America Has Changed.

The attacks of Sept. 11 were the worst attack against America since Pearl Harbour. In many ways it was worse, since it involved a deliberate targeting of civilians. The US was not prepared for such a strike. After the cold war, it has been basking in its role as the sole super-power, concerned primarily with the possibility of a limited attack against its interests by "rogue states". It never anticipated such a devastating attack, both symbolically and in terms of human lives, on its economic nerve centre by a terrorist group, operating from a territory controlled by a medieval-minded clique of radical Islamists.

After the initial shock, however, the US was quick to recover. It immediately identified the perpetrators, defined the parameters within which the war against terrorism would be conducted, and began its attacks within about a month of the WTC/Pentagon attacks. President George Bush put the American perspective on the war in a blunt fashion, saying that those who are not with the US were with the terrorists. This claim, while rejected by several countries as being impossible to accept, nevertheless persuaded those who may have considered extending verbal support to Bin Ladin not to do so.

The US showed a tremendous amount of flexibility, both diplomatic and military, in dealing with the threat represented by Al Qaida and other radical Islamist networks. It quietly reached out to Iran, and Tehran responded with a similar subtlety and strategic vision. This is one reason why Iran no longer figures in the rhetoric of hardline officials in the US as among those countries who may face American wrath in Phase Two of the war against terror. The US also strengthened and expanded defence and intelligence co-operation with Russia in a way that few would have expected before Sept. 11.

On the military side, the US stuck to its by now tested technique of overwhelming air bombardment to crush any obvious defences and kill as many Taliban as possible. But, in parallel, it also sent in Special Forces and Special Operations units - both from the military and from the CIA - to work alongside the opposition Northern Alliance in eliminating pockets of resistance or for other activities. The level of flexibility in this sphere was reflected by the fact that, at one point, US Special Forces apparently participated in a cavalry charge against the Taliban - something that American forces have not done for much of the 20th century, let alone the 21st.

More importantly, perhaps, the US has exploded the myth that it was not willing to put its soldiers in harm's way. This was, and continues to be, one of the basic beliefs of Islamist terror formations - that the US would not be prepared to sacrifice its own soldiers in a cause. What they failed to calculate was the possibility that the US would do so if its own territory were attacked. At present, US Special Forces and special operations capable Marines are present all over Afghanistan - and they may not leave for some time to come. Moreover, the strength of US forces in the region as a whole has increased - with deployments in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan, as well as naval deployments - and they too may not leave in the foreseeable future. In other words, Bin Ladin has achieved exactly the opposite of what he wanted: instead of getting the US out of Saudi Arabia, he has succeeded in bringing far more American forces into the Greater Middle East.

The implications for the Arab World are quite drastic. Observers believe regimes in the area have not yet fully understood the nature of the change that has taken place in the US. But one has only to read the US press and watch the television channels to understand that the way in which the average American now sees the Islamic World in general, and the Middle East in particular, has changed dramatically. While the perceptions of the region were never positive to begin with, increasingly the countries in the area are being seen as hotbeds of terrorism - be that allies such as Saudi Arabia or enemies such as Iraq.

For the allies of the US, the implications are ominous. It will certainly mean greater American scrutiny of the way the regimes rule, what their schools teach, the economic policies they follow, the transparency of their finances, etc. It will almost certainly also mean increased American pressure to change their political systems, expand democratisation, allow freedom of the media and take other measures to make them more open societies.

For those countries in the Middle East that are not allies of the US, i.e. those opposed the US bombing of Afghanistan - including Syria, to some extent Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Libya, etc. - the implications are more drastic than pressure for democratisation. They may well become primary targets of the American war machine once the war against the Taliban and Al Qaida comes to a close. The next phase could well begin with a targeting of Iraq. The diplomatic groundwork is being laid carefully. Washington is demanding that Baghdad accept the return of UN inspectors or face the consequences. Iraq has refused. There is not much support for the Iraqi position in the Security Council, because no one wants to go against Washington at this point - although the US methods are not appreciated either (see News Service No. 25).