A strategy for active Non-Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Real and potential world threats are what largely determines relations between states in the modern world. Proliferation of mass destruction weapons (MDW) is among such threats and it has become quite a problem lately for both the world community as a whole and individual nations. In 2003 we witnessed the DPRK's demonstrative withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Agreement on the Non-Nuclear Status of the Korean Peninsula. MDW proliferation problems caused a serious conflict in Iraq. Iranian nuclear program is still a pending issue. Lacking the UN Security Council mandate, the United States and Britain launched a military operation in Iraq, purporting to wrench the prohibited weapons from Saddam Hussein's regime.

Future international armed conflicts associated with MDW proliferation, emergence of illegal MDW arsenals (or attempts to retain them), accusations linked to their creation and proliferation, and possible withdrawal of countries from international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties cannot be ruled out either. Events in Iraq demonstrated that unilateral unlawful use of force to preempt creation of illicit arsenals of mass destruction weapons is counterproductive, resulting in more complicated interaction between states abiding by a policy directed at preventing MDW proliferation.

The cardinal challenge facing the entire world community is strengthening the regimes of non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons, technologies and materials. The scale and gravity of these problems are such as to require vigorous joint efforts by states and international organizations: it is necessary to strengthen the collective mechanisms controlling the global security process, to produce common approaches and coordinate specific action plans, and to overcome distrust existing between the states abiding by MDW non-proliferation principles. Using international law and the accepted international decision-making mechanisms, primarily the UN and its Security Council, is the only way to deal with the challenge. Conversely, attempts to address the MDW proliferation threat via unilateral use of force in circumvention of the UN can only destabilize the international relations and provoke a strategic chaos, a nuclear arms race and its regionalization.

This underscores the urgency of developing and implementing a global strategy against MDW proliferation, which might be effective and enjoy world-wide support.

Modern Threats to International MDW Non-proliferation

The existing international MDW non-proliferation system developed over more than thirty years. Currently it includes a number of treaties, conventions, legal rules, procedures and processes, specifically the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) and a set of associated international legal instruments, Missile Technology Control Regime, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (1993), and Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (1972), agreements on nuclear-free zones in different regions of the world and some other international legal acts. Final documents of conferences devoted to the consideration of effects of relevant treaties, which state the general attitudes of the international community, play a major role in the functioning of specific non-proliferation regimes. These actually formulate a strategy for coordinated steps by states willing to oppose proliferation, and, in effect, set the world standards in the crucial global security sphere.

One has to state at the same time that the declared potential of the international non-proliferation regimes is in many respects unrealized, and that they failed to check the concealed MDW development process. For example, their measures providing for states living up to their commitments were inadequate. The treaties contain no safeguards against MDW being obtained by non-state entities or terrorist networks. The multilateral non-proliferation regimes proved excessively dependent on their participants' goodwill and readiness to perform their obligations and to cooperate in good faith on their strict observance. Yet, as is common knowledge, certain nations participating in the said treaties used to flagrantly violate them, undertook actions that were directly banned by the treaties they had signed, and intentionally deceived the world community.

Far from all countries are currently covered by the non-proliferation regimes. In addition, some governments are not fully in control of the home situation, with terrorist groups that seek the possession of MDW or components for their manufacture using their countries as a safe haven. As of today only some multilateral agreements (Non-Proliferation Treaty, Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) provide for international monitoring. But even they have no detailed mechanisms for dealing with deliberate proliferants. Diplomatic and economic sanctions, which the UN and other international organizations routinely impose on states demonstrating MDW proliferation behavior, have not proved particularly effective, being insufficiently resolute, consistent and coordinated.

But the point is not only that multilateral treaties and agreements have defects. These were not of much importance, when the world was bipolar. Acting in a coordinated manner on the basis of the indicated conventions and treaties, the two superpowers (the Soviet Union and the United States) could on the whole ensure that international entities abide by the legal rule banning the spread of MDW. Between the late 1960s and the early 1990s, the international community managed to withstand the pressure of different kinds of proliferants. It was only the collapse of the bipolar world order that enabled the bid for nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles on the part of India and Pakistan (openly), as well as Iraq, the DPRK, and some other countries (covertly).

