A short history of birds' nests management in the Niah caves (Sarawak).

Introduction

The exploitation of birds' nests in Malaysia has a long history. Trade in birds' nests with China already existed at the start of the 17th century, when Dutch merchants began operating in the Malaysian and Indonesian region (Cranbrook, 1984: 150, Koon and Cranbrook 2002: 64-5). The trade in birds' nests was an important source of profit, which was therefore controlled first by the Sultanate of Brunei, and then by the Brooke administration which issued titles and permits to the different owners and enacted various ordinances to control the collecting of nests. In the early years of the Sarawak State, birds' nests constituted a significant source of revenue for the state, which collected export duties of 10% of the value of the nests (Cranbrook 1984:152).

In Malaysia, mainly two species of swiftlets produce edible nests: Collocalia fuciphaga (producing white nests) and Collocalia maxima (producing black nests). Both species inhabit mainly limestone caves, such as the Niah caves, which are the object of this study. The nests are made out of the saliva and feathers of the swiftlets. Once processed to remove the feathers, the nests are consumed in soups, which are believed by many people (mainly Chinese) to have rejuvenating and cosmetic virtues.

In the main Niah cave, the exploitation of birds' nests began fairly recently, less than 200 years ago (Harrisson and Jamuh 1956; Medway 1958; Koon and Cranbrook 2002: 68). Niah soon became a major center of black nest production, which peaked at 18.500 kg per year in 1931, or 70% of the total production of black nests in the state of Sarawak for that year (Cranbrook 1984: 155). The exploitation of birds' nests in the Niah caves sustains the livelihoods of hundreds of people, and has been one of the backbones of economic development for Niah town. One even talks of "birds' nests tycoons," people who became very rich within a short time, just through birds' nests trade. The fame of the Niah caves owes a lot to this huge production of nests, but also to the archaeological discovery of the oldest human remains in Southeast Asia (Harrisson 1958). In order to protect this unique archaeological site, the caves were made into a national heritage site under the authority of the Sarawak Museum, and later on into a national park under the authority of the National Parks department. Recently, the swiftlets have become protected species.

Before 1980, only two harvests were allowed, in December and June, each of which lasted for 2 months (Medway 1958: 467). Each harvest was followed by 4 months without harvest. (1) Most owners and collectors were Penan, while traders were first Malay, then, later on, local Chinese. The owners either worked in the cave themselves or hired Penan workers who were paid a fixed price per harvest, as well as a share of the harvest (Cranbrook 1984). During harvest time, workers stayed overnight in the cave. Traders established a whole village in an adjacent cave (the so-called "trader cave"), to barter goods for raw nests, or buy nests with money. As many workers contracted debts with traders, they often repaid the debt in kind. In the early 1930s, the state established auctions to secure a better price for the workers and owners (through traders' competition) and to prevent tax evasion (Banks 1937). The state also tried to outlaw the repayment of debt in kind with nests.

At the end of the 1950s, birds' nests collection was a dying business (Medway 1957; 1958). In 1958, only five Penan were still working as professional birds' nests collectors. The price was so low that it was not economical to exploit nests, given the concomitant risk. The bird population was very impressive and was estimated to be about 1.5 million in the 1950s (Medway 1957) and 1.3 million in 1978 (Leh and Hall 1996).

In short, before 1980, the local system of birds' nests management, which involved mainly Penan and some local traders, was still sustainable and well controlled. It was taking place on a rather low and declining scale. The number of birds and birds' nests was very high, but the price was low.

Today, any visitor would be struck by the contrast that exists between what they would see and the description that travelers made of the Niah cave 25 or more years ago. The clouds of birds and bats which used to swarm in and out of the cave in search of food, and which were praised by tourist guides, have disappeared. The cave looks quiet and empty of wildlife, but is full of people who stay inside to look after their holes (2) and prevent others from harvesting their nests. The days are gone when visitors covered themselves with plastic bags to prevent bird droppings from staining their clothes. The number of swiftlets building black edible nests has dramatically declined. It was estimated to be less than 500,000 in 1993 (Leh and Hall 1996), and 180,000 in 1997 (Kheng 1997).

Although these estimations are not easy to make, and are subject to numerous methodological problems, nobody challenges the fact that there has been a recent and drastic decline in the population of birds. What is more problematic, however, is to identify the causes of this decline. One can broadly distinguish two different types of causes: those which are physical, and those which are socio-economic in nature.

