Al-la nidam: an Arab view of the new world (dis)order.

RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR GLOBAL ORDER coexists with the specter of global disorder in the Post-Cold War world. A prime function of global order would be to balance the North's ever-growing scramble for profits, markets and military superiority with the demands of various peoples in the South for political, cultural, economic, spiritual, and environmental relevance and self-determination. This essay shows that the Middle East, especially its Arab component, represents a microcosm of unfolding global disorder. It identifies trends specific to that disorder and suggests options for its arrest.

Out of these troubled times...a new world order can emerge... free from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. (George Bush, speech to the US Congress, 9 September 1990)(1)

THE SEARCH FOR WORLD ORDER. FROM THE BALANCE OF TERROR TO THE TERROR OF IMBALANCE

Humanity's search for order(2) - norms and structures conducive to more or less harmonious co-existence - is not new. The search for order in the Middle East is attested to by the deluge of divine revelations in the Holy Land. The Judaic, Christian and Islamic messages are all quintessential attempts and quests for universal peace, justice and order. Expounders of Christian and Islamic orthodoxies continue to be the bearers of the universalistic ideals inherent in both faiths. St. Thomas Aquinas' idea of a universal community bound together by Christianity is one example. Similar universalistic ideals are articulated in the Qur'an: "Humankind, we have created you from a single pair of a male and female and we made you into tribes and peoples (communities) that you might get to know one another."(3)

Yet for all their unrelenting and perennial search for order, Middle Easterners, perhaps more than most other peoples, have historically tended to experience more disorder than order. Even ideals and beliefs which Middle Easterners exported to Europe (via Christianity) where used against them in the Crusades and then the consecutive European colonial expeditions of the 19th Century under the guise of missions civilisatrices. The kernel of the problem is that:

(i) However sound their supporting ideologies may have been, most, if not all, past international orders have been structurally flawed owing to lingering and inveterate parochialisms - national, cultural, economic and ideological. This is also true of the post-W.W.I international order which established the sanctity of what Richard Falk calls the "Westphalian template of sovereign states"(4) (which was boosted by President Wilson's support for colonized peoples, rights for self-determination), and of the post-World War II order with its East-west ideological split. Any past order can be said to have been, by definition and by practice, nothing less than the universalization of hegemonic particularisms.

(ii) The movement toward universalistic ideals, norms, structures and codes of behavior has been vitiated by the inherently lingering and unfettered particularisms of competing nation-states. Nation-states, aided by international law and transnational agencies, have proliferated since the 1950s, a date coeval with decolonization, becoming the universalistic norm of social organization.

(iii) Whatever the outward permutations of the distribution of power ratios, consecutive international orders have also carried a degree of disorder, at least in the eyes of the dissatisfied. The imposition of a hegemonic particularistic order, usually masked by universalistic norms and structures, remains, by dint of marginalization of the powerless actors, wanting with regard to legitimacy, justice, equality, peace and universalism. In the Arab and Islamic Middle East, the crises of legitimacy, justice, equality and peace are closely associated with the notion of global disorder.

(iv) As in previous orders, power continues to be understood in a cultist sense. The guardians and guarantors of order have been those actors who dispose of quantitative and qualitative military superiority, although economic might is fast becoming a significant variable.

What are the characteristics of the unfolding global disorder or of the so-called "New World Order"? Although the notion of global disorder is generally associated with the waning and eventual collapse of the former Soviet Union, for Arabs it is coeval with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent UN-mandated, mostly Arab-funded, US-led forces' 43-day sustained and devastating bombing campaign that led to the "liberation" of Kuwait.

Two mutually reinforcing factors are at the core of the unfolding global disorder. Firstly, the former Soviet Union's disintegration has left a power vacuum, the corollary of which has been a movement from bipolarity to unipolarity. In other words, the asymmetries resulting from the absence of the former Soviet Union's balancing role can be said to have, inter alia, spawned a situation akin to a terror of imbalance. If bipolarity found equality in power balance and, later on, in its balance of terror variant (MAD), the post-Cold War world is lacking in such a balance. Not only is unipolarity undesirable, but also continuous blind faith in military means to maintain a modicum of world peace defeats the very purpose of peace. Secondly, the dissolution of the former Soviet Union has led to a greater US preponderance in world affairs, giving her a freer hand to meddle in the South and within the United Nations.

ILLUSIONS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER

From the outset George Bush's proclamation of a "New World Order" has, in the eyes of many Arabs, portended adversity. The historical divide following the second Gulf War could not have been wider. What is hailed in the West as a victory is by most Arab accounts a defeat, or what Mohamed Hasanayn Heikal calls "illusions of triumph".(5) The US has finally cast aside the "Vietnain syndrome", and since the Soviet Union's dissolution the American Right has declared "the end of history"(6) and the triumph of capitalism and liberalism. While many Arabs find consolation in Kuwait's restored sovereignty, they are still pained by the devastation, the divisiveness, and the moral, material and environmental(7) defeat brought about by the war. Arab-American scholar, Naseer Aruri, sees the war effort leading to the Coalition's victory in terms of a "recolonization of the Arab world".(8) Hence,

The justification for the Gulf war was self-evident to most Americans and Britons, but less so to Arabs, including many in countries which supported the Coalition. President Bush emerged with his image enhanced, but most Arabs found it hard to share the West's euphoria.(9)

In the same vein, for many Arabs, the West's notion of world order leaves much to be desired. Disorder, akin to a kind of ordered chaos, is the order as far as they are concerned. The Arab term al-la nidam(10) conveys absence of order and imparts the idea of al-fawda (disorder, chaos). The Arab perspective tends toward disowning the "New World Order" for two interconnected reasons. Firstly, Arabs, like many other peoples, yet again find themselves on the periphery of such an order. As such the "New Order", being like its predecessors designed in Westem chancelleries and presidential palaces, is not expected to be more favorable. Former Arab League observer at the UN, Clovis Maksoud notes:

This new global order was basically an order defined and determined by the Western part of the globe. The Southern part of the globe, whose input, aspirations and rights are not yet factored into this new order ... began to sense that perhaps the globe is solely defined as the North. But the South, which represents the majority of mankind . . . began to sense its disenfranchisement and potential dispossession.(11)

Secondly, disorder is associated with unpredictability, paralysis and inefficiency. Thus little or no confidence is held in the existing global system, especially with regard to solving unresolved Arab problems:

In the light of this disorder, it is impossible to forecast either the future of world peace or of the global system. By disorder it is meant the explosion of problems that the institutional and organizational apparatuses of the existing international system are unable to solve.(12)

It is generally accepted that George Bush's proclaimed New World Order is little more than a reincarnation of the old order. What is new in Southern Lebanon, the Golan Heights, Gaza and the West Bank? What is new in the regional imbalance of power where nuclear Israel conquers and rules? Even with such historical developments started by the Madrid Peace talks, through to the Oslo-Cairo agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty, and the Israeli-Syrian negotiations over the Golan Heights, much remains unchanged. What about the imbalances associated with wealth and deprivation? Arabs cannot understand how a New World Order can be prefaced by the disorder unleashed by high-tech violence on an ancient Arab center of civilization (Babylonian and Abbasid). The promised "principles of justice and fair play"(13) of the New World Order are yet to materialize. Accordingly, Arab contempt and suspicion persist.

