Ambassador Razali suggests 24-member Security Council: 10 permanent, 14 non-permanent members.

These are excerpts from the statement on 20 March of General Assembly President Razali Ismail, in his capacity as Chairman of the open-ended working group on the question of equitable representation on and increase in membership of the Security Council:

This proposal is drawn from the many diverse and comprehensive views that have been expressed by delegations for over three years now, as well as from statements made in the General Assembly and from the various papers presented to this working group. I have proposed an increase of membership in the Security Council from 15 to 24 by adding 5 permanent and 4 non-permanent members. No names are mentioned in my proposal. The five new permanent and four non-permanent members will be elected according to the pattern that I have described in operative paragraph 1:

* Five permanent members: one each from the developing States of Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, and two from the industrialized States; and

* Four non-permanent members: one each from African States, Asian States, Eastern Europe States, and Latin American and Caribbean States.

In my proposal, all aspirants are expected to declare their readiness to assume the responsibilities of permanent membership to the General Assembly. No one State will become a new permanent member unless another four in the pattern I have described also obtain the required majority of at least two thirds of votes in the Assembly. The fate of any one is therefore inextricably linked to the fate of the others, thus preventing a so-called quick fix. This, in my view, is the most democratic means of expansion in the permanent category.

Some Member States have expressed concern at the size of expansion of the Security Council, claiming that once a certain threshold number has been reached, the Council's ability to work efficiently or expeditiously ceases to exist. It is my view that the work of the Council can only be enhanced with an increase in both categories, not only because fresh perspectives are brought to Council deliberations and broader alliances created in decision-making, but also because such an expansion will strengthen the effectiveness and authority of the Council in maintaining peace and security in a rapidly changing and increasingly unstable world.

Of equal importance is the consideration that an expansion of nine will also increase the chances of the smaller developing countries to participate as members in the Security Council. It is also necessary to point out that out of an expansion of nine, six will come from the developing world, three of which will be permanent members.

My proposal decides to urge the original permanent members to limit use of the veto to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and not to extend provision of the veto to new permanent members.

I believe that such a linkage would be a first concrete step towards making the application of veto on matters outside of the maintenance of international peace and security by the original permanent members progressively and politically untenable. This proposal also bears in mind the harsh reality that members of the General Assembly cannot restrict the use of the veto by the permanent members, as this would require Charter amendments, which in themselves are subject to the concurring votes of permanent members of the Council.

Some will, of course, say that I am proposing a subcategory of permanent membership with discrimination between the original and the new permanent members. So be it. However, as sustained and virtually universal condemnation has been expressed against the veto, I find it inconsistent and unacceptable, both logically and morally, to extend such a power to new permanent members of the Security Council. To do so would be to compound an inequity. The incoming five new permanent members are different: they are elected and have not inherited their powers or their membership as a result of 1945.

It is my belief that concepts of the functions and responsibilities of permanent membership of the Council must begin to evolve so that it is decoupled from or no longer equated with the possession of the veto power.

My paper proposes a series of steps to be taken within a suggested timeframe. I would like to point out that I have asked:

Step 1: A framework decision voted on in the working group or the General Assembly between June and September.

Step 2: By end of February 1998, countries who are interested in becoming permanent members, five or more, will come to the General Assembly for endorsement by two-thirds majority. It is necessary to underline that all five must be elected at the same time - fates inextricably linked.

Step 3: Amendments to the United Nations Charter will be adopted by a General Assembly resolution a week later. Ratification and entry into force of amendments are only possible with two-thirds majority, including the five permanent members' ratification.

I have proposed that 10 years after the entry into force, a review conference will be held to review the situation created by the entry into force of the amendments to the Charter.

On working methods, the paper elaborates measures the Assembly would urge the Council to undertake to enhance transparency and to strengthen the support and understanding of Council decisions by the whole membership of the Organization. These include:

* Institutionalize regular monthly consultations between the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, together with the Chairs of the Main Committees of the Assembly and members of the Council;

* Encourage consultations between members of the Security Council and the countries most affected by a decision of the Council;

* Institutionalize a system of consultations during the decision-making process on the establishment, conduct and termination of peacekeeping operations in order to strengthen the measures outlined in the presidential statement of the Security Council dated 28 March 1996;

* Institutionalize the practice of giving opportunity to concerned States and organizations to present their views during closed meetings of the Sanctions Committees on issues arising from implementation of sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council;

* Clarify what constitutes a procedural matter as reflected in Article 27(2) of the Charter;

* Make greater use of the International Court of Justice by seeking its advisory opinion consistent with Article 96(1) of the Charter.