Advice to Field Artillerymen: Making Fires Key to Objective Force Success.

Our "dirt" Combat Training Centers (CTCs) have been the greatest boosts to training our Army has seen in the last two decades. Although CTC "lessons learned" are focused on the close fight and the CTCs do not replicate artillery well in many circumstances, artillerymen have learned from CTC rotations that responsiveness is key to artillery effectiveness in all circumstances.

As we look forward to transformation, responsive, long-range fires will be the key to success for both the Interim and the Objective Forces. Artillerymen must continue to increase that responsiveness.

There are simple things we can do to cut fire mission processing times. We must cut slow, complicated processes. Illumination and smoke missions come immediately to mind. In former days, we could afford long adjustment times for coordinated illumination. No longer. Nowadays, especially with the night-vision devices we have, we no longer have to conduct the finesse adjustments that were required earlier.

Here are a few thoughts gleaned from my 30 years in the Army, most of which were spent working with Field Artillery and fire support.

First rounds should be two- or four-gun illumination. Adjustments should be made to the guns only as required by the mission and as time allows. Most of the time, with the modern night-vision devices and target location equipment, two or four illumination rounds in the vicinity of the target provide sufficient visibility to attack the target.

The same is true with smoke. You can begin shooting your battery smoke immediately and adjust off of the initial mark. We no longer can afford the time to adjust high-explosive (HE) and then fire smoke.

Furthermore, our maneuver commanders must be trained to be flexible and agile enough to use the smoke as it is delivered (location and density) to breach the obstacle and attack the objective. Fort Sill, in consultation with the Infantry and Armor Centers, has to update mission training plan (MTP) standards to reflect the required responsiveness.

We've come a long way with computers and digitization-we must use them. Field artillerymen have to know ballistics, and they have to know their software. Only by knowing ballistics and the intricacies of the software can we be responsive.

This statement has several corollaries. There is not enough time to train (in schools or in field units) using both computers and old manual methods. We must have a computer backup for our main system, and if that goes down, we should deadline the system and fix it expediently.

Working manual backups slows us down--first, because we cannot train to the level of expertise we need, and second, because these methods are inherently slower.

This is controversial, but we have to step into the 21st century and learn our ballistics well and the systems that give us computer and digital advantages. We must learn to trust in and rely on our digital systems and capabilities.

We must use distance learning in ways we are just beginning to understand. Distance learning gets the expertise of the schoolhouse out into units. We must set up Fort Sill classes on firing techniques, software and ballistics for unit training via distance learning. We can tie Fort Sill expertise to unit training.

We need to simplify our ammunition. Multiple munitions, propellants and fuzes pose an unacceptable challenge for our operations officers and logisticians. For example, 155-mm howitzer section chiefs have 20 projectiles, 14 fuzes and six propellants to juggle. We have to demand simpler systems.

As we simplify ammunition, we should study the munitions of other nations. Some allied munitions give one gun the power of many. Fuel air explosives, for example, can provide the simple, single-gun shock action that is the equivalent of several of today's battalions.

In the future, we also have to emphasize our sensors. Our fire support teams (FISTs) must remain capable of being the "eyes" of the force, and as such, they should have the best target acquisition tools we can develop. In the past, FIST equipment has been a second thought. Now, as we upgrade our reconnaissance forces, our FISTs and Strikers should be armed with, at least, the same level of capabilities.

Our lightweight laser designator rangefinder (LLDR) that will be fielded to the 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) at Fort Lewis, Washington, within the year was a long time in coming. It will accurately locate targets at 10 kilometers and designate the target for smart munitions. We need to keep the funding coming for fielding to the entire force and continue to develop follow-on technologies for our FISTers.

The deep fight is critical to shaping the battlefield. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will be key and should provide immediate digital feeds to our new effects coordination centers (ECCs). Advanced warfighting experiment (AWE) lessons learned demonstrate that teaming UAVs with delivery systems pays immediate dividends against high-payoff targets (HPTs).

Currently the Hunter UAV does not provide a direct digital link through the all-source analysis system (ASAS) to the advanced Field Artillery tactical data system (AFATDS). However, the Shadow tactical UAV (TUAV) will have this critically important capability.

Engaging moving targets has always been tough--let's get it right. The Army tactical missile system (ATACMS) with its BAT submunitions will enhance our ability to attack moving targets greatly. Also, adding rounds that provide surveillance and automatic target recognition (ATR) place the targeting burden where it should be: on the down-range sensor (in this case the round), rather than on computers, gun chiefs and FISTs. Both BAT and ATR rounds have the added benefit of cutting logistics tails and simplifying ammunition management.

Responsiveness is key to the Artillery's future. We, as Artillerymen, must increase our knowledge of our craft, exploit modern systems for all they're worth and just make it happen. The effectiveness of the Objective Force will depend on our responsive fires.

Lieutenant General William J. Lennox, Jr., is the Superintendent of the US Military Academy at West Point. In his previous position, he served as Chief of Congressional and Legislative Liaison in the Office of the Secretary of the Army. He also has served as the Deputy Commanding General of the Eighth US Army and Assistant Chief of Staff, CJ3, of the Combined Forces Korea; Chief of Staff of III Corps and Fort Hood, Texas; and Deputy Commanding General of Fort Still and Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He commanded the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and the 5th Battalion, 29th Field Artillery in the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, the same division in which he commanded a firing battery. Among other positions, he was a Forward Observer, Battery Executive Officer, Company Fire Support Officer, Battalion Operations Office and Battalion Executive Officer. He holds a Master of Arts and Doctorate in Literature from Princ eton University and was a Senior Service College Fellow at Harvard University.