Various physical causes have been suggested, which all argue that the local ecosystem has been disturbed to the point that it has affected the population of birds. It has been suggested that the collection of guano has a negative impact on the cave ecosystem and on the population of insects which the birds eat (Leh & Hall 1996: 25-26). Many local people also claim to have witnessed a major drop in bird populations after the forest fires and haze which hit the region in 1997. Some also blame fire and smoke to explain why the number of birds dropped in the big mouth of the cave after a house which was standing there burned, and the smoke from the fire killed thousands of birds. A recent invasion of green algae is also blamed for spoiling the reproduction grounds of the swiftlets (Kheng 1997: 91; Leh, personal communication). Many local people believe that the use of pesticides has had a negative impact on bird populations (see also Vardon, in Kheng 1997: 91), as it may have both reduced the amount of insects on which birds feed, and poisoned the birds who ate those insects. One can note, to support this hypothesis, that insecticide residues have been found in switflets from Niah cave (Cranbrook 1984:160). This argument might be related to another one, which is probably the most convincing, which argues that the most serious disturbance of the ecosystem, happening on the largest scale, is the establishment of huge oil palm plantations all over the Niah area. This has not only changed the ecosystem of the whole area in which swiftlets feed, but it has also involved the use of large quantities of pesticides (see, for example, Agger et al. 2000). This change has not only impacted the population of swiftlets building edible nests, but also the population of mossy swiftlets and bats. As I already mentioned, big clouds of bats used to be seen coming out of the cave at dawn. This is no longer the case, as the bats are not numerous enough. The production of guano, which comes not only from edible-nest swiftlets, but also from mossy swiftlets and bats, has declined sharply (Leh & Hall 1996), to such an extent that it cannot be accounted for just by the decline in edible-nest swiftlets, but also implies a decline in bats and mossy swiftlet populations. As the bats and mossy swiftlets are not so much disturbed by human exploitation inside the cave (exploitation usually concentrates on the edible nests), the decline of these species strongly supports explanations in terms of physical causes.

Apart from these physical causes of decline, most people agree that humans have also had a negative impact on the population of birds, both because of their constant occupation of the cave (noise, light and smoke can disturb the birds) and through overexploitation of the nests. Birds' nests could be exploited sustainably and generate a high yield, as they are a renewable resource. Two or three harvests per year could take place without having much detrimental impact on the bird population (Koon and Cranbrook 2002). But if all nests are harvested before eggs are laid and chicks can fly, then the birds cannot reproduce and their population will decline. An important question is, of course, to assess the relative importance of the physical causes compared to the socio-economic ones, and to establish the maximum population of birds that could be sustained under a sound system of management. Today, nobody can answer this question. Further research is needed to know how many birds can be sustained in the present state of the ecosystem. In any case, we must be careful not to consider over-exploitation as the only cause of edible nests' decline, as physical aspects also have had an impact on the bird population.

This being said, I intend in this paper to focus on the possible socio-economic causes of the birds' decline. I will explore the problems linked to the present management of this resource, which is generally believed to be unsustainable.

Methods

The research was conducted from April to June 2000, October 2000 and July-August 2001, and based mainly on semi-structured interviews. (3) All kinds of actors in birds' nests management were interviewed in Niah, including 7 traders (mainly Chinese), 11 owners of parts of the cave (mainly Penan who have become Malayized), more than 20 workers and collectors of nests (mainly Iban), and 6 government officials dealing with the management of birds' nests. A questionnaire was administered in Rumah Ranggong, an Iban community living close to the cave whose members are heavily involved in collecting nests (they constitute probably between a fourth and a third of all the people working in the cave). The questionnaire aimed at collecting data on how many people were involved in the collection, in what kind of specialized work, and how many people depended on the money generated by this business.

