Apropos of preparation and buildup of mobilization manpower resources.

Improving the preparation and buildup of mobilization manpower resources in the Russian Federation is emerging as one of the crucial present-day problems in the state and defense organizational development. This is due to the specifics of Russia's geostrategic and geopolitical status, its huge size and long borders, as well as the growth of migration processes among the population and an unfavorable demographic situation forecasted for the coming years. In addition, the military reform calls for a drastic reorganization of the arrangement that governs the preparation and buildup of mobilization manpower resources. It is also necessary to draw up some new approaches to mobilization's organization and conduct.

Quite logically, reductions in the army and the navy, accompanied by a conversion to the enlistment system, will entail greater amounts of preparation and buildup of militarily trained resources. Under the new circumstances, the former methods, which we used to deal with the task, grow unacceptable. This calls for a revision of a number of fundamental precepts in the mobilization work. Currently there is a clear discrepancy between the necessity of peacetime preparation and buildup of a militarily trained reserve resource on the one hand and the State's limited capabilities in providing the finance and materiel for the process, on the other.

Studies point to a potential reduction in the militarily trained reserve resource numbers in connection with the cuts in the strength level of troops (forces) and accordingly of the drafted enlisted ranks and NCO personnel as conversion gets underway to manning the enlisted ranks and NCO positions with volunteers (enlistees). At the same time, the Armed Forces are the main center for preparation and buildup of militarily trained resources, handling as they do the overwhelming majority of mobilization manpower resources.

Consequently, the planned transition to the voluntary manpower acquisition mode will lead to a dramatic decline in militarily trained resource numbers that join the reserves. In the transitional period, therefore, as we see it, a growing importance attaches to a well-balanced system of military professional training, regular classes and active duty training stints for reservists, which maintain the required strength level and quality of militarily trained manpower resources. Some currently employed measures are meant to improve the active duty training stints for reservists, but so far these are limited in scope and insufficient.

Of course, this country saw in the past similar periods of radical strength reductions, which nevertheless caused no substantial damage to Armed Forces mobilization readiness. For example, the 1924-1925 military reform reduced the army and navy strength tenfold. It introduced the mixed cadre-territorial organizational structure of the Armed Forces, which made it possible to have a small cadre army at a lower cost and to rapidly mobilize major forces in case of war. That called for organizing in the country mass-scale military training for the population subject to military service obligation in order to create a sufficient amount of militarily trained reserve resource. All technical combat arms, rifle combined units in border and partially inner districts, as well as artillery units remained on the cadre basis. Divisions deployed in the inner districts enjoyed reduced strength levels or were brought to strength on the territorial principle and had permanent (command, administrative and services, medical, etc.) and temporary personnel, the latter brought for annual short-term active duty training stints.

The territorial organization enabled purposeful and systematic training of reservists in concrete military occupational specialties within units. It also helped to considerably cut the time needed for deployment and readying of units and combined units for combat. Its big drawback was that the territorial units did not have the equipment that the cadre units had, for which reason the personnel had to learn how to handle it within brief intervals in the course of mobilization deployment. But on the whole this organization saved a lot of funds in the prewar years and raised a multi-million army and navy in wartime.

Some foreign States later used and improved this country's experience in preparing and building up a militarily trained resource. For example, a number of world countries have peacetime armed forces reserves (reserve components) * maintaining a sufficiently high level of combat and mobilization readiness, which helps efficient preparation and buildup of the militarily trained resource.

An analysis of the relationship between the strength level of the reserve and the regular forces (K1) and the percentage ratio of mobilization manpower resources (the regular forces, the reserve, men fit for military service) to the population numbers in any country (K2) will enable certain general conclusions about approaches to dealing with the militarily trained reserves buildup problem.

First, most countries possess considerable mobilization manpower resources that ensure deployment of multi-million armed forces if threatened with a large-scale war.

Second, a high K1 (>1) indicator is mostly characteristic of developed States and, depending on the degree of influence of internal and external factors, is in the range from 1.16 to 3.30. For example, in such enlistment-practicing States as the U.S. and U.K. the K1 equals 1.16 and 1.48, respectively. In Germany with its mixed draft-enlistment manpower acquisition system the K1 = 1.21. France, which pursues a relatively independent military policy, has the highest indicator: K1 = 3.3. Israel (where both the armed forces and the reserves are draft-based) is not a member of military blocs, and, for reason of its geopolitical specifics, has K1 = 2.5. Italy and Turkey, both of which rely on the draft as their manpower acquisition method for the armed forces and the reserves and which are NATO members, have K1 at 1.81 and 1.89, respectively. States like Canada and Japan, by virtue of their geopolitical peculiarities, have K1<1.

