ALGERIA - Islamists Vs The Government.

It is in this context that Algiers has renewed its battle against Islamic extremists after Sept. 11, 2001. Developments since Sept. 11 have come as a blessing for the Algerian ruling superstructure. The American war against terrorism has been interpreted by the government as a virtual carte blanche to act against the local Islamists. The government has offered full co-operation with the US after the bombing of the WTC and the Pentagon, and there has been intelligence sharing since then in light of the fact that the Al Qaida network had links with the Algerian militant groups like the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) among others.

The radical groups in Algeria were never treated with a "velvet glove", but in the current circumstances, observers say it has become clear that the regime will not be hindered even by the occasional criticisms it used to face from Western human rights groups. In this, there are implications even for the so-called "moderate" Islamist groups, some of which were tolerated hitherto.

Perhaps because of the new global environment, the level of violence has declined in the last months of 2001, albeit marginally. Estimates in the Algerian media put the number of people killed in civil strife in 2001 at around 1,900. But Ramadan passed off with relatively little bloodshed. The Muslim holy month of fasting had become widely dreaded for killing binges by Islamist terrorists, but Ramadan 2001, which finished in mid-December, saw the least bloodletting for 10 years.

The government remains on a virtual war footing, nevertheless. One high profile militant to be killed in December 2001 was Kamel Zoubiri, the "emir" (commander) of Tizi Ouzou, the provincial capital of Kabylie. He had reportedly been active in Kabylie since 1993. Alleged by the Algiers-based press to be one of the killers of militant Berber folk-singer, Matoub Lounes, he was shot dead in downtown Tizi Ouzou.

The government is also seeking to buy sophisticated military hardware from the US to combat the militants. But, publicly at least, it is prepared to get involved in co-operation with the US on anti-terror operations only up to a point. The government does not want US forces to based on Algerian soil, for example, as part of a weapons purchase deal. Algiers has also stepped up its anti-terror diplomacy, which in fact began well before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. The regime has always maintained that terrorism operates through an international network.

In the meantime, the government has been allowing amnestied militants to speak out. This has shown the extent of the splits within the militant movements themselves, demonstrating to some extent the success with which the security forces, and the intelligence operatives under the chief of counter espionage Smain Lamari and the chief of intelligence Mohammed Mediene (a Berber), had infiltrated and undermined the militant groups.

Speaking to 'Algeria Interface' in late December 2001, Former Islamist guerrilla commander, Ali Benhadjar, who once headed the Islamic League for Preaching and Combat (LIDD), revealed details on the infighting that splintered the extremely violent Armed Islamic Group (GIA) as well as worsened differences between the LIDD, GIA and the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the armed wing of the FIS. According to Benhadjar, amnestied under the Civil Harmony Act, said the fault line dividing the GIA from the AIS and LIDD hinged on the armed struggle. "We would have preferred political means if our rights had been respected. Our armed struggle was in self-defence. For the GIA, the only true struggle was the armed struggle. Anything else was haram (illicit). They bumped off some fighters just because they were listening to a cassette of Abassi Madani or Ali Belhadj speaking". Benhadjar, now living in the Medea region, broke away from GIA in 1997 and formed the LIDD, which then surrendered its weapons under the terms of a deal the AIS struck with the Algerian army.