A survey of emergency response planning as practiced in boiler/industrial furnace facilities burning hazardous waste derived fuels.

Introduction

The Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality is the permit-granting authority for construction and operation of hazardous waste treatment, storage, recycling, and disposal facilities within the state. State regulations require existing facilities wishing to begin hazardous waste handling to submit an emergency response plan as part of their permit application (1). This requirement is in addition to and different from the federal requirement that facilities handling specific quantities of hazardous waste submit a contingency plan with their application (2,3).

Emergency response plans and contingency plans are not the same. Contingency plans are designed to specify industry procedures for incidents that occur within the fence line of a facility, while emergency response plans extend beyond the fence line into the surrounding community. Emergency response plans as defined in the Oklahoma regulations include the provisions of federally-mandated contingency plans, in keeping with the primacy policies of the United States Congress and the permitting policies of the United States Environmental Protection Agency. The objective of the Oklahoma regulations was, in essence, to extend the scope of planning to ensure a community-specific emergency response at each facility.

Emergency response plans as defined in the Oklahoma regulations are broader in scope than contingency plans required by federal regulations. They must be designed to minimize hazards to health and property (environment) of each parcel of land owned by affected property owners within one mile of the proposed permit boundary, and a submitter must obtain approval of the plan by a majority of the affected property owners. (An exception involves operational Boiler/Industrial Furnace [BIF] facilities which propose to begin receiving hazardous wastes from off-site for treatment, storage, recycling, or disposal. These facilities - which include cement kilns proposing to begin burning hazardous waste derived fuels [HWDF] such as waste solvents - are not required to obtain prior approval from affected property owners.) The plan must be submitted as part of the permit application and is subject to public comment during the permit process. In developing specific guidelines to be used by permit applicants in structuring their plans, and by application reviewers in evaluating the plans, a study was conducted to identify current emergency response planning practices. A component of the study was a national survey of emergency response plans for BIF facilities burning HWDF.

Survey Methods/Approach

The survey focused on identifying emergency planning requirements and state-of-the-art practices for BIF facilities burning HWDF. Twenty-eight operational (permit-approved or interim status) facilities burning HWDF were identified from industry publications, and were contacted by telephone and in writing to request copies of their emergency response plans and any associated risk assessments. The documents subsequently provided were reviewed in detail with special attention to provisions for the prevention and assessment of potential hazards to adjacent communities, and the associated response actions. Provisions related to hazards arising from spills, fires, and explosions were of primary interest. Planned or unplanned releases from process combustion gases were beyond the scope of the study and were therefore not considered.

Emergency plan elements of the reviewed documents were categorized as "General Requirements," "Emergency Procedures," "Post-Emergency Procedures," and "Items Observed in Plans but not Discussed in Regulatory Guidelines." In developing guidelines for plan content, these elements were further categorized as (1) "Must Have," i.e., mandated by a state or federal regulatory requirement, (2) "Should Have," i.e., a "standard practice" provision commonly seen in permit-approved and interim status BIF facility plans, or recommended by several sources or by a regulatory agency, or (3) "Could Have," i.e., a special provision which might be advisable depending on the type and location of the facility and the specifics of its operation.

Results

Of the 28 BIF facilities contacted, 21 responded by providing copies of their contingency plans. These included 16 cement plants and five aggregate plants representing 13 corporations in 16 states. Eight of the facilities were located in communities of less than 5,000 in population, four were in communities of 5,000-10,000, seven were in communities of 10,000-35,000, and the only facility in a large city of 165,000 was actually in a small community that had been annexed. Four of the facilities were permit-approved and the rest were operating at interim status. All of the plants burned liquid HWDF as supplemental fuels in the production of cement or lightweight aggregate.

The evaluation results are provided in Tables i and 2. Plan components addressed in Table 1 are those for which there were firm federal regulatory requirements under Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations (40 CFR), Parts 264 and 265, i.e., the "Must Have" components. Components addressed in Table 2 are those for which there were currently no regulatory requirements but which represented good practice, i.e., the "Should Have" and "Could Have" components. An "x" indicates that a particular component was addressed in the plan. Where appropriate and useful, a descriptive entry was provided by the reviewer (e.g., "vague" indicates that the item was addressed, but that the reviewer felt the guidelines were too vague to be useful). References are provided for plan elements required by federal regulations.

