Algerian Islamists' conception of democracy.

INTRODUCTION

The religious question in any Arab/Islamic society should always be examined from a sociological perspective. In essence, this means that one should not consider religion as an independent variable, but should study it as a social phenomenon. The focus, therefore, ought to be on the "believers themselves: on their attitudes and conceptions; the roles and practices they assume; the rituals and symbols designed to express their beliefs and counterbeliefs."(1) Similar to the study of any other religion, it would be a useless exercise to attempt to determine the compatibility, or lack thereof, between Islam and democracy although, from a Qur'anic point of view, there is no intrinsic irreconcilability between the two. Muslims throughout the world have interpreted the Qur'an to support many different types of political behavior and systems of government. Even though the Qur'an does not contain any direct support for democracy, it does, however, embrace at least some form of 'democracy' articulated in a statement that reveals that "which is with God is better and more lasting: for those . . . who [conduct] their affairs by mutual Consultation [shura.]"(2) Clearly, like in any other religion, what makes Islam incompatible with democracy is not the religion in itself, but the interpretation given to it by individuals who seek to divinize politics, thus allowing only those who follow the 'true path' to participate in the contest for power.(3)

When treating the question of Islam and democracy in Algeria, one should also underline the disparate views emanating from the various dissimilar individuals and groups that comprise the Islamist movement. The socio-economic context, backgrounds and outlooks play an important role in the way they think about democratic values and political issues.

The other observation to be made in analyzing Algeria, and most Arab/Islamic societies for that matter, is that both the regimes and their Islamist oppositions have appropriated the religious discourse and symbols as instruments of mobilization and control, i.e., of legitimization and power preservation, or as a mechanism of agitation to overthrow and/or de-legitimize the existing order or adversary. In Algeria, both these processes have been a common occurrence. Their objective was not the establishment of a democratic order, but the monopoly of political power.

THE STATE AND ISLAM IN ALGERIA 

In order to build a modern identity/society and to gain legitimacy, the successive authoritarian regimes in Algeria aspired to integrate what they described as a modern type of Islam into revolutionary perspectives. Thus, Islam, understood in its modernized/progressive form and decreed religion of the state in all the Constitutions (1963, 1976, 1989), was seen as the foundation of the identity of the Algerian citizens, whereas the role of the State consisted in not only permitting the citizens to have access to the material benefits of the modern world (work, education, commodities, etc.), but also to promote Islamic principles and morality, through the erection of mosques, the teaching of the Arabic language, and the creation of religious institutions. Yet, Islam was accorded an influential role only insofar as it endorsed the authoritarian regime's propagation(4) of an Islamic socialism. In other words, the country's leadership decided to incorporate Islam, again in its so called modernistic/progressive version, as an essential element of the ideological and political apparatus of the regime in an attempt to build a modern nation-state through a developmentalist strategy. In this context, Islam, as a system of values, and modernity, or a set of rational principles, would coexist in a model defined by a French sociologist as laicite islamique (Islamic secularism).(5) In addition, Islam played an ever greater role with respect to the legitimacy of the successive regimes since independence. Islam was used not only as an instrument of national integration in an ethnically heterogeneous society, but also as a tool of political legitimization. Indeed, the irreversible character attributed to Islam in the different Constitutions inevitably paved the way to various interpretations, for, if some elites saw Islam as a religion open to modernity, others viewed it through a traditionalist prism, thus giving it the most conservative definition. This explains why the conservative forces, within the regime itself, used a certain interpretation of Islam as a force against the policies expounded by the state in the socio-economic and cultural fields. Faced with an ideological struggle within the structures of power between 'progressives' and Islamists, the state could not but seek a balance between two irreconcilable visions, contenting itself with the exclusion of the most extremists among them so that it could preserve national unity and to depict itself as an indispensable arbitrator.(6) Yet, despite their dissimilar views, neither group debated the issue of democracy in any systematic way. The conservatives criticized it from a moralistic point of view, whereas the progressives gave it a quasi Leninist interpretation that in practice denied its existence. The main reason was to be found in the stratification of Algerian society due to the economic transformations brought about by the process of development.

Even though the considerable growth of the radical Islamist movement in Algeria is a relatively recent phenomenon, Islamist groups have challenged the regime at various degrees and periods since the country's independence in 1962.(7) The first association, Al-Qiyam al-Islamiyya (Islamic values), was founded in 1963 and became official in 1964. The organization's inarticulate aversion to Ben Bella's (Algeria's first president) socialist policies and to some secular aspects of the policies adopted by the single-party mobilized a few religious figures that included Abbassi Madani, future leader of the Islamic Salvation Front [FIS] in the late 1980s. The most influential figure of the association, however, was the maverick Malek Bennabi, an outstanding, but often ignored, Islamic thinker. Because of his original and at times ambiguous views, it is not clear how much impact he had on the direction of al-Qiyam. What is certain is that he had a certain degree of influence among the early, French-educated Islamists who attended the University of Algiers in the 1960s and early 1970s, until his death in 1973.(8) His ideas appeared in a review in the French language, "Que sais-je de l'Islam?" (What do I know about Islam?), whose popularity went well beyond the premises of the University of Algiers, on whose grounds the mosque founded in 1968 attracted the most educated Islamists, especially physical scientists.(9) Malek Bennabi's views can best be described as gradualist and even intellectualist, which explains their minimal influence among the more radical Islamists of the 1980s and 1990s who evolved in a period of social marginalization and socio-economic hardship. As will be discussed later in this article, Bennabi's views on the relationship between Islam and democracy were not in fact expounded until the publication of his pamphlet in the late 1980s, without however having much of an impact except among some Islamist and non-Islamist intellectuals.

In addition to its opposition to socialism, al-Qiyam demanded the full implementation of Islamic Law (Shari'a). The association called on the State to close stores during Friday prayer (a demand satisfied in 1976 by the Houari Boumediene regime), to ban the selling of alcohol, to exclude non-Muslims from public jobs, to create separate beaches for men and women, to introduce religious teaching in schools - which it obtained in 1964 - and to inhibit women's participation in sport events, and parades celebrating national holidays.(10) This 'cultural' association, perhaps reflecting its tenacious rejection of Ben Bella's flirtation with communist and secular groups, declared in its publication in French, Humanisme musulman, that "any political party, any regime, or any leader that is not inspired by Islam, is dangerous and must therefore be banned. Any communist, secular, Marxist-socialist, or nationalist party (the latter putting in jeopardy the unity of the Arab world) cannot exist in the land of Islam."(11) It is difficult to establish the socio-economic backgrounds of the supporters of the association. Yet, one can safely assert that it appealed greatly to the merchants and landowners throughout the country who were bitterly opposed to both Ben Bella and his successor, Houari Boumediene.