TRENDS OF DISORDER

If balanced is a correlate of order, then imbalance and contradiction are correlates of disorder. The second Gulf War has not only heralded a new stage of uncertainty in the Middle East, but has also acted as a harbinger of trends antithetical to the highly-principled proclamations associated with the New World Order, and to international trends of democratization and disarmament. In this section four major contradictory trends are examined.

Contradiction 1: The persistence of Western direct and indirect support of authoritarianism in the Arab Middle East betrays the democratic claims and practices of the guardians of the New World Order.

The Gulf War was not fought under the banner of democracy. Yet the Bush administration was quick to demonize Saddain Hussein and the authoritarian practices of his mukhabarat (police) state. Like Nasser during the 1956 Suez crisis,(14) Hussein was likened to Hitler. Such a comparison is far-fetched and would not pass the test of objectivity. Hussein's technologically-dependent Iraq cannot be compared to Hitler's industrialized Germany. While it is certain that the latter's actions were motivated by imperialist ambitions, racism and notions of Aryan supremacy, it cannot be safely assumed that the former was driven by illusions of Babylonian grandeur or ethnic superiority.(15) And Hussein's murderous record is no match to Hitler's calculated genocide. While the leader of Iraq was not a Hitler, he certainly was a leader with megalomaniac instincts, and a dictator that the West originally supported against a "bigger evil" - Iran - conveniently choosing to overlook his regime's human rights violations. And again, in 1990, it was only for the sake of convenience that the West chose to take notice of Halbaja and the gassing of Kurds and other atrocities against the Iraqi people. This point has not been missed by Noam Chomsky:

The US is one of the major violators of the principles now grandly proclaimed .... George Bush warms of appeasing aggressors and clutches to his heart the Amnesty International (AI) report on Iraqi atrocities (after 2 August), but not AI reports on El Salvador, Turkey, Indonesia, and the Israeli Occupied Territories.(16)

More than four years have passed since the West's "triumph" in the Gulf. Yet as far as human rights and democratization are concerned there has been nothing to celebrate for either Arabs or the guardians of the proclaimed New World Order. In fact, despite encouraging democratic gains in Jordan and Yemen,(17) the trend has generally been one of persistent authoritarianism - a trend which is antithetical to the so-called global democratic revolution. Many Arabs have pinned high hopes on this global transformative process, and many among the intelligentsia have been crying for a response to it.(18) However, the Western response to Arab democratization has been less than enthusiastic.

A number of crucial points explain why the West would rather put the question of Arab democratization on the backburner:

(i) The West will not tolerate the fall or overthrow of friendly Arab regimes, especially those sitting on vast oil reserves. One shah's fall is one too many. The West will, in accordance with its interests, guarantee the survival of friendly regimes even when they are unelected and autocratic. Such protege regimes, being almost invariably representatives of international capitalism and ruling without the input of a democratic opposition and virtually free from societal and constitutional restraints, engage unhindered in concessionary (military facilities and low oil prices) and beneficial deals with the West (subsidization of the Westem military industrial complex and petrodollar recycling).(19) The West is no beacon of democracy in the Middle East.(20) The nonchalance toward democracy, which besmirched the U.S. messianic role and international reputation, led many Arabs to conclude that the U.S. commitment is not to democracy or human rights but to the status quo. Pro-Western authoritarian Arab regimes permit the US far more leverage and patronage than would be possible through Arab democratic regimes.(12) The Arab members of the U.S.-led coalition were no democratic models, and were motivated by self-interest.(22) Arab (and non-Arab) conspiratorial theorizing regards oil as the motivating factor for the Western members of the coalition.(23)

(ii) The execution of a war with devastating human,(24) financial and environmental(25) consequences resulted in the restoration of a Kuwaiti autocratic oligarchy. This stands in sharp contrast with the West's tough stance against to despots elsewhere (such as in Haiti). A sense of deja vu is strong with regard to this double standard, expressed in Jeanne Kirkpatrick's distinction between "bad" and "good" dictators.(26) The October 1992 elections restored parliamentary life in Kuwait. Yet women and badw (stateless Arabs) remained excluded. By excluding them, the patriarchal Sabahs have in fact reneged on the promise to increase political freedoms made in the Kuwait Popular Congress held in October 1990 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.(27) This exclusion is unconstitutional. Article 29 of Kuwait's constitution insists on the "equality of citizens before the law," according all "rights and duties" regardless of sex, race or religion. The witch-hunt that took place after Kuwaiti independence was restored went almost unnoticed in the corridors of power in Western capitals. Thousands of Arabs were made to pay for a minority's collaboration with the Iraqi invaders. State torture, killing, deportation and confiscation of property were committed against innocent workers who helped develop Kuwait. Many of the victims were Kuwaiti-born. Similarly, human rights violations by key Western allies (Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco) drew little criticism except for the perfunctory treatment given in the U.S. State Department's annual country reports.(28) In these countries, the personalized nature of Arab politics has made democratic initiatives inherently tentative or retractable, especially when the rules, procedures and ends of the democratic game clash with the rulers' interests.(29)

A classic case of Western confusion and disinterest with regard to Arab democratization was the U.S. response to the cancellation in January 1992 of the results of Algeria's first multiparty parliamentary elections. The initial response, read on 13 January by White House spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler, was clearly supportive of the coup, describing it as "constitutional". The following day, seeking to alleviate the damage and embarrassment caused by the previous statement, Tutwiler announced to a startled media that the U.S. would not comment further on the constitutionality, or lack thereof, of the Algerian military takeover.(30) Western governments know where their interests and sympathies lie - certainly not with Arab democratization. According to one Western commentator, "by neither criticizing nor approving the Algerian army's action, Western countries cloak their real attitude - that democracy is fine up to a certain point."(31) The idea is that "sovereign" Algerians cannot be allowed to elect Islamists (supposedly anti-democratic) who appeared on the verge of winning a majority. It is, however, quite acceptable for Western citizens to vote into office leaders (supposedly democratic) who, if need be, are prepared to go to war and bomb cities back to the Stone Age in the name of the national interest. A clear case of this double standard is the vigor with which U.S. leaders have pursued the restoration of democracy in Haiti. As Edward Said puts it:

