AFGHANISTAN - The Coming Challenges - Part 2 - The Internal Dynamics.

Afghanistan is currently facing an uneasy stability, in relative terms. Compared to the situation under the Taliban, things are much better at present for the ordinary Afghan. There is a degree of peace and stability in the northern, western and parts of the eastern areas under the control of various warlords. In the south-eastern part of the country, the Taliban is trying to make a comeback, with some success.

President Hamid Karzai, protected by American soldiers, remains in full control of Kabul and its immediate surroundings. The future stability of the country depends to a great extent on the commitment of the US to remain engaged politically, militarily and in economic terms.

It is because of the US presence that most of Afghanistan's neighbours are resisting their natural impulse to intervene in the country in a big way, as they did from the late 1980s when the Soviet soldiers pulled out until late 2001 when the US soldiers entered. All of Afghanistan's neighbours regard the country as being of vital strategic importance to their own security and future economic prospects because it straddles key trade routes and because anyone who controls Afghanistan will tip the strategic balance in their favour.

While the US presence has deterred overt and massive interference in Afghanistan by its neighbours, it has not discouraged them from trying to influence the situation in the country through covert means. This is especially true of Iran, which has maintained its influence in Heart province through its ally Ismail Khan, the warlord in control of the area.

Pakistan is playing a more blatant role, by trying to revive the Taliban. Most of the former top Taliban leaders are now living in Pakistan and are inspiring militants to carry out hit-and-run attacks against US forces in the south-eastern border areas.

Anti-US fighters in Afghanistan have over the past year become increasingly bold in their attacks. Observers believe such attacks will intensify in the months ahead unless drastic action is taken to ensure that the Taliban members do not find safe haven anywhere. The frontier region of Spin Boldak on the Afghan side of the Durand Line - which separates Pakistan from Afghanistan but which remains unrecognised by Kabul as a boundary - has become a haven for anti-US fighters who can easily slip across the border into Pakistan (see Part 3 to be issued in March).

As such, the efforts by various groups in Pakistan to revive the Taliban have met with some success. Several areas in the south-eastern part of the country now said to be under the sway of the Taliban. But this situation could be poised for change. Washington, after over a year of appealing to Pakistan to crack down on the movement and its leaders, recently declared that it would target areas within Pakistan itself. This threat has galvanised the Pakistani military establishment into action; for the first time, Pakistani army troops are entering the tribal areas of Waziristan to search for Al Qaida and Taliban remnants.

Within Afghanistan, the situation is becoming increasingly hostile to the US, with pro-Western President Karzai basically regarded as a puppet even by some of his nominal allies. Washington is depending on a number of established warlords and local leaders in the provinces to keep a degree of stability. These figures will switch sides the moment they feel that there is a weakening of resolve in the US, and they will also be looking to developments in Iraq to make their assessments.

While the casualty rate in Afghanistan and the nature of combat are not as well profiled in the Western media, American lives are being lost with steady regularity in the country. Unlike in Iraq, the nature of opposition to the US is clear and the way in which the Taliban are orchestrating their attacks and surviving is also clear. All this is having an impact on the domestic political situation as well.

One way to boost stability is to expand the reach of the Kabul government deep into the provinces, both directly through the deployment of Afghan troops loyal to the government and indirectly by expanding the strength and presence of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) controlled by NATO mechanisms. This should be paralleled by a serious effort at economic reform and reconstruction. So far the pledges of the outside world have remained largely on paper.

Yet this approach does not seem likely to materialise in the foreseeable future, partly because the Bush administration's attention is diverted and because the capabilities needed would be immense. Neither NATO nor the UN appear to be ready to share the burden of policing and reconstructing Afghanistan.

As of December 2003, the 5,700 strong ISAF force in the country only has three helicopters, for instance. Lieutenant Colonel John Tibbetts, chief planner at the 24-nation ISAF's headquarters in Kabul was quoted on Nov. 18 as saying: "If the (NATO) alliance does not step up to the plate, in five years we will be back here fighting again because this place will go to hell".

On Feb. 6, NATO's Secretary General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer and the alliance's supreme commander, US General James Jones, were to take the tough line during an allied defence ministers meeting that they should start offering troops and helicopters or forget about expanding peacekeeping operations in war-torn Afghanistan. Reuters quoted a NATO diplomat as saying on Feb. 6: "This is a chance for ministers to signal that their hearts are still in this. They will be told that this mission can't fail: despite problems over the availability of resources we just have to do it."

Human Rights Watch says in its latest World Report that, for NATO, failure in Afghanistan "would mean losing a raison d'etre in a world without a Soviet threat... Failure in Afghanistan would be a sign of the global community's impatience and insincerity in transforming failed states... For most Afghans, failure would mean a return to warfare, chaos and misery".