Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace: An Insider's Account of the Peace Process.

By Paul Hare

Published by the United States Institute for Peace

Reviewed by Julius O. Ihonvbere, The Ford Foundation, New York 

It is true that African States continue to suffer from the legacy of colonialism and neocolonialism. Nowhere is this better demonstrated than in Angola. Over 500 years of Portuguese colonialism left the country backward, underdeveloped and structurally distorted and disarticulated. Portuguese departure following the military victory of the Movimento Popular para a Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) in 1976 did not terminate the influence of Portugal in Angolan affairs. Worse still, the victory of the leftist-leaning party drew opposition to the new regime from most Western Powers, in particular the United States. This was evidenced more clearly in the United States' support for Jonas Savimbi's rebel opposition to the post-colonial government. Ironically, though the United States continued to buy Angola's oil, it also provided military and other forms of support to the rebels to make the country ungovernable, disrupt economic activities and possibly bring down the Government.

Paul Hare's book deals essentially with the peace efforts in Angola since 1994, beginning with the Lusaka Protocol. The focus is less on African and more on international, especially UN-brokered, initiatives. For Mr. Hare, the opportunities provided in the post-1994 situation represented the "last best chance for peace". In nine captivating chapters, he explores the issues, history, institutions, local, regional and international actors, and the dynamics of the peace process in Angola. He highlights the roles played by the United States, the United Nations Secretary-General and some African States like Zambia and South Africa in trying to keep the difficult process alive and on track. In what is dearly an objective rendition of the politics of peace negotiation, Mr. Hare critically evaluates the contributions and miscalculations of the respective actors, including the United Nations and the United States, as well as the Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) rebels and the Angolan Government. Many of these miscalculations endangered the negotiating process. Three issues stood out clearly in the book: first, the unwavering commitment of the UN Secretary-General to the peace process even if this was hampered by bureaucracy.

Second, the United States and the United Nations support for the legitimate government, especially after the 1996 elections, as evidenced in the insistence that the rebels had to make most of the concessions. Third, the often ignored extent of Savimbi's power and control, though the peace process steadily eroded his influence, control and support from the West.

The book fails in three major respects. First, its treatment of Angola's history and its impact and implications on stability, conflicts and relations with the outside world is rather brief and leaves out too much. Second, the book is silent on other civil society, especially community-based actors in the Angolan struggle. The author leaves the impression that only Governments, political leaders and international organizations were involved in the quest for peace. Finally, the author writes as if the Organization of African Unity (OAU) does not exist. Either in terms of the OAU's weaknesses and limited power or in terms of its overall southern Africa project, the United States' late intervention in the peace process cannot suddenly overshadow African concerns and contributions to peace in Angola.

In spite of the few above-mentioned shortcomings, I enthusiastically recommend Paul Hare's book to readers who will find it invaluable in understanding the dynamics of Angolan politics, the nature of power struggles, the alignment and realignment of political forces, the contributions of external interests, and the continuing impediments to the peace process.