Algeria, the Maghreb Union, and the Western Sahara stalemate.

Despite the 1991 cease fire and agreement to hold a referendum on the fate of the Western Sahara, the peace process continues to be stalled. The agreement, signed by the Kingdom of Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) under UN supervision has been put on hold due to disagreements regarding those eligible to vote. Allegations of a pro-Moroccan bias by the Secretary General's office and the continued backing of Morocco by France and the United States has led many observers to conclude that Morocco's 1975 invasion and occupation of this former Spanish colony will be allowed to stand.

This essay examines the irresolution of the Western Sahara conflict from a regional perspective. After a brief overview of perspectives from the broader Arab World, the article will show how the formation of the Arab Maghreb Union and the internal crisis in Algeria has contributed to Morocco's apparent ability to sidestep its obligations under the Western Sahara peace agreement and successive United Nations Security Council resolutions. It examines the history of Algerian relations with the Polisario Front - the liberation movement of Western Sahara - as well as Algeria's relations with Morocco, and how, despite continued ideological support for the Sahrawi cause, the Algerians are no longer in a position to support strongly their erstwhile ally.

WESTERN SAHARA AND THE ARAB WORLD

Efforts to gain support in the Arab World for the idea of a greater Morocco did not receive much support despite efforts in the early 1960s to enlist the Arab League for its cause. Indeed, Morocco's expansionist ambitions caused strains, including a temporary rupture of relations with Tunisia. The Moroccans have been more successful regarding the Western Sahara. Unlike the Organization of African Unity which has strongly backed Western Sahara's right to self-determination, the Arab League has shown little interest in the area. In addition, King Hassan has major influence in the Arab League and the Islamic Conference. Knowing it was in the minority, Algeria has never placed the issue on the table at such forums. Algeria,s efforts in the Arab World to link the Sahrawi's struggle to that of the Palestinians has fallen on deaf ears, as sultanic solidarity dominated the political agenda of most Arab states.

Prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Western Sahara situation was unique in the history of inter-Arab conflicts. While there had been a number of border wars, never before in modern history had one Arab state completely swallowed up another. Kuwait's financial support of the Moroccan war effort made its pleas to international law appear less than sincere when it found itself in the same situation as the Sahrawis.

The Arab Steadfastness Front, composed of hard-line Arab states opposed to U.S.-sponsored peace negotiations with Israel in the late 1970s, formally endorsed the Polisario cause, though such support was little more than rhetoric. At the same time, however, some of Morocco's strongest supporters have been backing off on their previous unconditional endorsement. Saudi Arabia, Morocco's chief financial backer in the war effort, hosted direct talks between the SADR and Morocco in July 1988, has played a major role in Moroccan-Algerian reconciliation and has reportedly pushed the Moroccans to compromise.(1) Egypt has evolved from all-out support of Morocco under Anwar Sadat to a more cautious and balanced approach to the region under Husni Mubarak.

THE ARAB MAGHREB UNION

The six countries of the Maghreb - Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Western Sahara, and Mauritania - comprise nearly one@third of the Arab World's population. In both the period of conquest and subsequent liberation struggles, the Maghreb has paid a higher price in human and social terms than elsewhere in the Arab World. Algeria and Libya led the way in the wave of nationalizations and oil price rises in the 1960s and 1970s and both Morocco and Algeria have played major roles as mediators in the Middle East and elsewhere. All of the North African states, like many of their Middle Eastern counterparts, share a dependency on mineral exports, the interest rates charged by Western lending institutions, and on the amount of rainfall. They are also dependent on the export of human resources to industrialized Western Europe and their financial remittances. Nearly two million Arabs from the Maghreb live and work in Europe, about half of whom are Moroccans, and the majority of whom are in France.(2) The Europeans are not taking any more immigrants, and have therefore eliminated what had been an important social safety valve.

