4. The Palestinians are in a very weak position. Arafat cannot allow Hizbollah tactics in areas under his control because it would undermine all the gambles he has taken since the peace conference in Madrid in 1991. The Palestinian Authority (PA) is already seen as being corrupt and unpopular among the people in the West Bank. Hamas is biding its time to make its political moves. A power struggle is underway within the PLO leadership for succession to Arafat, whose physical condition is poor. If violence breaks out in the Palestinian territories in this environment, the outcome is unpredictable. What is clear is that such violence will not persuade Israel to change its claim to Jerusalem, the central issue in the negotiations.

In reality, Arafat has few options at present except to depend upon the goodwill of the US to push the Israelis to give the best deal possible. By June 8, Palestinian negotiators had rejected the latest proposals put forward by Barak. They said that the Palestinian state as envisaged by Israel amounts to a "Bantustan", i.e. a non-contiguous patchwork of territories on the West Bank interspersed by Jewish settlements and roads under at least the partial control of Israel. Yet if the Palestinians stick to their positions, Barak may choose to make a deal with Assad in the coming months. Arafat's position will then be even weaker than it is now.