Achilles heel: why our top political leaders are easy targets for terrorists.

Why our top political leaders are easy targets for terrorists

WHEN A LONE SCHIZOPHRENIC broke into the U.S. Capitol building in July and killed two security guards, many Americans were astonished. How could anyone--let alone a madman--get past the armed guards stationed everywhere, the sophisticated equipment designed to detect weapons, and the large barriers to stop unauthorized vehicles? The answer is that the Capitol is not the fortress it seems. In fact, it's more like the Maginot Line: a strongly defended front that is highly vulnerable to attack from behind. The current security system may have been relatively effective years ago, but in today's world, where weapons are too easily available, it's a disaster waiting to happen.

I spent several years working on Capitol Hill as a congressional aide. In that time I learned the ins and outs, as well as the practices, rules, and customs, of Congress and its employees. I also discovered serious flaws in Capitol Hill security. Not only did I stumble across a way to turn a member's Lincoln Town Car into a time bomb on wheels, but I also saw how easy it would be to carry a loaded gun into the Capitol complex without anyone knowing. These security problems do not stem from any failings on the part of the Capitol Police, the special force created to guard Capitol Hill and protect members of Congress. I believe them to be brave, well trained, and effective. The problem is that they're required to treat members of Congress and staff with kid gloves.

Let's start with the car scenario. Most members have no bodyguards and simply drive themselves to their homes at the end of the day. Not only are they vulnerable to being followed, but members' cars often stick out like sore thumbs. The majority of states issue special license plates for members of Congress that identify the owner and his or her congressional district. In fact, members enjoy having these special tags labeling them as VIPs--it often gets them out of parking and speeding tickets and ensures that valets are extra careful.

After following a member home, a terrorist could simply wait in the shadows until late at night, then slip out and break into the trunk of the car. Very few members' vehicles are guarded at their home and a tour through any congressional garage reveals that almost none have car alarms installed. They simply drive to their homes and park in a standard two-car garage. Many members, especially those who live in D.C., park on the street at night.

I learned what an easy matter opening a locked car trunk is when I mistakenly left my keys in the trunk of my Ford Taurus while on vacation in Maryland. The AAA-dispatched locksmith arrived with a small box filled with keys. He said that Ford made only a few dozen different types of keys for the Taurus and that one of the keys in his box would match my set locked in the trunk. Sure enough, after trying 10 different keys, one worked and my trunk popped open. If a country locksmith can open a car trunk in five minutes, then we should expect a motivated and skilled terrorist to be able to do the same. Once the terrorist had placed a high-powered bomb in the member's trunk, the hard part would be over. The odds are small that the senator or congressman would check their trunk in the morning.

Upon arriving at the Capitol, the unaware member would be waved through security automatically. Members' cars are never inspected in any way while they are driving them. To do so would show disrespect and risk drawing the ire of the congressperson. As a result, members are allowed without question into the garages and parking areas that are off limits to the public. And while the trunks of staff-owned cars are occasionally inspected, the reality is that on any given day the vast majority are never even stopped. My anecdotal observation indicated that approximately one staffer's car in 10 is inspected upon entering the garage. When working on the Hill, I can remember weeks at a stretch where I wasn't asked to open my trunk. It is understandable why; there was only one guard in charge of car inspections at the popular C Street entrance to the Rayburn House Office Building garage.

At noon, parked 30 feet from the Capitol dome, the congressman's car would explode. A large hunk of the building could be sheared off, killing dozens of passersby and possibly hundreds within, including many of the country's foremost political leaders.

That's My Lunchbox

For terrorists without access to bombs, getting a gun into the Capitol would be just as easy. As any visitor to the Capitol knows, entering the building requires passing through a metal detector and having all bags run through an x-ray machine. On some days, especially when schools are out of session, this security screening can result in long lines. While most tourists, lobbyists, and vendors resign themselves to such a wait, members and staff would consider such a delay to be an affront and a waste of their time. As a result, members are simply waved through at special entrances. And while staff members must show their congressional ID card and open any bags they are carrying, this casual check is almost meaningless. Staff ID is unsophisticated, akin more to the simple types used by exercise clubs and universities, than to the complex ones issued as driver's licenses. There is no hologram or intricate pattern, just a picture of the bearer, a replica of the House seal, and a few lines of text. Terrorists adept at forging passports and other sophisticated documents would need very little time to create a fake House ID. To make matters worse, no metal detectors, x-ray machines, or computerized ID verification devices are employed at these entryways.

