A tale of two gate-sharing plans: the National Football League and the National League, 1952-1956.1. Introduction Gate-sharing rules reflect the tension within a professional sports The examples and perspective in this article or section may not represent a worldwide view of the subject. Please [ improve this article] or discuss the issue on the talk page. league. While most industries are characterized char·ac·ter·ize tr.v. character·ized, character·iz·ing, character·iz·es 1. To describe the qualities or peculiarities of: characterized the warden as ruthless. 2. by winnowing winnowing: see threshing. the weak, modern sports leagues A sports league is an organization that exists to provide a regulated competition for a number of people to compete in a specific sport. At its simplest, it may be a local group of amateur athletes who form teams among themselves and compete on weekends; at its most complex, it can often prefer to maintain weak clubs. One method of helping teams in small cities survive is through crosssubsidization, typically achieved through revenue sharing revenue sharing Funding arrangement in which one government unit grants a portion of its tax income to another government unit. For example, provinces or states may share revenue with local governments, or national governments may share revenue with provinces or states. . Many people believe that gate sharing exists to redress Compensation for injuries sustained; recovery or restitution for harm or injury; damages or equitable relief. Access to the courts to gain Reparation for a wrong. REDRESS. The act of receiving satisfaction for an injury sustained. inequalities This page lists Wikipedia articles about named mathematical inequalities. Pure mathematics
 Editing of this page by unregistered or newly registered users is currently disabled due to vandalism. , your
attitude might be, "I should get a large piece of the pie when I
visit Tampa Bay Tampa Bay, inlet of the Gulf of Mexico, 25 mi (40 km) long and 7 to 12 mi (11.3–19 km) wide, W Fla., separated from the Gulf by numerous small islands; it receives the Hillsborough River. St. , since I'm bringing in a strong (well-paid),
attractive club. When the Devil Rays start bringing in a strong,
well-drawing club to Yankee Stadium • • [ , I'll be willing to share more revenue." This paper examines the experiences of two professional sports leagues  This article has no lead section.To comply with Wikipedia's lead section guidelines, one should be written. with dissimilar gate-sharing plans during the 1950s: the National Football League (NFL NFL abbr. National Football League NFL (US) n abbr (= National Football League) → Fußball-Nationalliga ) and baseball's National League (NL). Because congressional investigations required owners to divulge financial records for the 1952-1956 seasons, this is a good era to study. While sports economists certainly wish that the legislators had demanded more information, the available information provides a rare, illuminating il·lu·mi·nate v. il·lu·mi·nat·ed, il·lu·mi·nat·ing, il·lu·mi·nates v.tr. 1. To provide or brighten with light. 2. To decorate or hang with lights. 3. glimpse into the finances of professional sports. With this information we can examine whether the NL and NFL wanted gate-sharing rules to simply help poorer teams in smaller cities or whether there were other motivations for such rules. I also address the question of whether the NL's revenue-sharing plan was "flawed flaw 1 n. 1. An imperfection, often concealed, that impairs soundness: a flaw in the crystal that caused it to shatter. See Synonyms at blemish. 2. " by its seeming lack of "generosity" (in terms of proportions of home gate revenue shared), compared with the NFL's plan. In addition, the National League altered its revenue-sharing plan during the period examined. The change in the plan provides some clues as to the owners' attitudes regarding gate sharing. Finally, examining the gate-sharing experiences of the 1950s will shed light on the debate concerning whether fans preferred absolute or relative quality in the visiting team. Of course, there are significant differences between the 1950s and today's environment. Gate-based revenue still formed the bulk of a team's overall revenue. Television revenue was just beginning to be significant for professional sports, and owners started expressing concerns regarding the division of local television revenue. In an earlier paper, I described the effects of baseball's American League's revenue-sharing plan during the 1950s with its flat-rate levies on box, reserved, general admission, and bleacher bleach·er n. 1. One that bleaches or is used in bleaching. 2. An often unroofed outdoor grandstand for seating spectators. Often used in the plural. seats (Surdam 2002). The plan initially worked to redistribute re·dis·trib·ute tr.v. re·dis·trib·ut·ed, re·dis·trib·ut·ing, re·dis·trib·utes To distribute again in a different way; reallocate. home gate revenue from the wealthier New York Yankees and Detroit Tigers The Detroit Tigers are a professional baseball team based in Detroit, Michigan. The Tigers are a member of the Central Division of Major League Baseball's American League. From to the present, the Tigers have played in Comerica Park. to the St. Louis Browns, Philadelphia Athletics, and Washington Senators
One of the two associations of professional baseball teams in the U.S. and Canada designated as major leagues; the other is the National League (NL). fans appeared to prefer absolute to relative quality in their opponents, the Yankees started becoming net beneficiaries of gate sharing after 1953 when the Browns and Athletics relocated re·lo·cate v. re·lo·cat·ed, re·lo·cat·ing, re·lo·cates v.tr. To move to or establish in a new place: relocated the business. v.intr. to Baltimore and Kansas City Kansas City, two adjacent cities of the same name, one (1990 pop. 149,767), seat of Wyandotte co., NE Kansas (inc. 1859), the other (1990 pop. 435,146), Clay, Jackson, and Platte counties, NW Mo. (inc. 1850). , respectively. The Orioles and Athletics now lost the most money from revenue sharing, even though these teams remained mediocre me·di·o·cre adj. Moderate to inferior in quality; ordinary. See Synonyms at average. [French médiocre, from Latin mediocris : medius, middle; see medhyo- on the field. American League teams already had evidence that, as a way of getting strong teams in large cities to subsidize sub·si·dize tr.v. sub·si·dized, sub·si·diz·ing, sub·si·diz·es 1. To assist or support with a subsidy. 2. To secure the assistance of by granting a subsidy. weak teams in small cities, the existing revenue-sharing plan was a clumsy vehicle. During the late 1930s, when the New York Yankees were crushing crushing deaths of newborn animals, especially those in litters, caused by the mother lying on them accidentally. Contributed to by weakness of the neonate or awkward accommodation. A problem in piglets and puppies. Called also overlying. the opposition, the team was occasionally a net beneficiary of revenue sharing. Between 1936-1939, the team lost a total of just $14,000 from revenue sharing (New York Yankees Baseball Club 1936-1939). Since the two baseball leagues had similar revenue-sharing plans, one is entitled en·ti·tle tr.v. en·ti·tled, en·ti·tling, en·ti·tles 1. To give a name or title to. 2. To furnish with a right or claim to something: to ask whether the American League's experience from the 1950s was the artifact A distortion in an image or sound caused by a limitation or malfunction in the hardware or software. Artifacts may or may not be easily detectable. Under intense inspection, one might find artifacts all the time, but a few pixels out of balance or a few milliseconds of abnormal sound of the New York New York, state, United States New York, Middle Atlantic state of the United States. It is bordered by Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and the Atlantic Ocean (E), New Jersey and Pennsylvania (S), Lakes Erie and Ontario and the Canadian province of Yankees' strong attraction on the road or whether wealthy NL teams would also be net beneficiaries. Did NL fans of the lowly low·ly adj. low·li·er, low·li·est 1. Having or suited for a low rank or position. 2. Humble or meek in manner. 3. Plain or prosaic in nature. adv. 1. Pittsburgh Pirates This article is about the baseball team. For the National Hockey League team, see Pittsburgh Pirates (NHL). For the National Football League team (1933–1940), see Pittsburgh Steelers. and Chicago Cubs also prefer the absolute quality of the Brooklyn Dodgers to that of watching closely contested games with each other? The NL also had the unique situation of having two teams in New York City New York City: see New York, city. New York City City (pop., 2000: 8,008,278), southeastern New York, at the mouth of the Hudson River. The largest city in the U.S. : the New York Giants
2. Past Discussions of Revenue Sharing Baseball historian Harold Seymour and witnesses at the 1951 congressional hearings Congressional hearings are the principal formal method by which committees collect and analyze information in the early stages of legislative policymaking. Whether confirmation hearings — a procedure unique to the Senate — legislative, oversight, investigative, or a implied that gate-sharing rules were intended to redress revenue differences between teams that drew well and those that did not, but the owners often sang a different tune. Seymour (1971, p. 8) wrote, "Appreciating the results of inequality inequality, in mathematics, statement that a mathematical expression is less than or greater than some other expression; an inequality is not as specific as an equation, but it does contain information about the expressions involved. of markets, the owners tried to compensate by sharing gate receipts." Ironically, he also chronicled the underlying animosity between owners of large-city teams and their peers. The NL had difficulties with its New York and Philadelphia clubs during its inaugural season of 1876. The large-city owners refused to travel west to play some clubs, and, instead, offered to handsomely pay the western clubs to come east. The NL eventually (but only temporarily) settled on a fixed guarantee of $125 instead of a percentage split in 1886. Owners of teams in the smaller cities favored the percentage split, with the Detroit manager complaining, "We should be nice suckers ... to go to Boston or to Washington and put big money in their treasuries for $125." (Seymour 1960, p. 209). Albert Spalding
