Agenda for the next parliament.

With the election in June of a second majority government, the Liberals are once again firmly ensconced in Ottawa's corridors of power. But do they have a vision of what they want to accomplish in office? Bill Robinson and Ken Epps outline Project Ploughshares' recommendations for the Chretien government's foreign and defence policy priorities as it enters its second mandate.

Work for nuclear abolition

Nuclear weapons remain the single greatest threat to Canadian and global security. As an influential middle power, Canada could play a crucial role in assembling a global consensus to eliminate nuclear weapons. The Canadian government should:

* Renounce the "nuclear umbrella" for Canada and end Canadian support for nuclear weapons.

* Advocate immediate steps to reduce the nuclear threat and call on the nuclear powers to begin negotiations on a convention to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

The end of the Cold War did not bring an end to the threat that nuclear weapons pose to humanity and the biosphere.

The number of nuclear weapons worldwide has been cut in half during the past decade, declining from a peak of around 70,000 in 1986 to 35,000 or fewer today. If current arms control plans are realized, the world total could fall to approximately 20,000 by the year 2007.

But the destructive power of even that residual arsenal is likely to exceed that of 200,000-300,000 bombs of the size that destroyed Hiroshima. The use of even a small fraction of these weapons would, in all likelihood, kill billions of people, destroy human civilization, and cause permanent damage to the global ecosystem. It is unlikely that any sane leader would choose to embark upon such a war, but as long as nuclear weapons continue to exist the danger of nuclear annihilation - whether caused by accident, miscalculation, desperation, madness, or deliberate terrorist act - will continue to threaten the entire human race. Only the abolition of nuclear weapons can ensure that these genocidal devices will never again be used.

The end of the Cold War enabled many people, and governments, to examine the nuclear threat with fresh eyes, unburdened by fear of imminent attack, and see more clearly the danger that the continued possession of nuclear weapons poses. This re-examination has led to a surge in support for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

A number of recent developments have contributed to putting the question of nuclear abolition on the international agenda. These developments include:

* the May 1995 permanent extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which commits the nuclear powers to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament";

* the July 1996 ruling of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons, which cast doubt on the legality of almost all uses of nuclear weapons and concluded that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects";

* the August 1996 release of the Australian government-sponsored Canberra Commission report, which called on the nuclear powers to "commit themselves unequivocally to proceed with all deliberate speed to a world without nuclear weapons - not as an objective for the far distant future, but as an objective which deserves action from the time the commitment is given"; and

* the September 1996 completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans all future nuclear tests in all environments. The CTBT has weaknesses, and it is not likely to enter into force for many years, but it is possible that the world will never see another nuclear test as a result of this long-sought treaty.

The growth of abolitionist sentiment also has led to the creation in recent years of two new international nuclear-weapons-free zones, codified in the Treaty of Pelindaba (encompassing all of Africa) and the Treaty of Bangkok (encompassing South East Asia). These two treaties, and the earlier treaties of Tlatelolco (Latin America) and Rarotonga (South Pacific), have, in effect, denuclearized half of the globe: every state in the Southern Hemisphere is now part of a nuclear-weapons-free zone.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals have played an important role in helping to focus increased attention on abolition. The World Court Project, a coalition of NGOs and individuals from around the world, was instrumental in bringing the issue of the legality of nuclear weapons before the International Court of Justice. In 1995, the Abolition 2000 network, an international coalition of more than 700 NGOs, was created to co-ordinate political work for the abolition of nuclear weapons. A similar Canada-focused network, the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (CNANW), was created in 1996. Project Ploughshares is a member of both networks. Another important example of citizen advocacy took place in December 1996 when some 60 former Generals and Admirals from around the world signed a statement calling on governments to eliminate nuclear weapons.

