A nontraditional way of information transmission at tactical level.

Traditional information transmission systems of tactical control (TC) existing today are base on the use of electromagnetic waves energy (Radio- and wire communications). They have some principled limitations that in particular result in the following: depending on the situation information exchange is hindered and sometimes even impossible. These limitations are caused by a number of factors starting from the terrain and atmosphere status till hostile countermeasures (electronic suppression means, conventional weapons, etc.). Use of nuclear weapons by the enemy practically excludes radio communications in a certain radio frequency spectrum within several hours or even days due to excessive ionosphere ionization. Counterintelligence protection and therefore security of the systems using open space (air) for information transmission is also rather low.

Besides, there are some traffic capability limitations in such transmission systems. And this in turn affects the effectiveness of the whole C2 system. At the same time, increasing use of tactical automatic C2 systems is accompanied by the growth of necessity to transmit big amounts of information (digital maps, video data, etc.).

Basic radio channels used for exchanging such information are capable of transmitting data at a rate of up to 16 kBt/sec. Calculations show that it will require from several hours to several dozens of hours to transmit large volume messages. These time characteristics absolutely do not meet the operational control requirements.

Use of wire communications and fiber-optical communication lines can increase a little traffic capability of information streams. But the process of laying wire lines sometimes is facing a number of problems--it is impossible to lay the lines across the territory occupied by the enemy, across contaminated areas and in mountainous and adverse terrain. Besides, due to highly dynamical nature of modern combat time taken for laying wire communication lines in many cases happens to go beyond the limits of information delivery time. At present time, use of fiber-optical communication lines at TC due to their design features is not possible at all.

In conditions when radio communication is hindered or completely destroyed and use of wire communication lines is not possible due to the above-mentioned reasons postal and courier communications can assist in delivering big amounts of information. But postal and courier communications means sometimes cannot be used (territory is occupied by the enemy, areas are contaminated, etc.). And time required for delivering information by means of postal and courier communications is not always acceptable. Besides, communications security when using postal and courier communications means is not high either.

That means that there are the following reasons to search for new ways of transmitting information at tactical level: on one hand, by continuous growth of information amounts to be transmitted, on the other hand, reduction of time required for transmission; by appearance of a possibility to use new hardware (CD-ROM drives, digital video data, etc.); by difficulties or absence of radio communications at tactical level in hostile ECM environment; by long period of time required for laying wire communication lines and low reliability in conditions of highly dynamic combat; by high level of communications security requirements and some others.

Use of artillery informational projectiles (AIP) can become a new nontraditional ways of transmitting big amounts of information over distances within battlefield. Special artillery pieces firing informational projectiles should be selected for this purpose and sites (areas) of AIP reception should be equipped (see Fig.). They should be equipped in the vicinity (up to several hundred meters) of communication center of the command post (CP), preferably in the open terrain with hard soil within rectangular with 150-200 m sides or within a circle 100-150 m in diameter. In turn artillery informational projectile instead of explosives will be equipped with special containers carrying various information storage devices (flash memory, CDs, etc.).

There can be several ways of configuring AIP with various information storage devices. It is estimated that developing and introducing them in service won't require high expenses and their use by forces will be tactically and economically reasonable.

No doubt there will be a lot of specialists considering this idea to be if not absurd then at least not actual, but some people may consider it to be a brave and offbeat solution. Moreover, according to one of Murphy's laws any new proposal brings new problems. It is quite clear that in case of more detailed study (evaluation) of the proposed way of information transmission a number of questions will inevitably emerge. What will be the accuracy of projectile delivery and how quickly will it be found? What will be the way of warning about employing AIP and what will be a report about receiving it? Where these projectiles shall be stored and what level of command will they belong to? How will information security be provided? Other questions are not excluded as well.

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Let's try answer some of them by combining problems related to the use of AIP and solutions in several groups.

Thus, tactical problems are connected to the necessity of providing safety of friendly forces when using AIP. But preliminary estimates and artillery firing practice show that accuracy of fire of the basic artillery systems is quite acceptable from the point of view of safe organization and equipping AIP reception sites even when firing at maximum range.

* Speaking about AIP storage and delivery several ways can be considered. The first way (to our mind, the most preferable one) -- AIPs are stored on the transportation vehicles of the artillery unit. Containers with information are loaded in the vicinity of the firing position (FP) prior to use. Containers are delivered to the FP are by specialists from the crews of the command post carriers (CPC) where this information was processed.