Al-Qiyam association, whose leader acknowledged his affiliation with Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Shakib Arslan, Hassan Al- Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Al-Ghazali and Abu 'ala Al-Mawdudi,(12) was disbanded in 1966. The Algerian regime banned the association and its main publication, Majallat al-ta'dhib al-islamiy (Review of Muslim Education),(13) because of the diplomatic strain it was likely to cause in Algerian-Egyptian relations,(14) but also because the Algerian regime never tolerated any form of contestation regardless of the level of the threat it represented to its rule.(15) Yet, this association did not disappear before performing the important task of paving the way for future Islamist organizations in the country.(16) Further, the final dissolution of the religious association in 1970 did not mean that its members left the political scene. Quite the contrary, they remained anchored within the system, thus exerting pressure to extract concessions from the state on moral, socio-economic (e.g., opposition to socialist policies; pushing for a family law based on Shari'a, etc.), and cultural issues (acceleration of the teaching of the Arabic language, increase of religious programs on television, etc.).(17) In fact, the same year the association was dissolved, the state, through the minister of religious affairs, Mouloud Kassim, launched its own campaign to prevent the alleged degradation of morals. The minister denounced the loosening of mores, alcoholism, and the attraction that the West exerted on some Algerians.(18)

The association Al-Qiyam was in no way unique in using Islam as a form of resistance to the regime. A traditional current linked to the Jamaat al 'Ulema, successor of the pre-independence 'reformist' association founded in 1931 by Ibn Badis, and close to al-Qiyam, expressed on several occasions its opposition to government policies and what it perceived as the Westernization - read secularization - of Algerian society and the degeneration of Islamic values. One of the most bitter attacks against Boumediene's socialist policies and the supposed dissolution of morals in Algeria came from one of the forefathers of Algerian Islamism, the Imam Abdellatif Soltani.

In a book he published in Morocco in 1974, entitled Al-Mazdaqiya hiya 'Asl al-Ishtiraqiya" (Mazdaqism is the source of socialism),(19) considered as the manifesto of Algerian Islamism at the time, the imam criticized socialism as a foreign ideology incompatible with Islam, a religion that does not prohibit private ownership. In his view, although Islam is a doctrine of social justice, it has no relationship with the state's conception of Muslim socialism.(20) Sheikh Soltani also attacked the atheism that resulted from the secular teaching provided in the public schools. The book also included a severe diatribe against an Algerian feminist, Fadela Merabet, and against a Berber novelist, Kateb Yassine. Both were accused of spreading lies about Islam; the imam went as far as disputing the "Algerianity" of the two individuals.(21) He saw the Shari'a as the solution to all the problems faced by society, a perspective that is prevalent today among most Islamist factions. The regime was forced to reckon with the demands formulated by these Islamists by giving in on certain religious issues, such as the outlawing in 1976 of gambling and the promulgation of Friday as the Muslim Sabbath.

Another group of Algerian Islamists was made up of the Arabic teachers who were educated in Middle Eastern universities. The best representative is probably Mahfoud Nahnah, leader of the non-violent Islamist association, Al-Irshad wa al-Islah (Orientation and Reform), which gave birth in 1990 to a political party, Harakat al-Mujtama' al-Islami, known under the acronym HAMAS. Nahnah belongs to the larger Da'wa wa al-tabligh, linked to the Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brothers). This group waged a bitter ideological struggle against Boumediene's regime - Nahnah having been imprisoned from 1976-1980 for his participation in such acts. Although its leader resorted to acts of sabotage in the 1970s because of his opposition to the 1976 National Charter's leftist orientation, Nahnah's association and party have held a moderate discourse (reference to human rights, non-violence, work for women, etc.). Nahnah's disciples endeavor to re-Islamize Algerian society through persuasion and only reluctantly did they organize themselves as a political party in 1990.(22) In the 1970s, the followers of this movement chose the linguistic issue, as well as the family question (woman's rights, divorce, inheritance), as their battle-ground.(23) The linguistic subject had a utilitarian value, for the Arabic-trained students felt that their education was inadequate because it offered little job prospects, and that the French-educated groups enjoyed better employment opportunities. Thus, their emphasis on the importance of Arab-Islamic values was motivated primarily by socio-economic considerations. In other words, the Arabic-trained cadres had less opportunities for social mobility than their French-educated counterparts. As to the family question, subject since Algeria's independence of bitter conflicts between secular and religious groups, it has remained much more complex and will in all certainty be an even more sensitive topic during a period of chaotic economic liberalization characterized by high unemployment. As is well-known, the FIS promised that when it came to power, it would keep women at home in order to resolve the problem of unemployment in the country.

MALEK BENNABI'S "DEMOCRACY IN ISLAM": ISLAMIC THINKING VERSUS ISLAMISM

As indicated earlier, Malek Bennabi's influence on the Islamist movement was limited. The views of this extraordinary thinker on the compatibility of Islam and democracy demonstrate that he was an Islamic thinker rather than an Islamist concerned with the seizure of power. His views also highlight the differences that exist between the various figures of Algerian Islamism and underscore the radicalization the movement took under different socio-economic circumstances since the late 1970s. Bennabi's thought evolved in a more prosperous Algeria; therefore, his concerns concentrated on psychological and cultural issues pertinent to development. Although he dealt with economic issues, Bennabi rejected what he called "economism," which in his view had become the new obsession of Arab/Islamic societies at the expense of civilizational, i.e., cultural values. It must be pointed out, however, that Bennabi did not reject socialism as a path for development in the Third World. His writings in the 1960s, reproduced in Pour Changer l'Algerie, reveal that he was a nationalist who shared much of President Houari Boumediene's revolutionary perspective. As an illustration for such an assertion one can point out to Bennabi's reaction to the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Whereas the June war is often viewed as marking the end of Arab nationalism and the start of radical Islamism, Bennabi thought that the solidarity shown by the Arabs and their mobilization during the conflict and its aftermath ought to be exploited to strengthen Arab unity. It goes without saying though that in order to confront what he perceived as imperialist and Zionist challenges, Bennabi believed that it was imperative that Arabs cling to their identity and to their Islamic values if they wished to overcome their military and technological inferiority.

