ARAB-EUROPEAN RELATIONS - Sept. 20 - Chirac Plan For Iraqi Sovereignty.

In an hour-long interview at the Elysee Palace in a Paris with the New York Times (NYT) to be published on Sept. 21, Chirac lays out a two-phase plan for Iraqi self-rule involving first a symbolic transfer of sovereignty from US hands to the existing 25-member Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), followed by a gradual ceding of real power over the next six to nine months. He says if the Security Council, France included, could agree on empowering Iraqis at once, France would be ready to train Iraqi police and soldiers - either in or out of Iraq. But he says France has no intention of sending troops to participate in the US-led military occupation force, but adds that circumstances could change. "There will be no concrete solution unless sovereignty is transferred to Iraq as quickly as possible," Speaking just before he leaves for New York, where he will meet with Pres. Bush on Sept. 23, he calls the administration of Iraq, an Arab and Muslim country, by a "governor who is Christian and foreign" dangerous and "a very difficult situation for any people to accept in the 21st century." As for the deployment of French combat troops to Iraq, Chirac says: "We are talking about training, and not sending troops to Iraq, of course...As things are now, there is no situation where I can imagine that France would send troops to Iraq", adding, however, "Everything could change. I don't have a crystal ball. But for the moment, this is the position of France and the position of a number of countries". (It is not clear whether Chirac intends to hold out the possibility of deploying French troops, however slight, as a means of negotiating a resolution more palatable to France. The US has already ruled out any plan to strip the current American administrator of Iraq, Paul Bremer, of his power, saying that a hasty transition to Iraqis would be counter-productive and dangerous. Britain, America's main ally in the war, has expressed similar concerns. The sharp divergence between the US and France over the management of post-war Iraq reflects both the scars of a year-long conflict between two old allies and their profoundly different visions of the place of American power and the role of the UN in the world). But Chirac says: "I have no intention of opposing the (US-sponsored) resolution, that is, saying 'no', vetoing it. I am not in that mind-set at all". But France will vote in favour of the resolution only if it includes a precise deadline for the transfer of sovereignty, a timetable for the transfer of actual power and a "key role" for the UN (though he does not spell out what that would be). "Otherwise", he adds, "France will abstain". (Chirac's proposal suggests it would be difficult for the two sides to agree on the wording of a resolution introduced this month by the Bush administration in an attempt to secure the UN blessing necessary to attract more foreign troops and more international funds to Iraq. While Chirac wants to get power in Iraq out of American hands at least symbolically by a transfer of sovereignty, the Bush administration argues that the Iraqis are not ready and that the only beneficiaries of a quick handover of any authority would be former Iraqi exiles who are politically active but enjoy little support among the Iraqi people. And whereas Chirac believes the continued governance of Iraq by the US will produce more violence and require a longer presence of foreign troops, the US thinks the relinquishing of any authority will create more chaos. Still, Chirac seems eager to appear conciliatory, saying twice that whenever American soldiers are killed in Iraq, "It hurts us", and rejecting any suggestion that the aim of his proposal is to provoke the US). He says: "I want you to understand that I'm not saying 'white' because the Americans say 'black'". Rather, he said, his goal is to engineer in Iraq a system similar to that already functioning in Afghanistan, where Pres. Karzai has full sovereignty over the country, while the US and its coalition partners keep the peace through the presence of their troops. "I am not inventing anything extraordinary, as I have read somewhere, simply to annoy the US", Chirac says of his ideas for what he describes as an increasingly dangerous situation in Iraq. (In an indication that France's negotiating position is fluid), he refuses to articulate a precise timetable for Iraqi self-rule except to say that sovereignty should be transferred as quickly as possible. (In the previous week, however, FM De Villepin laid out a plan under which Iraq would establish a provisional government in a month, write a constitution by end-2003 and hold elections next spring, all under UN auspices. US Secretary of State Powell quickly dismissed De Villepin's proposal as "totally unrealistic". Chirac is also seeking to avoid a repetition of the diplomatic fiasco in March, when he went on national TV nine days before the war began to say that France would veto any UN resolution paving the way to war. That declaration contributed to Washington's failure to get a resolution justifying the war, damaged France's relationship with the US and sparked outrage among the American people. Even if France abstains, the US is likely to receive the nine votes necessary to pass the resolution. Chirac says France would be willing to provide financial support and military and police training for Iraq once sovereignty is transferred to the Iraqis. Of the estimated 152,000 troops in Iraq, 127,000 of them are American, and the US is eager for other countries to share the burden. France has about 36,000 troops deployed around the world. In Afghanistan France has 500 regular troops under NATO command, 200 Special Forces under American command and several dozen troops training Afghan soldiers). The NYT says: "Although Chirac was relaxed and spoke easily throughout most of the interview, the subject of post-war Iraq was so sensitive that he referred to type-written talking points highlighted in yellow when he spoke about it. Chirac took exception with the Bush administration's conviction that the overthrow of Iraqi leader (Saddam) Hussein would provide the catalyst for the spread of peace and democracy in the Middle East. "I'd like to think so, but frankly, I don't believe so", he says, calling the war "traumatic for this region and culture". (Despite his insistence on a quick, symbolic transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis, Chirac states paradoxically that elections have to be handled with care, because the majority of Iraqis belong to the Shiite branch of Islam). He asks: "Are the Shiites in this analysis the real symbol of tomorrow's democracy? It is not so obvious". He says his own experience as an officer in France's colonial war in Algeria had influenced his thinking about Iraq, because it proved to him that a vast and powerful army could be defeated by a small group of determined adversaries convinced of the right to run their own country. He says: "We know from experience that imposing a law on people from the outside hasn't worked for a long time". (He defends his position before the war that UN weapons inspectors should have been given more time to complete their work before war was waged. He notes that no WMD had been found inside Iraq, which the Bush administration used as the main justification for going to war). He says it was "absolutely not" wrong to overthrow Saddam, but adds that he should have been overthrown "without a war". Asked if he was tempted to tell Bush, "You were wrong", he says: "On subjects as complex as this, it is always wrong to think that you are right and the other person is always necessarily wrong. This is a serious mistake and you always pay the consequences". (He defends his outburst last February when he berated East European states poised to join the EU for missing an opportunity to "keep quiet" as they signed letters backing US policy on Iraq). He says: "I don't regret it; I should regret it, but I don't. You can take your own position if you want to. That's not the problem. But at least warn us first so we don't look ridiculous". Such an approach, he says, is "not the way that Europe's made". (He also defends the concept of a common European defence policy outside of the framework of the NATO alliance, a development that the US strongly opposes). He says: "There is nothing unpleasant about it for the Americans. It suggests ignorance of the way things are to imagine it would be against them". He cites America's insistence that Europe take-charge of keeping the peace in the Balkans, and says, "We can do this, but how? With a flute?"