America's costliest fleet of lemons.

Senator John Glenn (Democrat-Ohio) is probing the truth about America's costliest fleet of lemons. Reacting to a Congressional Budget Office report that suggested the Air Force lied about the capabilities of the B-1B bomber, Senator Glenn is finally acknowledging what many in the bomber community have known for years: the B-1B is a dud that has added far more to the bottom lines of defense contractors than it will ever add to the bottom line of national defense. It is the type of bounteous expenditure that was forgiven at the height of the Cold War but that now begs to become infrastructure, child immunizations, job training, or any of a thousand other points of blight in desperate need of funding. It is precisely the type of excess defense spending that millions of Americans hope their military's new commander-in-chief will have the backbone to eliminate.

Congress has frequently paid to tape the broken bomber. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, the Senate's Committee on Armed Services, in considering funding options for bomber modernization, noted that the committee "could accept the familiar Air Force assurances that the B-1B ECM (electronic countermeasures) problems are |solved,' and that all that is required is for the Congress to provide the necessary funds. The committee, and the Congress, have twice before gone down that road, to our regret."

Black Boxes and Greenbacks

The BIB bomber has never worked as it was intended. Its electronic countermeasures package, dubbed the ALQ-161, is the collection of secret, super-high-tech equipment designed--supposedly--to recognize and counter enemy air defense threats and permit the aircraft to penetrate defended targets. In its initial configuration, it was to have had the capability to recognize and respond to 50 distinct air defense threats. Despite contractor promises and expensive bench-tests, the system proved unreliable when placed on the B-1B airframe. For in, stance, antenna locations resulted in jammers defeating each other rather than the intended threat signal. Moreover, when the system detected more threats than it could process or a threat that it did not anticipate, the whole defensive system could shut down at a time when it was needed most.

The Air Force modified the system, but the modification (ALQ-161A) again failed to function reliably. The ECM system was so poor that, during Strategic Air Command's 1989 bombing competition, some BIB defensive systems operators were reduced to simulating electronic countermeasures by calling in over the radio "JAM, JAM, JAM" when they detected competition threat signals--signals that should have been automatically countered by the B-1B's sophisticated ECM systems. Not surprisingly, a B-52 bomber unit walked away with the electronic countermeasures trophy.

The Air Force then abandoned the 50-threat capability for a system that would cover only the top 11 air defense threats based on a nuclear penetration mission. Test results of the new configuration, called CORE ECM, were published in March 1992 and showed that the CORE system failed three of the five logistics criteria established by the Air Force before testing was begun and that it "did not achieve, nor was it designed to achieve, an effective and suitable program when compared to all B-1B defensive avionics system (DAS) requirements."

Translation: $4 billion dollars later, the B-1B's electronic countermeasures package still does not work as advertised. According to the November 1992 Journal of Electronic Defense: "The B-1B ECM upgrade has created a veritable feeding frenzy within the EW (electronic warfare) industry community. Many industry insiders view the program as the last major EW con, tract for some time" Lockheed, ITT, Raytheon, and a host of other defense contractors relish the chance to land huge con, tracts "fixing" the most marginal of bombing platforms.

The B-1B has other problems besides unreliable ECM. Its engines periodically ground the entire fleet--most notably during most of Desert Storm. Its conventional-weapons arsenal is a dismal one-liner: Mk 82 (500,pound) unguided iron bombs. By comparison, the B-52 fleet can carry virtually any of a dozen or more conventional munitions--guided or unguided. The B-1B suffers from devicing problems, a dubious time-share relation, ship between its offensive and defensive computers, fuel capacity problems that place a fuel cell in a bomb bay instead of bombs, and an air-refueling envelope at maximum gross weight that is so low planners have to be concerned about mountain ranges near refueling tracks.