With respect to democracy, Bennabi's approach revealed the incredible level of culture he possessed. His deep knowledge of Islam and of Western concepts and values allowed him to treat the subject of democracy without any complex or any a priori prejudice, unlike some of today's Islamists who see democracy simply as a Western, thus alien, import. Bennabi looks at democracy from three perspectives: 1) "as a feeling toward one's self; 2) as a feeling toward others; 3) as a cluster of social and political conditions necessary for the formulation and the blossoming of similar feelings in the individual."(24) He perceives democracy as the result of a humanistic cultural development. He insists that democracy is not merely the transmission of power to the masses or to a sovereign people by virtue of a constitution. It is the development of sentiments, reflexes, and criteria that make up the foundations of democracy in the consciousness of a people and its traditions,(25) i.e., what some scholars today would define as elements of 'civility.'(26) In other words, before a democratic constitution is written, it must be preceded by a process of democratization. The process of democratization requires, according to Bennabi, that anti-democratic feelings and despotic tendencies be eliminated.(27)

The problematic that he raises is to determine whether Islam can foster the three perspectives he posited, i.e., whether "Islam can augment the sentiment toward one's self and toward others, one that is compatible with the foundation of democracy within the individual's psychology and whether it can create social conditions that are favorable to the preservation and development of the democratic sentiment as well as its efficaciousness."(28) Bennabi rejects any democratic enterprise that consists of borrowing certain principles from foreign democratic constitutions without measures undertaken to instill them in the psychology of the people that borrow them.(29) The conclusion Bennabi draws from this remark is that "if there exists a democratic tradition in Islam, it ought not to be sought in the letter of a constitutional text, but rather in the spirit of Islam in general."(30) Islam must, therefore, be considered as the initiation of a process of democratization, that is, the advance of the individual and the society to which he/she belongs toward the democratic ideal.(31) What distinguishes Islam from any other democratic type (French, Russian, Chinese), according to Bennabi, is that this religion confers upon man a value that transcends any political or social value. Whereas other democratic interpretations see in man the presence of humanity and society, the Islamic democratic conception recognizes in man the presence of God. In other words, the first explanation is of the secular type, whereas the second is of the sacred category.(32)

According to Bennabi, human beings who carry the honor of God within themselves feel that honor not only within themselves but in others, as well. This is enough to neutralize any negative sentiments human beings may have vis-a-vis themselves or vis-a-vis their fellowmen. Further, God has provided the Muslims with safeguards that prevent them from falling into slavery or from developing despotic tendencies. It is interesting that Bennabi cites a verse of the Qur'an which encourages a Muslim to emigrate rather than submit to slavery(33) or to take up arms against the oppressor.

Islamic democracy, then, is characterized first and foremost by the humans' immunization against anti-democratic tendencies: the bestowing of political rights and social guarantees derive from this evaluation. Bennabi argues that, in opposition to Islamic democracy, secular democracy confers upon humans rights and guarantees, but does not save them from being crushed under the weight of cartels, trusts or by the dictatorship of a class. Secular democracy, in other words, does not purge from society the evils that produce slavery or despotism.(34)

Bennabi's conception of democracy is not limited to the political sphere, but extends to the social as well, because, in his view, "an order which bestows upon man a ballot and allows him to starve is not a democratic order."(35) Bennabi then sets out to demonstrate the respect of individual freedoms in Islam. Unlike today's Islamists, Bennabi takes from the Qur'an the verses that come closest to modern days individual freedoms, such as the right to work and to travel; he argues that freedom of speech is guaranteed in Islam and that the Prophet Mohammed himself encouraged his companions to dispute his decisions.(36) The privacy of the home, says he, is also guaranteed by the verse in the Qur'an which prohibits entry into a home without the permission of its inhabitants. The only limitation he sees corresponds to Western public law's regarding the public domain where individual right submits to society's right.

What is perhaps more important in his work on democracy is his discussion on the rights of minorities. The example he gives in the text concerns a Jewish woman whose house could not be taken under Omar's rule despite the fact that a mosque was to be built on the same land. The argument was that the Jewish woman could not consider a mosque as part of the public domain; therefore, Muslim authorities were impelled to allow her house to coexist aside the mosque.

Even more interesting throughout Bennabi's discussion is his unrelenting rational interpretation of the Qur'anic verses and of the Hadiths [Prophet's sayings]. This approach allows him to view Islam as a religion that embodies all the marks of a political democracy where the principle of consultation is present, but also one that "provides the individual with responsibility in the constitution of power and all the guarantees against its abusive usage."(37)

Bennabi is critical of Western democracies because, in his opinion, they do not contain social rights, since one can become a slave to powerful interests; he is also critical of the former Eastern bloc because it granted social rights to the citizens but at the expense of political freedom. Thus, Islam, in his eyes, provides true democracy, for it constitutes a synthesis between political democracy and social democracy. Malek Bennabi believes that the Zakat (the giving of mandatory alms) is a good example of Islam's social legislation posited by the Qur'an. The communication that he believes prevailed between rulers and ruled in the time of the first Caliphs is proof that there existed a "democratic consciousness shaped by Islam."(38) But, the real basis of democracy remains human beings and the value that is conferred upon them by God. The influence of the Enlightenment period on Bennabi's thinking is unmistakable, as demonstrated by his references to the works of some French Philosophes throughout his book.