Subsequent developments showed that the United States, much as it is powerful militarily, economically and politically, is unable to tackle proliferation issues single-handedly by means of unilateral use of force, nor is it able to create and sustain on its own an effective world order in this area that would be accepted by the majority of world nations. As for Russia, West European countries and other states, they, as I see it, failed to convincingly demonstrate the effectiveness of political and diplomatic methods as used against the proliferants, i.e., to substantiate the validity of and the lack of alternatives to the traditional way of controlling the international non-proliferation system.

The situation being what it is, three processes have unfolded, which accelerated the erosion of international non-proliferation and called for new expedients.

First, there are newly emerged non-state forces (international terrorism), which are well organized, have no deficit of funding or other support assets, and are ready and able to commit the most heinous crimes against humanity and civilization, including to use any weapons, for the sake of achieving their criminal aims. Aside from illegal trafficking, their main sources of mass destruction assets are likely to be the "threshold countries" or nuclear states with unstable political regimes.

The antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan revealed that Al Qaeda had collected data on MDW components and focused on nuclear and other high-risk facilities as possible targets. Materials on how to manufacture a radiological bomb (diagrams, information, reports, etc.) * were found in a Kabul house. The press reported that Al Qaeda possessed chemical and biological weapons. According to the media, Iraq allegedly had passed poisonous substances to Osama bin Laden's comrades-in-arms, Asbat al-Ansar, a Lebanon-based Sunni group keeping close links with Bin Laden. (1)

In November 2002, the police arrested in London some members of a group that had close contacts with that organization, who had planned to use cyanide in several tube stations in a bid to make the attack as lethal as possible (the London tube carries over three million passengers a day). (2) In December 2002, just before Christmas, the French police managed to arrest terrorists who had been preparing an identical assault in the Paris tube. Seized during their arrest were retorts containing chemical substances and a radiological, chemical and biological protective suit. (3) All of that indicates that Al Qaeda is in possession of modern technologies for terrorist attacks using, for example, sprayed chemical and biological substances. Terrorist leaders are ready to use suicide attackers. Addressing the so-called World Chechen Congress in Copenhagen in November 2002, Akhmed Zakayev, Aslan Maskhadov's emissary, blackmailed the European public into believing in a possibility of terrorist assaults on atomic power stations.

Yet another worrisome tendency--the erosion of national state control (in some countries the state as an institution is in peril)--gets superimposed on this process. Cases are on record of the absence of effective state control over the territory and even the subordination of the national state institutions to international terrorist aims (for example, Afghanistan under the Taliban). Not only are degraded states unable to ensure normal control in their territory, they are also a danger to the rest of the world, being a source of instability, terrorism, religious fanaticism, and so on.

Another growing problem is the illicit trafficking in nuclear, radioactive, chemical and biological materials. As far as global illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials is concerned, SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) data suggest that almost a half (303) of 643 cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials registered between January 1991 and December 2001 were related to the stealing or seizure of nuclear materials. Of these 129 did not cause concern from MDW proliferation perspective (being related to low-enriched or depleted uranium), 126 caused some proliferation concern (for example, the stealing of low-enriched uranium and microscopic amounts of plutonium, including in radiation sources), and 48 caused much concern (being linked to highly enriched uranium and plutonium, i.e., weapon-grade nuclear materials). (4)

Acquisition of fissionable materials is a substantial technical prerequisite for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices (NED). Illicit transit of such materials is particularly dangerous. True enough, up till now it has been possible to prevent the stealing of considerable amounts of weapon-grade nuclear components, which might entail proliferation of nuclear weapons. But the danger of this sort of development is potentially enhanced in a situation where terrorist networks make persistent attempts to obtain mass annihilation materials.

So far there is no convincing proof of the existence of a well-organized black market for nuclear materials. But a worrisome signal is a considerable growth in the number of stolen radiation sources registered in the late 1990s. (5) What the public knows of international terrorist plans indicates that the growth in the number of "end users" of illicitly trafficked nuclear materials, carriers and the entire network catering to such carriage is not a long way in the future.

The illicit trafficking in nuclear materials affects all countries by reason of the associated nuclear proliferation risks. It is highly probable that the international community will be increasingly faced not only with criminal elements or non-professional criminal rings, but also with terrorist structures capable of making unexpected and highly sensitive attacks at centers of civilization. Their grown organization and technical expertise make it easier for those structures to get an access to nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction.