For two generations the United States has sided in the Middle East mostly with tyranny and injustice. No struggle for democracy, or women's rights, or secularism and the rights of minorities has the United States officially supported.(32)

(iii) Not only is democracy perennially quarantined when dealing with Arab autocracies, but also with the United Nations. The convenient "hijacking" of the UN Security Council(33) by a minority of powerful interests goes against the majoritarian democratic principle. As a result, the credibility of both the UN and the proposed New World Order are at stake. Malaysia's Prime Minister, a vociferous critic of the inequitable international system, expresses disillusiomnent with the international body. He questions the logic of the global push for democracy within national units but not among them:

In the United Nations we are equal, but five are more equal than the rest .... Seven countries on their own lay down the laws which affect adversely the economies of others. A few nations on their own have taken it upon themselves to determine the New World Order.(34)

This is the sort of democratic deficiency that facilitates belligerence. Were it not for such deficiency, Western powers would not, as Richard Falk observes, have been able to "turn the [UN] ... into an instrument legitimizing a war that could and should have been avoided".(35) Responsibility for the fact that the war was not avoided lies equally with the totalitarian nature of Ba'athism and Hussein's personalist rule. The Iraqi dictator placed himself in the difficult position whereby his endeavors for conditional withdrawal from Kuwait could not be reconciled with the coalition's demand for an unconditional withdrawal. Even if Hussein is to be assumed "insane" as was proclaimed in many Western circles, it was impossible for him not to have foreseen the consequential destruction to his country by the formidable firepower arrayed against Iraq. Accordingly, Iraq's search for a way out must not be overlooked. David Campbell cites the myriad of Iraqi proposals, made both directly and through third parties, to avoid a military confrontation.(36) However, the desire of the U.S. and its allies to avoid war must be questioned. Ramsey Clark showed that the destruction of the Iraqi military machine was one of three definite goals motivating the coalition's pursuit of the military option.(37) What logical explanation exists for the U.S. rejection of the Soviet initiative which finally secured Iraq's agreement to an unconditional withdrawal? Confusion about this did not even escape the American military: "As one of Schwarzkopf's officers observed, `the Soviets [were] talking about getting us exactly what we asked for, and we summarily turned them down.'"(38)

Contradiction 2: The international community's juggling of double standards stands in contrast to the New World Order's "principles of justice and fair play".(39)

In the Middle East, the underdogs (Kurds, Palestinians. . . ) of the embattled and stillborn New World Order balk at any suggestion of justice. The bitter experiences of the past have not been encouraging. They have become the "football" of high diplomacy. The September 1993 Israeli blitzkrieg into Southern Lebanon has only reinforced their cynicism. Arabs, and the Lebanese in particular, wondered how could such repeated flagrant transgression of international law and the UN Charter, which caused so much dislocation (nearly 300,000 Muslim Shiites fled their homes) and death (more than 100 civilians), go unpunished?(40) In short, many of them still ask: Why has the international system that many Arabs supported in 1991 against one fellow Arab country (Iraq) on behalf of another (Kuwait) consistently failed to support them?

The "victim syndrome" is deeply entrenched. Arabs almost invariably view themselves to be first in line when punishment is meted out and last when justice is distributed. The examples are numerous. Crippling embargoes are in place against Libya and Iraq. Libya is punished (UN Resolution 731 of January 1992) for failing to hand over two of her nationals to stand trial in Europe or the U.S. for their alleged role in the December 1988 Lockerbie Pan Am airliner disaster, and her alleged bombing in 1989 of a French UTA plane over Niger. Iraq is punished (through a series of UN resolutions, with 678 - which sanctioned the use of force - being still the most controversial) for continuous violation of UN resolutions, including suspected partial non-compliance with those concerning the destruction of all her chemical and nuclear weaponry capabilities and installations.

Inconsistencies with, regard to conflict resolution are conspicuous, for little or no distributive justice has been forthcoming. Resolutions 242 and 338, the terms of reference most commonly cited, yet least important,(41) for addressing the Palestinian question, remain unfulfilled. Although much hope has, in certain circles, been pinned on the 13 September 1993 Israeli-PLO mutual recognition and Declaration of Principles (DOP) and the subsequent peace talks, thus far little progress has been made as evidenced by the difficulties surrounding many aspects of Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho.(42) Many Palestinians reject the DOP on the grounds that it lends itself to manipulation by the U.S. and Israel and is designed to serve their interests rather than those of the Palestinians. They assert that a genuine peace can only be achieved through recognition of their rights as stipulated in the UN Charter and various UN resolutions. Resolution 425, the legal framework for Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, remains only ink on paper.(43)

Inversion of international norms and values is exemplified in the lack of political will to respond with the same zeal toward anti-Arab aggression. No punitive action or compensation was ever considered when in February 1973 Israel shot down the Libyan Arab Airlines Boeing 727 over occupied Sinai, killing all 104 passengers on board.(44) Former U.S. President Reagan described as legitimate the Israeli raid on the Tunis PLO headquarters in October 1985. That Tunisian sovereignty was violated and more than 70 people were killed did not seem to matter much. America's April 1986 bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi from British bases was not without wide sympathy amongst Western governments.

Most recently, the bombing of Iraq for her alleged plot to assassinate former U.S. President George Bush has baffled many Arabs. First, Kuwait, which investigated the alleged plot has a credibility problem. John Macarthur's Second Front(45) is living testimony. Second, Bush has not been killed. Third, why should the attempt on the life of a private American citizen spur state action by excessive means against another? A covert operation to kill Saddam Hussein is known to have been contemplated as one American option for ridding Iraq of her tyrannical leader. Arabs could not help noticing how the case of fellow Arab League member, Somalia, in which swift retaliation by the U.S. followed warlord General Aideed's killing of Pakistani troops, presented a stark contrast to UN and U.S. inaction in Bosnia.(46)

Contradiction 3: Continuous increases in armaments and violence do not bode well for the proclaimed peace of the embattled New World Order.