During the first ten years after Morocco's invasion, the Western Sahara conflict was clearly the most important diplomatic issue facing the region. Despite progress in the peace process, however, the Western Sahara has been eclipsed by economic problems. The entire region has been faced with stresses from rapidly growing populations, rising unemployment, problems with foreign debt, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and increasing calls for political pluralism. The rise of radical Islamists in Algeria, rather than distracting Algeria and the others from greater cooperation, scared the parties into trying to develop some mutually beneficial economic arrangement that would save them from the fundamentalist threat. It was becoming apparent that greater trends of demographic growth and urbanization were of more importance than individual alliances. Though the countries of the Maghreb are quite disparate politically, they had all come to the realization that economic instability - which they had all been experiencing - breeds political instability, and they could gain much through greater cooperation. There were also concerns about outside economic threats, such as the imminent cohesion of the European Economic Community (EEC) as well as outside military threats, as exemplified by the U.S. bombing of Libya and the Israeli bombing of Tunisia, both of which resulted in scores of civilian casualties.

With Algeria taking the lead, negotiations led to the signing by the leaders of the five Maghrebi states (excluding Western Sahara) of an agreement in Marrakesh in February 1989 for the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). The document called for the easing of border restrictions, designed to help both tourists and migrant workers. In order to facilitate trade, the agreement called for expanded rail links and the establishment of a single regional airline. The treaty is vague in its phrasing, but the call for economic reciprocity in industry and agriculture encourages countries with surpluses of certain resources to trade with those that lack them. The Arab Maghreb is the most important regional grouping geographically and demographically to the EEC, and its formation has been the focus of much international interest.

Morocco's successful effort to exclude the SADR was a major victory for King Hassan. However, four of the five countries in the Maghrebi union support Sahrawi self-determination and support direct Moroccan-Polisario negotiations. The fact that the 1989 treaty contains a clause for the admission of new members appears to open the possibility of inclusion of the SADR, since it is difficult to see how any other country could be considered part of the Maghreb. Despite its initial exclusion, the SADR acknowledges the benefits of such economic, strategic and cultural interactions, and has endorsed the trend toward greater unity.(3) This greater union,raised the possibility that with the decline of the North African nation-state that a Western Sahara settlement could emerge that would be less than full statehood without continued domination by Morocco. King Hassan brought forth a proposal for a federalization of Morocco comparable to the German lander, which would include Western Sahara with a large degree of regional autonomy similar to that granted to sections of Morocco.(4) Morocco's long history of centralized government and King Hassan's history of direct control made such an offer dubious to many observers, but it was an indication that Greater Maghrebi unity could lead to considering a variety of options.

Algeria had hoped that with the signing of the UMA agreement there would be greater willingness for Morocco to cooperate with the peace process. However, King Hassan instead interpreted the signing to mean that the pressure had been lifted, refusing further meetings with the Polisario and claiming that the conflict over Western Sahara was but a "grain of sand" in the larger design of a Greater Maghreb. Apparently, Morocco had sought to use regional integration as a way of weaning the Algerians from the Polisario cause, hoping that the bilateral benefits would outweigh their ideological support for the Polisario. Meanwhile, the Algerians hoped that it could lead to a negotiated settlement through creating an integrated Maghreb that would include the SADR as the Moroccans found this political integration was more important than nationalistic irredentist ambitions. What happened, however, was Morocco's intransigence actually halted the momentum in the UMA process. Both Morocco and Algeria hoped to use the UMA process to support their political agendas regarding the Western Sahara, thereby retarding greater regional integration. At the same time, however, this new regional cooperation did create a climate where Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar could press Algeria and Morocco with his proposal for a cease-fire and referendum.

North African scholar William Zartman sees relations between the Maghrebi states as an ongoing cycle that alternates between pluralist rivalry and integration. Following each effort at integration, there has been a period of indifference or hostility. Such prior efforts have included the Tangier meeting of 1958, the Casablanca conference of 1961, the functional cooperation of 1964-1969, and several efforts by Tunisia in 1984-85 to convene a pan-Maghrebi summit. The creation of a UMA, however, has been the most ambitious to date, though once again, it may be temporary. The irresolution of the Western Sahara conflict has been a brake on more complete and mutually beneficial regional integration.