"Desert Stateside"

The glaring absence of any B-1B presence during Desert Storm underscores the perceived ineptness of this expensive weapons system. In the crucial first days of the war, when it was politically and militarily essential that US. forces demonstrate decisive combat results, top U.S. commanders tapped B-52 bombers--not B-1B bombers--to fly nighttime, treetop penetrations against deep, defended Iraqi targets. Even after the U.S. forces established virtual unopposed air superiority, to the point where B-52s carried out their devastating bombardment campaign in daylight and at high altitude, the Air Force did not field even one B-1B attack--not one. In fact, B-1B units did not even relocate to the forward area in anticipation of any use. The absence of the B-1B in an air campaign as extensive (and one-sided) as Desert Storm raises the question of the air, craft's combat readiness and its ability to support national objectives in a conventional crisis.

Ironically, the Air Force continues to defend the B-1B. In its Bomber Roadmap published in June 1992, the Air Force exhorts a mystical logic that thrusts the B-1B from its current position as a fleet of flying lemons to the centerpiece of America's conventional bomber force. The road to this miraculous transformation is paved with billions of taxpayer dollars, a point illustrated by comments like "After completion of an improvement program on its electronic countermeasures equipment" and "enhancements to the B-1 will complete its transition from a nuclear focused system to a more versatile bomber"

America must fund weapons systems that perform in combat--not in airshows. It will take years and untold billions of dollars to get the BIB system to a level that is just on par with its ancient but effective counterpart, the B-52. For in, stance, the B-52 has been carrying 2,000-pound conventional weapons for decades; it can and has carried almost every type of sea mine and has demonstrated the ability to carry precision standoff weapons like the Israeli Have Nap or American SLAM. Years after its fanfare introduction, the B-1B still isn't cleared to release any 2,000-pound munitions, is not authorized to release even one sea mine, and has no capability to deliver Have Nap or SLAM. It would appear grossly misleading to assert, as the Air Force does, that the "B-1B is a superior airframe that will guarantee leading-edge performance well past the turn of the century." Its record suggests that the only thing the B-1B guarantees past the turn of the century is an endless string of defense contracts.

Reality-Check

B-52s have been the backbone of America's heavy bombardment fleet for over 30 years. They are a proven, flexible weapons system that has developed a fearsome reputation on the battlefield, not the pages of contractor brochures. For a fraction of the cost of the proposed B-1B "enhancements," the current fleet of B-52s could be modified to carry America past the year 2000--to a time when we might more easily afford to acquire more B-2 airframes or examine possible new alter, natives.

The B-1B should be the first major weapons system the Air Force eliminates in reaching the desperately needed defense cuts proposed by President Clinton. World events have dramatically diminished the nuclear scenarios for which the B-1B was envisioned. The lack of any substantive nuclear role and its inferior conventional posture argue convincingly that mothballing all 96 B-1B's immediately would save taxpayers billions of dollars while not reducing our war readiness one iota. The reality of our time is that America needs to fix its economy, its infrastructure, its health-care system, its schools--not a fleet of BIB bombers.

President Clinton has asked us all, in the interest of protecting the nation's domestic strength, to drink from the cup of sacrifice. He has asked the military to drink twice. The B-1B is a bottomless pit into which the American taxpayers have poured hundreds of billions of dollars and for which they have received shamefully little.

The men and women who fly and maintain the B-1B fleet are brave, proud professionals who deserve our utmost respect. It would be a grievous injustice to associate the inadequacies of the aircraft with the dedication, commitment, and sacrifice of those assigned to B-1B duty. The national debate must be on what tools to provide these competent warriors and whether or not their talents are most effectively utilized in a weapons system bought on promises. In truth, the New World Order demands a more intelligent strength than the old--a focused, cost-effective strength that can answer the call to battle, not the call to airshows.

Before Rockwell delivered the last of its scheduled 100 BIB airframes, it offered the Air Force a deal on additional B-1B's at a substantially reduced cost. The Air Force's curt rejection of that offer was echoed by a senior official testifying before Congress. Asked the reason why the Air Force was not interested in more B-1B bombers, it is rumored that the official replied: "Sir, 100 fucking lemons is enough " With all the challenges facing the country today, it's 100 too many.

C. James Novak is a freelance writer based in New York. His work on military topics has appeared in Newsweek and has been syndicated by the New York Times. He is a veteran with close ties to the bomber community.