The end of the Cold War is least conspicuous in the Middle East where historical protagonists still view one another with suspicion. This situation has not been helped by the Western arms suppliers who scramble continuously for petrodollars in the lucrative Middle Eastern arms bazaar.(47) Recently, for instance, the British Tornado Company has been saved from closure by a Saudi contract to purchase 70 of its jet fighters. In general, the trend in the Middle East to arm and rearm is antithetical to the more or less downward global trend of military expenditures.(48) While total Middle Eastern military expenditures have fallen slightly, mostly because of the UN embargo on Iraq, the oil-rich states have increased theirs. Two factors are central to this increase: ". . . costs accrued in the war against Iraq [and paid to the Coalition - especially the U.S.] ... and new arms purchases."(49) The Saudi increase is staggering: It jumped from nearly U.S. $15 billion in 1990 to more than 26 billion in 1992 - an 80 per cent increase.(50) The irony is, as the Gulf experience shows, that the billions squandered by the conservative monarchy and the other Gulf quasi-states have not enhanced their security or their self-defense capabilities. Nor will the Saudi's attempt to build a small but fast "high tech" army(51) spare them dependence on the American protective umbrella, which accords with Washington's strategy "to build shared security arrangements in the Gulf".(52) Kuwait entered into a bilateral security agreement with the U.S. in 1991.(52) The other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, except Saudi Arabia, have since followed suit. The Saudis have, however, openly welcomed U.S. involvement in the Arab peninsula as vital for "international trade, balance of power, and oil flow".(54) U.S. involvement in the area will entail "the prepositioning of heavy military equipment in Kuwait".(55)

Simply put, the Arab World cannot be expected to be immune to the heightened state of militarization that characterizes international relations despite "peace-speak". The strategic connectedness between liberal democracy, with its inherently materialistic ethos, and military industrial complexes paradoxically stands to defeat any notion of peace that challenges the West's own notion of self-serving peace equated with outright cultural, economic and military preponderance. Hence, it is no surprise that "the liberal democratic `peace' may be tied to the very tendency of hegemonic leadership to successfully organize and incorporate, above all, liberal democratic states in a strategic-militaly order."(56)

Arabs are very suspicious of the American military entrenchment in the region. Haymanah (hegemony) over Arabs and their oil resources are thought to be the coveted prize of the U.S. strategy.(57) It is hard to presage how the proclaimed New World Order could be "more secure in the quest for peace" with such grand-scale militarization, and narrow and mono-dimensional understandings of security. The tragedy in all of this is the probability that millions of Arab petrodollars will be invested to produce more arms to maim and kill human beings, many of whom will happen to be Middle Eastern children.

Money inserted at one end generates technopower that inflicts one-sided destruction on the other. . . . The "New World Order" will attempt to deepen the vulnerability of the entire non-Western world to Nintendo war, both by widening the technological gap . . . and by increasing the control and surveillance over Third World acquisitions of any weapons that threaten the invulnerability of the West.(58)

In fact it is this kind of Nintendo war that Arab analysts believe has left the Arab World at a critical three-way disadvantage. The destruction of Iraqi capabilities is believed to have tilted the regional balance of power in favor of i) Iran, ii) Turkey, and iii) Israel, with the latter. further widening her competitive edge.(59) According to this analysis, Arabs are left vulnerable to external threats to their water and oil resources, and remain divested of any bargaining power with regard to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.(60)

One aim of the U.S. four-part strategy is to stem the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. The destruction of Iraqi capabilities has thus far been the only undertaking in this regard. Arabs lament this as favorable to Israel. Despite arms control being on the Arab-Israeli peace talks agenda there is no expectation amongst Arab observers that Israel will freeze its nuclear program, as Egypt has done since 1986,(61) or destroy her nuclear arsenal. While Iraq is forced to destroy its mass destruction capabilities, no safeguards have yet been put in place to compel an Israeli non-use of her nuclear weapons against Arabs in future confrontations. For Arabs the leeway given to Israel in this respect is hypocritical. In the early 1970s the U.S. knew of, but chose to ignore, Israel's acquisition of an atomic bomb.(62)

In the Middle East more arms has always meant more violence. This is reflected in the upward spiral of violence and counter-violence visible today within and between national units. The impasse of liberalizing Arab authoritarianism accounts for state violence and Islamist counter-violence in Egypt and Algeria.(63) The latter has increasingly moved toward a praetorian polity reversing the early trend of the state's shrinkage and society's expansion. In both Iran and Turkey, the Kurdish minorities are exposed to high forms of state brutality and cultural suppression. This has been met by violent resistance from a number of Kurdish groups. In northern and southern Iraq, Kurds and Shiites respectively continue to suffer from state reprisals against what is seen by the ruling clique in Baghdad as Western-instigated treason in the aftermath of the second Gulf War. In Israel the "iron fist" policy continues to be employed against Palestinians. Violence between Jewish settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza has not subsided despite the DOP. An unabated war of attrition goes on between the Muslim north and the Christian-animist south in the Sudan(64) and between Moroccan troops and separatist Sahrawis in the Western Sahara.

Violence, or the potential for it between states in the region persists. In the Arabian peninsula, Saudi Arabia has recently advanced a territorial claim against Yemen.(65) This claim is seen as expressive of the monarchy's displeasure with both Yemen's anti-war stance (which is translated in Riyadh as a pro-Iraqi stance), and her incipient democratization which is feared for its future contagious spill-over effects throughout the traditionally authoritarian monarchies. Relations between Saudi Arabia and another oildom, Qatar, a fellow GCC member, have ebbed to their lowest point because of a border dispute. Further fissures in Arab ranks are evident in the "cold" response in the GCC capitals to Iran's renewed designs on the United Arab Emirates-owned islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs, whose final status has remained inconclusive since 1971. In 1993 Iran unilaterally canceled the 1971 agreement that stipulated future joint exploitation of the islands' gas and oil resources.(66) Israel's recent incursion into Lebanon and its occupation of a "security zone" in the country's south and other Arab territories does not bode well for sustainable peace in the area. Hamas (67) and Hizballah (Party of God) remain committed to armed struggle against Israel. Nor has the Iraq-Kuwait border dispute been settled even with Baghdad renouncing territorial claims inside Kuwait. The promise of new peace, like that of a New World Order,(68) looks at this juncture to be "phoney".

Contradiction 4: The open proclamations of the "worldliness" and "universality" of the New World Order contradict its hidden ethnocentric and racist underpinnings.

Arrogance is at the heart of this contradiction. It is the kind of arrogance that finds expression in jingoism. The visionaries of the New World Order are no doubt mostly, if not all, men. And their vision seems to have been largely informed by what feminists have referred to as "militarized masculinity", with its emphasis on violence as the primary means of ensuring order.(70) As noted by one feminist analyst, "The military is the distilled embodiment of patriarchy."(71) Their arrogance is, to a great measure, the by-product of the military victory in the Gulf. Such arrogance was not visible after the Vietnam war. And the messages of "grandeur" stem from the glory of that victory, a Christian God, and His self-assigned "missionaries" of peace and order with their superior scientific-technological culture. Falk captures the essence of these messages pointing out the inherent racism in them, which is evident in: i) "the assumption that God is on the side of the better technology"; ii) the wide belief that "military technology is the real test of civilization"; and iii (the tendency "to associate the evil `other' with non-white, non-Christian peoples".(72)

The monopoly over claims to Godliness and civilization have produced xenophobic reactions in both East and West. There is a wide perception amongst Muslims that with the death of communism, Islam is being demonized, unnecessarily making it the West,s new ideological foe.(73) For Muslims in general, and Islamists in particular, this directly threatens their cultural relevance and freedom. Cultural relevance is equated with identity and existence. Muslims and Arabs have been historically vulnerable to territorial and political division. They have not, however, been divided culturally, owing to Islam's relative resilience to cultural hegemony. Prominent Islamist leader Rachid al-Ghannouchi defines this resilience as the "acceptance of modernity but within the framework of the values of Islam."(74) Islamists oppose wholesale modernization. This stems from lingering suspicion of a process Muslims first encountered through colonial and neo-colonial experiences. For Islamist analysts, the West fears Islam,s stand against oppression and for social justice, and its rejection of the laissez faire ethos that condones pillaging and exploiting the resources and disrespecting the cultures of the powerless.

