Al-Qaeda's Spreading Franchise.

In late 2004, a 1,600-page treatise outlining a vision of a new al-Qaeda was posted on jihadi websites. Entitled The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance, it was drafted by Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, a Syrian mechanical engineer who had fought alongside bin Laden in Afghanistan and who had long been considered an ideologue for al-Qaeda. Its central theme was that al-Qaeda should be less of an organisation and more of an order, in which a central base would provide primarily ideological guidance to semi-autonomous cells around the world, loosely tied to each other.

Al-Qaeda leaders are encouraging groups to rebrand themselves as franchises, highlighting their links with central command. The first success came in Algeria, where the long-established Salafist Group for Call and Combat last September became "al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb".

So far, however, the link-up has been of greater propaganda than operational value, with no sign that attacks are being directed from Pakistan. But the GSPC is said by European and US officials to be running training camps in remote desert regions of the Sahel, bringing together militants from North Africa and beyond. This suggests it could represent a danger beyond its borders, and one which could extend to Europe.

It is in the UK that al-Qaeda's Pakistan leadership has made more direct inroads, thanks to its links with HuT. British officials say that, in every plot uncovered, one element - either direction or money or knowhow - came from overseas, often from Pakistan.

Al-Suri, who was captured in Pakistan in 2005, personified the global jihadi, with a career which spanned continents. Experts say his treatise has influenced young jihadis through the internet, particularly in Europe. Whether by coincidence or design, his vision of the post-9/11 al-Qaeda has become a reality.

Six years after 9/11, al-Qaeda as an organisation has been severely undermined, with many of its leaders captured or killed. But the violent fanaticism promoted by al-Qaeda has not only survived, it has proliferated - helped by the conduct of the US-led "war on terror".

While crackdowns in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, for example, seem to have reduced the jihadi threat for now, frontlines are expanding in North Africa and Lebanon. Attacks by al-Qaeda-inspired militants have not reached the spectacular scale of 9/11 but they have multiplied in numbers and diversified in geographic reach. Arab security officials say self-recruitment, largely through the internet, is replacing the radicalisation which once took place in mosques and religious schools.

Al-Qaeda's core remains based in Waziristan, providing logistic support and explosives training to some, and offering nothing more than inspiration to others.

Iraq has established itself as the most important new frontier. It plays the role of Afghanistan in the 1980s, a magnet for Arab militants looking for jihad (holy war). The US invasion and continued military presence have provided a new powerful narrative for recruiting jihadis in the Middle East and in Europe. According to counter-terrorism officials, al-Qaeda in Iraq is aspiring to act as a regional base, sending militants to wage attacks abroad - including against tourist resorts, for example, in India.

Al-Qaeda-inspired militants are now said to be looking to set up new frontlines in Africa, Syria and the occupied Palestinian territories. Even in Iran, officials have seen indications that "al-Qaeda facilitators" are passing messages and money between the top leadership in Waziristan and various jihadi groups.

Some counter-terrorism officials, however, say al-Qaeda central command is now staging its own comeback from Waziristan. Since a deal was reached between Musharraf and tribal chiefs in 2006, pressure on al-Qaeda has lessened. The top leaders have become better able to organise and communicate and, therefore, more capable of reaching out to jihadi groups elsewhere. This could shift the focus of their attacks from local acts to Western targets.

There are reports that a closer relationship between core al-Qaeda and Iraqi branch. According to Mowaffaq al-Rubai'e, Iraq's national security adviser, the June 2006 killing of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, removed a more independent-minded terrorist who had clashed with the Pakistan-based leaders. Since then Zarqawi's replacement, Abu Ayoub al-Masri, a newphew of Dr. Zawahiri, has brought the organisation into the fold of the core leadership. Iraq's al-Qaeda has been partly supporting the core financially. But Iraq is not a haven for al-Qaeda as Afghanistan was under the Taliban regime.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq is under a constant security clampdown and is rejected by the majority Shi'ites, the minority Kurds and many Sunni Arabs. But experts say Iraq has magnified al-Qaeda's destructive reach, raising the prospects of a blowback effect, as better trained militants return to their home countries. Algeria is one example.