Methodological problems included the difficulty to conduct research about income and money matters, as well as the difficulty in studying illegal activities (a big part of nest collection and trade is officially forbidden by different regulations and there is much theft--I will come back to these points later). Most people are reluctant to explain their practices in detail, and express a deep distrust of researchers. Many people are also unwilling to cooperate, as they doubt that the research will be of any benefit to them-and actually fear that the research will harm their short-term interests. In this context, I took all details about income, trade and harvesting practices with caution, trying as much as possible to cross-check the information with different actors (which was difficult, as the level of secrecy is also high among members of the same community and among the different actors of birds' nests management). This is the reason why this article does not give many quantitative details about harvest or income. When it does, the numbers have been crosschecked by different kinds of actors, such as the collector, the trader, and the owner of a cave nesting site, or have been directly observed by me, such as when accompanying collectors when they sold their harvest to a trader. Of course, I had to promise to protect the confidentiality relating to these data, and, therefore, the anonymity of my informants. Despite the lack of detail, the general lines, illustrated by a few trustworthy examples, are sufficient to understand the socio-economic causes and constraints linked to birds' nests management. These have been broadly confirmed and supported during a debriefing session organized by the State Planning Unit of Sarawak, which was attended by most government actors concerned with the management of birds' nests, including the national parks, Sarawak Museum, agriculture department, and Majilis Adat-Istiadat--the administration responsible for recording and codifying customary law.

Socio-economic causes of birds' nests decline

In the following, the different factors that have changed in the past 25 years and that have caused problems for the management of birds' nests, are reviewed.

Increase in price

The price of birds' nests began to rise in the early 1980s (Borneo Bulletin 1982, Leh 1998: 25, Koon & Cranbrook 2002: 86-7). From 10-50 RM/kg in the late 1970s, the price of raw black nests increased to 350-500 RM/kg in the late 1980s, and peaked at 1600 RM/kg in 1996. Then it went down to 1200-1400 RM/kg, following the Southeast Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s (Koon & Cranbrook 2002: 86. (4))

This huge raise in price was accompanied by a revival of the exploitation of birds' nests. From being a dying business in the 1950s, a great number of people suddenly began to be interested in birds' nests. The legitimate owners got a renewed interest in exploiting their resource, but were still doing this following the old management system of two harvests per year, under the supervision of the state. But people other than the Penan also tried to seize the new opportunities, especially the neighboring Iban. The Iban live closer to the cave than the Penan themselves (who live on the other side of the Niah river), and have therefore an easy access to the cave. The neighboring Iban communities then started "stealing" the nests outside of the harvesting period. The pressure on the nests then increased, both because of the Penan's renewed interest in their resource, but also because of the interest found among outsiders, who began to steal the resource. (5)

Challenge of ownership

The Penan felt totally powerless in regard to the new situation. They were not used to guarding their cave holes all the time, and it was in any case difficult for them to organize such a guard since they live far from the cave, on the other side of the Niah river. The encroachers got more and more daring, and did not mind being caught by an angry Penan owner. They just continued to operate, more and more in the open. The Penan ownership was seriously challenged, as few non-Penan people took it into account.

The Penan then reported the situation to the administration. However, instead of trying to support the Penan's ownership and prevent theft to secure the Penan's rights to their resource, the administration suggested that it would be a good idea to prevent everybody from harvesting nests, including the Penan themselves, to replenish the resource base. The administration then declared two total bans on the harvest of nests, from 1989 to 1991, and again from 1993 to 1996 (Kheng 1997). The Penan's ownership was thus challenged a second time by the state who took over the management from them. The Penan were left without access to their own resource, and without any alternative source of income.

But this did not stop neighboring communities from continuing to exploit the nests. Theft was sometimes encouraged by unscrupulous traders who argued that it was a shame to let the resource get spoiled. (6) As the cave has many entrances which cannot easily be guarded, people swarmed in and continued to steal nests, on an even larger scale since the Penan were not allowed to go inside their cave to guard their resource. Instead of reinforcing the Penan's ownership, the total ban weakened it further, giving a free hand for thieves to operate. And instead of paying the Penan to guard their own cave and nests, the state spent a substantial amount of money paying a police field force, which did

not have a personal stake in securing the resource, and which was relatively powerless in preventing access to the cave. Despite increasing the use of force and putting a few encroachers in jail, they were unable to stop the exploitation of nests. Some of them then began to accept bribes and let people go inside the cave to exploit the nests.

The Penan could not exploit their own nests because of the official ban, although they were stolen by their neighbors and bought by illegal traders. Their ownership was therefore seriously challenged; they were close to losing everything. Given the situation, the owners had the choice between two strategies: either harvest their own nests before they were stolen (which was difficult as there was a total ban on harvesting and as other people were already engaged in this activity), or lease their cave sites, thereby getting rid of the management problem. In order to retain some control over their resource, most of them preferred to rent their cave sites to the Chinese traders or Iban "thieves" who were stealing the nests under their eyes while they themselves were prevented from doing anything to stop it. In this way, they could secure revenue from their resource and get their ownership recognized by those who were formerly challenging it.