Bennabi thought that Islamic democracy existed at its best during the first Caliphs. Regression occurred when power became absolute, but also when Muslim democratic thinking disappeared from the moral order in the behavior of the individual. Islamic democratization ended "when it lost its foundation in the psychology of the individual, as soon as the latter lost definitively the appreciation of his own worth and the value of others."(39) From this point onward, Islamic civilization ceased to exist because it no longer rested on the excellence of the individual. Bennabi thought that the re-emergence of the democratic spirit had begun in some Islamic countries. However, he felt that the democratization process would only succeed when this new change has occurred within the individual's own conscience so that he or she was above both the despot and the slave. He was convinced that "only Islam could undertake this re-evaluation in the countries where social tradition has been shaped by the Qur'anic notion."(40)

Bennabi's self-proclaimed disciple, Nourredine Boukrouh, founder of the Parti du Renouveau Algerien (1989) and editor of some of his works argues that two groups emerged from those who attended Bennabi's lectures: the rationalists, whom he identifies with the Mutazilites, and those opposed to this type of rational thinking, such as Mahfoud Nahnah, the Haddam brothers (Anwar and Lahbabi), Mohammed Boudjelkha, and Mustapha Brahimi (who eventually became members of the Islamic Salvation Front [FIS] when it was founded in 1989).(41)

THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT

Before dealing with this question, a brief background to the socio-economic context which helped the emergence of radical Islamism, incarnated by the FIS, is indispensable. Radical Islamism in Algeria can best be described as a catalyst of contestation. Although there exist other reasons for its rise, the movement was primarily the product of the failure of authoritarian developmentalist policies adopted by successive regimes after the country's independence in 1962. Regardless of its many achievements, Algeria's modernization programs ended in failure due to the widespread corruption, injustice, arbitrary rule, nepotism and clientelism which characterized the one-party political system. The movement emerged in the early 1980s in a context of increasingly severe economic crises (inflation, huge international debt, unemployment, etc.). The flagrant marginalization of large segments of society, especially among the youth, coupled with the impoverishment of the middle classes and the pauperization of the popular masses, resulted in the loss of legitimacy for the state and its elites. Further, the so-called liberal economic reforms introduced by the regime aggravated the already dire socio-economic conditions of the majority of Algerians. Clearly, in the late 1980s, the fragility of the Algerian state was unmistakable; its weakness was demonstrated by the forceful new opposition to the single party rule by a multitude of social groups, especially radical Islamist organizations. The Islamic Salvation Front, created in March 1989, following the political liberalization introduced by the regime after the October 1988 riots, succeeded in channeling a leaderless protest movement into a contending political force. Due to the nature of the Algerian state and to the weakness of the democratic social forces, the FIS cultivated a hegemonic, highly ideologized discourse, reminiscent of the one used by the single ruling party, FLN. The FIS's leaders were able to manipulate this discourse to combat their foes, especially the secular forces and moderate Islamist groups that resisted the party's hegemonic ambitions and its social project. Because of its populist nature and its composition, the FIS sought to achieve uncontested power. In order to fulfill this goal, the party endeavored to impose its own interpretation of Islam and to politicize the sacred to preclude all form of opposition. The rationale for such a strategy for the conquest of power derives from the "unanimism" [love for unanimity] characteristic of Algerian modern history and from the FIS's attempt to emulate the wartime FLN to mobilize society around a political discourse that proved successful in the past.

Although there is some continuity between Islahism (reformism of the salafiyia movement) and Islamism in Algeria, the differences are much greater. Islahism was essentially reformist, intellectualist, and non-violent. The movement was led by Ulemas whose patrician social backgrounds differed considerably from those of the plebeians that make up the bulk of the radical Islamist wave today. Whereas Islahism rallies relatively small groups of religious scholars concerned with the moral values of their societies and intent on reforming them, Islamism is a social phenomenon resulting from modernity. Even if the movement seeks a return to the Shari'a, it is not interested in a return to an archaic past. Rather, Islamism is a revolutionary movement, at least at its initial stages (i.e., before turning into mere "neofundamentalism"), that strives to reappropriate society and modern technology through political means, i.e., seizing power in order to reislamize a society allegedly corrupted by Western values.(42) The movement is, therefore, not theological, but essentially sociological. There ensues, at least for important sections of Islamism, an ideologization of Islam, whereby "'Islam' is not only a system of religious beliefs, but also a set of principles which should guide the general organization of the community."(43)

The difficulty in studying the Islamist movement in Algeria, especially its revolutionary component incarnated by the FIS, stems from its composite membership and structures. Indeed, since its creation until its ban in March 1992, the FIS comprised a variety of groups and ideological currents. The heterogeneous leadership of the FIS, combining radicalized salafists and new activist militants,(44) never really agreed on the means to achieve power - their principal preoccupation - in order to establish a vaguely defined Islamist state. The aspirations of the different groups included in the FIS diverged greatly. Some upheld a millenarian vision in which recourse to violence is an intrinsic part and whose major aim is the dismantling of the nation-State as it currently exists; for others, the objective is limited to a mere substitution of the Islamist elite for the one in charge of the State which is perceived as having failed in both its modernizing tasks and in preserving Islamic values. Still others have no clear strategy whatsoever beyond nihility. What is certain, however, is that the main objective is the appropriation of the State by legal (i.e., electoral) means for some or through violence for others. This explains the contradictory statements concerning the necessity or refusal of participating in the electoral process.

Despite the heterogeneous nature of the main Islamist party in Algeria, a dominant ideological discourse did, however, emerge regarding important political and social issues. One must insist, though, that because of the ideologization of Islam which has inevitably shifted the core of the debate from theological concerns to norms and values of the socio-political domain, the core beliefs of Islam have either retrograded or been entirely cloaked.(45)

The main commentaries concentrate on the 'evils' that have plagued modern, democratic, society and are leading to its 'decadence': AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, degeneration of morals, prostitution, mixing of the sexes in education in schools, universities, and workplaces, and contemporary ideologies (liberalism, socialism, communism, feminism, etc.) which have, according to FIS leaders, replaced religion and corrupted societies. All of the evils of the Jahilyia [pagan era], that is, those aspects that characterized pre-Islamic society, are said to be present in the Western world and have been blindly emulated in Islamic societies. The only solution to all these problems can be found in Islam.(46) The state in Islamic societies has not performed its duties, by deviating from the divine commandments, and has, in fact, contributed to the Jahilyia. The regimes in these societies may also be considered as infidels and should, consequently, be fought through a jihad; their killing (qital) is halal (lawful).

The other forces which have contributed to the decadence of Muslim societies are, according to leaders of the FIS, Ali Benhadj, in particular: journalists, writers, artists, the state's Ulemas, secularist parties which "militate with unequaled impudence for the separation of state and religion: they are the creatures of colonialism in our country."(47) These groups must be fought because they are opposed to the Jihad; in fact, "democracy is against the jihad which it views as a manifestation of violence and interference in public liberties."(48)

THE ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT'S ISLAMO-POPULISM AND THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY

In this context, it would be interesting to discuss the FIS's conception of democracy,(49) for it may shed some light on the place of civil society in the vision of this movement and will show whether this vision is favorable or inimical to the emergence of a genuine civil society(50) where democratic principles can be learned and exercised.