The situation has changed somewhat after the collapse of the Taliban, which turned Afghanistan into an international terrorist base, and several powerful strikes delivered at Al Qaeda's most active international terrorist network. But all international terrorist leaders are yet to be neutralized. There are no signs to the effect that they intend to wrap up their plans and activities in this area. More than that, one observes a marked upward trend in international terrorism in the wake of the 2003 events in Iraq. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reports that radioactive materials stolen from Iraqi research facilities might be used to produce so-called "dirty" radiological bombs.

Notice in particular that terrorist organizations seeking to possess means of mass annihilation are potentially uncontainable subjects of international politics. At any rate the traditional methods, political and diplomatic ones included (negotiations, treaties, economic and political sanctions), as well as nuclear containment policy or devastating counterblow concept can hardly be regarded as fitting measures in the face of a threat of that type. This necessitates further development and streamlining of international law so that it measure up to new realities and be capable of addressing the super-terrorist threat.

The second process that tends to destabilize dramatically international non-proliferation is the growing number of states seeking to possess MDW. Some of these are either ruled by fanatic, unpredictable and unstable governments or are facing a real prospect of being saddled by extremist, obscurant and aggressive forces.

An extremely dangerous possibility is a union between various extremist, terrorist groups and ruling regimes that are active in attempting to obtain nuclear, biological and chemical weapons on the basis of their own secretly pursued programs. More than that, such regimes seek to purchase ballistic missiles and other vehicles to deliver MDW to certain regions. All of that aggravates the threat posed by the proliferant states.

These issues are of particular importance for my country. There are quite a few sources of terrorist threats and MDW proliferation, "threshold" nations included, in direct vicinity of Russian borders. Regimes ruling some of these are unstable and unpredictable and were found guilty of flagrant violations of their international commitments in the non-proliferation area and of contacts with terrorists. Russia, therefore, less than any other country can afford to underestimate the long-term threat to its national security, one connected with further proliferation of mass annihilation assets, whatever the current commercial and agency interests. It would be naive and irresponsible to think that "threshold" states will not necessarily turn their nuclear or other mass destruction weapons in the direction of Russia, for which reason she should not sacrifice her "good" relations with them for the sake of non-proliferation regimes.

The third process is connected with scientific progress which makes double technologies and mass destruction materials widely available and easy to obtain. It is noteworthy in this context that unfavorable political shifts in MDW proliferation occur against the background of sweeping civilian nuclear power programs and diffusion of know-how in the area of double technologies. Spent nuclear fuel stocks containing materials that are critical from the point of view of non-proliferation grow too. There is a sufficiently big backlog of plutonium across the world, which is fit for being used in NED (the world stocks of separated plutonium in the civilian industry sector exceeded 200 tons by the start of the 21st century). (6) On top of that the world has surpluses of military-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium. All of that enhances the feeling of vulnerability in the face of terrorism which acts without discrimination and involves massive casualties.

Formulating a Global Strategy for Active Non-proliferation

The insufficiency of the existing measures opposing the tendency to create illegal MDW arsenals emphasizes how important it is not only to universalize but also to toughen the regimes of non-proliferation of missile, nuclear and other mass annihilation materials and technologies. To assert the non-proliferation rule and ensure its observance by all subjects of international relations, the regimes existing in this sphere should be adapted to technological developments and the changing situation in the security area. In other words, the qualitatively new phenomena and shifts in the world necessitate substantial modifications in international approaches to MDW non-proliferation. The innovations should aid the real restriction of opportunities for the acquisition of mass destruction weapons, technologies and materials by the potential proliferants--states, terrorist groups and other plotters--while preserving incentives and advantages enjoyed by countries using nuclear, chemical and biological technologies and know-how solely for peaceful purposes. The latter ought to assist removal of illegitimate MDW arsenals by the legal methods.