What the rapprochement has accomplished is lessening the dangers of a wider war. In many respects, the war in the Western Sahara has been deliberately contained by all parties. There were frequent concerns that it might embroil the entire region. Some observers, citing figures from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, feared that the increased U.S. aid to Morocco would shift the military balance enough in Morocco's favor so that it would be tempted to launch a major war, which until the U.S.-led military buildup was impossible due to Algeria's military superiority.(5) The construction of the sixth wall in 1987, which brought Moroccan forces close to Algeria's relatively vulnerable southwestern border, raised additional concerns.(6) In the past, King Hassan threatened to attack Sahrawi refugee camps in southwestern Algeria as more sophisticated U.S. military hardware came into his possession, declaring that he would "not hesitate to violate the Algerian border."(7) There were several small-scale border clashes in the late 1970s.(8) In addition, there were some alarms raised when Morocco deployed 48 sophisticated tanks recently purchased from the United States on the southern part of the new wall near the Mauritanian frontier.(9) Incursions into Mauritanian territory by the Moroccan armed forces were routine until Morocco moved to a largely defensive strategy in 1982.

ALGERIAN INTERESTS

A major reason for the Polisario's string of diplomatic successes in the 1970s and 1980s was its support from Algeria. Algeria had a good reputation in international circles for its role as a mediator, as a bridge between North and South, East and West, and radical and conservative governments. Its revolutionary heritage, anti-imperialist credentials, and advocacy of socialism(10) gave it a particularly strong reputation in the Third World. Moroccan officials complain that this had given the Algerians l'aura which gave them much greater credibility in international forums than Morocco, a conservative monarchy with close ties to the West.(11) The Polisario cause benefited as a result, particularly by placing emphasis on the principle of self-determination, which has widespread support, particularly from countries which have also experienced colonialism.

For most of the war, the Moroccans attempted to depict the Polisario as essentially an Algerian creation. Many strategic analysts in the United States have also depicted the conflict as something of a proxy war between the two most powerful Maghrebi states. However, Algeria supported another independence movement for a period in 1973, rebuffing requests for assistance from the Polisario. Following the launching of the armed struggle in Algeria gave some limited support to the Polisario,(12) not throwing their full support to the movement until 1975 and then, only reluctantly.(13) In addition, there is some evidence suggesting initial Algerian acquiescence to the Moroccan takeover.(14) The Moroccans claim that Algeria, despite public pronouncements to the contrary supporting independence, endorsed the partition plan of Morocco and Mauritania at a closed session of the 1974 Arab Summit meeting.(15) Some European diplomats have charged that Algerian ambivalence in 1975 may have made things worse, or that Algeria may have taken a Machiavellian approach by hoping for a war between Spain and Morocco. In addition, Algerian leaders did not respond to approaches by Spanish officials.(16) Perhaps, one explanation for Algeria's ambiguity was its belief that there would, in fact, be a referendum and the Sahrawis would opt for independence. Eventually, however, Algeria's decision to contest Morocco at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) threw the country's weight fully on the side of self-determination and independence. They sent Muhammad Bedjaoui, a respected former ambassador to the United Nations and France (who would later become an ICJ jurist himself) to argue that case.

Algeria has never claimed any part of Western Sahara. Claims by Morocco, often echoed by their supporters in the U.S. government, that the war is one over Algerian expansionism in order to gain access to the Atlantic Ocean through the takeover of Western Sahara appear groundless. Algeria is hardly a land-locked country: It has over 700 miles of coastline on the Mediterranean Sea, including several prominent ports, and at least 98% of the population resides closer to the Mediterranean than the Atlantic. Virtually all roads and rail lines for international commerce are directed toward the Mediterranean and none toward any of the Western Saharan ports. Only the iron ore deposits near Tindouf could logically be routed westward, and there is no reason that Algeria would not be able to work out an agreement with Morocco should they desire, or, alternatively, to route iron ore through Mauritania and hook up with the rail lines at Zouerate. In addition, Algeria has its own processing facilities at Oran as well as its own steel production plants, thus there is little reason to export raw iron ore in the first place.(17)