Using their own interpretation of Islam, some FIS leaders are opposed to the liberal version of Islam that advocates the separation of politics from religion. For a number of them, individual freedom itself is inconceivable outside the realm of religious notions. It is obvious, in this interpretation, that democracy and Islam are incompatible since the former allows freedom of conscience, whereas Islam, in their view, does not. One is a Muslim and must remain so or would face death in the event he/she decides to change religion or to become an atheist. Islam is seen as a holistic order whose societal organization is perfect and does not allow individual beliefs, for, according to this version of Islam, individualism would lead to a division within the Umma [community/nation]. The introduction of any secular and/or imported ideas alien to divine revelation would destroy the foundation of the Islamic order. Democracy is viewed as an alien product belonging to a pagan society, Ancient Greece. The FIS's leaders present democracy as a religion that attempts to substitute itself to Islam. The inference, of course, is that democrats are Muslims who have converted to a new religion opposed to Islam - thus committing apostasy which is punished by death. What the radical Islamists seek is an ideal political arrangement that rejects a conflictual society. Evidently, the leaders of the FIS, because of their "understanding of the divine revelation" claim to hold the key to entering - and ruling over - this ideal societal blueprint. Democracy, identified with homosexuality, drugs, alcoholism, and many other evils, is, for its part, an order that has led to the decadence of moral and spiritual values in the West (pornography, sleazy songs, trashy movies, etc.).

The imprisoned FIS's Number 2, Ali Benhadj, rejected pluralism by asking rhetorically the question: "Would Algeria, as has been the case in Europe, reach this moral dissolution under the dominance of democratic pluralism?"(51) Secularism (laicite), the separation of state and religion, is seen as the biggest threat to Islamic societies. This conception led many to suspect that the FIS's participation in the legislative elections of December 1991 was of a tactical nature, even if some segments within the party are believed to have been favorable to the democratic game.(52)

Perhaps the greatest damage caused by the radical Islamists was the way they have discredited democracy in the eyes of the youth they have indoctrinated. Their Manichean view has only helped magnify the atomization of Algerian society and intensify the antagonisms within civil society. The most misfortunate aspect of the FIS's anti-democracy propaganda is that it presented democratic values as sacrilegious and totally antithetical to Islam. The impact of such an interpretation in a country that is profoundly Muslim is quite obvious. Democracy is, therefore, seen as the main factor of fitna (disharmony). The FIS's leaders, it must be emphasized, did not derive their conclusions regarding democracy from any theological or serious political analysis of the concept, as did Malek Bennabi, but the "FIS utilizes the rejection of democracy as a propaganda tool in the context of a strategy of conquest of power."(53)

Owing to their political discourse and their strategy for the conquest of power, the leaders of the FIS made their societal project, quite ambiguous on many aspects, incompatible with that of millions of Algerians, even if Islam holds a supreme position among the overwhelming majority. Yet, one must recognize that the FIS's Islamists are not the only ones to be blamed for this deficiency. Tolerance and civility are not attributes of Algerian political culture. Each political group, including the so called democrats, seeks to cancel out the other. There exists little willingness to compromise or to provide guarantees for the ideological adversary. The absence of a democratic culture and the difficulty of expanding one is complicated by the neopatriarchal character of Algerian society. Undoubtedly, one cannot but agree with Camau that, the main obstacle to the diffusion of democratic culture does not emanate from the political essence of Islam, but is due to the reproduction of the patriarchal system.(54) Even after five years of quasi civil war, there is no reason to believe that Algerian associations and political parties have accepted the really important notion that there is no single, right answer.(55) The divinization of politics will certainly not foster the expansion of tolerance or the acceptance of compromise. If anything, it defeats the purpose of civil society. It should be emphasized that Algerians did not rebel against the state in the name of democracy or because they sought to establish a democratic order, but they rose up, especially the youth, because this state was corrupt, unjust, stopped delivering the goods, and offered them no future. An authoritarian state that has the opposite qualities would, therefore, be acceptable.

Concerning the ideological struggle, some of the leaders of the FIS professed vigorously that when they come to power they would dispose of the republican Constitution and outlaw the secular political parties altogether. Ali Benhadj repeated ad infinitum that democracy is incongruous with Islam and is kufr [blasphemy]. As he put it,

Article 6 [of the 1989 Algerian Constitution] proclaims that the people is the source of all power. This means that political parties which will emerge could, God forbid, lead the people in an anti-religious path. The only source of power is God, through the Qur'an. The people intervenes to choose a chief of State, and at this level only does it become the source of power. If the people vote against God's Law, this is nothing but blasphemy. In this eventuality, the Ulemas order the killing of the infidels because the latter wish to substitute their authority to that of God.(56)

Inevitably, the FIS program, its conception of 'democracy,' and its recourse to violence to institute its own interpretation of an ethical order, horrified not only the so-called democratic forces and emancipated women, but large segments of practicing Muslims, as well. Also, the FIS program, deliberately vague because of the existence of various currents which constituted it, did not help in appeasing the fears of several societal groups, which, incidentally, it could have won over as allies against the regime. The party was mostly concerned with the seizure of power rather than with any clear societal project(57) whose expression might have elicited a strong response from both the military and other social forces, but which would also have shattered the Islamist movement itself. The importance of the differences between the diverse groups inside the party cannot be underestimated. But, the radical discourse of the most extreme among them is what frightened and alienated "democrats" and moderate Islamists alike. It is true, though, that some intellectuals inside the movement may have been genuinely attached to alternance in office and to democratic freedoms.

Following the ban of the party and the imprisonment of many of its leaders, some of the FIS's representatives who found refuge in Europe and in the United States, have insisted that their movement adheres to the principles of free elections, independent judiciaries, respect of the rights of minorities, freedom of the press, and the guarantee of individual rights? They also agree that political pluralism is the best guarantee against dictatorship and that some Algerian Ulemas, such as Abdelhamid Ben Badis, were authorities on democratic government,(59) an outrageous exaggeration. Even the advocates of a democratic line within the FIS have failed to realize that attempting to establish hegemony over Islam is in itself anti-democratic. The FIS's representative in the United States, for instance, declared that "Islam is the foundation of Algerian society and . . . the FIS is its expression."(60) Could not one infer from this statement that whoever is not in favor of the FIS is against Islam?

