AFGHANISTAN - The Pakistani Angle.

The so far "tolerated" Pakistani dictator, Gen. Pervez Musharraf whose leadership is yet to come clean on the nuclear proliferation issue in the US, would be greatly relieved if his troops did capture Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Washington has signalled that, short of capturing Bin Laden himself, however, there could be no clearer way for Musharraf to demonstrate how valuable his co-operation can be to the Americans. It is also hard to think of a more timely way to distract American attention from the many legitimate questions now surrounding Musharraf's leadership and the true depth of his co-operation with the US.

Last month, the Pakistani ruler initially disclosed the possible surrounding of a "high-value target" from Al-Qaeda in a CNN interview after talks with visiting US Secretary of State Colin Powell. One subject that came up in his meeting with Powell was the extent of military or government involvement in Pakistan's nuclear weapons assistance to North Korea, Iran and Libya. The story about Zawahiri overwhelmed coverage of the nuclear issue. (Washington failed to protest when Musharraf cut short the prosecution of the nuclear scientist at the centre of the scandal, Abdul Qadeer Khan, with a presidential pardon. It did not object when he blocked the investigation of any military involvement).

The least the Bush administration is expected to now - rather than concentrate on a viable democracy for Afghanistan - is to press privately for a full accounting of the nuclear proliferation issue in Pakistan. Americans are at least as threatened by rogue states and terrorists armed with Pakistani nuclear blueprints and bomb fuel as they are by Qaeda and Taliban fugitives holed up in South Waziristan. Washington has not been sold on Pakistan's official version of the nuclear transfers - that civilian scientists acted entirely on their own for purely financial reasons. There is no way that a sensitive nuclear hardware and uranium could have been transported out of Pakistan without the knowledge and complicity of the country's all-powerful military high command and intelligence agencies.

Washington cannot know that the Pakistani network has been shut down until its enablers and protectors have been identified. Washington is also being pressed internally to insist on an end to the ambiguous relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban, which have allowed fighters to cross the Afghan border and attack American troops.

The problem is, in part, a legacy of the Pakistani military's close co-operation with the Taliban until Musharraf officially severed these ties after 9/11. A more recent complication has come from alliances which Gen. Musharraf has made with radical Islamist parties to prop up his rule. These parties, which are ideologically close to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, now wield substantial power along the Afghan border. Instead of urging Musharraf to stop what US politicians call "maneuvering against unfettered elections and Pakistan's main secular parties", Powell last month lavished much praise on him for democratic progress as he announced that Washington was preparing to designate Pakistan a "major non-NATO ally", easing access to military sales.