Algeria would prefer its chief rival to remain smaller, poorer, and not controlling the Western. Indeed, while leading the call for anti-colonialism elsewhere in the world, Algeria made only token gestures against Spanish colonialism on its western border. Algeria's support for Sahrawi nationalism came with the realization that Spanish neo-colonialism would fail and that an authentic popular indigenous liberation movement was the best defense against Moroccan annexation. Algeria's perspective is that a successful conquest of the territory by Morocco would be a dangerous precedent, so keeping the Polisario alive was necessary. At the same time, some more cynical observers note that to supply the Polisario with sufficient equipment actually to defeat Morocco would likely result in the downfall of King Hassan, which could bring to power radical nationalists, Islamists, or other elements that would be a greater threat to the Algerian regime then the conservative monarch. Indeed, Algeria would have grounds for more direct involvement: Given the widespread recognition of the SADR, Algeria would have the legal right to intervene directly at the request of the SADR to defend a recognized government from invasion by Morocco.

The Algerians claim that their support for the Polisario is simply a matter of principle, of helping a neighboring country in need. Algerian support was crucial in the initial humanitarian relief efforts and in assisting the Polisario in its formation of the SADR, though Algeria has remained a respectful distance from the activities in the Polisario-controlled refugee camps, which - while located within Algerian territory - are given effective autonomy and the SADR flag flies alone. The Algerian approach to supporting the Polisario was a two-pronged military and diplomatic strategy: Keeping Morocco bogged down and embarrassed on the battlefield while winning a series of victories in the international arena. They were largely successful in this regard. Algerian President Houari Boumedienne refused to talk to Morocco on principle and had a strong ideological commitment to the Polisario. His successor, Chadli Benjedid, was more pragmatic and moderate than his predecessor, both in foreign and domestic policy, engaging in domestic liberalization and pursuing friendlier relations with the United States, France, and Morocco, but he continued Algeria's support for the Polisario. Far from being an Algerian puppet, the Polisario has always maintained a distinct identity in terms of its desire for independence, its own agenda distinct from Algeria's and its own autonomous political organization and decision-making. However, it is highly dependent on Algeria for food, supplies, arms, and sanctuary. Therefore, it has long been recognized that a major reduction or elimination of Algerian support would have serious consequences to the Sahrawi independence movement.

MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN RELATIONS

Tensions between Algeria and Morocco predate the dispute over the Western Sahara. Following the discovery in the early 1950s by French geologists of high-grade iron ore deposits and suspected oil and natural gas reserves, the French deliberately ceded territory running from Beachar to Tindouf as part of French Algeria. The understanding at the time was that Moroccan independence would be forthcoming, but that Algeria would remain indefinitely under French control. When the Algerian revolution commenced, the French offered the newly independent Moroccan government return of the territory in exchange for Moroccan cooperation in restricting Algerian independence forces based in Morocco, but popular Moroccan support for the revolution was too strong for such a deal to succeed.

When a popular movement on the left challenged the monarchy in the early 1960s, the new king decided to press his claims militarily against the unstable new Algerian regime with apparent French and American support. There were periodic border clashes, and France and the United States were accused of clandestinely funding Moroccan opposition guerrillas in Algeria with small enough amounts to render the attacks relatively harmless but sufficient to exacerbate tensions.(18) In the fall of 1963, Moroccan forces, taking advantage of the serious problems of newly independent Algeria, invaded Algerian territory, advancing toward Tindouf. Trained essentially as urban guerrilla fighters, the Algerians were no match for the well-armed and better trained Moroccan forces. Had Egypt's President Gamal Abd al-Nasser not rushed aid to Algeria, the Moroccan conquest would likely have been successful. The Algerians eventually counterattacked by seizing the Moroccan border city of Figuig. Diplomatic intervention by the OAU led to the return to the internationally-recognized borders. Negotiations began in 1969 and a tentative agreement was reached the following year. Hassan formally recognized the border in 1972 in the Treaty of Ifane, yet while Algeria ratified the agreement immediately, Morocco refused, claiming that it included an understanding of Algerian support of Moroccan annexation of Western Sahara.(19) Morocco finally ratified the treaty in May of 1989 following a warming of relations between the two countries.