Albert Goodwill Spalding (Byron, Illinois September 2, 1850 – September 9, 1915 in Point Loma, California) was a professional baseball , owner of the Chicago team, retorted that wealthier clubs were "tired of carrying along a club like Detroit." (Seymour 1960, p. 209). Certainly, some sports historians believe such rules foster competitive balance. Leifer makes explicit his belief in the link between the NFL's generous gate-sharing rule and its competitive balance: "The main reason why the NFL did not experience high performance inequality, and early baseball leagues did, was the liberal revenue-sharing policies adopted by the NFL." (Leifer 1995, p. 103). However, sports economists debate whether gate-sharing rules have much effect on competitive balance, but most agree that such rules may ensure the survivability sur·viv·a·ble adj. 1. Capable of surviving: survivable organisms in a hostile environment. 2. That can be survived: a survivable, but very serious, illness. of teams in smaller cities. In addition, most economists assume that gate sharing redistributes money from wealthier teams, typically in larger cities, to poorer teams, typically in smaller cities, creating, in essence, a "Robin Hood Robin Hood, legendary hero of 12th-century England who robbed the rich to help the poor. Chivalrous, manly, fair, and always ready for a joke, Robin Hood reflected many of the ideals of the English yeoman. " effect. Rottenberg (1956) and Quirk quirk n. 1. A peculiarity of behavior; an idiosyncrasy: "Every man had his own quirks and twists" Harriet Beecher Stowe. 2. and Fort (1992) argue that increased revenue sharing should have little effect on competitive balance but may serve to suppress To stop something or someone; to prevent, prohibit, or subdue. To suppress evidence is to keep it from being admitted at trial by showing either that it was illegally obtained or that it is irrelevant. player salaries. Scully (1989, 1995) and Quirk and Fort (1992) also share a belief that the "more equal the gate-sharing plan among the teams, the more equal the revenues." (Scully 1989, p. 80). Underlying their argument is the implicit assumption in their models that the stronger the team is, the more it draws at home but the worse it draws on the road (because the rival team is weaker): "Intuitively, gate sharing lowers the value of an additional win-percent to a team because the team only captures a fraction of any increased revenue at home games. On the road, the team generally loses revenue because, on average, the win-percent of its opponent has fallen." (Fort and Quirk 1995, p. 1287). Kesenne (2000) and Marburger (1997) develop models where a team's ability to draw on the road is not necessarily inverse (mathematics) inverse - Given a function, f : D -> C, a function g : C -> D is called a left inverse for f if for all d in D, g (f d) = d and a right inverse if, for all c in C, f (g c) = c and an inverse if both conditions hold. to its relative strength. Marburger alters this assumption and finds that revenue sharing can enhance competitive balance, a finding shared by Kesenne, under certain circumstances. Later, Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) demonstrate plausible conditions under which certain forms of revenue sharing might reduce competitive balance. With respect to football, Vrooman (1995) suggests that the short schedule may reduce the importance of the attractiveness of the visiting team, that is, there may not be a strong relationship between a team's relative strength and its ability to draw on the road. There may be another motive underlying gate sharing. Canes (1974) argues that revenue sharing and other league rules may help leagues, because "their absence may encourage team owners to produce higher team quality than is socially efficient." (p. 92). He describes the externality Externality A consequence of an economic activity that is experienced by unrelated third parties. An externality can be either positive or negative. Notes: Pollution emitted by a factory that spoils the surrounding environment and affects the health of nearby residents is problem thusly thus·ly adv. Usage Problem Thus. Usage Note: Thusly was introduced in the 19th century as an alternative to thus in sentences such as Hold it thus or He put it thus. : "Since the owner's profits are not affected by decreased demand for games in which his team does not play, he will not take such effects into account; that is, they will be external to the owner's cost and revenue calculations." (p. 94). While owners might compensate each other for such revenue losses caused by fielding too strong a team, "this would require difficult decisions about which teams should be compensated and to what extent. Moreover, if not all team owners were party to the agreement, some could increase the quality of their teams and so displace dis·place tr.v. dis·placed, dis·plac·ing, dis·plac·es 1. To move or shift from the usual place or position, especially to force to leave a homeland: the others, or could threaten to increase quality in order to be compensated not to do so." (p. 95). Thus, a properly designed revenue-sharing plan can reduce the incentive (in terms of marginal revenue Marginal revenue The change in total revenue as a result of producing one additional unit of output. marginal revenue The extra revenue generated by selling one additional unit of a good or service. product) to overinvest in team quality and also to help owners sidestep side·step v. side·stepped, side·step·ping, side·steps v.intr. 1. To step aside: sidestepped to make way for the runner. 2. the potentially disputatious dis·pu·ta·tious adj. Inclined to dispute. See Synonyms at argumentative. dis  pu·ta need to determine the compensation just
described.
3. The Two Leagues' Revenue-Sharing Plans The NL required the home team to pay 22.5 cents per admission to the visiting team through 1953 and 27.5 cents thereafter (U.S. Congress 1957, p. 1448; The Sporting News Official Baseball Guide 1954, p. 110). Owners of wealthy teams resisted some forms of revenue sharing. Walter O'Malley Walter Francis O'Malley (October 9, 1903 – August 9, 1979) was an American sports executive who owned the Brooklyn/Los Angeles Dodgers team in Major League Baseball from 1950 to 1979. , owner of the Brooklyn Dodgers, refused to share his television revenue with visiting teams, characterizing such sharing as "socialism"; to paraphrase par·a·phrase n. 1. A restatement of a text or passage in another form or other words, often to clarify meaning. 2. The restatement of texts in other words as a studying or teaching device. v. the famous line in the film A League of Their Own, he espoused the mantra mantra (măn`trə, mŭn–), in Hinduism and Buddhism, mystic words used in ritual and meditation. A mantra is believed to be the sound form of reality, having the power to bring into being the reality it represents. , "There's no socialism in baseball." (Kachline 1962, pp. 1-2; Povich 1951, p. 35). Sports historians and other commentators have lauded the NFL for its generous gatesharing plan. Leifer believes that football chose a generous plan because of "early uncertainties in local support.... Generous revenue sharing allowed teams to work out mutually advantageous schedules, bringing football to wherever it might attract large audiences." (Leifer 1995, p. 103). While the NFL's gate-sharing rule of a 60%-40% split is convenient to remember and seemingly seem·ing adj. Apparent; ostensible. n. Outward appearance; semblance. seem  ing·ly adv. more equitable than baseball's
rules, the plan was less generous than its reputation. First, according
to according toprep. 1. As stated or indicated by; on the authority of: according to historians. 2. In keeping with: according to instructions. 3. the NFL constitution, home teams deducted de·duct v. de·duct·ed, de·duct·ing, de·ducts v.tr. 1. To take away (a quantity) from another; subtract. 2. To derive by deduction; deduce. v.intr. 15% of the gate receipts to cover stadium rental and other costs, whether or not the home team incurred such expenses. The home team then sent 2% of the remaining 85% of the gate receipts (1.7% of the original receipts) to the league. Finally, the home team paid 40% of the remaining 83.3% of the gate receipts to the visiting team (U.S. Congress 1957, p. 2580ai; NFL Constitutions, various years). In effect, then, the home team paid a minimum of 33.2% of gate receipts to the visiting team. Second, most observers neglected to report a caveat to the simple 60%-40% rule: The home team had to pay a minimum of $20,000 to the visiting team. The guaranteed minimum had been only $4000 in 1935 (NFL 1935, p. 28). The guaranteed minimum increased through the years; although not all of the NFL constitutions were available, we can trace the progression. The minimum guarantee rose to $5000 by 1938; $15,000 by 1946; and $20,000 by 1949. The minimum continued to rise, reaching $30,000 in 1968 (NFL Constitution, 1938, pp. 28-29; 1946, p. 26; 1949, p. 26; 1950, p. 28; 1968, p. 42). These increases suggest that the team owners wanted a binding guarantee, not a symbolic one. 4. An Overview of the Two Leagues Table 1 gives basic attendance and win-loss records for teams in the two leagues during 1952-1956. Both leagues had chronically successful and unsuccessful clubs, although every team in the NFL had at least one losing season during the period surveyed. Over the five seasons, the standard deviation In statistics, the average amount a number varies from the average number in a series of numbers. (statistics) standard deviation - (SD) A measure of the range of values in a set of numbers. in Win-Loss Pct. was 0.081 for the NL. The standard deviation in Win-Loss Pct. for the NFL's 12 teams was 0.129 (ignoring the Dallas Texans Dallas Texans has been the name of various American football and soccer teams.