Equipped with a phony ID, a terrorist could easily bring a gun or other similarly sized weapon into any of the House office buildings. All it would take would be to place the gun in a false compartment of a briefcase or even inside a suit pocket. Then he or she could join the mass of staffers entering the building at 8:30 a.m. on any given workday.

At that time of the day, when many staffers are clamoring to enter the building at the same time, the Capitol Police screen very quickly. They glance momentarily at the ID, then ask to look in the bag. There is no electronic or manual verification done to ensure that the ID is genuine. So long as the ID looks normal and the picture matches the person holding it, no one is ever questioned. The bag inspection usually involves the Capitol Police officer looking down at it as the staffer holds it open. I have never seen a thorough search involving the removal of the bag's contents. Moreover, I have never seen the Capitol Police check the clothing pockets of the staff entering. The bulge in my left breast pocket from my glasses case could just as easily have been caused by a weapon; I was never asked to open my jacket and reveal it.

Most likely the reason for this oversight is that Capitol Police officers deal with egotistical people all day' long. They have come to learn that if they push staff or members too far they will get at best a rude response and at worst a strongly worded letter to their supervisor. As a result, they self-censor, avoiding conflicts with brusque staff who often view them as nothing more than glorified shopping mall security guards.

Once inside the House or Senate office building with a gun, a terrorist would be virtually unimpeded from killing his congressional target or random victims. The only other security checkpoints in these office buildings are the ones posted in tunnels that lead to the Capitol.

But a clever terrorist would never need to go to the Capitol to find his prey. Despite appearances on C-SPAN, most members spend only a fraction of their time on the House or Senate floor. Most of their working day is spent in their personal offices or attending committee meetings. And the majority of these offices and committee rooms are not in the Capitol building, but rather in the House and Senate office buildings. Committee meetings are open to the public (except for those that deal with national security issues) and the prospect of having 20 members all sitting next to each other on a raised dais would be an inviting target to any armed terrorist.

As if these opportunities were not appealing enough, a terrorist would have plenty of chances to wreak havoc at one of the many social receptions held each night Congress is in session. On the House side, these gatherings are often held in the Rayburn Gold Room or the Cannon Caucus Room, and metal detectors are rarely posted at them. Attracting anywhere from 1 to 50 members, depending upon the size and clout of the special interest group sponsoring the event, a terrorist could take his pick of VIP targets.

Tighten it Up

What can be done to fix these potentially life-threatening problems? While I am sure the professionals on the Capitol Police force have their own ideas, I would offer a few simple suggestions. First, have members and staff take their own safety more seriously. They should install car alarms, park only in secure or monitored lots, and quickly check each morning to ensure that no one has opened the vehicle's doors or trunk.

Security procedures on the Hill should be enhanced as well, even if this means a slight delay when entering the building. Cars should be searched more frequently, including inspections of members' vehicles. Sophisticated bomb detection equipment should also be purchased, regardless of the price tag attached.

Finally, staff IDs should become harder to duplicate. If every $20 bill can be redesigned to stop counterfeiters, so should the IDs that allow access to our nation's most important buildings. In addition, they should be unique and verifiable, similar to the electronic key cards used in many private-sector office buildings. Metal detectors and x-ray machines should be installed at all Capitol entrances, not just the ones used by visitors.

Taking these precautions will be a hassle for congressmen and their staffs. But if we don't, the next intruder in the Capitol could be far more dangerous than a lone schizophrenic.

JASON BRYSON-ALDERMAN, a former congressional aide, is now a government relations consultant in San Francisco. He can be e-mailed at: [e-mail].