AFGHANISTAN - The Political Process.

The post-Taliban era in Afghanistan effectively began in December 2001, all the anti- Taliban Afghan factions, under the auspices of the UN, signed an agreement at Bonn, which chose Hamid Karzai as chairman of the new interim government of Afghanistan. A Popolzai tribal chief from the Pashtun majority ethnic group, Karzai is a gentle and sophisticated personality, who is able to mix with the Afghans as well as he can with Western leaders.

Karzai has no real powerbase of his own, which can be both a blessing and a curse in Afghanistan. The curse is that without a powerbase he is easily dispensable in political terms, especially in case of a US disengagement; observers note that for the time being his power base is the US, and as such he is the most powerful warlord in Afghanistan. The blessing is that, having no Afghan powerbase, puts him in a position whereby he can sometimes be regarded as a "neutral" arbiter between the various warlords without really appearing threatening to any of them.

The regime is trying hard to set up processes in the country so that some sense of stability and political continuity can be created in the country, which has known no peace for more than three decades. Karzai has initiated some strong American-backed efforts to democratise the country and introduce relevant institutions. A constitution was agreed in December 2003, and a Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) of Afghan leaders was held in December-January to work out the problems that will be faced in the democratisation process, as well as to discuss distribution of decision-making power between the various ethnic and sectarian groups. In June 2004, presidential elections are to be held in the country.

However, the success of all of these efforts depends to a great extent on personalities, cultural factors and the commitment of the US. None of these can be taken for granted, although the broad outlines of what the parties involved want are clear. Karzai is a well-educated and widely read man, who has a vision of building a modern, democratic country that would no longer be a pariah state. He wants to build a durable government that would bring together Afghanistan ethnically diverse members, who have been at war with one another ever since 1989, when the former Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan. Karzai wants to transform Afghanistan into a relatively modern state.

While his views are understood and even appreciated by some of the warlords, none of them are willing to change the status quo to their disadvantage - which is what will happen if Karzai's vision for Afghanistan is transformed into reality. The second most powerful man in the country, Gen. Fahim, a Tajik who is the defence minister and an ally of the president, belongs to the old school of Afgan warlords. More powerful than ever before with his own army and sources of income, Fahim is essentially a man of the past who thinks of Afghanistan as defined by ethnicity and tribal rule and believes power can be exercised through the guns of his followers.

For example, from March 2002 until September 2003, Fahim delayed implementing reforms in the Ministry of Defence that required him to replace his Tajik generals with a more ethnically balanced officer corps. Such a reform was a precondition for carrying out a $200 million UN- sponsored plan to pay off and disarm 100,000 militiamen loyal to the warlords. Fahim was clearly trying to block reforms until the US began to apply strong pressure on him to comply. Since September Fahim has begun to make the changes demanded by the UN, but they are as yet far from complete.

The Loya Jirga was the first test on a nation-wide scale of the prospects for stability through some degree of co-operation among the many factions in the country. The first Jirga was in June 2002 and elected Karzai as president. The second, in December 2003, was of greater significance in terms of the constitution of Afghanistan and the institutions to be set up in the country. The Jirga convened on Dec. 14 and was to endorse the new constitution within ten days. But it continued for twenty-two days while US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and UN special representative Lakhdar Brahimi worked out back-room compromises between the government and those opposing the envisaged strong presidential system.

On January 4, the 502 delegates, of whom one hundred were women, eventually agreed to a constitution of 160 articles, which conceded more powers to an elected parliament, granted equal rights to women, and provided for language and other rights to be accorded to the ethnic minorities. Serious rifts became evident during the Jirga. The majority Pashtun population now feels somewhat alienated because the Taliban was largely Pashtun and people associate them with the group's activities. However, this group backed fellow Pashtun Karzai's call for strong central rule; they believed this would help them make a political comeback. But the other ethnic minorities in northern Afghanistan -Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Turkomans - demanded greater autonomy, more powers for parliament, and the right to be educated in their own languages.

The next challenge is the presidential election. The US is keen that the elections should go ahead by June, as stipulated in the Bonn agreement of December 2001. But media reports indicate that most other key forces - namely the UN, most EU and NATO states, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as many Afghans - are pleading with Washington to postpone them for at least a year. That much time is believed to be needed to increase security, build more infrastructure, strengthen the central government, and complete important building projects.

Yet Karzai has the final say on when the elections are held. It is important to note that large parts of the country are still plagued by conflict with the US still waging a guerrilla war in some areas as part of its search for Osama Bin Ladin and his associates. Renowned Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid recently quoted Afghan Vice President Amin Arsala as saying: "The security situation has to improve and real reconstruction must start before elections can be held".

There have already been warnings from think tanks that the elections would be a catalyst for violence. Several observers have concurred, pointing out that the ground situation in the country is unlikely to improve by then, since neither ISAF nor government troops are likely to be strong enough to check violence by then. Moreover, there are rumours that the US may be preparing to withdraw some its troops from Afghanistan ahead of presidential elections next year, perhaps even in the coming months, in order to reduce the criticisms about open-ended military deployment commitments in global hotspots.

In such a scenario, the sources add, it is certain that neighbouring countries like Pakistan will seek to strengthen their position in Afghanistan by strengthening the Taliban further, while others like Iran will try to ensure that their own allies in the country are not undermined. The net result will be a return to the situation which prevailed in the mid-1990s, an environment that allowed Al Qaida to consolidate its presence in the country.