Afghanistan - A Broad-Based Govt. That Will Satisfy All Is Virtually Impossible.

*** Hekmatyar, Based In Iran, Is Hoping For A Prominent Role In Any Future Govt. In Afghanistan, But This Is Not Likely As He Does Not Have Much Credibility With Either The US Or Pakistan At The Moment

*** UN Envoy For Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi Says A Force Comprising Representatives Of All Afghan Factions, And Backed By The UN, Is The Best Bet To Keep Peace In Kabul Over The Long-Term

*** The UK Says World Must Be Ready To Act 'Very Quickly' When Kabul Falls Out Of the Taliban's Grip

NICOSIA - Intense diplomacy is underway, both in public and behind the scenes, to lay the groundwork for the future government of Afghanistan. The US is guiding the process, with British advice, and the UN is also expected to play a key role in an administrative capacity. The other big power involved is Russia, which has indicated its preference for a regime that would include the opposition Northern Alliance (NA), and Japan which will be an important aid donor. But the key to the success of any future administration in Kabul is the attitude of the neighbouring powers, namely Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Saudi Arabia, India and to a lesser extent Turkmenistan.

Setting the tone for what is to come, US Secretary of State Colin Powell has said that no single state will be allowed to have a veto on the make-up of the post-Taliban administration. Despite the complexities behind the US-led war and regional geo-politics, observers note that there is a high degree of consensus on one point: everyone agrees there should be a "broad-based" regime in Kabul after the Taliban is ousted. The observers note that, more than goodwill towards the Afghans, this sentiment reflects recognition by all concerned that the US would no longer tolerate any one country in the region trying to impose their own proxy regime in Afghanistan.

As such, it also reflects the fact that the next regime in Afghanistan would have to be pro-American and to represent a wide variety of ethnic, tribal and sectarian groups. But the other powers involved do not believe that the American preferences should exclude them from trying to negotiate greater influence for their own preferred leaders in the future government; hence the intense diplomacy. Washington is well aware of the risks involved in trying to impose a regime on the Afghans, which is why it is insisting on the widest possible representation. It knows that an imposed regime will last while American bombers and commandos remain in the area to protect it. Such a regime would collapse speedily enough once the Americans withdraw, and civil war will resume.

The US has no other option but to assist in the creation of a representative government. To inject credibility and legitimacy into the effort, with the help and approval of the UN bureaucracy and the EU, it is trying to bring back former King Zahir Shah. The king, a Durrani Pashtun who only speaks Farsi (the root language of the Tajiks and Hazaras), still has legitimacy in the country. Afghans remember his rule until the early 1970s as being relatively peaceful. But the former king is not universally approved. Tehran does not want to see another monarchy on its eastern border, while Islamabad remembers that Afghanistan under Zahir Shah had refused to vote in favour of Pakistan's entry into the UN (but it has still accepted the idea of the monarch's return, under US pressure). Zahir Shah is ailing and has indicated that he does not want to reign, merely to preside over the return to normalcy in Afghanistan. He has proposed a Loya Jirga (a Grand Council) to reconcile the various Afghan tribal, ethnic and sectarian groups.

Neither the call for a Loya Jirga nor the call for a broad-based government is new. These have been there since the collapse of the Najibullah government in 1992, and numerous attempts by one party or another to form such an administration have failed simply because the neighbouring powers could not agree on a sharing of influence. There are no indications at present that an "influence sharing" understanding has been reached by the main regional powers. Given that the interests of these powers diverge significantly over a range of issues, from oil and gas pipelines in the region to sectarian and ethnic questions, the prospects for the emergence of such an understanding are slim.

Iran and Pakistan remain hostile over their Afghan interests, with the former being extremely angry at Islamabad for trying to shut Tehran out of Afghanistan through the 1990s. Russia, upset with Pakistan over the role it played during the anti-Soviet jihad in the1980s, has expressed its support for the NA with President Vladimir Putin on Oct. 24 reaching an agreement with the NA leader Burhanuddin Rabbani, who is still legally recognised by most countries in the world as the president of Afghanistan. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan believe that Pakistan, through the Taliban, has tried to increase its strategic reach into Central Asia and both are upset at the way their ethnic counterparts were massacred by the Taliban militia since 1996. India wants to ensure that whatever regime comes into being after the Taliban will not collude with Islamabad in training separatist Kashmiri militants to wage a jihad.

However, all these considerations became secondary once the US entered the picture. Everyone except Pakistan, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, is satisfied with this turn of events because it meant that, whatever the outcome, they would end up having more influence in Afghanistan than they have had since the mid-1990s when the Taliban took over. Pakistan, having found that its creation had turned into a monster, was presented by the US with no choice but to acquiesce in the overthrow of the Taliban. Thus it, too, is now supporting a broad-based government. Saudi Arabia, which had less strategic investment in Taliban than Pakistan, was quick to distance itself from the movement after Sept. 11.

There are indications that both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have been lobbying to retain some influence in Afghanistan by promoting the idea that "moderate" Taliban leaders may be included in the broad-based government. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal visited Pakistan on Oct. 25 and met with Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Later, Musharraf said: "We did discuss the situation in Afghanistan in its totality. There is total unanimity of views on how to approach the problems in Afghanistan and its consequences". US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has flatly rejected the notion of a role for a "moderate" Taliban in the future, and Powell has indicated the same despite initially appearing to support the idea. India and Iran have also flatly rejected the notion of a role for "moderate" Taliban leaders in Afghanistan.

Increasingly, Pakistani observers are recognising the possibility that their country may turn out to be a net loser in Afghanistan, although the reward for good behaviour from the US could well be large sums of economic aid. The military government is beginning to realise that, contrary to its initial hope that Washington would allow it a significant input in the composition of the next Afghan regime, the US is not likely to overlook the interests of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Russia, Iran or India in order to satisfy Islamabad. It is expected that Pakistan would next seek to forge a coalition of anti-Taliban Pashtun tribes and promote them as part of a future government.

Meanwhile, the military situation on the ground may force the issue. The US has been consistently attacking by air up and down the Taliban frontlines, allowing NA forces to move forward gradually. The NA has already indicated that, although it may reach the gates of Kabul, it would not attempt to take the city so long as the US prevents other forces from doing so - an unusually astute political move which suggests the NA is getting advise from other powers. This responsible posture has been received favourably by the US - which does not want to see a bloodbath in Kabul - because it means the NA would effectively do the fighting that would otherwise have to be done by American troops. Additionally, there have been persistent reports suggesting that Ismail Khan, one of the leading anti-Taliban commanders and ally of Iran, is preparing for a major assault on Herat, a city populated mainly by Shiite Hazaras.