Muslim concern with cultural relevance in the context of the New World Order is tremendous. Western media domination and a one-way flow of Western information to the Islamic world through sophisticated communication technologies is seen as a kind of cultural "tele-crusade". Islamists fear this media domination propagates "social norms, ways of life, and behaviors in a way that renders the indigenous culture inferior and second-class".(75) The five Western media giants (Time Warner Inc., USA; Bertelsman, Germany; Murdoch's News Corporation Ltd, Australia-USA; Hachette-SA, France; and Capitol Cities/ABC, Inc., USA)(76) have spread their tentacles worldwide. A West is absent. This media monopoly and the lack of a two-way information flow, combined with the frequently negative portrayal of Islam and Muslims by the Western media, has, in the eyes of many Islamists, helped "tarnish the image of Islam,"(77) and largely packaged it as inherently anti-democratic.

The association of Islam with violence is one example of such negative imagery - the "green peril scenario".(78) Robin Wright speaks of the return of "jihad" (holy war).(79) This is unhelpful reductionism. Jihad is a legally, politically and socially complex concept, a thorough explanation of which is beyond the scope of this paper.(80) Broadly speaking, however, holy war is one of two forms of jihad. Al-jihad al-asghar (lesser jihad), holy war, is not as important as al-jihad al-akbar (greater jihad) - spiritual, political, social, economic and intellectual forms of struggle. Islamists engage in one or both struggles. Electoral politics as forms of (greater jihad) - have given way in Algeria to lesser jihad where the state and the outlawed (Islamists engage one another violently. In Egypt, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah (the Islamic Group), being excluded from politics, is visibly engaged in lesser jihad, and without the moderate Muslim Brotherhood's legalization as a political party, things could get worse. In Lebanon, Hizballah has abstained from anti-state/society lesser jihad except against Israel, but engaged in greater jihad through the domestic political process. Hamas does the same in occupied Palestine. In Tunisia, although the banned Harakat al-Nahdha (Renaissance Movement) is coming under increasing pressure to engage in lesser jihad against Ben Ali's regime, its exiled leader, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, remains committed to greater jihad.(81)

There is a growing feeling amongst Islamists that the wide crackdown on Islamist movements throughout the Middle East aims at combating Islam as a political ideology and a medium of liberation from dependent authoritarianism. Western governments certainly appear to condone the crackdown. Western governments, their protege Arab regimes, and Israel are all accused of forming an anti-Islamic power triangle.(82) An Israeli Defense Force-authored document, available at the Israeli Embassy in Canberra, lends credence to this scenario. The 13-page document, entitled "The Danger of Islamic Fundamentalism: Background Material", is a good example of the negative imagery cited in Islamist circles. Amongst many things, it claims that the most prominent assassination in 1992 was that of the Copt spiritual leader, Faraj Foudah, who was considered to be one of the leading opponents of the extremists in Egypt." Faraj Foudah was never a Copt. He was a Muslim and his full name was Mohamed Faraj Foudah. Foudah was a leading secularist, hardly a "spiritual" leader. The document also fails to point out that Islam is not a monolith: Islamic movements are neither homogeneous nor are they united. While some engage in anti-Copt, anti-tourist, anti-West violence, they engage in anti-Muslim violence, too. The warring Islamists of Afghanistan are instructive in this regard. Other Islamists reject violence. The ballot, not the bullet, is their preferred modus operandi. Thus: To ignore these facts and claim that all Islamic movements are "fundamentalist". . . [and] against the West, is a gross misrepresentation of reality. Those who insist on it are either misguided or prisoners of a Cold War mentality.(83)

LOOKING AHEAD

The trends and imbalances of disorder are clearly manifest in the Middle East. Arresting and redressing them requires such vital human traits as trust, care, tolerance, mutuality, reciprocity, equality, honesty and reconciliation. For this, human beings do not need a New World Order. Rather, the New World Order requires these qualities in human beings for it to be orderly. As regards the trends identified above they can be dealt with through:

i) Stressing the importance of democratic values and procedures for state-society relations, and state-state relations. This has relevance for minorities, for gender relations, for civil society, for governance, and for power (a positive sum game as distinct from a zero sum game) in the Middle East. It also has relevance for the UN and genuine representation and operation. Societies, not just states, should be involved in the UN.(84) Any gains for democracy are gains for peace. However, it should also be noted that no democracy is complete without economic democracy, which has relevance for equity and justice. Australia, the aspiring "clever country", could play a role by promoting, while not imposing, democracy and human rights abroad. The "clever country's" potential is not limited to sheep and wheat.

ii) Distributing justice to the dispossessed Palestinians and other aggrieved peoples in the region through peaceful means. This has relevance for self-determination which is in essence a democratic norm. Strength and impartiality of the UN are essential if justice is to take hold.

iii) Demilitarizing the Middle East. This has internal and external relevance. Internally, many Middle Eastern polities cry for demilitarization. The military belongs in the barracks and not in government. Regional authoritarianisms are closely linked to militarized polities. Externally, demilitarization would mean confidence-building Measures between historical protagonists. The civil economies would benefit from the freeing of huge and badly-needed financial and human resources currently monopolized by the military. Demilitarization also has relevance for non-violence. A reconceptualization of security is needed so as to encompass economic, environmental and spiritual dimensions. One proposal for lasting security is the emphasis of "community-sponsored and guaranteed security" and its indigenization to make it the shared business and enterprise of Middle Easterners, not outsiders.(85) Another possibility is a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean/Middle East.(86)

iv) "Delinking Islam and terrorism,"(87) and concentrating on the common bonds that connect peoples of various faiths and backgrounds, and accepting cultural differences. And no bond is greater than the human one. This has humanist relevance. For human beings happen to be Muslim, Christian, Jewish, or Hindu. They are not Muslim, Christian, Jewish and Hindu who happen to be human beings.

However desirable the above vision may be, the reality is one of persistent disorder. Unless self-determination, democracy, and a culture of nonviolence and accommodation between and within communities and states are fostered, the gap between what should be and what could be will remain too wide to warrant optimism about deconstructing the foundations of disorder and reconstructing the foundations of order in the Middle East.