These various developments have combined to make this an opportune moment for a review of Canada's nuclear weapons policies. Last year's community roundtables, sponsored by Ploughshares and other CNANW members and led by former Disarmament Ambassador Doug Roche, helped focus Canadian attention on the importance of working for abolition. In October 1996, Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy asked Parliament's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade to review Canada's nuclear weapons policies, citing, among other developments, the final report of the roundtables, Canada and the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons.

The committee began its review in March 1997 (see Ploughshares' testimony in the March 1997 Monitor), but all work was adjourned almost immediately as a result of the federal election. The new committee must now decide whether or not to resume reviewing the issue. Foreign Affairs Minister Axworthy has promised that he will "ask the Committee under the new Government to continue the review."

Renounce nuclear umbrella

The first change that should be made to Canadian nuclear policy is to renounce Canadian reliance on the "nuclear umbrella" and bring an end to Canadian support for the nuclear weapons of its allies.

More than fifty years after the advent of the nuclear age, Canada still maintains a fundamentally ambiguous policy toward nuclear weapons. The Canadian government rules out acquiring its own nuclear weapons, opposes nuclear proliferation, and supports, at least in principle, the abolition of all nuclear weapons. But it also supports the continued possession of nuclear weapons by its allies, participates in a nuclear-armed alliance, and "[does] not foresee any future need" to change "any aspect" of NATO's nuclear posture or policy. Canada is a non-nuclear-weapon-state signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but the Canadian government continues to believe that the defence of Canada relies on the "nuclear umbrella" that the United States and other NATO allies have unfurled above this country, and it continues to provide both physical and political support for those weapons in a variety of ways. In short, while the Canadian government condemns any reliance on nuclear weapons by non-allied countries, it continues to treat those same weapons as a useful - even necessary - element of Canada's defences and those of its allies.

Among other forms of nuclear co-operation, Canada:

* provides airspace and facilities for nuclear bomber training;

* hosts visits by nuclear-armed submarines;

* maintains communications sites for nuclear forces;

* has agreed to permit the deployment of nuclear-armed bombers and support forces to Canadian airfields during nuclear crises;

* produces and exports components for nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, such as bombers and submarines; and

* provides political and diplomatic support for American and NATO nuclear policies.

In recent years the Canadian government also has begun laying the groundwork for possible Canadian participation in whatever US ballistic missile defence system might be deployed in the future. The deployment of such a system would not be a step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Rather, it would be a dangerously destabilizing misstep, providing no significant protection against nuclear terrorism or accidental launches, almost certainly preventing further nuclear cuts, and quite possibly leading to a renewed nuclear arms race. Canada should be working actively and publicly to discourage the US from making such a move - not actively encouraging it and, even worse, signalling that Canada is interested in participating.

The Canadian government's pro-nuclear-weapon activities undermine Canada's ability to be an effective advocate for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The Chretien government's decision in May 1994 to stop testing the air-launched cruise missile in Canadian airspace was a significant step in the right direction. But as long as Canada remains a loyal cog in the nuclear infrastructures of its allies, the overall effect of our actions will be to help legitimize the continued possession of nuclear weapons, no matter what our long-term policy objectives may be claimed to be.

Canada should become a true non-nuclear-weapons state and declare itself a full nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ). NWFZ status would not protect Canada from the consequences of a nuclear war, but it would make Canada a more effective advocate for the abolition of nuclear weapons - which is the only way to prevent nuclear war in the long run.

Canada should reject not only the possession and production of nuclear weapons (as we do now), but also:

* the deployment of nuclear weapons in Canada at any time;

* the transport of nuclear weapons through Canadian territory; and

* the provision of any form of support for nuclear weapons, including participation in ballistic missile defence systems.

Support Nuclear Weapons Convention

The Canadian government should also commit itself to working for nuclear abolition, advocating immediate steps to reduce the short-term nuclear threat and calling on the nuclear powers to begin negotiations on a convention to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

Canadian governments have long expressed their commitment to the "eventual elimination" of nuclear weapons. But in practice, as demonstrated above, this commitment has been treated as a matter not for the present but for some unimaginable time in the distant future - bearing no consequences for current activities. Canadian officials mouth platitudes of support for nuclear abolition, but at the same time they sign NATO communiques saying Canada foresees no future need to change NATO's nuclear policies.