The militaristic and nationalist sentiments stiffed up in both countries increased the power and influence of such tendencies at the expense of more socialist elements. Hassan used the war as an excuse to suppress the left and a more conservative element of the Algerian anned forces eventually seized control in that country. The political impact was to sour Hassan's relations with the armed forces, who opposed their withdrawal, and boosted the Algerian armed forces and their defense minister Houari Boumedienne, who was emboldened to seize power two years later. Indeed, the military coup against Ahmed Ben Bella may have been based in part on his considering some territorial compromise with Morocco in exchange for a cessation of threatened Moroccan attacks.

After several years of gradually improving relations, the interests of the two countries collided over the fate of Western Sahara. Morocco broke diplomatic relations with Algeria when Algeria formally recognized the newly-established SADR. Even with their twelve-year rupture in relations, Algerian and Moroccan officials met regularly in private and sometimes in public, including summit meetings in 1983 and 1987. Saudi Arabia brokered the 1987 Algerian-Moroccan summit at the border town of Akid Lofti, with King Fahd present. Western Sahara was a major topic, with the Saudis pushing both sides for compromise, apparently using their generous financial assistance as leverage. With the 1988 Arab League summit scheduled in Algiers, Morocco threatened not to attend without formal diplomatic relations. Wanting to show a united Arab front in support of the recently begun Intifada, Algeria desired Moroccan participation. Both countries saw real economic benefits from closer relations. The locust infestation of March 1988 also underscored the importance of closer cooperation.

The renewal of formal diplomatic relations led to some speculation that it was indicative of a decline in support by Algeria of the Polisario or that some secret deal had been struck. Most of these arguments were by analysts who tended to downplay the SADR as an independent actor. The Polisario did not react negatively to the resumption of diplomatic relations, seeing the possibility that an improved political climate might lead to progress on negotiations.(20) Indeed, the Polisario likes to note that it was Morocco, not Algeria, that broke off diplomatic relations in 1976 so renewal was not a sign of compromise on Algeria's side. In addition, it symbolized the end of the Moroccan fiction that the Polisario was just a front for Algeria and thereby pave the way for direct talks. Morocco's initiative, despite Algeria's continued support of the Polisario, may have been indicative that the Polisario's interpretation was correct. Indeed, Algeria firmly denied any lessening of its support to the Polisario cause, arguing that mutually beneficial economic and political relations did not lessen support for the right of national self-determination. In the agreement resuming diplomatic relations, it appeared that it was Morocco that had made the major concessions, by agreeing to a joint communique which stated that the two governments were:

... eager to promote the success of international efforts undertaken to hasten the process of good offices for a just and definitive solution to the Western Sahara conflict, through a free and regular referendum for self-determination held without any constraints whatsoever and with utmost sincerity ... [the two countries] have decided to reestablish diplomatic relations.

Algeria did soften its criticism of Morocco's occupation of Western Sahara in the period soon after the resumption of diplomatic relations.(21) However, after it became apparent that Morocco was not living up to its promises outlined in the communique, statements by both governments and their media following the brief escalation of fighting in the fall of 1989 demonstrated that neither side had fundamentally changed its positions on the Western Sahara.(22)

DOMESTIC ALGERIAN POLITICS

AND RELATIONS WITH THE POLISARIO

Though the secular nationalist revolutionary regimes in Algeria certainly have a history of abusing their citizenry, they also pale in comparison to their Arab secular nationalist counterparts, the Ba'athist regimes in Syria and Iraq. Still, the lack of authentic democracy and the level of corruption led to increasing pressures for liberalization. Most important was the increased economic difficulties from declining oil prices and mismanagement. Algeria faced enormous pressure from the International Monetary Fund and private banks to cut government spending and privatize state enterprises. A confidential report within the World Bank noted with satisfaction that Algeria dropped the word "socialism" from its new constitution and abolished the planning ministry.