v. i·de·al·ized, i·de·al·iz·ing, i·de·al·iz·es v.tr. 1. To regard as ideal. 2. To make or envision as ideal. v.intr. 1. standard deviation," a league with equally matched teams would have a standard deviation of 0.018 for 770 games and 0.065 for 60 games. The NL's standard deviation was four times greater than its idealized standard deviation, while football's was twice as large (Scully 1989, pp. 88-93; Quirk and Fort 1992, p. 245). For the decade, Fort found that the NL had less competitive balance, as measured by the standard deviation ratio of winning percent imbalance imbalance /im·bal·ance/ (im-bal´ans) 1. lack of balance, such as between two opposing muscles or between electrolytes in the body. 2. dysequilibrium (2). : 2.06 to 1.52 (Fort 2006, pp. 172 and 174). The Gini coefficients The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion most prominently used as a measure of inequality of income distribution or inequality of wealth distribution. It is defined as a ratio with values between 0 and 1: the numerator is the area between the Lorenz curve of the for revenue imbalance were higher, on average, in the NL than in the NFL during the 1950s (0.180 vs. 0.151), but the NFL had a higher Gini coefficient for payroll imbalance (0.194 vs. 0.112). The attendance patterns are of more interest. Five teams in the NL essentially broke even under the revenue plan because their home and away attendance figures were nearly equal. Indeed, revenue sharing was basically an affair between the three strongest clubs. If one subscribes to the "Robin Hood" interpretation of revenue sharing, then the NL is a perverse per·verse adj. 1. Directed away from what is right or good; perverted. 2. Obstinately persisting in an error or fault; wrongly self-willed or stubborn. 3. a. example indeed. These perverse results occurred partly because the Brooklyn Dodgers attracted the largest crowds on the road. The New York Giants also did well. Part of their high road attendance certainly occurred because the two teams' fans could easily travel to "road games" between them. The attendance differences between teams in the two sports were, in some cases, compounded by differences in ticket prices. The average ticket revenue for the NL during the five seasons was $1.53 per admission. The home teams shared 16.8% of their revenue with the visiting teams, a rate roughly half that of the NFL. Average ticket revenues varied from $1.33 in Chicago to $1.65 in Brooklyn. The ratio between Brooklyn's and Chicago's average ticket revenues was 1.24:1. Thus, the Dodgers paid a lower proportion of their gate revenue, 15.4%, to the visiting team, while the Cubs paid the highest proportion of theirs, 19.1%. Based on the game-by-game information for 1956, the average ticket revenue in the NFL was $3.08. Cleveland had the lowest average ticket revenue at $2.74, while Washington had the highest average ticket revenue at $3.42. The ratio of Washington to Cleveland's average ticket revenue was 1.25:1, similar to that of the top and bottom teams in the NL. Green Bay's higher-than-average ticket revenue partially offset the team's tiny stadium and small home attendance. The NFL's gate-sharing plan, based on a percentage basis, promised to redress the situation found in baseball's gate-sharing plan, where teams with higher average ticket revenues paid out smaller proportions of their gate revenues to the visiting team. However, the amount of the redress depended on the prevalence of payments of the $20,000 minimum. Both leagues, then, had revenue-sharing plans with regressive re·gres·sive adj. 1. Having a tendency to return or to revert. 2. Characterized by regression. re·gres features. 5. NFL and NL Revenue and Gate-Sharing Data What were the initial disparities in revenue between NFL and NL teams? Tables 2, 3a, and 3b are from financial data given to a congressional hearing in 1957. All dollar amounts are reported in nominal terms because the Consumer Price Index was remarkably stable between 1952 and 1956, varying from 99.3 to 101.6. In addition to yearly data, football owners provided game-by-game data for the 1956 season. In general, the data appear accurate and consistent, with occasional addition errors. The game-by-game data was consistent with the league's revenue-sharing rules. The tables use the standard deviation of the teams' shares of league revenue, top:bottom ratio, and first quartile Quartile A statistical term describing a division of observations into four defined intervals based upon the values of the data and how they compare to the entire set of observations. Notes: Each quartile contains 25% of the total observations. :fourth quartile ratio to compare the revenue distributions of the two leagues. The NL appeared to have greater relative disparity dis·par·i·ty n. pl. dis·par·i·ties 1. The condition or fact of being unequal, as in age, rank, or degree; difference: "narrow the economic disparities among regions and industries" in gate revenue than did the NFL, especially as measured by the top:bottom and first quartile:fourth quartile ratios. The NL's standard deviations also appeared to be higher, but then it only had 8 teams instead of 12. The NL also appeared to have smaller disparities in gate revenue than did the American League, or at least until the St. Louis Browns and Philadelphia Athletics relocated in 1954 and 1955, respectively. The NFL's media revenue was typically much more evenly distributed than that of the NL, where the Brooklyn Dodgers had more than four times as much as did four of its competitors. Dodgers' owner Walter O'Malley led the resistance to any sharing of television revenue, and, given the dramatic disparities between media revenues in the NL, his stance is not surprising. Aside from 1952, the NFL typically had roughly a 2:1 ratio between the teams with the most and the least media revenue. Although the NFL's relatively even distribution of media revenue might not have persisted into the 1960s, one can speculate whether the "equal shares" aspect of the national television contracts might not have been as revolutionary as is often portrayed por·tray tr.v. por·trayed, por·tray·ing, por·trays 1. To depict or represent pictorially; make a picture of. 2. To depict or describe in words. 3. To represent dramatically, as on the stage. . However, during this era, media revenues comprised only about one-eighth of either league's total revenue. The NFL did have one source of revenue that was quite unevenly distributed: revenues from exhibition games. The San Francisco 49ers Thus, without gate sharing, the two leagues had roughly similar disparities in income between the "haves" and the "have-nots." 6. Gate Sharing's Effects The NL's Experiences The NL's gate-sharing plan succeeded in reducing the standard deviation of team's shares of total league gate revenue, but the overall impression is that the redistribution re·dis·tri·bu·tion n. 1. The act or process of redistributing. 2. An economic theory or policy that advocates reducing inequalities in the distribution of wealth. toward poor teams was moderate at best (Tables 3a and 3b), especially when compared with the earlier effects of a similar plan. The NL's revenue-sharing rules appear to have been different before 1946. The owners provided detailed information on the 1929, 1933, 1939, and 1943 seasons (U.S. Congress 1952, pp. 1606-7). Since Pittsburgh did not provide information on 1929, I can only discuss the apparent revenue-sharing effects for the latter three seasons. NL constitutions are unavailable to this author for the pre-World War II period so I do not know what the rules were. However, teams collectively paid between 23.6 and 24 cents per home admission to the visiting team. I do not know whether teams paid the same flat rate per admission, but I think it is reasonable to assume that all teams paid close to the average. Whatever the actual plan, the amounts transferred to Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis in 1933 represented proportionally larger shares of those teams' overall gate revenue than the transfers of the 1950s. Philadelphia, a dismal dis·mal adj. 1. Causing gloom or depression; dreary: dismal weather; took a dismal view of the economy. 2. team, probably earned roughly $130,000 in gross home revenue during 1933. Thanks to the almost $50,000 net transfer, the Phillies had $179,000 in actual gate revenue. In 1939, the Boston Braves Boston Braves may refer to any of the following American professional sports teams:
Although teams did not report the amount of home revenue paid to visiting teams, the revenue-sharing rules make such calculations easy. A team's estimated gate revenue without gate sharing is: Estimated gate revenue without gate sharing = home revenue reported + (0.225 or 0.275)(home attendance). Aside from discrepancies for Boston and Milwaukee in 1952-1953 and Cincinnati in 1953, the calculations were consistent with the total away revenue reported. Table 4 shows the amount of redistribution under the NL's gate-sharing plan in 1952. No team gained or lost more than $87,000. The Boston Braves gained $87,000 from gate sharing, raising their total gate revenue to $462,000; without gate sharing, the team would have had just $375,000 in revenue. Thus, gate sharing provided 18.8% of the Braves' actual gate revenue in 1952, but the pennant-winning Brooklyn Dodgers gained almost as much as the Braves did. To give the reader a reference on how significant these amounts were, consider that in 1952 the Dodgers reported a team payroll of $505,139 (including managers and coaches, as well as players). The Braves reported a player payroll of $333,251. Thus, the $87,000 transfer was over one-quarter of the team's payroll. It was more than half of the difference between the Dodgers' and the Braves' payroll. The Boston Braves discovered the baseball equivalent of E1 Dorado dorado: see dolphin (fish). in Milwaukee. The team earned the least combined home and road revenue in 1952, but the relocated team had the greatest combined gate revenue for each of the four seasons, 1953-1956. Although other NL teams would occasionally lose small amounts of revenue because of the gate-sharing plan, the Braves essentially funded the redistribution, with the Brooklyn Dodgers or the New York Giants gaining the most revenue from the plan in each season surveyed. The change in the gatesharing rule from 22.5 to 27.5 cents per admission after 1953 primarily injured in·jure tr.v. in·jured, in·jur·ing, in·jures 1. To cause physical harm to; hurt. 2. To cause damage to; impair. 3. the Braves. Surprisingly, there was little mention of this rule change in The Sporting News, New York Times, or Chicago Tribune Chicago Tribune Daily newspaper published in Chicago. The Tribune is one of the leading U.S. newspapers and long has been the dominant voice of the Midwest. Founded in 1847, it was bought in 1855 by six partners, including Joseph Medill (1823–99), who made the paper , just a one-sentence mention in The Sporting News Official Baseball Guide (1954, p. 110). Therefore, I cannot say whether the Braves were against the change. Ironically, the increase in the gate-sharing rate after the 1953 season did not greatly benefit all of the financially weaker teams in the league, while the Dodgers and, later, the Giants appeared to gain the most from the increase. Moreover, the league did not alter the gate-sharing rules to ensure a greater redistribution of revenues, nor did it address the growing disparity in media revenue. As a sop to the weaker teams, the league's revenue-sharing rule was ineffective. The moribund moribund /mor·i·bund/ (mor´i-bund) in a dying state. mor·i·bund n. At the point of death; dying. mor Pittsburgh Pirates finished last every season between 1952 and 1955; the team improved to seventh in 1956. For the five seasons surveyed, the Pirates This is a list of known pirates, buccaneers, corsairs, privateers, and others involved in piracy. This list includes both captains and prominent crew members. See also: pirates, wokou, buccaneers, corsairs, and privateers Ancient World The American League's revenue-sharing plan, paying an average of 29.0 cents per full admission, had roughly similar effects on the standard deviation and other measures of distribution in gate revenues (Tables 3a and 3b). However, the Browns and Athletics received larger net transfers than did the weak teams in the NL. And, the New York Yankees did not reap as much in net transfers as did the Dodgers. Table 6 shows the team-by-team attendance and net transfers during 1956. The Dodgers attracted more fans on the road than at their stadium against every rival. Indeed, the Dodgers were the best road draw for five of their seven rivals. The Braves drew more at home than on the road against all of their rivals. The Giants benefited greatly by having the Dodgers in such close proximity. Games with Brooklyn represented 38% of the team's home gate. Looking at the lower right corner of upper panel in Table 6 reveals that NL fans of weaker teams did not flock flock 1. a group of one species of animal or bird which eats or travels or is kept together, e.g. flock of sheep, of wild geese. 2. wool or cotton particles or debris used as stuffing or packing. to games against other weak teams; for this season at least, fans appeared to prefer absolute quality instead of relative quality of the visiting team. While the NL's gate-sharing plan was less "generous" than the NFL's, a more generous plan, say, of double the amount wouldn't have redressed the situation. The lack of generosity simply was not the key factor driving the league's "perverse" redistribution toward the Dodgers and Giants. If home teams had to share 45 cents in 1952-1953 and 55 cents in 1954-1956, the amounts shown in Tables 4-6 would simply have doubled: The Dodgers and Giants would have gained twice as much, while the Braves would have lost twice as much. The weaker teams would have seen gains of roughly 1% of gross home gate revenue. Of course, it is possible that owners might have changed their ticket prices and promotions if they had to relinquish more of the home receipts. For the NL's gate-sharing plan to have been more redistributive, the owners would have had to sever TO SEVER, practice. When defendants who are sued jointly have separate defences, they may in general sever, that is, each one rely on his own separate defence; each may plead severally and insist on his own separate plea. See Severance. the link between a team's ability to draw on the road and its share of road revenue. The NFL's Experiences What effects did the NFL's revenue-sharing plan have in 1956? The gate-sharing plan did reduce the standard deviation of the percent of the league revenue (net of the league share). With 12 teams, a typical team would receive 0.083 of the overall gate receipts. Without gate sharing, the standard deviation would have been 0.028 in 1956; the gate-sharing plan reduced the standard deviation to 0.022. Given the unreliable nature of the home revenue figures reported for the other years, there is no estimate of the standard deviations for 1952-1955. The smaller standard deviation in the NFL than the NL for 1956 appears to be significant. The F-statistic for the NFL's and NL's variances in shares of league revenue without gate sharing was 2.94, implying that one can reject, at the 10% level, the hypothesis that the variances are equal. From Table 7, only two teams experienced more than a $100,000 shift in gate revenue from the plan, but these transfers represented a larger proportion of gate revenue than found in the NL; for the Chicago Cardinals (38.3%) and Green Bay Packers (16.0%), the transfers comprised a significant proportion of their revenue from the gate (Table 8). The two teams that lost the most dollars, the Giants and Lions, lost 11.5 and 6.1% of their gate revenues, respectively. For most teams, though, the plan had minimal effects. Table 9 shows that for several NFL teams in 1956 attendance at games against intraconference rivals did not strongly depend on the strength of the visiting team. Each team played its five intraconference rivals home-and-home. The remaining two games were against interconference teams. Over the five seasons, the Packers were the biggest beneficiaries from revenue sharing. As shown in Table 1, the Packers drew over 500,000 more fans on the road than at home, so they probably gained around $500,000 from revenue sharing. The Rams were the biggest losers. Still, the attendance differences shown in the table imply that few teams saw a change of even $50,000 per season. The woebegone woe·be·gone adj. 1. Affected with or marked by deep sorrow, grief, or wretchedness. See Synonyms at sad. 2. Of an inferior or deplorable condition: a rundown, woebegone old shack. Cardinals might have averaged a gain of $30,000-$40,000 per season. The NFL's gate-sharing plan did not suffer from the flat-rate "defect" afflicting af·flict tr.v. af·flict·ed, af·flict·ing, af·flicts To inflict grievous physical or mental suffering on. [Middle English afflighten, from afflight, baseball's plan. The transfers would have been larger, except the $20,000 minimum gate-share rule diluted di·lute tr.v. di·lut·ed, di·lut·ing, di·lutes 1. To make thinner or less concentrated by adding a liquid such as water. 2. To lessen the force, strength, purity, or brilliance of, especially by admixture. gate-sharing's redistributive effect. Philadelphia paid $20,000 for two home games, while Cleveland and Green Bay each paid $20,000 for one home game. However, the perennially per·en·ni·al adj. 1. Lasting or active through the year or through many years. 