Afghanistan At The End Of Phase One.

Neither the US nor the countries supporting it are sure what will emerge in Afghanistan once Phase One is over. Each of the main players involved has its own idea of what would be an ideal regime in Afghanistan, but none of them are in total agreement about it. Virtually no one, and this includes even America's NATO's allies like France and Germany, wants to see the US having a permanence presence in the area.

The reason is that if Washington does manage to achieve its immediate objectives - i.e. arresting or killing Bin Ladin on the one hand and removing the Taliban leadership on the other - then the US will secure an important tactical advantage in the "Great Game" - i.e. over control of the export routes for oil and gas from Central Asia and the Caspian Basin. Among the big powers, neither Russia nor China want to see this happen, and key EU states would not want to see the US dominating the area as well. Among the regional players - Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia and India - there are a broader range of more immediate concerns rather than those related directly to the export of oil and gas from Central Asia.

Forces gathered under the Northern Alliance (NA) are loyal to the Rabbani government, at least nominally, and the US-British attacks so far have helped troops that form part of the NA to gain some territories in recent days after years of defeats at the hands of the Pakistan-military backed Taliban. The US still remains equivocal about the post-Taliban scenario, merely saying that it should be a broad-based government representing all the ethnic and sectarian groups within Afghanistan. A somewhat similar position is being adopted by Russia, India and Iran - although all three are being somewhat more emphatic in their support for Rabbani.

What seems certain is that, after Phase One is over and the Taliban is thoroughly weakened or removed from the scene, there will be some form of government which includes the range of ethnic and sectarian groups within Afghanistan. As such, this will probably include exiled King Zahir Shah as a figurehead. He is widely popular in the country for several reasons, including: (a) during his reign, i.e. until the early 1970s, things were far better than they have been since; (b) as a Durrani Pashtun, hailing from the most powerful clan from the majority ethnic group, he has a lot of credibility among the Pashtuns; and (c) the royal family speaks Farsi, which is not the language of the Pashtuns but rather that of some of the minorities, including Shiite Hazaras, Tajiks, etc.

It is inevitable that the NA warlords will also be part of the post-Taliban set up. These would include, among others, Gen. Fahim who succeeded Ahmed Shah Masood as the main commander of the Northern Alliance. He has a good reputation as a worthy successor to Masood, although no one can replace the latter's legendary status among the minorities of northern Afghanistan. The Uzbek leader Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum has made a comeback in recent months and is now poised to re-emerge as a significant player. He is seen by most factions in Afghanistan as an opportunist, having been allied with and betrayed almost every group in the country.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Hizb-i-Islami, a Pashtun who was favoured by Pakistan during the anti-Soviet Jihad is also likely to re-emerge as a political player. Currently placed in Iran, he has reportedly been sending feelers in the direction of Islamabad and some officials have responded positively. He is another opportunist whose past anti-US sentiments and involvement in drug trafficking may undermine his position. Moreover, he is not universally supported by Pakistani officialdom. It is conceivable that some "moderate" elements from the Taliban may survive to remain in leadership positions, although most observers believe this is highly unlikely.

It is certain that the UN and its organisations will be closely involved in the rebuilding and reconstruction of Afghanistan, in economic and social terms. As such, there will be a sort of parallel administration for the distribution of aid, for the spread of education, for the institution of agricultural programmes, etc. Behind the scenes, the US and EU will have a guiding role as well.