AFGHANISTAN - Karzai On US Raids.

On Sept. 20 Karzai questioned the need for major military operations in Afghanistan, saying air strikes were no longer effective and the US-led coalition should focus more on shutting off the flow of militants. He said the fight against terror should "concentrate on where terrorists are trained, on their bases, on the supply to them, on the money coming to them". Apparently he was referring to Pakistan.

The Pakistani Factor: Seth G. Jones a political scientist at the Rand Corp, wrote in The New York Times of Sept. 24 that unless the US and Islamabad took steps to eliminate the Taliban's "sanctuary" in Pakistan, "the security situation in Afghanistan will continue to deteriorate and undermine the country's fragile democracy". He noted that 2005 has been the most violent year in Afghanistan since the US helped overthrow the Taliban government in late 2001.

The number of Americans killed so far in 2005, 74, is a 570% increase from 2001 and a 50% increase from 2004. The number of insurgent attacks against Afghan civilians has steadily increased each year since 2001. Unlike the violence in Iraq, the fighting in Afghanistan is not the result of a local population deeply hostile to US forces. A 2004 opinion poll by the Asia Foundation showed that 65% of Afghans had a favourable view of the US government, and 67% had a favourable view of the US military - findings backed by Dr. Jones' observations and data from trips to the region during the last three years. "Nor is the fighting in Afghanistan the result of a failing American political and military strategy, he said, adding that US conventional and Special Forces had conducted "effective strike operations and civic action programs" which had undermined Taliban, al-Qaeda and HIA insurgents and their local support network in Afghanistan.

"Instead", Jones said, "a complex support network in Pakistan is the key to the Afghan insurgency's survival. Taliban insurgents in southern Afghanistan get supplies and help in Pakistani provinces like North-West Frontier and Baluchistan. Numerous captured Taliban prisoners have said they received training in Pakistani areas like the Mansehra district. Even more troubling, evidence suggests that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence directorate has helped Taliban insurgents. How can the insurgent sanctuary in Pakistan be eliminated?

"First, Pakistani police can strengthen controls along the Afghan-Pakistani border. American Special Forces have played a critical role in stopping infiltrators and training Afghans to patrol their borders over the last two years. But greater Pakistani participation is needed to block insurgents and their supplies.

"Second, Pakistani forces can conduct an unconventional war that undermines popular support for the insurgents, captures or kills leaders and guerrillas, and destroys their support network. New Taliban recruits have replaced those killed or captured. Operating behind the scenes in deference to Pakistani sensitivities, the United States could help by providing intelligence and surveillance during the campaign.

"Of course, President Pervez Musharraf faces serious obstacles to wiping out the insurgent base of support in Pakistan. Since 9/11, he has placated the West with unfulfilled promises of reform and crackdowns on extremists and simultaneously catered to Islamic political parties in order to retain their support. Pushing Musharraf and Pakistan to act will require finding pressure points. Perhaps the most significant is tying American assistance to Pakistani cooperation. The United States gives Pakistan more than $700 million in military and economic assistance each year. This assistance covers areas like health, economic development, trade and law enforcement".

Jones said the US could tie continued assistance in some of these areas - as well as implicit US support in multilateral bodies like the World Bank and the IMF - to "progress in defeating Afghan insurgents and their support network". The US "can also focus on a second pressure point. Musharraf wields power through a military government that seized control in 1999. Washington has been remarkably quiet about the shortcomings of democracy in Pakistan. In the absence of cooperation on counterinsurgency, the United States can and should increase pressure on Pakistan to pursue democratic reforms".

With the election of Karzai as president last October and the Sept. 18 legislative voting, Afghanistan has made "enormous political strides". Jones added: "It would be a shame to see this progress unravel through no fault of Afghanistan's, but through the failure of one of its neighbors to act and of the United States to do anything about it". (Dr. Jones is the author of "Establishing Law and Order After Conflict").