New actors

Before the 1980s, the number of actors involved in birds' nests exploitation was relatively limited. There were the owners, who were generally Penan descended from those who had discovered the main cave and had started exploiting it in the 19th century. As stated previously, the cave is subdivided into several hundred "holes," which are all individually owned by more than 100 owners. The ownership is private, and is sanctioned by a title which was given under the Brooke administration, and which can be sold or inherited. Although the Penan were the original owners, a certain number of Chinese or Malay traders now own some holes, either through historical matrimonial alliances with Penan, or through purchase. Second, there were the workers or collectors (either climbers who make the nests fall from the walls of the cave or gatherers who take the nests which have fallen to the ground). Third, there were the traders who were first Malay and then, later, local Chinese. Finally, as already mentioned, the state played an important role in controlling and regulating the harvesting of nests, collecting taxes, controlling immigration (many workers are illegal immigrants from Indonesia who were attracted to Niah because of the development of oil palm plantations and the labor opportunities thereby created) and crime (illegal gambling and selling of drugs is taking place inside the caves).

During the 1980s, with the rapid increase in the price of nests, many new actors became interested in the nests. New traders (mainly Chinese) appeared, who began to buy nests without having a proper permit entitling them to do so. The chain of traders, which already used to be very long (nests were sent from Niah to Miri or directly to Kuching, where nests are usually processed (7) before being exported to Singapore, Hong Kong or mainland China, where they end up in the soup of rich consumers), became even longer. Today, even some collectors sometimes buy nests from other collectors and try to sell them for a profit to traders in town, and some traders in Niah also give money to local people staying in the communities involved in harvesting nests, in order to buy nests for them.

The most important change in the 1980s was the creation of a chain of renting and leasing. As the Penan were unable to assert their ownership rights and to exploit their own resource, they began leasing their cave nesting sites. In what follows, I will refer to those who rent a site as leasers. Most leasers are traders (although not all traders are leasers) who seldom go into the cave themselves and prefer to sublet the site to other people who will take care of the exploitation. But some leasers exploit the cave site themselves (mainly the Iban or Penan, sometimes Kenyah), especially if the hole is small and is difficult to access. Leasers usually pay a fixed rent per year, and those who do not exploit the site themselves sublet to others for a monthly rent and the monopoly of trade on the birds' nests harvested. Again, those who sublet from leasers can work in the cave themselves, especially if the site is small and difficult to access. But when the hole is big, those who sublet hire labor to take care of and harvest nests. Those who hire laborers will be called team leaders (mandur in Iban), as they are in charge of finding labor, controlling the collection of nests, selling them to traders (usually the leaser), and distributing the salaries to the workers. Among the workers, a new kind of actor has appeared: the caretakers (tukang jaga in Iban), who stay in the cave and look after the nests to prevent theft.

It is important to distinguish these different actors as they control different and specific aspect of birds' nests management. The owners (together with the state) control ownership (the right to harvest nests). The leasers control the capital which is wanted by owners and lacking among team leaders or workers. The team leaders control labor, something which is very difficult to do for owners and leasers alike. Caretakers control the assets--the nests--and prevent their theft. The collectors control the harvest. The traders control trade (the buying and selling of nests). The government agents control legislation and its enforcement. And finally, consumers control demand. However, the situation is complex and some actors play several different roles at the same time (e.g., most leasers are traders, some are team leaders, and a few are workers; some owners and team leaders can be workers at the same time, etc.).

This period also saw a progressive disengagement of the Sarawak Museum, first in the enforcement of collection rules, which at some point involved police field forces, then in the actual management of the caves. Although the Sarawak Museum still remains in charge of the archeological site, the management of the caves and of their wildlife (bats, birds, insects, etc.) has been officially transferred to the Forestry Department. This transition created confusion and tensions, not just between civil servants belonging to different administrations, but also between people involved in the birds' nests exploitation and the government servants. For some years, people were unsure who was in charge and with whom they had to negotiate. Moreover, people working for the Forestry Department did not have the long experience and knowledge of the local people and their context that the Sarawak Museum had accumulated over many years. Finally, people working for the Forestry and Wildlife Department had a more pronounced eco-centric perspective, while all the other actors had a clear anthropocentric view of birds as a valuable resource. Unfortunately, the transition happened at a time when the old system had broken down, and when intervention from the state, despite the best of intentions, was unable to control abuses, and actually made things worse. The Forestry Department has therefore so far failed to gain the trust of the local actors.

