After Saddam a post-war Iraq: some of the pressing issues the United States will be forced to confront when it topples the regime of Saddam Hussein. Given that some measure of death and destruction is inevitable in any conflict, what kind of state might be expected to emerge from the ashes? (Current Affairs).

While the world tried hard to find a peaceful exit for the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. to spare the Gulf region a devastating war, he remained defiant. A day after Hans Blix's report to the Security Council gave more momentum to the Anglo-US drive to give Iraq until 17 March to disarm or lace war, Saddam called for disarming Israel and America instead of Iraq.

It was evident during the Arab summits at Sharm el Sheikh and the emergency Doha Islamic conference four days later (see page 12) that the ruling Iraqi Baathist regime was kicking away every ladder dangled down to help them.

One Qatari official used the term meystibia'een to describe the Iraqis. The Egyptian slang word, plural of meystabi'a, first emerged around 1900, at a time when gangsters carved out blocks of influence for themselves in urban areas. It means a desperado who cares for nothing, not even for his own safety; one who would provoke a fight without giving much thought to the consequences.

Saddam, who has no conscience, no qualms or concerns that many of his fellow countrymen and women could perish in the confrontation, calculates that no responsible statesman in the civilised world would have the stomach to fight him to the bitter and tragic end. He is banking on the fact that at some point the civilised world would halt the confrontation, when it realised the cost would be too high for the world to bear.

Given the inevitability of death and destruction resulting from war, the unknown fear is the kind of Iraq Saddam Hussein will leave behind. Driving the despot out of Baghdad and destroying his malicious Baathist regime is likely to be a picnic compared to the task that would face America the morning after --clearing up the mess left in his wake. It is certain to be a costly and unpleasant business. Iraq is a country divided along more than half a dozen ethnic groups. There are 35 major tribal confederations, some of which span more than one ethnic and sectarian divide. An oppressed Shi'a majority in the south, warily dominant Sunnis in the west, precariously autonomous Kurds in the north, a smattering of Christians, Turkmen Assyrians and Armenians, all make up a part of the bigger Iraqi picture.

Modern day Iraq was forged 80 years ago when Britain captured three neglected but known to be oil-rich, Ottoman provinces, losing 20,000 troops in the process. The Iraqis are historically difficult to rule as Britain, even with its long colonial experience, soon discovered. A revolt in 1920--which took the use of mustard gas to subdue it--taught the empire that it could not by-pass the authority of the country's tribal chiefs and warlords in any workable strategy.

Eight decades later Iraq is no better. Twenty years ago it seemed immune to the Islamism that bedevilled the region at the time. Now secularism has retreated in reaction to the evident bankruptcy of Baathism, but also in response to the regime's manipulation of religion to sustain its own legitimacy.

There is no way to measure the strength of Islamism except in Kurdistan--the only place where elections take place--where 20% of votes are regularly won by Kurdistan's range of mild-to-radical Islamist parties. What is certain is that once Iraq's isolation ends, the Islamist rhetoric that dominates the region will penetrate fast and deep.

The once modern urban areas witnessed a long process of deliberate de-modernisation by the Baath party. Saddam's own mafia-like gangster structure of the hierarchy relies heavily on tribes. He `rents' their loyalty--with gifts of guns and Toyota Land Cruisers. Much of the educated elite, who were once modernising against the forces of tribalism, has fled. Incomes are 10% of what they were in 1980. Most families rely directly on government food rations to survive. A quarter of children are malnourished. No one trusts civil institutions anymore preferring to rely on the cheap firearms that proliferate. Religious, ethnic and clan loyalties predominate, providing a fertile soil for anarchy once the regime of Saddam Hussein is toppled.

The Baathist regime controls the roots of Iraqi society by relying on layer upon layer of complex intelligence gathering networks as well as half a million members of its official armed forces. There are multiple pyramid-like structures, consisting of some 30,000 members of Al Takritis, Saddam's own extended clan and from the Al Bu Nasir. Another 30,000 forces from affiliated loyalist clans; an estimated 80,000-200,000 secret police in at least eight over lapping security agencies, and as many as a million party officials, petty informers and profiteers, form the president's charmed circle. Although a great number of party members joined for the benefits, such as subsidised housing or guaranteed exam results, one must not underestimate the ability and the willingness of at least half the party members to fight the Americans. They fear what awaits them if Saddam's regime loses.