Members of the FIS's leadership have made statements which confirmed the suspicions held by their opponents and, thus, have only themselves to blame for the lack of credibility they project. For instance, the FIS representative to Belgium, Abdelkrim Ould Ada, affirmed in October 1995 that "We are for democracy as a political practice only, not as a philosophical basis."(61) The FIS's misfortune is that the party has been unable to produce a leader of Malek Bennabi's intellectual and political caliber.

ISLAMIST CHALLENGERS TO THE FIS

Other Islamist or Islamist leaning parties held quite different conceptions of democracy from that of the FIS. Imam Mahfoud Nahnah held an exceptionally moderate position, especially regarding the question of women. Nahnah's party, HAMAS, published a manifesto(62) in both Arabic, French, and English in which, unlike the FIS, the party presents itself as an organic part of society rather than an alternative to it. What is also remarkable is the consistent emphasis put on pluralism.(63) In the manifesto, it is said that "geographic, linguistic, and doctrinal diversity in the context of Islam . . . is a natural and healthy phenomenon which enriches life and stimulates society by means of shura, dialogue, loyal competition, exchange of ideas and constructive criticism."(64) According to this program, any constitution would be inspired by Islamic principles in order to establish an "Islamic system of government," founded on shura, equality, freedom, and justice. It is also stated that individual and public liberties - of conscience, thought, expression, publication, association, creation of political parties and unions and to organize pacific demonstrations, etc. - would be assured, "provided that these liberties are not exploited in order to destabilize the bases of society, to plot against the nation or to spread immorality among its members."(65) The objective is not to substitute a secular constitution for the shari'a, but to proceed with its incremental implementation, progressively abolishing the laws that are in opposition to it. In an interview he granted a British scholar, Nahnah asserted that "Islam must be freely chosen by the people, who would always be able to vote for a non-Islamic party in the future."(66) This is quite different from Benhadj's statement that "all the parties which are opposed to the Islamic solution are parties of the devil,"(67) although the FIS leader, Abbassi Madani, did subscribe to the notion of political pluralism without, however, extending it to secular parties.(68)

Nahnah's beliefs in non-violence, pluralism and democratic principles are rather surprising. Less than two weeks before the November 1995 Algerian presidential election in which he ran as one of the four candidates, Nahnah declared:

Our movement is a moderate Islamic movement which does not believe in violence. It stresses moral values and adherence to them, and it renounces violence as a means to reaching or monopolizing power. Our movement recognizes democracy and promotes its principles. We are committed to accepting the will of the majority of the people in any free elections held in the country. If our movement wins the majority's confidence, the minority's views and interests will be respected. We believe in a pluralist system in which all the various parties compete to win the votes on the basis of their election programs in a secure atmosphere dominated by respect, understanding, moderation, and the rule of law.(69)

What is even more extraordinary is that Nahnah asserts that he seeks the establishment of a constitutional republican system because "it is the only system capable of solving [Algeria's] problems."(70) His sole demand in this context is that the Algerian Constitution be implemented.

HAMAS's moderation is particularly interesting with respect to the question of women. Unlike the interpretation of the FIS, Nahnah argues that, based on the Shari'a, woman is man's equal "in struggle and at work, in education, in the building of civilization, and in the elaboration of a universal thought whose distinction is equity and the sense of moderation."(71) Women, says he, are an integral part of the human experience and have been created by God as equal. In his view, "women are entitled to organize their life, run their property, and assume part of the responsibility in the economic, political, and social environment."(72) The party's manifesto contains seven points on the subject. The program seeks to "free women from ancient traditions which are not related to Islam," to encourage them to "accomplish their mission side by side with men," to increase their participation in public, political, social and economic activities, and to reconsider "the arbitrary laws vis-a-vis women."(73)

Abdallah Djaballah's Al-Nahda Party was, like HAMAS, opposed to the FIS's claims that it had won the June 1990 municipal and departmental elections on its own and that, consequently, the FIS could not contend to be the sole representative of Algerian Islamism. Al-Nahda strives for the erection of an Islamic state through the execution of the Shari'a, but within a pluralist and democratic framework. However, like the FIS, the party opposes the legal representation of secular parties and would impose the wearing of the veil by women.(74) Djaballah's real objective is to found an alliance of Islamist parties that transcends their differences and in which the latter could be freely discussed. Needless to say, the dissensions within the Islamist movement have always been of a political nature and/or stemmed from questions of tactics, but not from theological disputes. In fact, it is their ideologization of Islam which helps explain the rejection of these Islamist parties by many Ulemas and true fundamentalists.

CONCLUSION

The Algerian Islamist parties that have emerged from the Islamist movement in the 1980s hold dissimilar views with respect to Islam and its compatibility with democracy. Although some of the members of the various Islamist parties made statements favorable to pluralism, democratic freedoms, and even alternance in power, they have never produced a systematic body of knowledge regarding the question. The main reason a priori is their primary concern with the conquest of state power. It is difficult to discern what is democratic discourse as a tactical maneuver to achieve that goal and democratic discourse as the intrinsic component of a societal project. The FIS was a front constituted of groups holding conflicting views. Yet, the major ideologue and most charismatic leader of the party, Ali Benhadj, expressed contempt for democracy, defined in its most negative aspects. The lack of democratic experience, resulting from thirty years of authoritarian rule in a neopatriarchal society, could not but produce another authoritarian party vying with the one that in fact produced it. Actually, the FIS has been correctly described as the son (fils) of the FLN. The divisions within Algerian society resulting from the failure of modernization, nation- and state-building could not be expected to produce a political culture of tolerance or of democratic politics. The resilience of the regime to cling to power and to share it with others led to the emergence of groups intent on replacing the personnel in place through violent means.

Algerian Islamists were not concerned with issues of democracy, except in a narrow sense. The most appealing aspects were political liberalization, which made the existence of Islamist parties possible, and elections which were perceived as a less costly means of achieving power. The main preoccupation has often revolved around issues of morality and social justice. The aspiration for power was concealed in a religious garb. Further, the lack of interest in genuine democratic principles prevented the Islamist parties - and the so called democratic parties for that matter - from envisaging alliances or serious political debate.