NOTES

(1.) As quoted in Thomas H. Henriksen, The New World Order: War, Peace and Military Preparedness (Stanford: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1992), p. 1. (2.) The notion of "World Order" - globalism, worldism, universalism - is a conceptualization that has gained both comprehensiveness and wide circulation since World War I and II, the bloodiest chronicles in human history. The notion, however, appears to have had roots in ancient sacred and secular thinking. The Marxist ideal of an internationally-united proletariat transcending eventually-withering nationalism and nation-states is one example. Hedley Bull cites many others, such as the Kantian universalistic tradition and the Grotian/internationalist tradition. See The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1990), chapter 2. (3.) Qur'an, 49:13. Universalistic sentiments are also articulated by, for instance, the medieval Arab poet, Abu al-'Ala al-Ma'arri, who deems religion to be divisive. Another, Muhi al-Din Ibn Arabi, expresses more or less identical views intimating that love for humankind is his religion. (4.) Richard Falk, "World Order Conception and the Peace Process", in Elise Boulding, ed., Building Peace in the Middle East: Challenges for States and Civil Society (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, (1994), p. 190. (5.) Mohammed Heikal, Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992). See also Earl H. Tilford, Jr., "The Meaning of Victory in Operation Desert Storm: A Review Essay", in Political Science Quarterly, 108, 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 327-331. (6.) See, for instance, Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin Books, 1992). (7.) See "Tchernubeel al-Khaleej" [The Gulfs Chernobyl], in Al-Hawadith, 5 April 1991, pp. 14-15. (8.) Naseer Aruri, "The Recolonisation of the Arab World", in Middle East International, no. 385, 12 October 1990, pp. 18-19. (9.) Heikal, Illusions of Triumph, p. 7. (10.) See, for instance, "Usuliat fi kulli makan. . . Limada?" [Fundamentalisms everywhere... Why?], in Al-Shuruq, no. 54 15-21 April 1993, pp. 12-21. (11.) Clovis Maksoud, "The Healing Process Begins", in American-Arab Affairs, no. 35 (Winter 1990-91), p. 56. (12.) Muhammad al-Sayyid Sa`id, Mustaqbil al-Nidam al-'Arabi Ba'da Azmati al-Khaleej [The Future of the Arab Regional System in the Aftermath of the Gulf Crisis] (Kuwait: Alim al-Ma'rifa, 1992), p. 242. (13. Richard K. Herrmann, "The Middle East and the New World Order", in International Security, 16, 2 (Fall 1991), p. 42. (14.) Eden changed his mind and "wrote to Eisenhower that he [did] not think Nasser a Hitler, but that the parallel with Mussolini [was] close". See Ritchie Ovendale, The Middle East Since 1914 (London: Longman, 1992), p. 75. (15.) See Robert Springborg's criticism of the Hitler thesis, "Selling War in the Gulf', in St. John Kettle and Stephanie Dowrick, eds., After the Gulf War: For Peace in the Middle East (Leichardt, Sydney: Pluto Press, 1991), pp. 26-43. (16.) Noam Chomsky, "The U.S. and the Gulf Crisis", in Haim Bresheeth and Nira Yuval-Davis, eds., The Gulf War and the New World Order (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1991), p. 19. (17.) Since reunification in 1990, Yemen has slowly but progressively liberalized polity and society. Jordan's incipient democratization was inaugurated in the November 1989 elections. Further democratization initiatives saw the introduction of the National Charter, a supplement to the constitution, enshrining rights for both the citizenry and the Crown. In 1993, party politics were resumed with the legalization of political parties for the first time in nearly 30 years. The November 1993 elections produced a pluralist parliament. (18.) Suad al-Sabah, "al-Thawrat al-Thalatha" [The Three Revolutions], in Ash-shiraa', no. 421, 16 April 1990, p. 32. (19.) Saudi Arabia is a classic example. The stationing of the Coalition troops on her soil contrasts with the Kingdom's long-standing reluctance to grant such concessions. In the mid-1950s and the early 1960s the U.S. deployed strategic bombers at Dhahran to deter Soviet and Egyptian aggression scenarios. See C. Madison, "Mastering the Game", in National Journal, 3 November 1990, p. 251. The U.S. had no problem securing funds from the Saudis for "Desert Shield", with King Fahd reported to have told visiting James Baker that "his government [would] pay all the monthly in-country costs of the U.S. troops...." See details in W. Mossberg and P. Truell, "Arab Allies of the U.S. Promise Billions to Help Cover Pentagon's Expenses", in The Wall Street Journal, 10 September 1990. The pliancy of the Saudis encouraged U. S. legislators to make further requests through George Bush - namely, the reduction of oil prices (whatever happened to market forces?!). See "Senators Call on Saudis to Reduce Oil Prices", in East Asia/Pacific Wireless File 193, (U.S. Information Service) 4 October 1990, p. 19. (20.) Recall that the U.S. was behind the overthrow of the Mossadeq Government in August 1953. (21.) For instance, Jordan suffered greatly, with her U.S. aid suspended, as a result of her anti-U.S.-led forces' deployment stance, and her favoring of a diplomatic solution to the crisis. These stances were, in great measure, influenced by a democratically-elected Lower House and an anti-war public opinion. Tim Niblock observes that Arab states which opposed the coalition forces' deployment were those in which democratic initiatives were being taken (Jordan, Yemen, Algeria). See his article, "The Need for a New Western Arab Order", in Middle East International, no. 385, 12 October 1990, p. 17. (22.) Dina Haseeb and Malak S. Rouchdy illustrate this, pointing out the pecuniary motives of Egypt (which also applied to Syria). See "Egypt's Speculations in the Gulf Crisis: The Government's Policies and the Opposition Movements", in Bresheeth and Yuval-Davis, eds., The Gulf War, pp. 70-79. (23.) Sami Yousif, "The Iraqi-US War: A Conspiracy Theory", ibid., pp. 51-69. Still on the subject of conspiracy, according to Mohamed Heikal Libya's strongman, Qaddafi, believed in a conspiracy telling former Algerian leader, Chadli Benjedid, "I am haunted by a feeling that it's all arranged." (I.e., Saddam Hussein was implementing a U.S. plan). See Illusions of Triumph, p. 21. (24.) See, for instance, Ramsey Clark, The Fire this Time: US. War Crimes in the Gulf (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1992). See also Needless Deaths in the Gulf, War: Civilian Casualties During the Air Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991). (25.) For a detailed report on environmental damage associated with the Gulf War, particularly concerning the use of chemical weapons, see Sue Mayer and Paul Johnson, Chemical Weapons and Their Effects on the Environment, Greenpeace Environment Briefing (London: Greenpeace, February 1991). See also Andrew R. G. Price, Possible Environmental Threats from the Current Gulf War (York: University of York, 1991). (26.) Noam Chomsky, referring to a similar convenient distinction, notes: "It is fashionable to distinguish between `authoritarian' and `totalitarian' regimes.... A regime is `totalitarian', hence the essence of evil, if it