Only first steps have been made in developing a strategy for active non-proliferation. Some important contributions to the process are the Joint Declaration of New Strategic Relations between the RF and the U.S.A. of May 24, 2002, the Rome Declaration "Russia-NATO Relations: A New Quality" of May 28, 2002, and the G-8 Kananaskis Statement "Global Partnership against Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons and Materials" of June 22, 2002. Demonstrated by the key members of the world community, the common approaches to international compulsion of deliberate violators to obey the non-proliferation rules are reflected in UN Security Council resolution 1441 approved on November 8, 2002. Many countries supported the Russian draft UN General Assembly Resolution on creating a global system of counteraction to modern threats and challenges (accepted in December 2002). If this trend continues, the fight against MDW proliferation is likely to become more of a priority in relation to other goals in the policies of the leading states and the world community as a whole. For it to be pursued with any success, all members of the UN Security Council, permanent members in the first place, should demonstrate more effective interaction. As is to be regretted the Iraq war has complicated that coordination. The political basis of support for an active non-proliferation strategy is unlikely to expand fast in the absence of appropriate efforts. Adapting the traditional non-proliferation and arms control regimes to the changing world will hardly be an easy process.

The world community and primarily the experts lack consensus on what "active non-proliferation" is all about, although the term has entered interstate agreements. Specifically, the joint declaration on new strategic relations issued by President Vladimir Putin of Russia and President George Bush of the United States says in part that Russia and the U.S.A. will work to obtain a wide-ranging international support for an active non-proliferation strategy, including by abiding by and reinforcing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the conventions on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. (7) There is no consensus either on active non-proliferation priorities. The international research community might help hammering out a common view on "active non-proliferation."

As the present writer sees it, active non-proliferation should in the first place be understood as a set of political, economic, financial, technical, and organizational measures, coercive included, directed at the interdiction of secret acquisition of MDW by any person, be it a state, a non-state entity or a private individual, as well as a continuous buildup of efforts (regardless of progress in dealing with other important security issues and arms cuts) to reinforce the non-proliferation framework, to expand its coverage, to prevent the number of MDW owners from growing, and to resolutely cut short any attempts of this kind (including by means of voluntary or forced disarmament on the basis of UN SC mandate).

The above definition does not aspire to be exhaustive. It does not cover a number of aspects connected with the so-called traditional positive non-proliferation agenda (economic and other benefits afforded by the use of nuclear and other double technologies for peaceful purposes, nuclear disarmament, etc.).

It is still the world community's general desire and priority to settle urgent non-proliferation problems by political and diplomatic methods. Persisting in the foreground are issues of more active employment of possibilities inherent in multilateral treaties and agreements on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, and control over missile technology; the strengthening of the IAEA guarantees and export controls; development of programs counteracting the illicit trafficking in nuclear, radioactive and other strategic materials and technologies. And certainly, the world community should be more resolute in involving the "threshold" countries in the international arms limitation and non-proliferation arrangement and in removing by diplomatic methods the regional risks of "diffusion" of mass destruction weapons and materials, including by creating MDW-free zones.

At the same time, as the present writer sees it, a number of factors increases the importance, in the context of an active international anti-proliferation strategy, of instruments of compulsion (with the use of force included), which can be employed with the UN sanction to change the behavior of proliferant states and remove the arsenals of prohibited weapons created in violation of non-proliferation.

There are different, occasionally opposite, views, in my country as well as elsewhere, on the expediency, legality, efficacy and timing of compulsion in non-proliferation, in particular preemption and prevention. Many issues are disputable ones, such as concrete situations necessitating compulsion, the required procedures, the timing, how to internationally legitimize compulsion by force designed to disrupt proliferation of mass destruction weapons, etc.

I believe that the interconnected threat of international terrorism and proliferation of MDW and its delivery vehicles has increased the likelihood of emergencies where the traditional political and diplomatic (so-called non-violent) instruments may prove insufficient and ineffective. Prompt decision-making is required to oppose new MDW proliferation threats with any effectiveness. This is evident from some earlier gross violations of MDW non-proliferation commitments assumed and the plans of terrorist networks to obtain mass destruction materials and technologies.