Increase of insecurity 

We have already seen how the Penan's ownership became very insecure, being threatened both by thieves and by the state which enacted a total ban on harvesting and prevented the Penan from harvesting their nests. They then started renting their cave sites to traders and workers, thereby "legalizing," from their point of view (in the sense that they authorized the "illegal" activities) the theft and trade in stolen nests that was going on. Although the position of traders and workers became relatively more secure after the leasing arrangements were created, these arrangements still remained characterized by a great deal of insecurity.

The contracts made between the owners and the traders are renegotiated every year, and this is a source of insecurity for the traders, who bear a high financial risk and invest a lot of money before they can make a profit. The fact that they lend money to owners and workers helps them to lower this uncertainty in binding them to longer-term agreements. The traders also try to establish monopolies through subletting their cave sites to workers on the condition that they sell the entire harvest through them (at a price which is less competitive). But there is much insecurity in this as the workers who rent the cave site from them often try to sell the nests to other traders who will give them a higher price.

The workers' contracts with the traders are also made on a yearly basis, which brings the same type of uncertainty. Moreover, they are the ones risking their lives and health to exploit the nests, although they get the lowest share per person (see below). Another risk and uncertainty is that they often harvest nests outside of the legal period, which is illegal and can bring sanctions. Their strategy to cope with these uncertainties is, first, to try to increase their income through selling their nests to unauthorized traders, and second, to engage in the exploitation of unregistered caves, which have no traditional owner, which do not depend on a trader, and which gives them all the profit. A final source of insecurity is that the nests can easily be stolen by others, and that workers are held responsible when this happens.

Finally, even the state feels insecure, as its legitimacy and credibility are at stake. The state must protect the swiftlets (they are defined as a threatened species), secure local people's livelihoods, and secure law and order. So far, it has had a lot of difficulties in fulfilling these duties. Part of the problem is that the management of the cave involves different administrations (forestry and wildlife, archaeology, agriculture, local development, customary law of indigenous people, police, etc.) which defend different things, based on different premises and strategies that are at times contradictory.

Dilution of responsibility

The higher insecurity of all the actors described above goes hand in hand with their lower sense of responsibility. As all the actors depend on others for the management of the nests, and as the number of different actors has increased in the past 25 years, people feel helpless in changing the present system. A sound management of the nests requires the collaboration of different actors, but nobody knows how to organize this collaboration. Everybody blames others as responsible for the degradation of the resource. The long chain of actors increases insecurity and dilutes responsibility.

The owner of the cave site does not feel responsible anymore, since he delegates responsibility to the person who rents the site from him. He gives the contract to the highest bidder, not to the soundest manager (the contract does not mention anything about the number of harvests which can be taken, despite the fact that the rent is fixed, regardless of the number of harvests). The owner gets a yearly rent, and does not know what is happening inside his cave site. It is not so much that he does not care as long as he receives the rent, but rather that he feels totally powerless in imposing any sort of management--owners started renting their cave sites precisely because they could not control the situation.

The leaser (often a trader) is usually not exploiting the cave site by himself, and rents it to a team leader (who does not exploit it either but hires people to do it) or directly to a worker; he therefore delegates all the management problems to them. He does not know what is happening in the cave; he only wants to make sure that his workers sell the nests harvested to him instead of his competitors. He makes a profit on every nest that he buys, and he does not mind, therefore, if the number of nests harvested is too high and unsustainable.

The worker exploits nests that he does not own, and does not feel responsible in developing a sound management of the resource. He is not motivated to be a sound manager since he does not own the right to harvest nests, he has an insecure contract, and since a sound management--two harvests per year--is relatively risky because the nests might be stolen and he would bear the consequences. Moreover, it is believed that even if the worker is a sound manager, the birds to which he gives time to reproduce might go elsewhere and reproduce in places which are not well managed. If the cost of the management is individual while the benefit is communal, it does not encourage anybody to behave responsibly, unless everybody else does the same. And as people are unable to reach a consensus on common management rules, everybody reluctantly engages in overexploitation of the nests.

The recent creation of a birds' nests committee by the Forestry Department is unlikely to find any sustainable solutions. First, this committee does not represent all stakeholders as it is mainly constituted of cave site owners. Second, it is not really in charge of the management of the collection (which remains vested in the hands of the Forestry Department), and is powerless when dealing with the huge interests which are at stake and with the great complexity of the problem.