The tasks facing the victors are enormous; weeding out hundreds of Baath party commissars and members of security apparatuses implicated in crimes will also involve purging the law of Baathist accretions and rebuilding the corrupt justice system.

The Iraqi army and over 80,000 uniformed police will have to be demobilised and then reorganised, as will the intelligence agencies. Ordinary daily trading can only be resumed by restoring law and order on issues such as spontaneous reprisals against the former regime, preventing the Kurds from asserting their contentious historical claim to the city of Kirkuk, which will almost certainly lead to radicals among the Turkomen inviting Turkey to protect them. Curbing the influence of the armed Shi'a militias based in Iran, who have waited 23 years to export its Islamic revolution to Iraq, will also be a priority.

Just look at the Iraqi opposition in exile--drawn from among over four million who fled Iraq since Saddam took power in 1979. More than 100 groups and parties claim to represent the exiles' point of view, and each has an agenda for a future `democratic' Iraq. However, the only effective groups remain essentially clan-based. Kurdistan, which enjoys a de facto autonomy thanks to the no-fly-zone, is freer than it was under Saddam, with a lively press and a plethora of political parties. However, it remains divided between two clan chieftains who pose as modern politicians. In the south the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), an Iranian backed Shi'a group, headquartered in Tehran, is the largest and best organised of the Arab parties, has followers in the east of Iraq but few among Shi'as elsewhere.

"It will be a very, very nasty affair," says Joseph Wilson, who was First Secretary at the US Embassy in Baghdad in 1990 and acted as an ambassador in the days following the invasion of Kuwait. Saddam tried to bribe him, in August 1990, by offering to sell America all the oil it needed at well below market price, if they would leave him alone. Almost 13 years on, the Bush administration frequently recalls that offer and the fact it turned Saddam down, especially when it is accused of launching a war for oil. There is a battle royal going on between the State Department and the CIA on one side, and the Pentagon backed by the hawks in the administration, over plans for rebuilding and governing Iraq.

Failing to prevent the war of `regime change', the State Department tried to stop the Pentagon installing Dr Ahmed Chalabi, the head of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), to lead Iraq. Supported by US Secretary of State Colin Powell, State Department officials and regional experts are pushing for the UN to be given a prominent role in the reconstruction of a future Iraq. However hawks at the Pentagon and some at the White House see the UN as irrelevant.

To the State Department's dismay, the planning for a new Iraq has been entrusted to the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), based in the Pentagon and headed by Lt General Jay Garner, a retired officer who led Operation Provide Comfort, the humanitarian relief operation in Northern Iraq in 1991, that followed Saddam's onslaught which drove 150,000 Kurds across the borders to Turkey only to be savagely beaten back into no-man's land.

The Bush administration envisages Lt. Gen. Garner taking over control of Iraq from Gen. Tommy Franks, commander of allied forces in the Gulf, once Saddam's forces have been defeated. Some argue that despite Uncle Sam's deep pockets, the cost of the occupation could mount up beyond the available budget. Unlike the last Gulf War when America received massive financial support from friends in the region and elsewhere, this time President Bush in the form of the American tax payer, will it seems, be footing the bill alone.

The administration has only recently created a body to coordinate ideas for relief and reconstruction--but NGOs have complained of a lack of consultation. The UN agencies, despite their plans, remain strapped for funds. Meanwhile, there are warnings that Saddam's traditional victims--Kurds in the North and the Shi'a in the southeast--might flee for safety as soon as war starts, creating a huge refugee problem in Iraq's six neighbouring countries. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the annual cost of peacekeepers at $250,000 a head. This puts the price for maintaining 100,000 troops in Iraq at $25bn a year, equal to Iraq's GDP. Immediate humanitarian aid for a minimum 5m people could cost $500 a head, or $2.5bn. Rebuilding Iraq's basic infrastructure to the pre-1990 standard is estimated at $25bn. There is also the cost of reconstructing institutions such as schools, hospitals, universities, civic centres, leisure centres and museums, which could take the total cost to $100 bn.