In late 1988, riots in Algeria resulted in over 500 deaths. The political reform which followed led to the birth of more than forty political parties (which later coalesced into a smaller number), a free press, and the open discussion of political ideas. Suspicions over the authenticity of the election process led to additional riots in the spring of 1991. In contrast to Morocco, which feared the Algerian example, the Polisario was pleased with the democratic trend in Algeria, noting the support of their cause across Algeria's political spectrum.(23) Much to the shock of the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN), the first round of voting for the national assembly in December 1991 led to their winning only fifteen of 430 seats, with the radical Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) winning 188 seats and being posed to win a clear majority in the subsequent runoff elections. The military seized power on 11 January 1992 before the second round of voting could take place, however, forcing President Chadli Benjedid - who had apparently been willing to accept his party's defeat and share power with the FIS - to resign.

The events in Algeria were a shock for many who had seen Algeria as something of a model of autonomous Third World development, non-aligned international relations, and support for oppressed peoples around the world. Yet the internal situation was less than ideal. The ambitious industrialization schemes of the FLN, combined with serious neglect of agriculture and one of the highest population growth rates in the world, led to rapid urbanization. Millions of new city-dwellers, torn from traditional village life, found the mosque as the only familiar institution with which to identify. The strong secular orientation of the FLN, as well as the party's estrangement from the masses, made the leadership forget just how strong traditional values remained. The vast majority of the population felt alienated from what was supposed to be a populist revolutionary government. A whole generation had grown up since the FLN's bloody independence struggle from France. The heroism of the revolution could no longer legitimize rule by a party which had been unable to find meaningful opportunities for millions of unemployed and underemployed youth. Despite its recent reforms, the party had not been able to live down its reputation for authoritarianism and corruption. Indeed, among those who remembered the anti-colonial revolution, there was some lingering resentment of how the strong Islamic element of the struggle was suppressed by the ascendant FLN leftist elites. Despite military rule, resistance continues, both through nonviolent underground activities, and increasingly through bombings, assassinations, and other violent attacks. The assassination of the military-appointed president Muhammad Boudiaf that June was the first presidential assassination in the Maghreb, though many speculate that it came from within the military, not the FIS, due to his anti-corruption efforts.

These events led to increased speculation as to whether a long-rumored end of Algerian support for the Polisario was forthcoming. Such abandonment by secular nationalist regimes of revolutionary movements in neighboring states, with which they have professed solidarity, is not unprecedented. One can point, for example, to Syria's abandonment of the Lebanese revolution in 1976 when it sided with the right-wing Christian Phalangists against the coalition of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Lebanese National Movement. According to some leftist critics, like Syria, Algeria espouses leftist rhetoric while maintaining an essentially conservative and authoritarian domestic policy. While their geo-political aims are enhanced by their support for a revolutionary front on their borders, according to this argument, an outright victory by those forces may graphically expose the contradictions in the host regime's policies, thus becoming a threat that needs to be eliminated.

The October 1988 riots in Algeria included attacks on the Polisario headquarters in Algiers, apparently as a result of resentment of the costs of financing the war while Algeria's economy deteriorated.(24) Although the direct economic impact of the Saharan war on Algeria was small, the indirect cost of maintaining military superiority over Morocco was quite large and contributed significantly to the economic problems and political unrest which Algeria subsequently faced. Though the percentage of the budget going to such war-related expenditures has been much higher for Morocco, with the overall state of the Algerian economy crippled by low oil prices, the impact has perhaps been as great. Recent events have clearly placed the Sahara conflict on a low priority, since the government and people have been so internally focused. Simply put, Algeria is tired of supporting the Polisario and popular enthusiasm for the struggle has waned considerably.(25) With the rise of the Islamic fundamentalists and their pressure on the government, their perspective has had to be taken into account: They have primarily a social and economic agenda, not a military and political one. In addition, while sharing support for Sahrawi independence, the FIS is quite taken aback by the prominent leadership of women in the Polisario movement and they have also been influenced by the perspectives of their Saudi benefactors. Further, between 1987 and the Algerian declaration of neutrality in the Gulf War, the Algerian government also got financial support from Saudi Arabia, which conditioned this aid on Algeria pushing for Polisario compromise in the peace process. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1987, Morocco finally acknowledged that its conflict was with the Polisario, not Algeria.(26) In doing so, Morocco admitted that the Polisario was indeed an independent movement, not simply a creation of Algeria, yet this also laid the groundwork for isolating the Polisario from Algeria as relations between the two large neighbors improved.