Third, in peacetime developed States give priority to the reserves, which have a vast numerical edge over the regular troops (forces).

Fourth, the share of expenses on the upkeep of the personnel of the regular forces and the reserves in the overall amount of military spending (as illustrated by the example of the U.S.A.) has diminished considerably. Standing at 37% of all military expenditures in the 1970s, the sum declined to 26% in the 1990s. Thus, it may be stated that the policy to reduce the regular forces in the developed states has entailed a shrinking of the financial expenditures linked with a transition from the mixed to the voluntary manpower acquisition mode and the creation of a specialized reserve training system enabling rapid deployment on the basis of a mobilization plan. For example, at the start of regional military conflicts (local wars) the reserves make it possible to boost the armed forces strength in the range from 2.2 (U.S.A.) to 4.4 (France) times. The relationship between the regular forces and the reserves is determined by such factors as a State's geopolitical characteristics, the availability of manpower resources, the population's material and educational levels, and others.

Fifth, the K2 value for a number of developing and developed countries is in the range from 12.1% (Iraq) to 22.8% (Canada), and its mean value is 17%. The biggest coefficient is in the developed countries (upwards of 21% on average). A high K2 indicator meets armed forces manpower needs in a mobilization. For example, thanks to the reserves and a powerful web of training centers, the U.S. armed forces strength can be increased, toward the end of the first mobilization year, by 4.6 times in the Land Forces, 2.5 times in the Air Force, and 2 times in the Navy. Germany has mobilization manpower resources for as many as 100 new divisions. The U.K., due to its reserves and manpower resources, is able to bring to strength a multi-million army with its available mobilization deployment personnel.

Sixth, developed States strictly conform to juridical norms and laws that ban the use of untrained reserves in combat operations and therefore pay much attention to improving their reserve training systems. With this aim in view they envisage: a steady increase in the number of various mobilization measures with participation of militarily trained organized reserve units; annual short-term active duty training stints for members of the individual combat-ready reserve, who were never before recruited for any type of peacetime compulsory military training. The NATO leadership is highly concerned with the training of reserves, which helps in a speedier conversion of the armed forces from the peacetime to war status. A powerful network of training centers is either available or get deployed to cater to the rest of the mobilization resources that are not with reserve components of any kind, providing military training in large-scale military conflicts.

Methodological Foundations of Organizing for Mobilization Preparation and Buildup of Militarily Trained Resources

The military reform in progress in this country has been instrumental in the appearance of a practically new legislative framework related to mobilization preparation and mobilization. At the present time, mobilization preparation and buildup of militarily trained resource in the Russian Federation are organized and pursued under the Federal Laws "On Defense," "On Mobilization Preparation and Mobilization," and "On Military Service Obligation and Military Service." These form the methodological basis of military organizational development and serve to improve and organize preparation and buildup of militarily trained resources. They are also the crucial legislative acts that determine the entire system, its legal, organizational and financial mechanisms, conceptual tenets, and structural principles and foundations.

The totality of all practical assignments and measures associated with the organization and pursuance of a mobilization in the Russian Federation and a mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces forms the methodological basis for this country's mobilization and its mobilization preparation. "Mobilization preparation in the Russian Federation shall mean a complex of peacetime measures designed to prepare in due time the economy of the Russian Federation, the economies of the Subjects of the Russian Federation, and the economies of the municipal entities, to prepare the bodies of State power, of local self-government, and organizations, to prepare the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military units, bodies, and special units created in wartime in accordance with the Federal Law 'On Defense' for ensuring the defense of the State from an armed attack and for satisfying the State's needs and the population's requirements in wartime." (1)

Preparation and buildup of militarily trained resources is one of the principal points in mobilization preparation. The methodological foundations of this process include the following: a legislative framework, principles, content, and a system for preparation and buildup of militarily trained resources. The legislative framework of preparation and buildup of militarily trained manpower resources includes all laws of the Russian Federation, which determine the organizational and practical measures in mobilization preparation and mobilization on the national scale. The main principles in mobilization preparation and buildup of militarily trained resources are: centralized leadership; doing things in good time; planned character and control; complex nature and coordination. The content of mobilization preparation comprises the following: the legislative foundations and normative and legal regulation; scientific and methodological support; organization of military registration within bodies of State power and local self-government; training (additional training, retraining) in military occupational specialties; a system of inactive duty training; the financing of mobilization preparation and buildup of militarily trained reserves; military-patriotic indoctrination.

