Ambitions & Achievements.

After 9/11, as the US plans to target terrorism emanating from the Greater Middle East started to crystallise, officials began to indicate in private comments as well as via think-tank analyses, newspaper columns, etc. that the ultimate objective of the campaign against terror would be to eliminate terrorism by changing the fundamental nature of regimes in the Middle East. It was suggested that one of the central reasons for the breeding of terrorism was the "freedom deficit" in the area stretching from Morocco to Pakistan, and also in some south-east Asian countries. It was suggested that terrorism would only be ended after the Middle East was re-ordered in such a way that democracy would prevail alongside a moderate Islamic society.

The grand ambition behind this vision was compared to that which existed in the US in the immediate aftermath of World War II, when the Marshall Plan was introduced in West Europe to change the political and economic behaviour of the region. Simultaneously, 9/11 was compared to Pearl Harbour, the attack by Japan on the US navy in Hawaii, which got the Americans directly involved in World War II. Indeed, some officials in the US have encouraged discussion of such parallels, alongside numerous discussions and warnings of regime change in the Middle East. This set the stage for the invasion and occupation of both Afghanistan in late 2001 and Iraq in April-May 2003.

However, the vision of a new Middle East in which democracy is the rule rather than the exception and in which radical Islam has no appeal does not appear likely to materialise in the foreseeable future. There are socio-cultural challenges in the region which the US and its allies did not have to face in West Europe after World War II. There is also the fact that democracy as such is considered an alien concept in the Middle East, whereas in post-World War Europe it was part of the historical and cultural heritage. Nevertheless, observers agree that US could well succeed in its objectives if successive administrations demonstrate the staying power needed to push through the agenda for a new Middle East.

It has already succeeded on several counts, particularly if the focus is kept on the big picture. First, and perhaps most importantly from the American standpoint, the terrorist groups are either on the run or have become very circumspect in their behaviour towards the US - be that Al Qaida or its ideological allies throughout the greater Middle East. A large number of groups have been put on the terrorist list of the US, giving the countries in which they operate a virtual free hand to deal with these groups in a tough way - without much criticism from the US government. On the contrary, the US has taken advantage of the legal flexibilities in these countries to interrogate prisoners using methods it cannot apply on US territory.

In Afghanistan it has succeeded in getting rid of the Taliban, and although the movement is beginning to revive on the border areas with Pakistan, it is in no position to return - unless the US abandons its commitment to Afghanistan, something it is not likely to do. In August, in an important indicator of US intentions, command of military operations in Afghanistan was transferred to NATO from the existing UN-mandated force. The implication is clear: the US is not going to leave Afghanistan any time soon, and it has no intention of letting the Taliban return. It is important also to note that the situation on the ground has been improving gradually in Afghanistan, especially in the capital and in immediately surrounding areas. Education is gradually beginning to normalise, with schools reopening and girls being permitted to attend classes. Small businesses are beginning to flourish and life for Afghanis is slowly beginning to return. Large scale fighting, of the sort that has plagued this country for over two decades, has ended for the most part. US operations still continue, but these are limited mainly to relatively remote areas.

In Iraq, the ouster of Saddam was welcomed widely by the Iraqi people. Regardless of what complaints ordinary Iraqis may have about the American presence in the country, the vast majority is happy that the Baathist regime has been crushed. Indeed, part of the antipathy towards the US can be explained by the fact that, so long as Saddam himself remains free, Iraqis will have a nagging fear that he may return and are therefore hedging their bets. But their confidence has been boosted by the elimination of Saddam's sons Uday and Qusay as well as many other figures closely linked to him. In northern Iraq, the situation is extremely positive, with the region enjoying unparalleled autonomy and a higher degree of prosperity than it has seen in decades. In the south, the Shiite majority is for the first time able to perform their religious rites without fear of being targeted by Saddam's secret police. As the majority community in the country, the Shiites are also poised to play the dominant role in any future democratically chosen ruling superstructure. For the Shiites, none of this was conceivable under the Baathist regime