Dilution of benefit

Before 1980, as there were less actors than today, the benefits were more concentrated in the hands of the owners (often themselves working in the cave) and the traders. Today, in most cases, owners lease their cave site to a Chinese trader who sublets it to an Iban team leader who hires workers to take care of the cave and harvest nests. The deal between the trader and the team leader is usually either that the trader gets a monthly rent from the team leader (which encourages over-harvesting), or that he gets 1/3 of the harvest as rent. In almost all cases, the trader has the monopoly on trade of the nests harvested in the cave site (usually bought at a price which is lower than what could be found if the nests were sold on a free market). The team leader gets 2/3 of the harvest, which he redistributes among the workers according to the specific agreement between them. The monthly rent, or the 1/3 of the harvest, given to the trader roughly covers the yearly rent that the trader pays to the owner, although in some cases, especially in the new deals between new aggressive traders and newcomers in collecting, the trader makes a very high profit from the monthly rental.

To take an example, a Chinese trader rents a cave site from a Penan owner. The rent is 3000 RM per year. The trader leases the site to an Iban team leader who hires 6 other persons to take care of the cave site and harvest the nests. The trader takes 1/3 of each harvest, which today yields between 800gr and 1.5 kg of raw nests, according to the season and the size of nests at harvest. He also buys the nests at a price ranging between 800 and 1200 RM, depending on the quality of the nests. The amount of harvests per year is extremely difficult to determine exactly. According to the team leader, it is three times per year, but it is widely believed to be up to 5 or 6 times per year, if not more. If one considers 6 harvests per year, with an average I kg of nests, the total is 6 kg of nests. The owner gets a rent of 3000 RM per year, the workers get 2/3 of the harvest (4 kg, which they sell for 1000 RM/kg to the trader, i.e. 4000 RM or 570 RM per person). The trader gets 1/3 of the harvest (2 kg), but makes a profit on the trade of nests by selling the 6 kg to Kuching traders with a high profit (at least 50%, or 3000 RM for 6 kg). So he makes at least 6000 RM, but he has to deduct the cost of transport to Kuching, and the rent to the owner (3000 RM). In this example, the share of the profit is roughly 30% for the owner and the trader, and 40% for the workers (or 5.7% per worker). If the number of harvests is less than 6 per year, the share of the owner will increase. If it is more, it will decrease.

In another example, a Chinese trader rents a cave from a Penan owner for 1000 RM per year. He leases it to an Iban team leader who hires 2 other persons to work in the cave. The yield is around 800 gr. If we hypothesize 6 harvests per year, the total is roughly 5 kg per year. The workers get 2/3 of the harvest (paid at an average price of 1000 RM/kg), the trader takes 1/3 of the harvest. He sells the 5 kg in Kuching for 1500 RM/kg. In this example, the workers get 39% share of the profit (3330 RM, or 1110 per person), the owner gets 12% (1000 RM), and the trader gets 49% (or 4170 RM).

Although these examples do not give the exact figures (one does not know exactly how many harvests there are per year, the exact price paid for each harvest, how much is sold directly to the trader and how much is sold on the black market, etc.), they nevertheless show that the share of the profit can vary. Owners can get between 10 and 30% of the profit, traders between 30 and 50%, and workers get around 40%, but much less if one figures the amount per person (and if one takes into consideration that team leaders can easily retain more money for themselves than what they redistribute to the workers). Considering the benefit has little meaning without considering the costs. The owner usually does not work; he just takes the money once per year. The trader bears the financial risk of the trade, and the worker risks his life and his health to establish a 24-hour guard of the nests and climbs poles to harvest nests often situated 30 to 50 meters above ground level. He is also the one who risks being pursued by the authorities in case they try to enforce their bans on collection.

Greater control, violence, and frequency of harvest

The establishment of a new chain of contracts did not make the security of harvest greater. Old thieves, transformed into rightful leasers or workers, suddenly had to face theft by others. They therefore had to create solutions that the previous managers had failed to find. They resorted to three strategies. First, they began to establish a 24-hour guard in the cave, at least during the period when birds are making nests. This raised the operating cost of exploiting birds' nests tremendously. However, this strategy is not completely successful, as the nests can be quickly harvested in one or two hours when a caretaker falls asleep or is not present.