Training of militarily trained resources in military occupational specialties takes place: within public associations and organizations; at primary and secondary professional educational establishments; during active military service and inactive duty training periods.

The system for buildup of militarily trained resources includes the following: forecasting of the demographic situation on the national scale and in the regions; organization of military registration; planning of the amounts and designation of mobilization manpower resources in order to meet in full the mobilization requirements of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; forecasting of losses of mobilization manpower resources during the mobilization period and at the early stage in a war.

It is a task of State importance to improve the performance of the legislative and executive authorities, military command and control agencies, as well as organizations and enterprises in preparing and building up militarily trained resources for a possible mobilization in the face of a threat to national security. At the initial stage the main ways of doing the job are these: scientific investigation of problems connected with mobilization preparation and mobilization in the Russian Federation; mapping out of practical measures intended to bring the national mobilization readiness in conformity with the military-political and military-strategic situation; improvement and further elaboration of the methodological and conceptual framework.

Proposals on a Prospective System for Preparation and Buildup of Militarily Trained Resources

The geostrategic, military-political and socioeconomic conditions shaping Russia's modern-day status are behind the urgent need for a totally new approach to preparation and buildup of mobilization manpower resources. * The term covers definite strata and groups of the population intended to ensure the mobilization military plans and the mobilization plans of all components of the national economy, different industries and agricultural segments. The strength of military and labor mobilization manpower resources is determined by the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Labor of the Russian Federation, which coordinate their work with the relevant federal executive authorities. In this context, the labor mobilization manpower resources are created (in keeping with the Federal Law "On Mobilization Preparation and Mobilization in the Russian Federation," other federal laws, and enactments issued by the President and the RF Government) by way of exempting from military service, in the mobilization period and in wartime, reservists employed by the bodies of State power and local self-governments, enterprises and various organizations.

In special cases, on the strength of the RF President's decision, the General Staff may use previously exempt labor mobilization manpower resources for military purposes in order to form new military units and replace casualties sustained in the course of protracted combat operations. But in so doing it must see that all branch sectors continue functioning and meet the needs of the front and the civilian population.

As is evident from the history of 20th-century wars, the armed forces personnel strength that participated in hostilities tended to grow steadily. During WWI and WWII its maximum size (in million persons) was: 8.2 and 9.6 respectively in Germany; 3.7 and 12.2 respectively in the United States; 9.9 in Russia (1914-1917) and 11.4 in the USSR (1941-1945). Huge mobilization manpower resources became needed for armed forces deployment and replacement of casualties. The embattled States had to call to arms from 12% to 20% of their populations.

In our time and age the need for mass armies and advance preparation of major mobilization resources perseveres as a general regularity. In this connection we are concerned with problems related to the provision of manpower resources exclusively for this country's military mobilization needs in case of a war, and to the implementation of military-strategic plans of its defense security.

As we see it, the military mobilization manpower resource (see Fig.) is part of the population which can be recruited for military service in keeping with the legislation now in effect in order to meet the Armed Forces' wartime mobilization plan requirements at the start of a war and to replace casualties in its course. The military mobilization manpower resource (MMMR) is a crucial component of the State's military potential. It has a direct effect on military organizational development and determines the quantitative and qualitative composition of troops (forces). It is also behind the capability to reinforce the armed forces through mobilization. In the Russian Federation, MMMR means the population that is in the military service or on the military registration boards' records.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

The RF AF Reserve is a part of the military mobilization manpower resource, which includes citizens who have signed contracts with the RF Defense Ministry for military service in the Reserve on the voluntary basis. The contract terms provide that civilians combine their main job with service in military units of the RF AF Reserve for money remuneration and also that they are given certain benefits (free secondary specialized and higher education, medical care, transport costs reductions, longer holidays, etc.). Forming RF AF Reserve units will make it possible to considerably reduce the time for their deployment and transportation to border support areas and for action in emergencies.

As we see it, the RF AF Reserves form part of the military mobilization manpower resources and are intended for deployment and bringing to strength of military units in accordance with mobilization plans and for replacement of casualties incurred in the course of military (combat) operations. It makes sense to subdivide the Reserves into the organized reserves and the general (individual) reserves.