HAMAS's approach is the most clearly respectful of democratic principles, at least in rhetoric. But, the long-term goal of the party makes it clear that once the party's theological principles are put in practice, it is not clear how much room, if any, will be left for dissent.

The contention in this article is that the only true democratic thought in post-independent Algeria came from the independent Islamic thinker Malek Bennabi. His efforts were concentrated on creating a genuinely democratic psychology through a rational understanding of Islam. But, Bennabi was too much of a maverick, little known in his own society and persecuted by an insecure regime. Bennabi was the only Islamic thinker to have not only accepted many aspects of Western political democracy, but also to have advanced propositions to enrich democracy as a whole. The question that remains to be studied is why the FIS's Jaz'ara faction and Nahnah himself, who owe a great deal to Bennabi, have made no effort to convey, let alone apply, his ideas. What is certain is that Bennabi was ahead of his time, his ideas remain too advanced and would be in direct contradiction with the populist, highly politicized discourse of the FIS or the demagogic approach of HAMAS. The ideas of Bennabi will probably have to wait until such preconditions of democracy as the end of political violence, high levels of literacy and urban development are in place before these ideas can be absorbed by an elite willing to combine democratic principles with indigenous, rational Islamic values.

NOTES

1. Halim Barakat. The Arab World-Society, Culture, and the State (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), p. 121.

2. The Holy Qur'an [S. XLii. 35-38]. Text, translation and commentary by A. Yusuf Ali (Brentwood, MD: Amana Corp., 1983), pp. 1316-1317.

3. On a similar point, see I. William Zartman, "Democracy and Islam: The Cultural Dialectic," Annals/AAPSS, Vol. 524 (November 1992): 188-189.

4. See, Mohamed-Cherif Salah Bey, "La Constitution et la theorie generale du droit," Revue algerienne des sciences juridique, economique, et politique, 15, 3 (September 1978): 448.

5. Henri Sanson. Laicite islamique en Algerie (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1983), p. 8. Laicite, in this context, is also understood as the absence of a religious hierarchy and that despite the preponderance of Islam, power is exercised in a secular fashion; see, esp., pp. 52 ff.

6. Bernard Cubertafond. L'Algerie contemporaine (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1981, 2nd edition), p. 21.

7. For a thorough chronological analysis of Islam's resistance to the State in Algeria, see, Jean-Claude Vatin, "Puissance d'Etat et resistances islamiques en Algerie, XIX-XXe siecles. Approche mecanique," Ernest Gellner, Jean-Claude Vatin, et al. Islam et politique au Maghreb (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1981), pp. 243-269.

8. A biographical sketch of Malek Bennabi can be found in Khelladi, Les Islamistes algeriens face au pouvoir (Algiers: Editions Alfa, 1992), pp. 37-44.

9. See, Khelladi, Les islamistes algeriens, p. 91. Among Bennabi's works, which have yet to be carefully studied, one should refer to, Le Phenomene coranique (Algiers: SEC, 1992), written in 1946 and the collection of newspaper articles published as a book, Pour changer l'Algerie (Ouled Fayet, Tipaza: Societe d'Edition et de Communication, 1989). Malek Bennabi's books have been - or are in the process of being reprinted - under the editorship of Nourredine Boukrouh, leader of the Parti pour le renouveau algerien (PRA), founded in 1989.

10. Jean Leca and Jean-Claude Vatin. L'Algerie politique: Institutions et regime (Paris: Presse de la Fondation des Sciences Politiques, 1975), p. 308 and Saadi Nouredine. La Femme et la loi en Algerie (Alger: Editions Bouchene, 1991), p. 45; Mohamed Harbi, ed. L'Islamisme dans tous ses etats (Alger: Editions Rahma, 1992), p. 134.

11. Cited in Leca and Vatin, op. cit., p. 308.

12. Francois Burgat. L'Islamisme au Maghreb-La voix du Sud (Paris: Karthala, 1988), p. 150. This book is available in English, as Francois Burgat and William Dowell. The Islamic Movement in North Africa (Austin, Texas: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1993).

13. This publication and Humanisme musulman were both put out by the Algerian military's printing plant.

14. Aissa Khelladi. Les Islamistes algeriens face au pouvoir (Alger: Editions Alfa, 1992), p. 19. The leaders of al-Qiyam sent letters to both Boumediene and Gamal Abdul Nasser to condemn the execution of Sayyed Qutb by the Egyptian regime.

15. On this point, see Yahia H. Zoubir, "The Concept of Civil Society and the Problems of the Transition to a Pluralist Political System: The Case of Algeria," paper presented at the 28th Middle East Studies Association Annual Convention, Phoenix, Arizona, November 1994, especially page 13 ff.

16. See Luc-Willy Deheuvels. Islam et pensee contemporaine en Algerie: La revue al-Asala, 1971-1981 (Paris: CNRS, 1991).

17. For a detailed discussion, see Abderrahim Lamchichi. Islam et contestation au Maghreb (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989), pp. 151-153.

18. Bernard Cubertafond. La Republique algerienne democratique et populaire (Paris: P.U.F., 1979), pp. 88-91.

19. Some commentaries and/or excerpts can be found in Burgat, L'islamisme au Maghreb, op. cit., pp. 147 ff.; Harbi, L'islamisme dans tous ses etats, op. cit. p. 135 ff. Mazdaq is in reference to a Fifth Century Persian leader of a tribe reputed to have been heretic and communistic.

20. Harbi, p. 137.

21. See the text in Burgat, op. cit., pp. 146 ff. The fact that Merabet was married to a Frenchman, the philosopher M. Maschino, discredited her even more in the eyes of the Imam.

22. For details, see Mustafa Al-Ahnaf, Bernard Botiveau, and Franck Fregosi. L'Algerie par ses islamistes (Paris: Karthala, 1991), pp. 37-42; see also, Kate Zebiri, "Islamic Revival in Algeria: An Overview," The Muslim World, 83, 3-4 (July-October, 1993): 215-217; Abderrahim Lamchichi. L'Islamisme en Algerie (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 1992), pp. 104-105.