restricts `economic freedom', a term that does not refer to the freedom of workers or communities to control production, but rather to the freedom for private business. .. to conduct its affairs without constraint. If it does not restrict the freedom to invest and exploit, a state is at worst `authoritarian'. This distinction has little relation to the concern of the regime for the welfare of the population." See his Towards A New Cold War (London: Sinclair Browne Ltd, 1982), p. 6. (27.) A popular joke underscores the rulers' slowness to respond on Kuwaiti women's demands for enfranchisement. It states that the quickest decision the amir has ever made was to escape Kuwait on the eve of the Iraqi invasion. (28.) For details of human rights violations in these countries, see country reports in Huquq al-Insan fi al-Watan al-Arabi [Human Rights in the Arab Homeland] (Cairo: Arab Human Rights Organization, 1992 and 1993). (29.) For examples of Arab democratic reversals and breakdowns see Larbi Sadiki, Progress and Retrogression in Arab Democatization (East Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1992). A shorter version of this monograph can also be found in Journal of Arabic, Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, 1, 1 (September 1993), pp. 80-103. (30.) East Asia/Pacific Wireless File 009, 14 January 1992, pp. 14-15. (31.) Jim Hoagland, "Washington's Algerian Dilemma", in The Washington Post, 6 February 1992. Another excellent article is by David Ignatius, "Islam in the West's Sights: The Wrong Crusade?", in The Washington Post, 8 March 1992. For the U.S. response with regard to the restoration of democracy in Haiti, see "Restoring Democracy in Haiti: Persistence and Patience", State Dispatch, 3,8 (24 February 1992), pp. 132-133. (32.) Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Chatto & Windus, 1993), p. 363. (33.) For details of how the Security Council was manipulated to secure resolutions to use force against Iraq, see Keith Suter, "The United Nations and the Gulf Conflict", in Kettle and Dowrick, eds., After the Gulf War, pp. 56-66. Arab suspicion of, and frustration with, the UN are articulated by `Abd al-'Alim Mohamed Abd al-'Alim, "Al-Umam al-Muttahida wa Harb al-Khaleej" [The United Nations and the Gulf War], in Qira 'at Siyasiyyah, 2, 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 101-119. (34.) In UN Chronicle (March 1992), p. 29. (35.) Richard Falk, "Reflections on Democracy and the Gulf War", in Alternatives, 16 (1991), p. 267. (36.) David Campbell, Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1993), pp. 62-64. See also Michael McKinley, ed., The Gulf War: Critical Perspectives (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994). (37.) Clark, The Fire This Time, p. 61. (38.) Campbell, Politics Without Principle, p. 63. (39.) Richard K. Herrmann, "The Middle East and the New World Order", in International Security, 16, 2 (Fall 1991) p. 42. (40.) From author,s interview with visiting Lebanese Parliament Speaker, Nabih Birri, 27 September 1993, Canberra. (41.) For instance, what ever happened to such resolutions by the General Assembly such as 181 (November l947) which recommends "a plan of partition with economic union"; 194 (December 1948) which, inter alia, resolves the right of return for Palestinians; 273 (May 1949), which in deciding Israel's admission to the UN, calls on the Jewish state to "unreservedly ... undertake to honor" Resolutions 181 and 194 "from the day it becomes a Member of the United Nations", 3236 (November 1974) which "reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including: a) the right to self-determination .... b) the right to national independence and sovereignty"; and "reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return. . ."? What is the fate, for instance, of Security Council resolutions 298 (September 1971) confirming the illegality of Israel's actions "to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties [and] transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section. . ."; 605 (December 1987) and 607 (January 1988) which deplore Israel's human rights violations in the Palestinian and Arab lands it occupies reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention's provisions under the section on the "Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949" to those occupied lands? (42.) For instance, Dr. Nabil Sha'ath, Minister for Planning and Economic Cooperation in the Interim Palestinian Authority (Gaza/Jericho), and chief Palestinian negotiator with Israel, projects an optimistic view that downplays the difficulties in the implementation of the agreements resulting from the DOP. This stands in contrast with the cynicism expressed by Dr. Raji Sourani, Director of the Gaza Centre for Rights and Law, the Gaza Affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists, and by Yosef Ben-Aharon, former Director-General of the Israeli Prime Minister's Office and Head of Israel's Delegation to the Peace Talks with Syria. The author spoke with all three men who gave seminars at the Australian National University on 20 September 1994, 15 November 1994, and 30 November 1994 respectively. (43.) For a critical view of Western double standards regarding ignored UN resolutions on Arab questions see Abderrahmane Bensid, "The Maghreb and the Gulf Crisis", in American-Arab Affairs, no. 35 (Winter 1990-91), pp. 27-32. (44.) Muhammad Amin Bwisir, son of the late Libyan Foreign Minister who was killed in that incident, has since IN@ begun legal proceedings through Egyptian courts to seek compensation from Israel. His argument is that a just world order should deal with and punish Israel the way it has Libya. See Tareq Hassan, "Al-Irhab al-Israili Amam Mahkamat Janoub al-Qahira" [Israeli Terrorism Before South Cairo's Court], in Rose El-Youssef, 3 March 1992, pp. 12-13. (45.) John R. Macarthur, Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War (New York: Hill & Wang, 1992). (46.) Arabs have their inconsistencies too. While most Arabs, bar those from the Gulf states, opposed the U.S.-led involvement in the Gulf, today they would like to see similar involvement in Bosnia. It is also ironic that the most prominent "fundamentalist" leader, the blind cleric Shaikh `Umar Abd al-Rahman, sought exile in the United States, of all places, where he resided in Brooklyn. This constitutes a major contradiction with his anti-Western and anti-American stances. (47.) The fallout from the revelations of Western arms transfers to Iraq continues. For an insight into the British example, see Richard Norton-Taylor, "Waldegrave Blamed for Iraqgate", in Guardian Weekly, week ending 19 December 1993, p. 1; pp. 10-11. (48.) According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Centre (SIPRI), this downward trend is due to major cutbacks by the USA, the former USSR, and countries in Central and Eastern Europe. See SIPRI Yearbook 1992 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 189. See also Yahya M. Sadowski, Scuds or Butter? The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993). (49.) Refer to SIPRI Yearbook, 1993, p. 189. (50.) Ibid. See table of world military expenditure, p. 260. See also William D. Hartung, "Relighting the Middle