2. a. Lasting an indefinitely long time; enduring: perennial happiness. b. weak Chicago Cardinals paid out $20,000 for five of its six home games during 1956, even though the team enjoyed an aberrant aberrant /ab·er·rant/ (ah-ber´ant) (ab´ur-ant) wandering or deviating from the usual or normal course. ab·er·rant adj. 1. season by winning 7 of its 12 games. However, the Cardinals had won only 10 times in the previous 4 seasons and would win only 7 games during the next three seasons. The Cardinals' home games had receipts of $276,538.80, almost $164,000 less than Philadelphia, the team with the next lowest receipts. The Cardinals paid $121,193.60 to visiting teams, including $100,000 for the five games where they paid the minimum. Had the $20,000 minimum rule not been in effect, the Cardinals would have paid 33.2% of receipts, or $91,810.88, to the visitors. The rule cost the Cardinals almost $30,000. The Cardinals paid 43.8% of their receipts to the visiting team, the highest proportion in the league. No other team paid more than 35% of their receipts to visiting teams. Thus, although the NFL's percentage gate-sharing rule mitigated mit·i·gate v. mit·i·gat·ed, mit·i·gat·ing, mit·i·gates v.tr. To moderate (a quality or condition) in force or intensity; alleviate. See Synonyms at relieve. v.intr. To become milder. the varying average ticket prices received by its members, unlike the NL plan, the minimum payout pay·out n. 1. The act or an instance of paying out. 2. A percentage of corporate earnings that is paid as dividends to shareholders. requirement had "regressive" effects. Although NFL owners did not provide game-by-game receipts for 1952-1955, attendance figures found in Maher and Gill (1997, pp. 117-20) show that the Cardinals probably had to pay the minimum two or three times each season. In some cases, the minimum wasn't much higher than the 33.2% levy; still, the weak Chicago Cardinals lost some of the benefits from gate sharing. Of course, if when weak teams played each other they simply exchanged $20,000 minimums, the rule's deleterious deleterious adj. harmful. effects would have been minimal, but in 1956 the minimums were not always paid to other weak teams. The Chicago Cardinals had the misfortune of playing in the American Conference American Conference may refer to:
The Village of Cleveland is at the eastern boundary of the Town of Constantia on Route 49. History The Village of Cleveland was incorporated in 1857. , Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Washington. The American Conference teams drew far fewer fans to games during the five years than did teams in the National Conference: 5.1 versus 7.2 million. Typically, the Cardinals played home-and-home series with their intraconference rivals. The remaining two games on the schedule were interconference games, usually one with the crosstown cross·town or cross-town adj. Running, extending, or going across a city or town: a crosstown street; crosstown traffic. adv. Bears and one other National Conference club. Thus, while Green Bay drew fewer fans at home than did the Cardinals, their road attendance was much greater because of playing against the top four drawing teams in the NFL (plus Baltimore might have ranked sixth had the team played all five seasons). The Packers also benefited from playing the American Conference's best drawing team, Cleveland, in three of the seasons. In a sense, aside from the regressive effects of the gate-sharing plan that blunted blunt adj. blunt·er, blunt·est 1. Having a dull edge or end; not sharp. 2. Abrupt and often disconcertingly frank in speech: the Cardinals' gains, the NFL's plan was the very model of a gate-sharing plan, as held by popular opinion: transfers from successful teams, mostly in large cities, to weaker teams. 7. Conclusions The two leagues' revenue-sharing plans did reduce the standard deviation of member teams' shares of total gate revenues by roughly similar amounts in 1956. The proportional decrease in the standard deviation was larger in the NFL than in the NL, but there is only one season's worth of data for the NFL. However, the leagues differed significantly in the nature of the redistribution and narrowing of the standard deviations. In the NL, the reduced standard deviation was primarily the result of whittling Whittling is the art of carving shapes out of raw wood with a knife. Whittling is typically performed with a light, small-bladed knife, usually a pocket knife. Specialised whittling knives are available as well. down Milwaukee's impressive drawing power at home while enriching the heretofore richest teams in Brooklyn and New York. Weaker teams in the NL did get net transfers, but these were often smaller in both absolute and relative terms than those accruing to Brooklyn and New York. The similar reduction of the NFL's standard deviation occurred by helping the poor-drawing Green Bay Packers and Chicago Cardinals at the expense of New York, Los Angeles Los Angeles (lôs ăn`jələs, lŏs, ăn`jəlēz'), city (1990 pop. 3,485,398), seat of Los Angeles co., S Calif.; inc. 1850. , and Detroit. Thus, the NFL's experiences correspond more closely to the way most people think about gate sharing. The NL failed to have the "Robin Hood" effect found in the NFL not strictly because of a lack of generosity, but because wealthy, strong teams, such as Brooklyn and New York, drew well on the road. Thus, even if the NL had approximated the 33.2% redistribution rate mandated by the NFL by doubling the flat rate to 45 cents in 1952 and 1953, and 55 cents after 1953, only Milwaukee, Brooklyn, and New York would have been affected by more than $80,000 over the five seasons. The other five teams, including the truly wretched Pittsburgh Pirates, would have received smaller gains than the Dodgers and Giants from a more "generous" plan. To significantly alter the distribution of gate revenue, the NL needed to pool the road revenue and then split it evenly, thereby severing sev·er v. sev·ered, sev·er·ing, sev·ers v.tr. 1. To set or keep apart; divide or separate. 2. To cut off (a part) from a whole. 3. the link between a team's win-loss record and its ability to draw on the road. However, the NL owners did not appear willing to do so, and they settled on merely increasing the per-attendee amount paid after 1953. The policy did curb Milwaukee's home attendance advantage, mostly to the advantage of the Brooklyn Dodgers. Because the Braves lacked the Dodgers' media revenue (that Brooklyn did not have to share), the equity of the transfer is ambiguous. The moral of the NL's experience was the potential gains from relocating a moribund franchise, such as the Braves. Indeed, the NFL would eventually send the Chicago Cardinals to St. Louis. Green Bay would eventually prosper under Vince Lombardi's coaching. Throughout the period surveyed, though, the Packers were hampered by their small stadium. Even shifting some games to Milwaukee did not greatly bolster This article is about the pillow called a bolster. For other meanings of the word "bolster", see bolster (disambiguation). A bolster (etymology: Middle English, derived from Old English, and before that the Germanic word bulgstraz attendance. The NFL's gate-sharing plan worked as pundits expected, because the amounts transferred were 12.9 and 10.8% of the Cardinals and Packers' total gross incomes in 1956. The league's policy of enacting a $20,000 minimum blunted the redistributive aspect of its plan. Why did the NFL have a guaranteed minimum? American League baseball owners were familiar with franchises that held "fire sales" of players to ostensibly os·ten·si·ble adj. Represented or appearing as such; ostensive: His ostensible purpose was charity, but his real goal was popularity. remain solvent solvent, constituent of a solution that acts as a dissolving agent. In solutions of solids or gases in a liquid, the liquid is the solvent. In all other solutions (i.e. . The St. Louis Browns sold most of their best players between 1947 and 1951. The owners, the DeWitt brothers, pleaded poverty, but some rival owners grumbled about the brothers being "parasites, who feed on the drawing power of the better teams while on the road and keep themselves weak and without support at home." (Stann 1951, pp. 35-6). A local sportswriter sports·writ·er n. A person who writes about sports, especially for a newspaper or magazine. sports observed: "The [DeWitt brothers'] theory is that a major league franchise has a certain minimum value that can't be reduced even if no players of established major league caliber go with it ... [they] recognize they can't draw much more poorly with no big leaguers in their lineup A criminal investigation technique in which the police arrange a number of individuals in a row before a witness to a crime and ask the witness to identify which, if any, of the individuals committed the crime. than they have drawn with a few, and that they may as well take advantage of their rivals' prosperity and cash in while the cash is good." (Cobbledick 1949, pp. 59-60). During the 1930s, the Philadelphia Phillies “Phillies” redirects here. For other uses, see Phillies (disambiguation). The Philadelphia Phillies are a professional baseball team based in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in the United States. had sold many players and remained weak on the field, despite the revenue sharing. Thus, the NFL's guaranteed minimum might have served as a deterrent de·ter·rent adj. Tending to deter: deterrent weapons. n. 1. Something that deters: a deterrent to theft. 