At the same time, it would be a great exaggeration to imply that Algeria has abandoned the Polisario. In addition to the strategic risks and dangerous precedent should Morocco's annexation be successful, Algeria would lose a lot of credibility among non-aligned Third World countries, which have traditionally looked upon Algeria as a leader. Even the Moroccans acknowledge that Algeria could not abandon the Polisario after putting so much pressure on so many countries to support its cause.(27)

The decline in military aid from Algeria to the Polisario during the late 1980s came more from an Algerian realization that, unlike the past, there were sufficient diplomatic means for forcing a Moroccan withdrawal, so armed struggle was no longer necessary.(28) Military aid was essentially halted as a result of the 1991 cease-fire. Still, all Algerian political parties, including the FIS, are on record supporting the Sahrawi cause and sympathetic pieces continue to appear in Algerian journals and on Algerian broadcasts. The FIS despises King Hassan, and opposes any cooperation between Morocco and the FLN/military government. They want to keep their nemeses divided.(29) The Polisario claims that Algerians have changed their style but not their position. Despite some popular resentment at the costs, there is still grassroots ideological support. Some wealthier elements in Algerian society have personal interests in closer ties to Morocco, but they are not influential. The Algerian leadership still openly supports self-determination for Western Sahara. The military has apparently not changed its position, either. In addition, just as Morocco has concerns over what to do with demobilized soldiers from the Sahara, so does Algeria, which has kept a large standing army near the Western Sahara border to protect the refugee camps from threatened Moroccan attacks and fears that returning them unemployed to the urban slums would make them easy recruits for the Islamists.(30)

If the Polisario loses a fair referendum, there is little question that there will be no more support from Algeria and the Polisario and the SADR will cease to exist as significant political actors. With anything less than that, however, it is doubtful that Algeria will totally abandon the Polisario. The problem is that the amount of diplomatic and material aid will not likely return to earlier levels, and - given that Morocco controls the disputed territory and is not being pressured to compromise from other quarters - this may still result in ending the quest for an independent Western Sahara.

CONCLUSION

Even if the merits of international law are on the side of the Polisario, or any other party in a similar conflict, they need to be influential themselves or have influential backers to give their case a fair hearing. Like Western Sahara, East Timor was also invaded in 1975 as it was becoming free from colonial rule, but the FRETILIN government did not have a powerful backer in Southeast Asia as the Western Sahara had from its influential neighbor Algeria.

Not only is the Polisario overmatched militarily, but they continue to be overly dependent on Algeria, which is far too distracted by its internal crises to muster effective leadership at this critical juncture. Indeed, the flow of arms from Algeria, already reduced, has essentially been halted since the cease-fire. By contrast, Morocco has far more freedom of action, given its usefulness to France, the United States, the Gulf monarchies, and whatever Maghrebi regime with which it may be courting favor at a given time. In addition, the stakes for the Moroccan government are much higher and popular support for the cause is much greater than in Algeria. Indeed, there is an assumption in diplomatic circles in Rabat that King Hassan would lose his throne if he lost the referendum.(31)

In short, a fair referendum, as sensible a solution as it is, is based on the premise of a more balanced power relationship than actually exists. This phenomenon goes beyond just Algeria's troubles. Morocco's successes at derailing the agreement and the failure of the Polisario's calls for rigorous enforcement of the agreement can be attributed in part to the changing international balance. The fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the international debt crisis has significantly reduced the political leverage of non-aligned Third World countries at the United Nations, which have traditionally been the strongest supporters of the Polisario and Sahrawi self-determination. Meanwhile, the West, which has been far more tolerant and sometimes outrightly supportive of Morocco and its irredentist designs, now has far more clout in the United Nations and other international forums.

