A one-sided nuclear deal.

Byline: The Register-Guard

Closer ties between the United States and India are all to the good - the two countries are natural allies. Still, the agreement on nuclear reactors announced during President Bush's visit to New Delhi this week raises questions. The many benefits to India are obvious; much less clear is what the United States gains from the deal. Congress should feel no obligation to approve the accord.

India first tested an atomic weapon in 1974, but has never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Its status as a nuclear renegade has prevented India from purchasing commercial nuclear reactors and fuel from the United States and other countries bound by the treaty.

The new agreement, whose final details were ironed out just hours before it was announced Thursday, opens India to trade in nuclear technology and materials.

In exchange, India will classify two-thirds of its reactors as civilian facilities open to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The remaining eight reactors, including a fast-breeder facility capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium, will be classified as military facilities and will be closed to international scrutiny. The inspection regime will not be fully effective until 2014, and India retains the right to develop new fast-breeder reactors for military use.

The best spin that can be put on this deal is that the nonproliferation treaty was already dead as far as India is concerned, and it might as well be buried so that the United States and other nations can get on with the business of selling nuclear fuel and equipment to a big new customer. France welcomed the agreement for that reason, and Russia, Germany and Great Britain are expected to follow. India's economy, expanding at a rate that will lead to a doubling every decade, will need lots of electrical power, so the agreement opens a potentially huge market.

India's energy needs, however, could have been harnessed to bring it inside the nonproliferation regime. Instead, the agreement demonstrates to other nations that they can develop nuclear weapons without lasting consequences.

Pakistan has already demanded similar treatment. Iran, North Korea and others can now claim that the United States has a double standard when it applies pressure to stop their nuclear programs.

With this agreement, a double standard undeniably exists. U.S. negotiators conceded as much, but argued that India is a special case - a large and increasingly powerful democratic nation that has had nuclear weapons for 30 years without using them.

Every nation, however, regards itself as a special case. An emerging world leader such as India should have been encouraged to set an example by opening all of its reactors to international inspection. Iran, for instance, would then have been in a much weaker position in keeping its nuclear programs closed to inspections.

The notion that India's military power should be cultivated to serve as a counterweight to China in Asia and beyond should also be examined. India shows no sign of seeing itself in that light. And if China perceives India as a military challenger, the likely result will be more Chinese aid for its ally Pakistan. Two can play the counterweight game - and it could lead to an arms race by proxy between China and the United States in one of the most volatile regions of the world.

Congress would need to change U.S. law to permit the agreement with India to take effect. Before doing so, lawmakers must ensure that both parties to the deal derive commensurate benefits. So far, the advantages for the United States appear outweighed by the risks.