2. for franchises tempted to strip their clubs, thereby reducing the potential for moral hazard Moral Hazard The risk that a party to a transaction has not entered into the contract in good faith, has provided misleading information about its assets, liabilities or credit capacity, or has an incentive to take unusual risks in a desperate attempt to earn a profit before the problems. The NL was less likely to enact a minimum guarantee, given the inverse relationship A inverse or negative relationship is a mathematical relationship in which one variable decreases as another increases. For example, there is an inverse relationship between education and unemployment — that is, as education increases, the rate of unemployment between a team's win--loss record and its ability to draw on the road: If the Pirates killed the gate at Brooklyn's Ebbets Field • • [ , why should the Dodgers be penalized pe·nal·ize tr.v. pe·nal·ized, pe·nal·iz·ing, pe·nal·iz·es 1. To subject to a penalty, especially for infringement of a law or official regulation. See Synonyms at punish. 2. by having to pay a minimum? Football's minimum guarantee and the NL's apparent unwillingness to alter its gate-sharing plan to truly help its ne'er-do-well clubs suggest that some sports owners are suspicious of mindless redistribution of revenue. Instead, owners of strong teams appeared to use gate sharing as a stick: Maintain a minimally decent team or else pay a penalty. While the NL did not have a minimum team payroll during the 1950s, major league baseball "MLB" and "Major Leagues" redirect here. For other uses, see MLB (disambiguation) and Major Leagues (disambiguation). Major League Baseball (MLB) is the highest level of play in North American professional baseball. did have a minimum player salary. The baseball owners in both leagues appear to have stood Canes' negative externality of too strong a team (and, goodness knows, the Cleveland Browns
A continuation pattern in technical analysis formed when there is a large movement in a stock, the flagpole, followed by a consolidation period with converging trendlines, the pennant, followed by a breakout movement in the same direction as the initial large movement, the winners secretly wished for a Lake Woebegone league where all rival teams were (slightly) above average (but not as good as their pennant-winning teams), ensuring good crowds for every game. Received November 2005; accepted May 2006. References Canes, Michael E. 1974. The social benefits of restrictions on team quality. In Government and the sports business, edited by Roger G. Noll. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, pp. 81 113. Cobbledick, Gordon. 1949. Why Browns get fantastic prices. Baseball Digest, February, pp. 59-60. Fort, Rodney D. 2006. Sports economics. 2nd edition. Upper Saddle River Saddle River may refer to:
In 1913, law professor Dr. . Fort, Rodney D., and James Quirk. 1995. Cross-subsidization, incentives, and outcomes in professional team sports leagues. Journal of Economic Literature 33:1265-99. Kachline, Clifford. 1962. 'Socialism threatens game'--O'Malley. The Sporting News, December 22, 1962, pp. 1-2. Kesenne, Stefan. 2000. Revenue sharing and competitive balance in professional team sports. Journal of Sports Economics 1:56-65. Leifer, Eric. 1995. Making the majors: The transformation of team sports in America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press The Harvard University Press is a publishing house, a division of Harvard University, that is highly respected in academic publishing. It was established on January 13, 1913. In 2005, it published 220 new titles. . Maher, Tod, and Bob Gill Bob Gill can refer to:
. New York: Macmillan. Marburger, Daniel R. 1997. Gate revenue sharing and luxury-taxes in professional sports. Contemporary Economic Policy 15:114-23. National Football League. 1935, 1938, 1946, 1949, 1950, and 1968. National Football League constitution. Various cities: National Football League. New York Yankees Baseball Club. 1913-1944. General ledger General Ledger A company's accounting records. This formal ledger contains all the financial accounts and statements of a business. Notes: The ledger uses two columns: one records debits, the other has offsetting credits. and cash books. Cooperstown, NY: National Baseball Hall of Fame. Povich, Shirley. 1951. He Saighs over foes' TV take. Baseball Digest, August, pp. 35 6. Quirk, James, and Rodney D. Fort. 1992. Pay dirt: The business of professional team sports. Princeton, N J: Princeton University Princeton University, at Princeton, N.J.; coeducational; chartered 1746, opened 1747, rechartered 1748, called the College of New Jersey until 1896. Schools and Research Facilities Press. Rottenberg, Simon. 1956. The baseball players' market. Journal of Political Economics 64:242-58. Scully, Gerald W. 1989. The business of major league baseball. Chicago: University of Chicago Press The University of Chicago Press is the largest university press in the United States. It is operated by the University of Chicago and publishes a wide variety of academic titles, including The Chicago Manual of Style, dozens of academic journals, including . Scully, Gerald W. 1995. The market structure of sports. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Seymour, Harold. 1960. Baseball." The early years. New York: Oxford University Press. Seymour, Harold. 1971. Baseball: The golden age. New York: Oxford University Press. The Sporting News. 1953-1957. The Sporting News official baseball guide. St. Louis, MO: Charles Spink. The Sporting News. 2002. Complete baseball record book. 2003 edition. St. Louis, MO: The Sporting News. Stann, Francis. 1951. It's 'buy-the-Browns' time again. Baseball Digest, March, pp. 35-6. Surdam, David. 2002. The American 'not-so-socialist' league in the postwar post·war adj. Belonging to the period after a war: postwar resettlement; a postwar house. postwar Adjective occurring or existing after a war Adj. 1. era. Journal of Sports Economics 3:264-90. Szymanski, Stefan, and Stefan Kesenne. 2004. Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports. Journal of Industrial Economics 52:165-77. Thorn thorn, in botany thorn, sharp-pointed projection on some plants, usually protective in function. Botanically, thorns are distinguished as modified stems (as in the honey locust and hawthorn) from spines, which are modified leaves (as in the barberry), and , John, Pete Palmer, and Michael Gershman. 2001. Total baseball. 7th edition. Kingston, NY: Total Sports Publishing. U.S. Congress. 1952. Organized baseball. Report of the subcommittee sub·com·mit·tee n. A subordinate committee composed of members appointed from a main committee. subcommittee Noun on the study of monopoly power of the committee of the judiciary judiciary Branch of government in which judicial power is vested. The principal work of any judiciary is the adjudication of disputes or controversies. Regulations govern what parties are allowed before a judicial assembly, or court, what evidence will be admitted, what . House Report No. 2002, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. U.S. Congress. 1957. Organized professional team sports. Hearings before the antitrust Antitrust The antitrust laws apply to virtually all industries and to every level of business, including manufacturing, transportation, distribution, and marketing. They prohibit a variety of practices that restrain trade. subcommittee. (85th Cong., 1st Sess.) Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Vrooman, John. 1995. A general theory of sports leagues. Southern Economic Journal 61:971-90. David G. Surdam, Department of Economics, University of Northern Iowa The University of Northern Iowa, in Cedar Falls, Iowa, was founded in 1876, as the Iowa State Normal School. It has colleges of Business Administration, Education, Humanities and Fine Arts, Natural Sciences, and Social and Behavioral Sciences, and a graduate school. , 204 Curtis Business Building, Cedar Falls Cedar Falls, city (1990 pop. 34,298), Black Hawk co., N Iowa, on the Cedar River; inc. 1854. It developed as a milling center in the late 19th-century after the coming of the railroad; its name is derived from the cedar tree. , IA 506140129 USA; E-mail David.Surdam@uni Uni (  `nē), fl. c.2325 B.C., Egyptian official of the VI dynasty. His career is known through his private inscription. .edu. The author thanks Professors Louis Cain,
John Hoag, Mind Cinar, Stacey Brook, Rodney Fort, and anonymous referees
for their sagacious sa·ga·cious adj. Having or showing keen discernment, sound judgment, and farsightedness. See Synonyms at shrewd. [From Latin sag comments. George Rugg of the Joyce Sports Collection at Notre Dame Notre Dame IPA: [nɔtʁ dam] is French for Our Lady, referring to the Virgin Mary. In the United States of America, Notre Dame University was instrumental in tracking down contemporary periodicals. The University of Oregon The University of Oregon is a public university located in Eugene, Oregon. The university was founded in 1876, graduating its first class two years later. The University of Oregon is one of 60 members of the Association of American Universities. library staff assisted in locating the congressional investigation.