Though most independent observers believe that a fair vote would go in favor of independence, the political balance is decisively in Morocco's favor. The international community is focused on the demanding problems of Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Tom Porteus, writing in Middle East International, stated, "this leaves the Moroccan monarch, who simply cannot afford to lose the referendum, with a free hand to ensure that it goes his way."(32) Indeed, it appears that King Hassan has not significantly altered the position he has held since 1981 - that is to give verbal support for the referendum while indefinitely delaying its implementation with the assurance that the international community will not apply sufficient pressure to deter his refusal to implement it. Failure of the Security Council to invoke Article 25 of the UN Charter to make UN decisions binding on Morocco in order to insure its full cooperation has made the prospects of successful implementation of the peace plan highly unlikely. Indeed, had the international community responded forcefully to Morocco's initial invasion, the many years of war and tense diplomacy could have been avoided.

Supporters of Sahrawi self-determination and of the peace plan had assumed that in his acceptance, King Hassan had boxed himself into a comer. It now appears that the international community is letting him get out. UN officials admit it may be years before the situation is resolved. And time appears to be on the side of the Moroccan occupation.

NOTES

(1.) Lothar Heinrich, "Edging Slowly Toward Peace," The Middle East, April 1989, p. 21. (2.) Joe Stork, "North Africa Faces the 1990s," Middle East Reports, (March-April 1990), #163, p. 6-8 (3.) See the comments by SADR President Muhammad Abdelaziz as reported in West Africa, 13 June 1988. (4.) Le Monde, 3 August 1988. (5.) Daniel Volman, Memorandum on Proposed U.S. Arms Sales to Morocco, (Washington,: Institute for Policy Studies, 1979), 3-4, citing The Military Balance 1979-1980, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979). (6.) Based on interviews and observations during author's visit to the military zones to the south of Tindouf, Algeria, June 1987. (7.) New York Times, 7 July 1978. (8.) Baltimore Sun, 31 October 1979. (9.) Interview with Madjid Abdullah, SADR Representative at the United Nations, January 1991. (10.) Some leftist critics, for example, prefer to call Algeria's orientation as "populist military state capitalism" (Pauline Lalutte, "Sahara: Notes Toward an Analysis", MERIP Reports, #45, March 1976, p.10). (11.) Background briefing, Moroccan Foreign Ministry, Rabat, June 1990. (12.) Robert Mortimer, "The internationalization of the Conflict in Western Sahara," Middle East Annual, Vol. II, Boston: B & G Hall, p. 131. (13.) New York Times, 22 October 1981. (14.) Richard P. Parker, North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns, New York: Praeger, 1987, pp. 109-110. (15.) Mortimer, op. cit., p. 131. (16.) Background briefing by senior European diplomat at United Nations, May 1990. (17.) Ibid, p. 109. (18.) Cited in Jim Paul, "Games Imperialists Play," MERIP Reports, #45, March 1976, p. 17. (19.) William Zartman, cited in Mortimer, op. cit., p. 131. (20.) See the comments by SADR President Muhammad Abdelaziz as reported in West Africa, 13 June 1988, 1060. (21.) Yahia Zoubir, "Solution Needed for Western Sahara," New African, June 1989, p. 38. (22.) Yahia Zoubir and Daniel Volman, "Back to Battle," New African, March 1990, p. 19. (23.) Abdullah, op. cit. (24.) Paul Delaney, "Why Morocco and Algeria are Tired of War," New York Times, 15 January 1989. (25.) Barbara G.B. Ferguson and Tim Kennedy, "North Africa at Risk as Western Sahara Peace Plan Stalls," The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Vol. XI, No. 3, (August/September 1992), p. 50. (26.) The reason for this shift, say the Moroccans, is that with the increasing differences between the FLN and the Algerian government, the Polisario had become more autonomous. (Background briefing, Foreign Ministry, Rabat). (27.) Ibid. (28.) Interview with an Algerian diplomat to the United Nations, May 1990. (29.) Background briefing, Madrid, June 1990. (30.) Delaney, op. cit. (31.) Kim Murphy, "Moroccan Throne Appears at Stake in a Historic Western Sahara Vote," Los Angeles Times, 9 November 1991. (32.) Tom Porteus, "Polisario's Weak Hand," Middle East International, 28 June 1991, p. 14.