One cannot rule out future attempts by terrorist organizations as well as regimes managed by fanatical and unpredictable rulers to use nuclear, chemical, biological and other assets. To neutralize these, as well as to convince or compel governments involved in proliferation to change their behavior, measures are required that correspond to the new nature of threats. In this context one is not convinced by claims that there is no alternative to political and diplomatic methods and that any use of force against deliberate proliferants is absolutely unacceptable. It ought to be kept in mind that the issue of using compulsion where no action is taken on the requirements to eliminate illegal arsenals of MDW and observe international commitments assumed and there is a threat to international peace and security has gained prominence precisely against the background of gross violations of the main tenets of the international MDW non-proliferation regime. In the future it is crucial not to let the world be faced with an accomplished fact involving both strong-arm arbitrariness, i.e., unlawful use of armed forces in the international arena, and unpunished emergence of new owners of nuclear-tipped missiles and other MDW, let alone their direct or indirect (via blackmail) employment.

Under the UN Charter (VII, 39, 41, 42) the UN Security Council is empowered to use prevention and compulsion in the face of a threat to peace and international security. Importantly, in its resolution 1441 the UN Security Council recognized MDW proliferation to be precisely such threat. It says that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles is a threat to international peace and security. It is appropriate to remind the reader that the preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty indicates that proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. One should also keep in mind the statement by the UN Security Council chairman on the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, issued on January 31, 1992 on behalf of the SC members. The statement underscores that proliferation of all types of mass destruction weapons is a threat to international peace and security. The Council members shall pledge to work to achieve prevention of the proliferation of the technology connected with research into such weapons or with their production, and to adopt appropriate measures to that end. (8)

Chapter VII of the UN Charter scrutinizes the mechanism for measures to maintain or restore international peace. A likely proposition is that in the light of recent experience it will become necessary to specify it by developing additional norms and procedures to address a situation where non-compliance by a state or some other participant in international relations with MDW non-proliferation regulations endangers peace. Obviously, it is necessary to elaborate, in a detailed and fundamental manner, a legal mechanism for international enforcement of non-proliferation and for making it difficult for states to turn to unlawful, unilateral use of force; it is necessary to exclude arbitrariness in this area. But to do that, the United Nations should possess effective tools that could oppose proliferation of mass destruction weapons and materials.

The UN Security Council ought to be modernized and made more effective. As I see it, it would be reasonable to envisage within the UN Security Council framework appropriate possibilities and procedures for using force to implement the international active non-proliferation strategy, and to modernize this mechanism in order to assist the closure of MDW proliferation channels. I believe the UN Security Council should have the central, coordinating role as states sharing the non-proliferation values plan and implement joint compulsion, the member states having authorized the SC to use force. This is the necessary and crucial prerequisite of a broad-based international support for the idea to use compulsion for non-proliferation enforcement. It is only the UN SC that can impart the required legitimacy to the use of force in the fight against MDW proliferation and map out concrete measures of retribution and voluntary or forced disarmament in the MDW area as a component part of the rights of the UN member states to self-defense. Any unilateral actions can only lead to disarray in international relations and strategic chaos.

Any operation in the context of the fight against MDW proliferation should remain under the political and strategic control of the UN Security Council. For that it must have wider powers for a rapid reaction to crises and threats to peace and security created by the proliferation of MDW. Possibly additional international non-proliferation control tools will be needed for the job, given full awareness of the terrorist threat and the challenge of the dictatorial regimes. It will also be necessary to develop new documents authorizing anti-proliferation enforcement under the UN SC aegis for it to be consistent with international law and world public opinion. That would reduce, incidentally, the propensity to use force unilaterally in circumvention of the UN and would hamper unlawful military actions.

Given the aggravation over the MDW non-proliferation regimes, the world community should be highly prepared for immediate action. Therefore a possibility ought to be considered of the UN SC approving a special resolution to counteract MDW proliferation, containing, among other things, points on sanctions and other forms of compulsion in response to concrete proliferation, including voluntary or forced disarmament, out-of-schedule verification visits to proliferant states, procedures for the elimination of illegal MDW potentials, etc. Obviously, it stands to reason to set up within the SC a specialized agency to prevent and settle international proliferation crises (modeled on the UN SC Antiterrorist Committee created after 9/11), and a situational center to monitor and analyze the MDW proliferation situation. Prospectively the member states should give the Security Council the necessary assets and powers to prevent MDW proliferation crises and to react militarily thereto.