Table 1. Attendance (in thousands) and
Win-Loss Records 1952-1956
Team Total Home Road Net W-L
Att. Att. Att. Att. Pct.
NL Attendance
Brooklyn Dodgers 13171 5520 7651 -2131 0.630
Chicago Cubs 8184 4133 4051 82 0.440
Cincinnati Reds 7531 3676 3855 -179 0.490
Milwaukee Braves (a) 13080 8291 4788 3503 0.549
New York Giants 9931 4405 5526 -1121 0.527
Philadelphia Phillies 8301 4206 4096 110 0.510
Pittsburgh Pirates 6391 3154 3237 -83 0.352
St. Louis Cardinals 9604 4712 4892 -180 0.503
NFL Attendance
Baltimore Colts (b) 1658 799 859 -60 0.340
Chicago Bears 2479 1236 1243 -6 0.569
Chicago Cardinals 1498 672 826 -154 0.310
Cleveland Browns 2137 1172 964 208 0.712
Detroit Lions 2775 1561 1213 348 0.678
Green Bay Packers 1814 650 1164 -514 0.373
Los Angeles Rams 2857 1693 1164 529 0.614
New York Giants 1867 975 892 82 0.534
Philadelphia Eagles 1642 760 882 -122 0.500
Pittsburgh Steelers 1715 819 896 -77 0.417
San Francisco 49ers 2532 1230 1302 -72 0.552
Washington Redskins 1484 719 765 -46 0.458
Dallas Texans (b) 230 57 173 -117 0.083
Attendance figures may not sum due to rounding.
Total Att.: home attendance + road attendance;
Att.: home attendance - road attendance;
Win-Loss Pct.: win-loss record for 1952-1956
(ties not counted in computation).
Source: Thorn, Palmer, and Gershman 2001, p. 76;
The Sporting News 1953-1957; The Sporting News
2002; Maher and Gill 1997, pp. 117-20.
(a) Braves played in Boston in 1952, Milwaukee 1953-1956.
(b) Dallas played during 1952; Baltimore played 1953-1956.
Table 2. Five-Year Total Sources of Revenue in the NFL
(in thousands of U.S. dollars) 1952-1956
Team Gate Media X-Games Gross
Baltimore Colts 2431 377 189 3205
Chicago Bears 4713 683 468 5943
Chicago Cardinals 2218 434 558 3323
Cleveland Browns 2558 660 831 4311
Detroit Lions 3341 708 836 5069
Green Bay Packers 2204 337 295 3050
Los Angeles Rams 3228 530 1261 5148
New York Giants 2102 931 533 3566
Philadelphia Eagles 1809 565 536 3106
Pittsburgh Steelers 3155 498 434 4123
San Francisco 49ers 4710 546 1694 7205
Washington Redskins 2968 502 646 4371
League total 35,437 6771 8282 52,420
Top:bottom 2.61 2.76 8.96 2.36
First:fourth 2.09 2.02 4.13 1.95
SD 0.027 0.024 0.051 0.024
Gate: Home revenue and road revenue; Media: sales of
television and radio rights; X-Games: revenue from
exhibition games; Gross: gross operating income from home
revenue, road revenue, exhibition games, sales of radio and
television rights, concessions, and other income; SD: based
on share of total league revenue, i.e., average team would
have a 0.833 share.
Source: U.S. Congress 1957, pp. 2562-5.
Table 3a. Estimated Gate Revenue without Gate Sharing
in the NL 1952-1956 (in thousands of U.S. dollars)
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
Brooklyn 1644 1787 1745 1833 2124
Chicago 1309 983 1009 1194 992
Cincinnati 830 793 1105 1123 1798
Milwaukee 375 2629 3063 3108 3166
New York 1491 1264 1818 1482 1181
Philadelphia 1069 1241 1149 1485 1565
Pittsburgh 1037 874 762 759 1515
St. Louis 1199 1216 1635 1359 1579
Top:bottom 4.384 3.315 4.020 4.095 3.192
First:fourth 2.602 2.649 2.756 2.625 2.434
SD 0.044 0.056 0.059 0.057 0.048
American League
Top:bottom 3.90 5.89 6.86 4.48 4.41
First:fourth 3.23 4.62 4.18 2.55 2.26
SD 0.060 0.069 0.059 0.045 0.046
Table 3b. Actual Gate Revenue (Home and Away) in the NL
1952-1956 (in thousands of U.S. dollars)
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
Brooklyn 1708 1857 1909 1994 2221
Chicago 1224 987 1032 1200 1040
Cincinnati 840 856 1098 1141 1792
Milwaukee 462 2434 2757 2808 2946
New York 1493 1312 1836 1586 1309
Philadelphia 1046 1248 1204 1439 1546
Pittsburgh 990 888 803 801 1495
St. Louis 1192 1247 1646 1374 1574
Top:bottom 3.697 2.843 3.433 3.506 2.833
First:fourth 2.459 2.460 2.543 2.473 2.200
SD 0.043 0.050 0.052 0.050 0.043
American League
Top:bottom 3.34 4.77 5.66 3.92 4.04
First:fourth 2.88 3.83 3.77 2.42 2.24
SD 0.056 0.065 0.058 0.043 0.046
Top:bottom: team with most gate revenue/team with least gate revenue;
first:fourth: first quartile revenue/fourth quartile revenue.
SD is based on each team's share of total league gate
revenue (mean share = 0.125).
Source: U.S. Congress 1957, pp. 354-6 and 2046-7; Surdam 2002,
pp. 273-4 for American League measures.
Table 4. Estimated Amounts Transferred via Gate
Sharing 1952-1956 (in thousands of U.S. dollars)
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
Brooklyn 64 70 164 160 97
Chicago -85 3 23 7 48
Cincinnati 10 63 -7 19 -6
Milwaukee (a) 87 -195 -305 -300 -220
New York 1 48 18 103 127
Philadelphia -23 6 55 -46 -19
Pittsburgh -47 14 41 42 -21
St. Louis -7 31 11 15 -6
In 1953 Cincinnati ($36,171) and Milwaukee ($4178)
had road revenue discrepancies; both teams reported
more than $0.225 per road attendee.
Columns may not sum to 1 because of rounding.
Source: U.S. Congress 1957, pp. 354-6 and 2046-7.
(a) Milwaukee Braves played in Boston during 1952.