The Canadian government's current nuclear disarmament efforts are focused entirely on arms limitation measures, notably the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a proposed treaty to stop the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons. Such measures are valuable, but they do not go far enough. The time has come for Canada to join with other countries in calling for the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) laying out a framework for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The negotiation of such a convention undoubtedly would take many years. But even the process of negotiating it would dramatically improve the international security climate, helping to allay Russian concerns about NATO expansion, strengthening the legitimacy of the global non-proliferation regime, and greatly increasing the acceptability of measures such as the proposed fissionable materials production ban (which many countries consider discriminatory because it would have little effect on the existing nuclear weapons states, which already have produced more than enough fissionable material) by placing such measures firmly in the context of an abolition process. NWC negotiations would also put on the table crucial abolition-related measures, such as the development of stringent warhead and fissionable material accounting procedures, that are not currently the subject of negotiations. They would also ensure that the interim steps we do take are in the right direction. (The negotiations might determine, for example, that the preferred configuration for the smaller nuclear arsenals that would exist as the world proceeds down the road to abolition is significantly different from the configuration currently being pursued in arms control talks.) Finally, agreement to negotiate a NWC would be a valuable step forward in itself, signalling acceptance that nuclear weapons are unnecessary and detrimental to security. This would open the way for a number of immediate steps to dramatically reduce the risk posed by existing nuclear arsenals.

Among the immediate steps that could be taken (and which Canada should advocate) are the following measures recommended by the Canberra Commission:

* removing remaining nuclear forces from alert;

* removing warheads from delivery vehicles;

* ending deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons;

* negotiating deeper reductions in nuclear stockpiles; and

* concluding agreements on no-first-use of nuclear weapons and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states.

In their second "Red Book," released during the recent federal election, the Liberal Party made a dramatic promise to Canadians: "A re-elected Liberal government will ... work vigorously to eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons and anti-personnel mines from the planet." By any reasonable interpretation, this statement should mean that the government is now committed to working for the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention - just as it is committed to supporting the Chemical Weapons Convention and the proposed landmines convention, which it has taken the lead in promoting. But the Liberals may claim that all they really promised was to continue the nuclear policies currently in place. It may be necessary to remind the government that signing official statements that nuclear weapons should be retained "for the foreseeable future" is not the best way to advance the cause of eliminating these weapons from the planet.

The Liberals have committed themselves to work vigorously for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The government should now live up to this promise, and declare Canada's support for the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

Reduce military spending

During the last parliament, the government formally adopted a broader definition of security incorporating the full range of non-military as well as military factors, and took major steps to implement this new understanding of security in its operations. But the government has yet to make significant progress in realigning its spending priorities to reflect this new approach to security. The new government should:

* Reduce military spending and transfer savings to non-military security.

* Refocus military procurement on equipment for peacekeeping and constabulary roles.

The original "Red Book" promised that a Liberal government would "adopt a broader definition of national and international security, encompassing such goals as sustainable development, global economic prosperity, a capable defence, and the eradication of poverty and social inequality." This policy commitment was fulfilled, following the public foreign and defence policy reviews held in 1994, in the government's February 1995 foreign policy statement, Canada in the World. This document acknowledged the necessity of broadening the focus of security policy, and agreed that "such a broader orientation can best be achieved at least cost, and to best effect through approaches that broaden the response to security issues beyond military options and focus on promoting international cooperation, building stability and on preventing conflict."

The government subsequently took a number of concrete steps to implement this new approach to security. But in the area of spending priorities the government has not responded very effectively to its changing understanding of security policy.