The necessity is obvious for the Security Council to plan in good time a number of steps geared to the specifics of preparing for and pursuing anti-proliferation operations under the UN aegis. It is necessary to study the possibility of using sanctions and compulsion as part of a general active non-proliferation strategy in order to give the UN more leverage for both the decision-making and execution of its own decisions. These acts should become a component of the international reaction to specific MDW proliferation. In particular, UN armed forces must be ready to deliver preemptive attacks against terrorist infrastructure used for the manufacture of mass destruction materials and preparation of sabotage and terrorist assaults.

In the interests of neutralizing the MDW proliferation threat, the world community will find it necessary to go on strengthening and improving defenses against radiological, chemical and biological weapons and to develop antimissile defenses. Interaction on these matters (within the UN) would make potential MDW proliferants reconsider the risks they will have to face on entering confrontation with states pursuing an active non-proliferation policy. Thus the latter would have more freehand in crisis settlement linked to clandestine attempts to obtain mass destruction weapons and materials. That would enhance the efficiency of containment and demotivation of MDW proliferation behavior.

The horrible terrorist attacks of the recent time make even more urgent the concerted and energetic efforts by states, aimed at preventing the use of nuclear, missile and other strategic materials and technologies for criminal purposes.

For this reason it is essential to energize the multilateral diplomacy forums such as the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and others.

Preparations are under way for the 2005 Review Conference. Between 2002 and 2003, the Preparatory Committee met two times and yet another meeting is scheduled for 2004. The earlier sessions considered both organizational matters (procedure, conference officials) and further program of action. The Final Document accepted by consensus at the previous Conference in 2000 will have to be reviewed. The document contains points of principle valid for the present-day situation as well, such as NPT universalization, to wit, accession of current nonmembers, primarily Israel, India and Pakistan; further steps to bolster up the physical protection of nuclear materials, systems of IAEA guarantees and nuclear export controls; opposition to illegal trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials; multiplication of nuclear-free zones, etc.

One would like to say in conclusion that the present article outlines just some priorities and poorly covered issues related to active non-proliferation strategy. As they are dealt with, it is certainly necessary to go on looking for ways of removing the deep-down motives, reasons and factors that fuel the proliferation trend and to map out new steps building up incentives to governmental restraint on armament issues and enhancing interest in renunciation of mass destruction weapons.

As I see it, the dynamism of this process will depend on many factors, including to a considerable extent on whether or not the leading states of the world possessing powerful pressure potentials team up for joint counteraction to threats of the new type. This "coalition of the willing and the capable" might become a component of the 21st-century global security structure, provided it is based on international cooperation and the UN Security Council plays the determining part. The priorities in this sense are the following: to bring back opposition to MDW proliferation to the fold of coordinated decisions and actions by the UN SC members; to overcome differences between nations sharing principles and aims of active non-proliferation on such strategic matters as forms and methods of the fight against MDW proliferation, the terms and procedure for using compulsion (including military force) against deliberate proliferants, identification of chief dangers on the path of the implementation of the active non-proliferation strategy, etc.

The importance of the active non-proliferation strategy should grow in a stable and predictable world order. Russia as a permanent UN Security Council member is due to play a key role in its further development and execution.

* The bomb can be made from ordinary explosives in package with radioactive materials, which are diffused by the explosion and may cause radiation sickness in the immediate vicinity.

NOTES:

(1.) See: Izvestia, December 14, 2002.

(2.) Ibid., November 18.

(3.) Ibidem.

(4.) See: Yezhegodnik SIPRI 2002. Vooruzheniya, razoruzheniye i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost', Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 2003, p. 604.

(5.) See: SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 14.

(6.) See: Yezhegodnik SIPRI 2002. Vooruzheniya, razoruzheniye i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost', p. 14.

(7.) See: Izvestia, May 24, 2002; Krasnaya zvezda, May 28, 2002.

(8.) See: UN Document. S/PV. 3046.

A.N. KALYADIN

Doctor of Historical Sciences

Alexander Nikolaevich KALYADIN was born in Moscow in 1932. In 1956, he graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), where he majored in international relations. He won the degree of candidate in 1964 and that of doctor in 1975. At present he is chief research fellow with the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO), deputy head of IMEMO International Security Center, and the science editor of the Russian version of SIPRI Yearbook. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. He authored and co-authored more than 50 books and pamphlets on problems of national and international security, arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.