ALGERIA - The Campaign Against Terror.

The role of Algeria in the war against terrorism, launched by US President George Bush after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon, is largely on the periphery of the main action in Afghanistan. But there is a possibility that in Phase Two of the war, which involves the destruction of Al Qaida's global network, Algiers will become a more active player in view of its long experience in combating groups linked to Osama Bin Ladin. Phase Two has already begun, although Phase One will not be completed until Bin Ladin and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar are captured dead or alive by US forces.

From the US perspective, Algeria does not fit precisely into any of the clear-cut categories that have emerged post-Sept. 11 - namely preferred allies, allies of convenience, and "states of concern" or "rogue states" (see the latest edition of RIM). While it is not as close to the US in its geo-political posture as Washington's preferred allies such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, etc., Algiers is also not an ally of convenience in the current situation, like Sudan, Somalia, etc. Rather, in the spectrum of relationships that the US has with countries in the Arab World, Algiers falls somewhere between the preferred ally and an ally of convenience.

Depending on how Algeria conducts itself as part of the American war against terror, and this may have as much to do with geo-political issues that go beyond the direct efforts to destroy Al Qaida and related Islamic militancy, the Algerian regime will find itself viewed either as a preferred ally or an ally of convenience. The implications can be enormous. A preferred ally, although regarded by the Islamists as a puppet of the US, is virtually assured of protection from external attack or internal destabilisation through militant tactics. An ally of convenience, on the other hand, is dealt with on a somewhat ad hoc basis and may not benefit from such assurances of protection. On the contrary, it may come under more direct pressure for reforms and/or geo-political realignments than would be faced by preferred allies.

Yet in the war against terrorism, the Algerian regime has found a common cause with the US whereby it can enhance the existing relationship. In fact, from the perspective of the Algerian government, the war against terrorism began in February 1992, just after the cancellation of elections in which the militant Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) was poised to win. The cancellation sparked off a decade of violence, comparable in some ways to the war of independence Algeria fought against the French - although the number of dead is less and the degree of popular support for the Islamist cause is less. However, the violence continues, and many observers believe Algerian society is more deeply split than it was in the late 1980s or early 1990s.

The regime is desperately looking for a way to solve the problem of militancy. It has tried negotiations, without much success. This is because the bottom line for the Islamists is participation in the political mainstream without compromising on any of their core principles - which includes eventually turning Algeria into a "caliphate". On the other hand, the bottom line for the secular military-backed government involves an absolute rejection of any possibility that people holding such views are allowed to become legitimate political leaders.

In view of these conflicting bottom lines, the moderates on both sides have for years been circling around each other warily but with no real scope for reconciliation. The extremists of both camps - be that the hardline cadre of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) or the "eradicators" on the regime's side - have continued with a spate of bloody attacks and retaliations, which by now has taken the lives of well over 100,000 people according to most estimates. The chances of a reconciliation in the environment of the war against terror are slim, because the regime now sees a chance to finish off the radical Islamist tendency once and for all.