World military spending has fallen dramatically over the past decade. Canadian military spending also has fallen, but in comparison to the rest of the world's spending Canada's military spending has actually grown substantially. By contrast, while the need for humanitarian aid and sustainable development assistance has continued to grow over the past decade, Canadian aid spending has undergone much larger cuts than our military spending has. Canada in the World explicitly acknowledged that aid makes a vital contribution to security, "tackling many key threats to human security, such as the abuse of human rights, disease, environmental degradation, population growth and the widening gap between rich and poor." But, in budgetary terms, the government has actually been moving towards a more, rather than less, military-dominated security policy.

Cut DND budget

The government should reduce Canada's military spending and transfer the savings to non-military security programs, such as Official Development Assistance (ODA).

Canada's 1997-98 military budget of $10.306 billion remains 11 per cent higher (after accounting for inflation) than the 1980-81 military budget of $9.3 billion. Additional planned cuts will reduce the military budget to $9.7 billion by 1999-2000 (or 5 per cent higher than the 1980-81 level), but no further cuts are planned for subsequent years.

By contrast, as of 1995, worldwide military spending was 23 per cent lower than its 1980 level. The contrast is even more striking if close allies such as Japan and the members of NATO are excluded. As of 1995, the "non-allied" world's military spending was a full 47 per cent lower than it was in 1980. To the extent that Canada's military spending can be considered to be related to the level of worldwide military "threat," these figures strongly suggest that we can afford to make much deeper cuts than have been made to date.

Of course, much of Canada's military activity is related to other requirements, such as peacekeeping, which have not declined at all. In fact, we currently deploy roughly twice as many soldiers on peacekeeping missions as we did during most of the 1980s. But, by DND's own estimate, peacekeeping costs will account for only 2.7 per cent of its 1997-98 military budget. Project Ploughshares estimates that a more specialized Canadian Forces could perform the essential military functions that Canada requires, such as peacekeeping, domestic security, and coastal patrol, with a budget no larger than $7.5-8.0 billion per year - roughly $2.5 billion less than currently spent.

Instead of taking advantage of this opportunity, further reducing military spending, and using the savings to maintain or even increase ODA and other non-military security spending, recent governments have cut ODA by an even greater percentage than they have cut military spending. According to the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, the ODA budget will be cut by more than 40 per cent between 1991-92 and 1999-2000. The DND budget will be cut by only 25 per cent over the same period. In short, while both budgets have declined in absolute dollars, in relative terms Canadian governments have spent the post-Cold War period beating ploughshares into swords, rather than swords into ploughshares. The new government should put its money where its policy mouth is, reducing military spending and transferring the savings to non-military contributions to global security.

Top Ten Pointless Purchases

(some projects have not yet been approved; costs shown are estimates)

Surveillance drones ($50 million)

Advanced air-to-air missiles (over $100 million)

Smart bombs ($103 million)

Oberon sub refits ($135 million)

Leopard tank upgrades ($145 million)

Eryx antitank missiles ($179 million)

Omnibus space project ($600 million)

Armoured combat vehicles ($800 million)

Upholder submarines ($850 million)

Low-level air defence ($1,076 million)

Refocus procurement

The government should also refocus its military procurement spending on the core requirements of the Canadian Forces, such as peacekeeping and coastal patrol.

In the original 1993 "Red Book" the Liberal Party did promise to "[reorient] Canadian defence policy and procurement practices to emphasize the key priority of peacekeeping." But in its 1994 defence white paper the Liberal government failed to establish priorities for the Canadian Forces, opting instead to maintain "multi-purpose, combat-capable sea, land and air forces." As a result, DND is still attempting to maintain the full variety of its Cold War-era combat capabilities, whether needed or not.