Table 5. Summary of Gate Sharing's Effects on NL Teams
1952-1956 (in thousands of U.S. dollars)
Estimated Actual Net Rev. %
Gate Rev. Gate Rev. Transfer Transfer
Milwaukee 12,341 11,407 -984 -0.076
Brooklyn 9133 9689 556 0.061
New York 7238 7535 297 0.041
St. Louis 6989 7034 44 0.006
Philadelphia 6509 6482 -27 -0.004
Cincinnati 5649 5727 77 0.014
Chicago 5487 5482 -4 -0.001
Pittsburgh 4947 4977 30 0.006
Estimated Gate Revenue: estimated home gate revenue without
gate sharing; Actual Gate Revenue: home and away gate
revenue with gate sharing; Net Revenue Transfer: amount
transferred via gate-sharing plan; % Transfer: net revenue
transfer or estimated gate revenue.
Amounts may not agree exactly with figures shown in
Tables 3a, 3b, and 4 because of rounding.
Sources: See Tables 3a, 3b, and 4.
Table 6. NL Attendance and Estimated
Gate-Sharing Payments 1956
Attendance (in thousands)
Home Team
BKN MIL CIN STL PHI
Road team 0.604 (a) 0.597 0.591 0.494 0.461
Brooklyn 0 343 220 218 215
Milwaukee 252 0 214 206 166
Cincinnati 179 349 0 150 133
St. Louis 144 208 195 0 134
Philadelphia 144 267 120 98 0
New York 216 304 138 127 105
Pittsburgh 153 230 114 131 96
Chicago 122 346 123 100 85
Home Att. 1210 2046 1124 1030 935
Net Revenue Sharing (in
thousands of U.S. dollars)
Road team BKN MIL CIN STL PHI
Brooklyn 0 25 12 20 20
Milwaukee -25 0 -37 -1 -28
Cincinnati -11 37 0 -12 4
St. Louis -20 1 12 0 10
Philadelphia -20 28 -4 -10 0
New York -7 55 21 15 13
Pittsburgh -12 20 -10 -4 -1
Chicago -3 54 11 -3 2
Net -98 221 4 6 19
Attendance (in thousands)
Home Team
NY PIT CHI Road
Road team 0.435 0.429 0.390 Att.
Brooklyn 241 197 133 1568
Milwaukee 103 155 149 1244
Cincinnati 61 149 82 1104
St. Louis 74 144 109 1009
Philadelphia 59 99 77 864
New York 0 117 85 1092
Pittsburgh 61 0 85 869
Chicago 30 89 0 894
Home Att. 629 950 720 8644
Net Revenue Sharing (in
thousands of U.S. dollars)
Road team NY PIT CHI Net
Brooklyn 7 12 3 98
Milwaukee -55 -20 -54 -221
Cincinnati -21 10 -11 -5
St. Louis -15 4 3 -6
Philadelphia -13 1 -2 -19
New York 0 15 15 127
Pittsburgh -15 0 -1 -22
Chicago -15 1 0 48
Net -128 22 -48 0
May not sum because of rounding.
Explanation of upper panel: Brooklyn drew 343,000 fans
for games played in Milwaukee. Milwaukee drew 252,000
fans for games played in Brooklyn.
Explanation of lower panel: Brooklyn received $25,000
net from Milwaukee from revenue sharing. Milwaukee
paid $25,000 net to Brooklyn for revenue sharing.
Source: Day-by-day tabulation of attendance recorded in
box scores, New York Times (checked against Des Moines
Register). Daily totals were within 1000 of the
published season home and away totals except for
Brooklyn home (off 3817) and Cincinnati home (off 2067);
Milwaukee road (off 1030) and Pittsburgh road (off 5058).
(a) Win/loss percentage.
Table 7. NFL Revenue Sharing in 1956
Home Paid Road Rec.
Team Att. Rev Att. Rev
Baltimore Colts 236 $247 238 $236
Chicago Bears 281 $285 281 $298
Chicago Cardinals 99 $121 214 $227
Cleveland Browns 208 $192 154 $169
Detroit Lions 316 $318 248 $260
Green Bay Packers 138 $155 221 $229
Los Angeles Rams 299 $302 236 $245
New York Giants 266 $292 182 $191
Philadelphia Eagles 148 $151 173 $181
Pittsburgh Steelers 170 $171 196 $206
San Francisco 49ers 248 $265 233 $239
Washington Redskins 143 $163 175 $178
Net W-L Gross
Team Share Pct. Income
Baltimore Colts -$8 0.417 $947
Chicago Bears $13 0.818 $1512
Chicago Cardinals $106 0.583 $825
Cleveland Browns -$23 0.417 $966
Detroit Lions -$58 0.750 $1075
Green Bay Packers $74 0.333 $681
Los Angeles Rams -$57 0.333 $1194
New York Giants -$101 0.727 $935
Philadelphia Eagles $29 0.273 $692
Pittsburgh Steelers $35 0.417 $909
San Francisco 49ers -$26 0.455 $1634
Washington Redskins $15 0.500 $1000
Attendance in thousands and revenue figures in thousands
of U.S. dollars.
Home Att: home attendance. Paid Rev: gate-share amount
paid to visiting teams. Road Att: road attendance.
Rec. Rev: gate-share amount received on road. Net share:
Paid Rev - Rec. Rev = gain (loss) from gate-sharing (may
not sum to zero because of rounding). W-L Pct.: win-loss
record (ties not counted in computation). Gross Income:
gross operating income, including "games at home,"
"games away," "exhibition games," "radio and television,"
"concessions (net)," and "other income."
Source: U.S. Congress 1957, pp. 2552-6 and 2564-5; Maher
and Gill 1997, pp. 119-20.
Table 8. Summary of Gate Sharing's Effects on National
Football League Teams 1956 (in thousands of U.S. dollars)
Receipts
w/Gate Transfer Transfer/
Receipts Shr Gate Shr Receipts
Detroit Lions 955 881 -58 -0.061
Los Angeles Rams 906 834 -57 -0.063
New York Giants 876 760 -101 -0.115
Chicago Bears 836 835 13 0.015
San Francisco 49ers 795 755 -26 -0.033
Baltimore Colts 742 722 -8 -0.011
Cleveland Browns 569 536 -23 -0.040
Pittsburgh Steelers 513 539 35 0.069
Washington Redskins 488 495 15 0.031
Green Bay Packers 464 531 74 0.160
Philadelphia Eagles 440 462 29 0.066
Chicago Cardinals 277 378 106 0.383
Top:bottom 3.45 2.33
First:fourth 2.32 1.91
SD 0.28 0.22
Receipts: actual gate receipts in 1956; Receipts
W/Gate Shr: receipts after gate share (less league
share); Transfer Gate Shr: transfers via gate-sharing
plan; Transfer/Receipts: transfers/receipts.
Columns do not sum because of league share and rounding.
Source: U.S. Congress 1957, pp. 2552-7.
Table 9. Attendance at Intradivision NFL Games 1956
Eastern Conference
Home Team
Road team NYG CHIC WAS CLE
NYG -- 21,799 26,261 60,042
CHIC 62,410 -- 25,794 25,312
WAS 46,351 30,553 -- 22,878
CLE 27,707 20,966 23,332 --
PIT 48,108 17,724 21,097 50,358
PHI 40,960 22,609 22,333 20,654
Western Conference
Home Team
Road team CHIB DET SF BAL
CHIB -- 57,024 53,612 45,221
DET 49,086 -- 46,708 42,622
SF 47,526 55,662 -- 37,227
BAL 48,364 55,788 43,791 --
GB 49,172 54,087 32,436 40,086
LA 48,102 56,281 56,489 40,321
Eastern Conference
Home Team
Road team PIT PHI Total
NYG 31,240 16,562 155,904
CHIC 24,086 36,545 174,147
WAS 27,718 26,607 154,107
CLE 35,398 25,894 133,297
PIT -- 22,652 159,939
PHI 31,375 -- 137,931
Western Conference
Home Team
Road team GB LA Total
CHIB 24,668 69,894 250,419
DET 24,668 76,758 239,842
SF 17,986 69,828 228,229
BAL 24,214 51,037 223,194
GB -- 45,209 220,990
LA 24,200 -- 225,393
Teams listed in order of finish in the conference. Cleveland
and Pittsburgh tied; Green Bay and Los Angeles tied.
Source: Maher and Gill 1997, pp. 119-20.
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