East", The New York Times, 20 September 1991. For details of American-Saudi arms deals from which the U.S. was expected to reap some U.S. $20 billion for the 1991-92 period alone, see The Military Balance: 1991-92 (London: Brassey's, 1992). An excellent contribution to this debate is made by Said K. Aburish. He ably establishes the nexus between oil and power in the arch-conservative monarchy, observing, for instance, that the only two sectors that have enjoyed budgetary increases over the past five years have been the Ministry for Defence and the Royal Household. See his The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud (London: Bloomsbury, 1994), especially chapter 1. (51.) Patrick E. Tyler, "Gulf Security Talks Stall Over Plan for Saudi Army", The New York Times, 13 October 1991. (52.) Herrmann, The Middle East and the New World Order, p. 47. (53.) Eric Schmitt, "US and Kuwait Sign Pact on Troops", New York Times, 20 September 1991. For details of Arab reaction to the Kuwait-US pact, see Joseph A. Kechichian, Political Dynamics and Security in the Arabian Peninsula through the 1990s (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993), pp. 86-88. (54.) See Qira" at Siyasiyyah, 3, 3-4 (Summer/Fall 1993), p. 192. (55.) Kechichian, Political Dynamics and Security, p. 86. (56.) Robert Latham, "Democracy and War-making: Locating the International Liberal Context," Millenium: Journal of International Studies 22 (Summer 1993), p. 164. (57.) Munir Shafiq, "Al-Istratijiyyah al-Amirikiyyah wa Atharu al-Nidam al-'Alami al-Jadid `ala al-'Alim al-'Arabi' [The U.S. Strategy and the Effects of the New World Order on the Arab World], in Qira'at Siyasiyyah, 2, 1(Winter 1992), pp. 5-24. (58.) Falk, "Reflections on Democracy and the Gulf War", pp. 270-271. (59.) Abd al-Fattah al-Rashdan, "Al-Nidam al-Duwali al-Jadid wa Atharuhu `ala al-Nidam al-'Arabi' [The New World Order and its Effects on the Arab System], in Qira'at Siyasiyyah, 3, 1 (Winter 1993), p. 108. (60.) Ibid. (61.) Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "Strategic Balance and Disarmament in the Middle East," in E. Boulding, ed., Building Peace in the Middle East, p. 201. At a meeting in Cairo in early February, the Damascus Declaration States (Egypt, Syria and the six Arab Gulf states) criticized Israel's exemption from nuclear inspections, arguing that this is incompatible with the quest for peace in the region. They want international pressure to be brought to bear on Israel to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israel has never declared her nuclear status, although she is reported to possess installations for the manufacture and storage of some 300 nuclear weapons. (62.) For further details on this point, and the "unraveling of the nonproliferation regime in the Middle East" see Samuel S. Kim, The Quest for a Just World Order (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 124-126. (63.) See Larbi Sadiki, "Islamists Fight the Secular State", The Canberra Times, 3 August 1993. (64.) See Larbi Sadiki, "Sudan Seeks Help", in The Observer, 1, 3 (December 1994), p. 21. (65.) See Larbi Sadiki, "Why Yemen is at War", in Current Affairs Bulletin, 71, 3 (October/November 1994), pp. 41-43. Also by the same author, see "Why Yemen Matters", in Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, 21, 4/5 (October/November 1994), p. 18; p. 27. (66.) For a summary of these conflicts, see "The Fire Next Time", in The Middle East (January 1993), pp. 9-10. (67.) Author's interview with Ibrahim Ghosha, Hamas spokesman, 5 June 1994, Amman, Jordan. (68.) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "What New World Order?", in Foreign Affairs, 71, 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 83-96. (69.) Paul Hirst, "The World Order, The Phoney Peace", in New Statesman and Society, 3, 117 (7 September 1990, pp. 12-14. (70.) See Simona Sharoni, "Gender Issues in Democracy: Rethinking Middle East Peace and Security from a Feminist Perspective", in E. Boulding, ed., Building Peace in the Middle East, pp. 99-109. See also Carol Cohn, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals", in Linda Rennie Forcey, ed., Peace: Meanings, Politics, Strategies (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 39-72. Feminist discourses present alternative visions and conceptions for a more just and harmonious world order. Some contributions to these discourses include V. Spike Peterson, ed., Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992); Nira Yuval Davis and Floya Anthias, eds., Woman-Nation-State (London: Macmillan, 1988); Anne Tickner, Gender in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); and Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Bases and Beaches: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (London: Pandora, 1990). Also Evelyne Accad, Sexuality and War: Literary Masks of the Middle East (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1990), especially pp. 160-164. (71.) Rita Whalstrom, "The Challenge of Peace Education: Replacing Cultures", in Elise Boulding (ed.), New Agendas for Peace Research: Conflict and Security Reexamined (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 173. (72.) Falk, "Reflections on Democracy and the Gulf War", pp. 268-272. (73.) Adel Mahdi, "Al-Nidam al-Duwali al-Jadid wa Aatharuhu `ala al-Wath' al-'Arabi al-Islami' [The New World Order and its Impact on the Arabo-Islamic State of Affairs], in Qira`at Siyasiyyah, 1, 2-3 (Spring/Summer 1991), pp. 5-25. (74.) Rachid al-Ghannouchi, "Islam and the West: Realities and Prospects", translated by Azzam Tamimi, unpublished paper delivered at Westminster University, London, 1993. (75.) Hassan Elhag Ali, "The New World Order and the Islamic World", in The Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 8, 3 (1991), p. 465. (76.) Ibid. (77.) Al-Ghannouchi, "Islam and the West", p. 4. (78.) A fine article criticizing Western Islamophobia is by Leon T. Hadar, "What Green Peril?", in Foreign Affairs, 72, 2 (Spring 1993). (79.) Robin Wright, "Islam, Democracy and the West", in Foreign Affairs, 71, 3 (Summer 1992). (80.) One of the best references for explaining the different meanings of jihad can be found in M. Mazzahim Mohideen, "Islam, Nonviolence, and Interfaith Relations", in Glenn D. Paige, Chaiwat Satha-Anand and Sarah Gilliatt (eds.), Islam and Nonviolence (Honolulu: Matsunaga Institute for Peace, University of Hawaii, 1993), pp. 137-143. Also see Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 37, and John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 32-33. (81.) Interview with Rachid al-Ghannouchi, 15 April 1993, London. (82.) Ibid. (83.) Amin Saikal, "Islamic Fundamentalists, `Now Under Every Bed'", The Canberra Times, 9 March 1992, p. 9. (84.) A. See, for instance, Paul Ekins, A New World Order: Grassroots Movements for Global Change (London: Routledge, 1992). See also Keith Hindell, "Reform of the United Nations", in The World Today, 48, 2 (February 1992), pp. 30-33. (85.) See "The Commission Document on Peace Building in the Middle East" in E. Boulding, ed., Building Peace in the Middle East, p. 49. (86.) Ibid. (87.) Fred Halliday, "International Relations: Is There a New Agenda?", in Millenium, 20, 1 (1991), pp. 57-72.