23. See Lamchichi, op. cit., p. 155.

24. Malek Bennabi. La Democratie en Islam (Alger: Mosquee de Beni Messous, n.d.), p. 10. The translation is mine.

25. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

26. On this notion, see Edward Shils, "The Virtue of Civil Society," Government and Opposition, 26, 1 (Winter 1991).

27. Bennabi, La Democratie en Islam, p. 12.

28. Ibid., p. 15.

29. Ibid., p. 17.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., p. 19.

33. Ibid., p. 20.

34. Ibid., pp. 21-22.

35. Ibid., p. 24.

36. Ibid., p. 29.

37. Ibid., p. 33.

38. Ibid., p. 36.

39. Ibid. p. 42.

40. Ibid.

41. Nourredine Boukrouh, "Comment j'ai connu Malek Bennabi," El Watan (Algiers), 11 November 1992 and 12 November 1992.

42. An outstanding discussion of the phenomenon can be found in Olivier Roy. L'Echec de l'Islam politique (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1992).

43. Ali Merad, "The Ideologization of Islam in the Contemporary Muslim World," Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali H. Dessouki, eds. Islam and Power (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1981), p. 38.

44. A very good study of the historical, generational and political differentiation with the FIS can be found in Severine Labat's, "Islamismes et islamistes en Algerie-Un nouveau militantisme," in Gilles Kepel, ed. Exils et Royaumes: les appartenances au monde arabo-islamique aujourd'hui. Etudes reunies pour Remy Leveau (Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 1994), pp. 41-67. The English version, "Islamism and Islamists: The Emergence of New Types of Politico-Religious Militants," can be found in John Ruedy, ed. Islamism and Secularism in North Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 103-121. See also her latest book, Les islamistes algeriens - Entre les urnes et le maquis (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1995).

45. Merad, "Ideologization . . .," op. cit., p. 37.

46. These points are drawn from Abbassi Madani's Azmat al-fiqr al-hadith wa mubarryrat al-hal al-islami (Algiers: Impr. Meziane, 1989); commentaries on this book can be found in Al-Ahnaf, op. cit., pp. 77 if.; Sheikh Abu a'bd al-Fatah Ali Ben Hadj (Ali Benhadj). Fasl al-kalam fi muwajahat zul al-hukkam (np: al-jabha al-islamyia li al-inkkad [FIS], n.d.), 310 pages. The book is a gold mine for scholars interested in Benhadj's views. The influence of Qutb and Mawdudi, to whom he refers very frequently, is unmistakable.

47. Ali Benhadj, "Qui est responsable de la violence?" El-Mounqid [FIS's newspaper], No. 9, reprinted in A1-Ahnaf, et al, L'Algerie par ses islamistes, p. 136.

48. Ibid., 140.

49. In addition to the speeches of its leaders, this section draws heavily from Abdelasiem El-Difraoui, "La critique du systeme democratique par le Front islamique du salut," in Kepel, Exils et Royaumes, op. cit. A1-Ahnaf, et al, L'Algerie par ses islamistes is also a remarkable source.

50. Civil society is here understood in the definition given by Larry Diamond, "Toward Democratic Consolidation," Journal of Democracy, 5, 3 (July 1994): 5-6.

51. Cited in Al-Ahnaf, et al. op. cit., p. 117.

52. See Severine Labat, "Islamismes et Islamistes en Algerie - Un nouveau militantisme," Kepel, Exils et Royaumes, op. cit.

53. El-Difraoui, op. cit., p. 123.

54. Michel Camau, "Democratisation et changements des regimes au Maghreb," Bernabe Lopez Garcia, Gema Martin Munoz, Miguel H. de Larramendi, eds. Elecciones, participacion y transiciones politicas en el Norte de Africa (Madrid: Agencia Espanola de Cooperacion Internacional, 1991), p. 77.

55. See Augustus Richard Norton, "The Future of Civil Society in the Middle East," Middle East Journal, 47, 2 (Spring 1993): 214.

56. Ali Benhadj's declaration published in Horizons (Algiers), 23 February 1989. See also his writings on democracy reproduced in Mustapha Al-Ahnaf, et al., L'Algerie par ses islamistes, op cit., pp. 87 ff.

57. The reason why Islamists in general do not have a well-defined societal project is discussed in Fouad Zakariya. Laicite ou islamisme - Les arabes a l'heure du choix, pref. and trans. by Richard Jacquemond (Paris: La Decouverte, 1991): 73 ff.

58. See Anwar Haddam, FIS representative in the United States, "The Political Experiment of the Algerian Islamic Movement and the New World Order," Power-Sharing Islam, edited by Azzam Tamimi (London: Liberty for Muslim World Publications, 1993), p. 128.

59. Ibid., p. 133-4.

60. Ibid., p. 139.

61. Al-Majallah (London) in Arabic, repr. in Foreign Bulletin Information Service-Near East and South Asia, FBIS-NES-95-212, 2 November 1995, p. 13.

62. "Barnamij al-inthikhabat al-tashri'iyya" (1991), cited, in Zebiri, "Islamic Revival in Algeria," op. cit., p. 215. The English version is Movement of the Islamic Society (HAMAS)-Program of Election (1991), published in Algiers. The text has no date and only contains the address of the party's headquarters in El-Mouradia, Algiers.

63. During the Government-political parties conferences held in July 1991, which this author watched in its entirety, Nahnah said: "Even God created Satan in order to have an opposition." Most of the HAMAS members interviewed hold the same view on the necessity of pluralism. The membership of HAMAS is highly educated and rejects violence as a means of action.

64. Program of Election, p. 1. This author has edited the passages cited here because of poor English in the original.

65. Ibid., p. 3.

66. Zebiri, "Islamic Revival in Algeria," op. cit., p. 217.

67. Sermon at the Kouba mosque in 1990, cit. in Khelladi, Les Islamistes algeriens, p. 108.

68. See Madani's interview in Politique internationale, No. 49 (Fall 1990): 186.

69. Interview of Mahfoud Nahnah, in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat in Arabic (London), repr. in FBIS-NES-95-214, 6 November 1995, p. 10.

70. Ibid.

71. Cited in Al-Ahnaf, et al, p. 116.

72. FBIS-NES-95-214, op. cit., p. 12.

73. Program of Election, op. cit., p. 11.

74. See Al-Ahnaf, pp. 52-59.

Yahia H. Zoubir is an associate professor in the Department of International Studies, Thunderbird, The American Graduate School of International Management, Glendale, Arizona.