Accurate, Responsive Enemy-Focused Fires.

Interview by Patrecia Slayden Hollis, Editor

Q Some people have said the Field Artillery is failing to provide responsive, accurate close supporting fires to the CTCs [Combat Training Centers]. Based on your experiences as a brigade, division and now corp commander, what are your thoughts on this? What do the FA and Army need to do to improve our responsiveness and accuracy?

A The process of providing close supporting fires is complex, involving training, leader development, equipment and the commander's intent. Executing fires in the CTC environment is challenging. Precision, timing and focus of fires are critical factors in determining success.

In analyzing ineffective fire missions at the CTCs, many times they are due to a lack of precision in target location. So without an accurate target location, we begin the fires process with faulty information.

We must have better target location equipment in terms of fielding technologies that enable soldiers calling for fires to determine and transmit target grid coordinates accurately and rapidly. We need lightweight, highly mobile target locator-designators for all our observers.

And those soldier-sensors need to transmit the data directly to the shooting battery, sensor to shooter. Our current system is rigid and somewhat cumbersome--AFATDS [advanced FA tactical data system] has too many intervention points that delay fires and make them less responsive. We need to address the issues with AFATDS as we streamline and simplify the sensor-to-shooter process significantly.

We also need to train soldiers to identify and locate targets better. That's a challenge at Fort Polk [Louisiana] because of the close proximity of the enemy to friendly forces and the fact that the close, complex terrain is sometimes difficult to read. Target location at the National Training Center [NTC, Fort Irwin, California] is difficult because of the vastness of the training area. At the NTC, what appears to be two kilometers away is actually four or five kilometers.

We need to train units in integrated combined arms operations before they get to the CTCs. Synchronizing the maneuver plan and fire support plan is demanding and requires the focus of the commander and his entire staff to make it happen. Most often units work in a compressed time period, and if they are not careful, they can get caught up in the process--caught up in producing products that may or may not be relevant to the fight. Units have to stay focused on fighting the enemy, not on the process of fighting the enemy. At the CTCs, we may have become too process- rather than results-oriented when it comes to fire support. Effects on target is the only outcome that matters in war.

In III Corps we have three warfighting rules. First, "Focus on the enemy." Second, "Fight the enemy, not the plan." Third, "See Rule Number One."

Last, we need to improve the replication of indirect fire effects in force-on-force battles at the CTCs. It's easier to replicate direct fire effects than indirect fire effects. We need to explore and develop technologies to truly replicate indirect fires at the CTCs at the level we would see in combat.

Because we do not replicate realistic indirect fire effects at the CTCs, we have defaulted to "negative training"--units fire-for-effect instead of conducting adjust fire missions, which are the "bread and butter" of artillery effectiveness. The time pressure is such that commanders are not following our doctrine. They fire artillery and go on to the next mission rather than shoot around, adjust the fire in on the target and then fire-for-effect. That's a recipe for ineffective fires. Current simulations reinforce the incorrect notion that all fires will be effective from the first round of impact.

The CTCs give leaders and soldiers a tremendous opportunity to learn at every level repeatedly. We need to make the most of that opportunity in hard, demanding training that replicates combat conditions as closely as possible.

Q As the 1st Cavalry Division commander [Fort Hood], you were the architect of artillery-based maneuver as outlined in your September-October 1996 article "Massing Combat Effects: 1st Cav Fire Support TTP" [tactics, techniques and procedures]. Please briefly explain the concept and why you implemented it in the 1st Cav Division. Is artillery-based maneuver still a valid approach and under what circumstances?

A As we went through the military decision-making process in the 1st Cav, we devised artillery-based maneuver as a mechanism to defeat an enemy's center of gravity in a particular area of the world. We developed a scheme of maneuver and fires to keep the enemy from capitalizing on his strengths.

The enemy's center of gravity was his artillery that out ranged our artillery significantly, and the theater of operations had very rugged terrain with a lot of choke points. The many choke points did not allow for rapid maneuver, so our choice was to fight with fires-a combination of cannon- and rocket-delivered fires coupled with close air support and attack helicopters.

We developed TTP to get our artillery closer to the enemy to range him with our systems without allowing him time to maximize his artillery range advantage. Our maneuver forces rapidly seized terrain from which our artillery could range the enemy and quickly brought up FA battalions to occupy that terrain. The artillery then fired and moved out to fire on another piece of terrain maneuver forces had seized. We used maneuver to extend our killing mechanism, which was fires.

Is artillery-based program still valid today? Yes-against a similar enemy in similar terrain. Would I use that TTP fighting a different enemy in wide open desert terrain? No.

Commanders must focus on the enemy and determine the method of dealing with his capabilities on a given piece of terrain.

Q Do you envision the IBCT [interim brigade combat team] employing artillery -based maneuver TTP?

A I can envision several situations in which artillery-based maneuver would be very effective. In these situations, the lightweight, highly mobile IBCT would want to maximize its intelligence-gathering and fire-delivery capabilities without confronting enemy forces in a direct fire fight.

Under other conditions, such as in MOUT [military operations in urban terrain], the TTP would be less applicable. In those situations, the IBCT would want to rely more heavily on its infantry to accomplish the mission.

Q With the IBCT projected to be deployable in FY03 and the Objective Force transformed as early as FY10, what significant challenges do you see in integrating the IBCT in mechanized forces, as necessary, through about 2020?

A From the perspective of the Counterattack Corps [III Corps], we need to ensure the legacy forces are interoperable with the transformed forces in terms of training, leader development, doctrine and equipment so we can fight in the same battlespace. As the Army gets new equipment with leap-ahead technologies, it must interface with legacy technology equipment and we must mediate any significant differences in doctrine.