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw says Iraq is rich in oil so no donors will be needed. But it is not that simple. The infrastructure to pump oil is greatly depleted from its pre-1990 level. Saddam might also attempt to torch his own wells. Current exports of 2.5m barrels a day (b/d) earn over $15bn a year. Experts say an increase of another 1m b/d day, requires a $7bn investment. To produce an additional 6m b/d will require another $20bn and take 10 years to accomplish. Only then would Iraq begin to pay for its own rapid development. The country's debts are estimated at between $60bn and $140bn. But with so many claims on oil revenue, relatively little would be reinvested in production.

Washington officials discussed the idea of a civilian "tsar" such as Michael Mobbs, a Pentagon lawyer, or David Kay, a former UN weapons inspector to govern Iraq. Meanwhile the Pentagon was pushing the name of Barbara Bodine, a career diplomat who has served in Baghdad, Kuwait and Yemen. The State Department has suggested that an Iraqi official in the current regime might emerge as a potential leader--which frightens most Iraqis since this might lead to Saddamism without Saddam. Pentagon officials have admitted to being in a mess over the postwar planning. To the dismay of the neo-conservatives, several CIA and State Department officials, some viewed as determined opponents of regime change, have been given key positions in Gen. Garner's office. Thomas Warrick, adviser with the State Department--northern Gulf affairs office--is in charge of helping assign Iraqis to government ministries after liberation. Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN Secretary-General's special representative for Afghanistan, has scotched reports that he might be chosen as the UN-nominated ruler of Iraq after Saddam. "This is very far-fetched and speculative," he said in Kabul. However the picture need not be that bleak if the Americans were to play it right. Iraq's proven oil reserves are second only to Saudi Arabia's. This means international firms lining up to invest; but only if the country is stable. But investments have to be long term and the rewards will not be immediate.

Iraq has another great resource in its people. Before Saddam Hussein's rise to power in 1979, which lead to destructive and costly war, there was a high level of investment in human resources such as education and health. As regards the equality of women, Iraq was a regional model of progress. As Saddam's rule progressed most top professionals emigrated or fled the country. Almost 75% of Iraqis were born after 1980 and grew up in the years of decline and retrenchment. Illiteracy has risen, school standards have plummeted. Baathist corruption, Saddam's police state and his destruction of civil society, together with 12 years of sanctions destroyed a once educated and prosperous middle class. However, Iraq has a rich pool of emigres to draw on. It will be a shock for exiled Iraqis to see what has happened to their nation.

There will be problems as exiles hoping to recover abandoned property, such as the 100,000 Kurds displaced by Saddam's "Arabisation" schemes around Kirkuk, may be confronted by hostile usurpers. Some ambitious Iraqis--especially those with skills--may leave as soon as they have the chance. However signals from Iraqi exiles are encouraging, suggesting that many of the country's 4m exiles, wealthy and educated as they are, will want to return and help with the rebuilding process.

The effects Saddam's rapacious levelling sword is likely to prevent the swift rise to dominance of any single ethnic group, opening the way for a political formula that may find success. The fear of Iraq splitting into Kurdish, Sunni Arab and Shi'a states, will also make the Iraqis behave more responsibly.

Optimists say the Iraqis may be more willing to accommodate diversity than is commonly assumed. The sectarian consciousness of the country's Shi'as--55% of the population--for example, is not very strong. Also, there is no single Khomeini-like figure to unite them. Traditionally Iraqi ayatollahs have scorned involvement in politics.

The idea of a federation of strictly administrative regions, (see The Middle East October 2002) not of tribes or other political groupings has been put forward by many. Opponents say allowing the central government to grow strong by sucking up all the oil revenue is a recipe for future oppression. They also point out that there is no history of ethnic conflict in Iraq.