The continuing effort to acquire Britain's four surplus Upholder-class submarines (a final decision is supposed to be made later this year) is a clear example of DND's determination to maintain non-essential capabilities. Subs are efficient war-fighting weapons, but, unlike other naval forces, they have very little use in peacetime roles. Canada has no overriding requirement for submarines, and the estimated $850 million cost of acquiring them (whether through purchase or some form of disguised "lease") is only the beginning of the expenses. The full cost of purchasing, basing, operating, modifying to Canadian standards, and eventually upgrading these vessels would be certain to run into the billions of dollars. The Canadian Forces cannot afford to sink that kind of money into non-essentials, and neither can Canadian taxpayers.

With a 1997-98 capital budget of $2.430 billion (including research and development and ammunition expenditures) - 52 per cent more than the 1980-81 capital budget of $1.6 billion - DND can make additional spending cuts and still afford to equip the Canadian Forces for its core requirements. But only if it focuses its spending on the essentials. As long as DND continues to waste money attempting to maintain non-essential capabilities, Canada's required military capabilities will not receive sufficient support, and savings that could have been used both to meet those needs and to support essential non-military security programs such as development assistance will not be realized.

Restrict conventional weapons

To advance national and international efforts toward an effective regime to control and severely restrict military acquisitions and transfers - efforts that include proposals for an international "code of conduct" for arms suppliers - there are three realistic initiatives that a new Canadian parliament should give immediate priority. These are:

* Improve the transparency of Canadian military transfers by revealing more trade details.

* End Canadian military sales to countries at war or where war is imminent.

* End Canadian military sales to countries violating human rights.

Widespread recognition that proliferation of conventional arms fuels the flames of the world's many armed conflicts and strengthens the repressive capacities of regimes violating the rights of their own citizens has generated scant restraint. Since the end of the 1991 war in the Persian Gulf, when world attention briefly focused on an international trade that placed Iraq's opponents in front of their own weapons on the battlefield, the global competition to sell arms has only intensified. The post-Cold War shrinkage of military budgets has concentrated suppliers' attention on the remaining export markets, and national control of arms exports has eroded in the face of the competition. Post-Gulf War hopes of international restraint in weapons trade remain unfulfilled, with an international agreement to limit conventional arms sales yet to emerge.

Canadian participation in the international arms trade is significant although at a lower level than that of the permanent five members of the UN Security Council (USA, UK, Russia, France, China). Using varying measurements, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ranked Canada as the 12th largest supplier of major conventional weapons during the period 1991-1995, the US Congressional Research Service placed Canada as the 8th largest weapons supplier to developing nations during 1992-1995, and the US State Department's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ranked Canada as the 7th largest supplier of total conventional weapons for 1992-1994. By any of these standards, Canada is hardly the shrinking violet of the arms trade.

Nor are Canadian military exports limited to countries that meet strict export control standards. In 1995 Canadian military goods worth $100,000 or more were shipped to nine countries involved in internal conflict and to four additional countries where the government perpetrated serious human rights violations. (These do not include five other countries falling into either category that received Canadian arms shipments valued at less than $100,000.) In all, Canadian military sales to countries that are at war or that abuse the rights of their own citizens amounted to 40 per cent of the value of all military exports reported by the government for 1995.

If Canada's proclaimed interest in the global constraint of the conventional weapons trade is to be taken seriously, the Canadian government must get its own house in order. By establishing improved standards for national export controls, Canada would contribute to the construction of "norms of constraint" that must be shared by many countries before international agreements will be reached and made effective. Several such norms have been proposed by a growing number of non-governmental organizations as parts of a supplier "code of conduct" that Canada could promote for international adoption.

As demonstrated by its leadership on a global treaty to ban anti-personnel mines, Canada does not have to wait for other countries to cooperate with the NGO community to further mutual goals or to introduce initiatives that advance international conventional arms control. There are at least three areas where measures improving Canada's export controls would serve to buttress pursuit of similar initiatives at the international level. First, the government should reinforce the nascent movement towards transparency in global arms transfers (reflected in the recent UN Register of Conventional Arms) by providing more detail on Canadian military exports. Second, the Canadian government should prohibit all military transfers to countries involved in conflict, including pervasive internal conflict. Third, no Canadian military exports should be made to countries that grossly and systematically violate the rights of their citizens.