The organized reserves may include citizens, who went through military training in a specialty and have been put on the establishment of (assigned to) reserve-status military units. The personnel of reserve units are subjected to systematic military specialized training in accordance with mobilization plans. Assigned to the genera1 (individual) reserves are citizens who have no military occupational specialty nor are on the establishment of reserve-status units, but who must be mobilized if the need arises to form new military strategic units, combined units and units or will be used as replacements for casualties sustained in the course of military (combat) operations.

Along with the traditional forming methods applied to the RF AF Reserve and the Reserves there is a necessity of looking for more promising and effective approaches to the definition of the modern structure of mobilization manpower resources, their buildup and preparation. A most important element in the reform of the existing system is using different forms of manpower acquisition for the RF AF Reserve and the Reserves--enlistment (voluntary), mixed, and draft. The task calls for large-scale in-depth scientific investigations in order to work out the most effective methods of buildup of militarily trained resources. The need to ensure Russia's military security urgently necessitates a study of the problem of transition to voluntary and mixed modes of manpower acquisition for military units of the RF AF Reserve. This will enable a differentiated approach to the selection of personnel for those units in accordance with their operational and combat designation. As is obvious, the better the RF AF Reserve military units are manned with enlistees, the higher their mobilization and combat readiness. These enlistee units may be deployed on a short notice and sent to cover the country's borders, or to "hotspots" to aid the regulars.

Manpower acquisition for RF AF Reserve military units should start with identification and selection of individuals wishing to enlist for them. The requirements placed on the volunteers, the terms and the obligations of the sides, as reflected in contracts, are determined by the normative legal instruments. Contract-based voluntary service with RF AF Reserve units implies certain material and social benefits. The foreign practice of having more civilian personnel from among reservists in Reserve units merits notice: this category can be called up under mobilization deployment plans and used, for example, in signals, engineer and motor transport units, as well as in maintenance, rear services and medical support elements.

The territorial principle of manpower acquisition for the Reserve opens up opportunities for corresponding military professional training. Thus, it becomes vitally important to actively assert and expand this principle, which will make it possible: to pursue purposeful selection of citizens for service with RF AF Reserve units; to cut down the time they need to deploy and become combat-ready; to improve the system of training (retraining) of militarily trained reserves and of combat teamwork training.

As is evident from practice and investigations into the training of militarily trained manpower resources, maintaining the needed state of training and equipment handling skills requires well-organized drills (lasting not less than 8 hours) with the use of training equipment and stores, held once a month at the least. Reservists enlisting for military service should have training exercises no less than one time a week; inactive duty training (exercises) should be for two or three weeks each year.

Quite logically, it is necessary, against the background of reductions in the army and the navy, to maintain the corresponding strength level of the RF AF Reserve by Services (Component Services) of the Armed Forces, Combat Arms and Special Forces. This can be done: first, by transferring the units (ships) and combined units to be reduced to the RF AF Reserve. These must be manned with permanent (officers and warrant officers, who sign contracts for the Reserve, as well as civilian personnel in charge of the daily routine) and assigned personnel from among reservists recruited on the territorial principle. Second, in order to provide military professional training (additional training, retraining) to mobilization manpower resources, we can and must, as the present writers see it, use reduction-slated military educational establishments, training centers, units and combined units, which are in possession of abundant training equipment and stores, good training grounds, and highly skilled personnel.

Thus, against the background of strength reductions in troops (forces), introducing the mixed manpower acquisition method for the RF AF Reserve and expanding the territorial principle by application to manpower acquisition and military professional upgrading of the personnel at its units and combined units will make it possible to maintain these at the needed rated strength level and in a state of combat readiness.

The opponents of the suggested methods of manpower acquisition for the RF AF Reserve and the RF AF Reserves explain their position primarily by the high cost of this transition. But the case in point is Russia's security, which emerges as the priority, given the army and naval reductions and the immense length of the State border: by saving something on security we may lose everything. In addition, we think it is in any event cheaper to keep a mobilization reserve on the contractual basis than cadre military units.

We believe it is expedient to make a transition to the prospective system of preparation and buildup of militarily trained reserves in three stages: preparatory, executive, and final.