That gets to the importance of Crusader to the Counterattack Corps. We need Crusader for its increased range and firepower to fight future adversaries and serve as a technology carrier for the Objective Force. Crusader brings significant advantages to Army formations-it is agile enough on the battlefield to stay up with maneuver forces, and one battery of Crusaders will give the formation the equivalent fires of an entire battalion of Paladins. Crusader will provide our maneuver forces responsive, accurate close supporting fires, among other missions.

In terms of interoperability, throughout our history, the Army has been a "hybrid" force. We never have had the entire force at the same level of modernization at the same time. For example, just because the 4th Infantry is a digitized division does not mean it can't fight side-by-side with the 1st Cav, which is still an analog force, or fight with a less modernized coalition force.

Q Please contrast how corps and divisions are prosecuting the deep fight today with how Force XXI will fight deep with its new digital tools.

We still can rely on basic command and control measures, such as maps, boundaries, phase lines, fire support coordination measures, etc., to allow us to fight effectively with forces at different stages of modernization in the next 15 or so years.

A In so many ways, the digitized 4th Division, with its new technologies and connectivity with joint systems, is more capable than a traditional corps is in getting information on targets and prosecuting the deep fight. In the past, units had some form of deep battle handover of intelligence between the division and corps. Today, the 4th Division's enhanced capabilities allow it to attack throughout a typical corps battlespace.

I think in the future we will have more division assets supporting the close fight. The battalion or brigade in the close fight that knows where the friendly and enemy forces are has the distinct advantage and can make the most of its firepower.

The 4th Infantry Division has tremendous capabilities. Its situational awareness has taken it to the next level of situational understanding--that is, understanding the interrelationships of entities in the battlespace. This allows the commander to begin to "see" the enemy's intent and make tactical decisions in terms of fires, both close and deep.

The division also has the technology to allow it to prosecute the close and deep fights simultaneously from one location--which the corps does not. The corps still has the deep operations coordination cell [DOCC] for the deep fight while the tactical command post focuses on the close fight.

In the near term, FBCB [2] [Force XXI battle command brigade and below] will be one of the most significant digital tools for situational awareness for the Army. [FBCB [2] is a ruggetized computer mounted on vehicles or in tactical operations centers that provides consistent real-time visualization of friendly forces on a moving map display.]

During DCX I [Division Capstone Exercise I for the digitized 4th Division at the NTC], FBCB [2] proved its worth. As the brigade fought major battles at night over extended distances--50 to 60 kilometers--while countering flank threats, the FBCB [2] helped provide the commander the situational awareness that allowed him to make effective tactical decisions.

When a commander can look at a digital map on the computer display and see every vehicle in his brigade to 10-digit grid resolution, that's significant. When he can transmit operations overlays with the push of a button instead of making copies and having LNOs [liaison officers] drive throughout the battlespace delivering those products hours later, that's significant.

Systems such as FBCB [2] are allowing commanders and their staffs the freedom to focus on warfighting versus mundane tasks to make the intelligence, command and control, communications and fires processes work.

Q As the new information and high-technology systems become fielded, what do you see as the most significant training and leadership challenges the mechanized forces face?

A We face training and leadership challenges at different levels. At the individual level, we must train the soldier to operate the new equipment, but with the added challenge of ensuring he fully understands how his digital device interfaces with other ATCCS [Army tactical command and control system] systems--for example, how the intelligence BOS' [battlefield operating system's] ASAS [all-source analysis system] operates with the artillery BOS' AFATDS. In the past, that level of understanding was required of battle captains and field grade officers. But our young leaders will have to integrate ATCCS systems' information and display it--an entirely new challenge.

The commander of a digital unit will have to focus on his CCIR [commander's critical information requirements]. He will have access to a tremendous amount of information and must define the critical information he and his staff need.

One challenge is to train the commander how not to be overwhelmed with the volume of information he will have coming at him and how to determine the information he needs to accomplish his intent selectively and precisely and then access it. He will have to coach his staff on how to extract the information he needs out of the ATCCS systems and then display it so he can make good tactical decisions. He will need "thinking" staffers to support him.

It all goes back to integrating all the BOS on the battlefield. Integration is tough to train. It requires experience and an understanding of the interrelationships between systems and entities in battlespace.

In the next 20 years, I believe the principles of war will remain constant integrated combined arms warfare still will be key. Every element of the force will have requirements it must fulfill for the force to be successful.

The essence of warfare might change slightly to emphasize information operations and combat in complex terrain, such as in MOUT. But we still are going to have to train our officers, NCOs and soldiers to be combined arms warriors.

Q What message would you like to send Army and Marine FieldArtilleryman stationed around the world?

A As the King of Battle, continue to focus on the basics, those building blocks that allow you to deliver responsive, effective fires. Massing the effects of all fires on the enemy is still the primary focus of the artilleryman.

As a Cavalryman-and Cavalrymen are true combined arms warriors-I understand how critical indirect fires are to the fight.

Those of us who have been in combat and have endured mortar and artillery attacks understand how truly devastating indirect fires can be-not only their physical destruction, but equally their emotional and mental effects.

Lieutenant General Leon J. LaPorte commanded Ill Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, at the time of this interview. He currently is the Deputy Commanding Generaland Chief of Staff of Forces Command headquartered at Fort McPherson, Georgia. He also served as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans at the Pentagon. In other tours at Fart Hood with the 1st Cavalry Division, he commanded the division; commanded the 3d Greywolf Brigade; was the division G3; and in the Gulf during Operations Desert Shield and Storm, was the Chief of Staff of theist Cavalry Division. General LaPorte commanded the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. He is a Vietnam veteran and holds a Master of Science in Administration from the University of California.