Improve export transparency

Government disclosure is an essential part of the democratization of Canadian policy formulation: it provides the public with the necessary information to scrutinize and debate national policies and practices. In the case of military exports, full disclosure also improves government accountability to Parliament and brings the wider public attention to military exports that is the basis for restraint.

Ottawa can make Canadian military sales more transparent in three areas. First, the government should routinely and fully disclose all military export permits it grants, either by expanding the data provided through the Access to Information Act, or, preferably, by regular (such as quarterly) reports. In addition to the total annual value of export permits for each destination country that may be reported currently, full disclosure requires a detailed description of the material or equipment, and the maximum value, of each permit. To protect commercial confidentiality, specific financial information (such as unit values of goods) that could jeopardize competitive interests or advantages need not be disclosed.

Second, the Canadian government should improve the detail of reported military exports. At present, the government provides Parliament with an annual report on the export of military goods from Canada that includes the total value of classes of equipment sold to each country. These classifications are general, however, and do not reveal the specific nature of the equipment sold, even though this information is crucial to analysis of the security impact of particular sales. Equipment details should be included in the report.

Third, the annual report should include data on military exports to the United States, the largest recipient of Canadian military goods but the only country currently omitted from the report. For details of military exports to the US, the government would need to compile trade data that it stopped tracking in 1992. This could be done by requiring export permits for military sales to the US, but it could also be achieved by other instruments.

Prohibit military sales to countries in conflict or human rights violators

Every year Canada ships military equipment to countries embroiled in armed conflict or threatened by it in spite of Canadian export control guidelines that stipulate the "close control" of military exports to countries "involved in or under imminent threat of hostilities." Foreign Affairs Minister Axworthy announced guideline improvements in June 1996, including "rigorous analyses of the regional, international and internal security situations ... to forestall the possible destabilising effects of proposed sales," but government security analyses and guideline interpretations, conducted behind close doors, do not preclude military sales to countries at war.

To make recent improvements more effective, the Canadian government should introduce a public review process that more fully and formally assesses the security conditions of a country or region or the impact of a major military sale. By drawing on official and non-governmental interest and expertise in security matters, the Canadian government could provide a more credible and tighter military export control regime to ensure that no Canadian equipment is sold or transfered to a country involved in or threatened by any form of war.

Canadian military goods also are sold every year to governments that violate human rights. Guidelines call for the close control of military shipments to countries "whose governments have a persistent record of serious violations of the human rights of their citizens, unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population." "No reasonable risk" is undefined but apparently does not include the risk of the internal security force of an unpopular and autocratic regime regularly cited for human rights violations using Canadian-supplied light armoured vehicles against public opposition. Otherwise, the largest Canadian military export order in recent memory - the $1.5 billion sale of 1,500 LAVs to the Saudi Arabian National Guard - would not have received approval.

Minister Axworthy's June statement promised "a stricter interpretation of human rights criteria... to further minimise the risk that Canadian military equipment might be used against civilians." A welcome development, the tightening of human rights guidelines nevertheless remains beyond public scrutiny. As with security assessment, human rights interpretation would benefit from a formal, and public, process that draws on external human rights expertise and evaluation to conduct the inexact and difficult task of identifying countries that are, or are not, serious human rights violators.

Although typically justified economically, a military transfer is ultimately a political signal to the international community of support for the recipient government. Conversely, an early measure of displeasure with a country's human rights record is the removal of its eligibility to receive military shipments. To improve its own export control record and to promote an international norm of denial of all military sales to human rights abusers, Canada should cease the export of all military goods to governments which, through a public review process, are demonstrated to practice gross and systematic violations of the human rights of their citizens. The ban on military exports to serious human rights violators should be total, regardless of the assessment of the risk of the specific equipment being used against civilian populations.