Most of the emergency plans were similar in scope, in that they addressed those plan elements mandated by 40 CFR 264/265 Sub-parts C and D (2,3). Many of the submitted plans were extracts of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Part B permit applications. Although the scope of all of the plans was similar, the depth and detail of information provided and the probable utility of the plans in an actual emergency varied greatly. Many of the plans essentially parroted the regulatory language and provided little specific guidance. The most complete plans either incorporated a standalone emergency response handbook or provided detailed, step-by-step guidelines which would minimize dependence on the training or experience of any particular emergency coordinator or responder.

Nearly all of the plans focused on spills, fires, and explosions which would be controlled "inside the fence" by on-site personnel or by supporting fire departments. Only two of the plans (one of them a corporate plan common to three plants) provided specific guidelines for assessment of the nature and extent of health hazards such as toxic plumes, or on the determination of conditions requiring the notification of local authorities that an evacuation of nearby communities might be advisable. This may have reflected planner perceptions of low community risk due to facility layout or materials used.

Only one of the plans (again the corporate plan common to three plants) specified that the primary emergency coordinator would receive Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Technician-level training, and that both the primary and alternate emergency coordinators would receive On-Scene Incident Commander training (training content is specified in 29 CFR 1910.120) (4). Less than half of the plans indicated arrangements for on-site visits by supporting police, fire departments, hazardous materials (hazmat) response teams, etc., and less than one-third described efforts to familiarize supporting medical resources with the hazardous materials handled and the injuries or illnesses that might occur in an emergency situation. No risk assessment documents were received from facility operators. Natural disaster planning provisions appeared to reflect hazards of special concern due to local climate and/or geographic location.

As a group the BIF plans met the fire and explosion contingency planning requirements mandated by federal regulations. With few exceptions, however, the plans did not include provisions that went beyond the fence line to address potential community risks. Although such provisions should be addressed in Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) emergency response plans prepared under the auspices of Title III of the 1990 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA Title III), and although a BIF representative should be an active member of the LEPC to see that facility-related provisions are included in the plan, there is no regulatory "hammer" to ensure that effective plans are actually developed. Small communities, in particular, are unlikely to develop and exercise such plans except where a facility is perceived to present a significant health or safety hazard, or where [TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 1 OMITTED] [TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 2 OMITTED! previous incidents have sensitized the community to the need for adequate planning and preparation. In addition, small communities are less likely to possess training and equipment resources appropriate to deal with hazardous materials releases.

Conclusions

The results of this study demonstrated that the quality and completeness of the emergency response plans of HWDF-burning BIF facilities vary greatly. Essentially all of the plans were contingency plans which met the minimum federal requirements in that they addressed each of the considerations specified in applicable regulations, although to varying degrees of depth and detail. Several exceptionally good plans were found which addressed many valuable planning considerations not required by federal regulations, and these plans were believed to reflect the "state-of-the-art" in emergency response planning for BIF facilities burning HWDF. However, even these plans were incomplete, especially regarding specific criteria and procedures to be used in hazard assessment and response, and regarding coordination with off-site agencies and affected communities. This planning "gap" could contribute to uncoordinated and ineffective response actions by supporting agencies (fire, police, medical, civil defense), with consequential unnecessary exposures of responders or the general population to potentially hazardous materials. It is therefore critical that adequate planning and preparation be achieved in order to ensure that potential hazards are recognized, assessed, and minimized, and that this information is communicated to the community and to regulatory authorities before a plant begins operation. These results support efforts by the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality to establish clear and specific emergency planning guidelines for permit applicants and reviewers and to thereby ensure that adequate planning and coordination are achieved before operating permits are issued.

REFERENCES

1. Title 252, Oklahoma Administrative Code, Chapter 200, Hazardous Waste Management Rules.

2. Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 264, Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities.

3. Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 265, Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities.

4. Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1910.120, Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response.

David L. Johnson, Ph.D., P.E., C.I.H., Department of Occupational and Environmental Health, University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center, P.O. Box 26901, Oklahoma City, OK 73190.