The preparatory stage draws up the concept of and a draft federal target program for a prospective system of preparation and buildup of military mobilization manpower resources, which will ensure the guaranteed (complete and high-quality) bringing to wartime strength level of all components of the RF military organization in conditions of the transition to voluntary enlistment, as well as replacement of casualties sustained in operations of the early period in a war (armed conflict). For this it is necessary: to identify requirements of troops (forces) and the capabilities of the federal executive authorities as to the delivery of planned mobilization manpower resources in line with the degrees of combat readiness of troops (forces); to specify the list of training and reserve combined units and units, establishments of higher professional education, public organizations affiliated with the Russian Defense Sports and Technical Organization (ROSTO), the numbers (codes) of military occupational specialties and military positions, in which reservists (both in the Reserve and the Reserves) may be trained, as well as the availability and potential of the training equipment and stores (facilities) that could be used to train mobilization manpower resources in peacetime and in a period of threat; to monitor nationally on the annual basis the numbers of individuals willing to sign contracts with the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense for service with RF AF Reserve units; to work out principles of acquiring mobilization manpower resources for different types of reserves, ways and methods of their creation and use in peacetime, in a mobilization period, and in wartime; to determine the periodicity, duration and procedure of training of mobilization manpower resources that form elements of different types of reserves and are intended for bringing to strength combined units and units in accordance with upkeep categories and degrees of combat readiness; to determine foundations of a planning and control system that will govern preparation and buildup of mobilization manpower resources in the new conditions, the structure of agencies that will control their preparation and buildup, their functional tasks and the tasks of agencies to be recruited to prepare militarily trained resources; to develop methodologies and criteria for professional and psychological selection of reservists who will sign contracts with the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense for military service obligation; to calculate the financial and economic costs of transition to a new system of preparation and buildup of mobilization manpower resources and costs of its functioning; to accomplish the necessary investigations and experiments; to introduce changes (amendments) to the existing Federal Laws "On Defense," "On Military Service Obligation and Military Service," "On the Status of Servicemen," as well as to the Code of Labor Laws of the Russian Federation, to draft a new federal law "On the Reserve of the Russian Federation."

The executive stage is intended for an analysis and verification of scientific and practical results of experiments on preparation and buildup of mobilization manpower resources; organization of support from the State budget for measures to create a mobilization reserve (reserves) and to realize guarantees and benefits encouraging reservists to sign contracts for service with RF AF Reserve units. At this stage it makes sense: to specify amounts, periodicity, duration and procedure of preparation of mobilization manpower resources that form elements of the different types of reserves and are intended for bringing to strength combined units and units in accordance with upkeep categories and degrees of combat readiness, as well as financial and economic costs needed for the functioning of the new system of preparation and buildup of mobilization manpower resources; to develop a planning and control system to be put in charge of preparation and buildup of mobilization manpower resources and to get down to an overhaul of the former structure, including the organizations enlisted to prepare militarily trained resources; to start a stage-by-stage introduction of the new system of preparation and buildup of mobilization manpower resources; to analyze the state of readiness for full-scale introduction of the new system of preparation and buildup of mobilization manpower resources.

At the final stage it is necessary: to finalize introduction of the new system of preparation and buildup of mobilization manpower resources; to analyze results of the transition to that system and draw up recommendations for its further upgrading. Importantly, the new system of preparation and buildup of mobilization manpower resources must be based on an updated legal framework. The domestic and foreign experience of military organizational development convincingly demonstrates that State-run military reforms, including ones involving cuts in the armed forces strength, require radical changes in preparation and buildup of military mobilization manpower resources. If for objective, mostly economic, reasons the latter cannot be put into practice within the next few years, scientific investigations into this problem should be pursued on a wide scale, comprehensively and as a priority. The State and primarily its military agency must have a clear idea of prospects for dealing in practice with this long overdue problem.

* Reserves (reserve components) are peacetime military units and trained contingents (or those in course of training) intended for rapid mobilization and deployment in wartime, in a national emergency, as well as in any other national security situations.

* Manpower resources means population engaged in public production or military service, as well as manpower contingents, which may be additionally recruited to reinforce the armed forces or branches of the economy or to man civil defense units.

NOTE:

(1.) Federal Law "O mobilizatsionnoi podgotovke i mobilizatsii v Rossiiskoi Federatsii."

Maj. Gen. V.F. FEDOROV (Ret.)

Candidate of Historical Sciences

Maj. Gen. A. V. POGORELOV

Col. O.Yu. KOBYZEV

Col. V.A. BAIBORODIN