A second strategy has been to raise the level of violence and to develop mob justice inside the caves. Thieves who are caught can be beaten on the spot. Part of the problem here is that, as most of the harvesting going on is "illegal" (outside of the legal periods, or during official bans), the workers, leasers, owners, and traders involved in harvesting the birds' nests during that time are working and making profit illegally. Therefore, they cannot rely on the state or on the police to help them prevent "theft" inside the caves, since the state perceives their own activities as illegal. The only solution is for them to develop their own system of mob justice in order to discourage unwanted "thieves."

As all the former strategies partly failed, a third strategy was developed, which consists in harvesting nests as soon as they can be sold, without waiting for the chicks to have the time to fly away and reproduce, and without giving a chance to thieves to operate. Collectors don't want to take any chance in investing for the future when there is such a high risk of losing everything in the present. The lack of any efficient control of theft is one of the primary causes of over-harvesting.

Less respect for the cave

Bird-David (1993) argues that hunting-gathering societies usually develop subject-to-subject types of relationships with their environment. This is true of the way the Penan used to have a very close and personified relationship with the Niah caves. Various myths exist that describe the cave as the remnant of a former village which was flooded because of some transgression of rules (Husain 1958; Sandin 1958), or that tell how the nests were originally mistaken for some form of fungi (Medway 1960). The cave is believed to be inhabited by various spirits (including some of the most important Penan local heroes), and respectful behavior must be adopted inside in order not to disturb them. Various taboos exist, some of them defended by the National Parks administration in Niah (it is, among other things, forbidden to shout inside the cave). Some of the most important Penan fertility rituals used to be performed annually at the mouth of the cave to secure abundance and good fortune.

This mythical, ritual and respectful relationship with the cave is today challenged by the new situation. Workers stay overnight in the cave and live there. They cook, eat, sleep, defecate, and listen to music or even to television. The old taboos are not respected anymore. The rituals, which require a total closure of the cave for a few days per year, are more and more difficult to practice (the workers don't want to leave their nests unguarded, and the state does not want to close the cave to tourists). As a result of this trend, the cave and the nests have been commodified and have lost most of their ritual and symbolic potency.

Conclusion

Different factors have contributed to the breaking down of the old Penan management system, including the increase in the demand for nests which drove prices up. This triggered the interest of various new actors to get involved in the business, sometimes through unlawful practices, such as theft, illegal trade. This involvement of new actors has weakened the traditional mechanisms of social control and conflict resolution, and it has challenged the traditional system of ownership. State intervention, although based on the best of intentions, made things worse by closing the cave to the exploitation of the nests. This proved not only inefficient; it also weakened even further the previous system of management. As a reaction, and in an attempt to retain some form of control over their resources, the Penan owners started leasing their cave sites to traders or workers, which diluted further the responsibility for a sound management of the nests through a cascade of leasing and subleasing arrangements.

The former "thieves" were transformed into rightful workers renting their cave sites directly from the Penan owners, or sub-renting them from a Chinese leaser/trader. All workers began to stay overnight in the cave to deter thieves. The nests began to be harvested more and more often, with the number of nests decreasing steadily every year. With the workers staying overnight in the cave (cooking, eating, sleeping, etc.), the old taboos lost ground, as well as the old rituals, which require a total closure of the cave for a few days once per year.

The old sustainable system of management has given way to a new one, which is characterized by the involvement of a great number of different actors, leasing and subleasing arrangements, people staying 24 hours a day in the caves to look after the nests and prevent theft, and an intensive exploitation of the resource.

(1) However, several of my informants told me that each harvest lasted 3 months and was followed by a period of 3 months without harvest.

(2) The main cave, where most of the birds' nest collecting takes place, is subdivided into several hundred "holes," all of which are owned by individual owners.

(3) I would like to express my gratitude to SLUSE (The Danish University Consortium on Sustainable Land Use and Natural Resource Management) for funding this research.

(4) Prices are in Malaysian Ringgit (RM). Throughout 2002, the Malaysian Ringgit was valued at roughly 3.8 to 1 US Dollar.

(5) This happened at the same time that huge oil palm plantations began to be established, disturbing the ecosystem on which the birds relied.

(6) If one harvest is missed, the nests degenerate naturally and may even become unmarketable (Medway 1958: 469).

(7) Nests are also processed at Niah on a very small scale, for local consumption or for sale to tourists visiting the caves.

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Quentin Gausset

Institute of Anthropology, University of Copenhagen 

Frederiksholms Kanal, 4

DK-1220 Copenhagen K., Denmark

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