* The second way -- AIPs are in the unit of fire for each gun mount of the artillery company (one or two projectiles) or all AIPs are concentrated near one gun detached for firing special purpose projectiles. In this case specialists from the crews of the command post carriers themselves will bring the containers and load the projectiles at FP.

* The third way -- AIPs are stored in and transported by transportation vehicles of CP communications centers. Loading is done in the area of communications center (single CPC) and then loaded AIP is transported to the firing position for employment.

Each way has its pros and contras and selection of one of them is a question of further consideration.

When discussing organizational issues it is necessary to mention that AIP can be used both in the interests of combined arms commander and in the interests of artillery commander. Decision on using AIPs is made by combined arms commander (or artillery commander if information is transmitted in the interests of artillery units and formations). Use of AIPs in the interests of Arms commanders should be coordinated with combined arms commander.

It's quite obvious that in order to exchange information by means of AIP between command posts of artillery units in the interests of artillery division command their organic guns should be used. Organizational moments of using (detaching and assigning) guns for firing AIP in the interests of tactical level command should be considered additionally. In the course of further assessments it is necessary separately develop recommendations for storage, location, configuration and organizational assignment of these projectiles.

AIP reception site can be an element of CP communications center. Special crews detached from signal units should equip it and organize duties, search and detection of AIPs. Besides, personnel of command post carriers whom this information is dedicated to will unload information from AIP as well as prepare and transport it to the transmission place (to FP). Warning about use of AIP and information reception confirmation can be performed through the ordinary radio and wire communication channels by means of specific signals.

When solving tasks of providing information security it is necessary to take into account that security level and mimic resistance* are the main features used for evaluating security of transmitting information. Due to the fact that information transmitted by means of AIP is designed for tactical control level and its operative-tactical value time is rather short, information security level can be low, i.e. temporarily secured.

This information security persistence is achieved thanks to the use of existing hardware, i.e. all information before copying on a certain storage device is preliminarily programmatically ciphered by means of a specific coding pattern known to sender and recipient. It is this preliminary ciphering that will provide the sufficient mimic resistance. If required to increase it then it will be enough just to use more persistent codes. Besides, it is possible to use other ways of information protection such as so-called information self-liquidation in case of "incorrect" actions of operator that can be performed by available software. This won't allow the enemy to disclose transmitting information (if he manages to seize AIP) and send us disinformation by means of it.

Speaking about technical problems they are resolvable, in principle. In particular, design of AIP can be made in a shape of an ordinary 152-mm or 122-mm artillery projectile (in course of further evaluations it is possible to consider a possibility of using various caliber mortar projectiles). To simplify their search at the reception sites there can be several ways of detecting AIP. In particular, projectile itself can be equipped with quick detection device, such as visual or audio signal (unfolding pennant, low altitude flares, alarm signal, etc.) that is activated at the moment of impact. Also it is possible to equip AIPs with so-called radio beacons with operation range up to 0.5 km. Radio beacon with a small operation range won't disclose command post. Special pager-type receiving device available at the operator's facility can inform about AIP impact at the reception site. But it's necessary to mention that in ECM environment radio beacon will be inefficient, and installation of it on AIP will raise total cost of the projectile.

By equipping AIP with parachute (similar to illuminating projectile) will certainly simplify the process of detecting the Projectile and provide safety of personnel at the reception site. But one shouldn't forget that parachute can disclose to some extent the area of CP, especially when it is located within the range of hostile visual surveillance means. It also will be difficult to "hit" the site in case of strong wind.

An finally, AIP reception site can be equipped with observation means, e.g. some small size video cameras, placed along the site perimeter. By the way, the perspective general-purpose command post carrier is mobile enough; it is based on an armored vehicle, equipped with video surveillance cameras and definitely can be used for this mission if required.

Use of one or several proposed ways of AIP rapid detection can significantly simplify and accelerate the searching process. But additional evaluations should be done to select and prove a specific variant of equipping AIP with rapid detection means.

The proposed way of transmitting information can be used together with other traditional ways both in combat and when getting ready for it. But we should mention at the same time that this way is the most preferable in respect of providing authenticity, security and promptness when transmitting significant amounts of information. This way of delivering messages may be required even when conducting special operations in adverse and impassable terrain especially if it is necessary to keep in secret the fact of information transmission itself. Besides, when enemy establishes powerful task force for conducting ECM warfare and affecting C2 system by various destructive means this way of information transmission in the decisive directions can happen to be the only one acceptable.

Of course, not all the questions related to this idea have got answers yet. But it's obvious that development and introduction of this project into life won't require big financial spending and search for big amount of new technical solutions. Because a lot of them have already been found and are successfully used in practice. That is why I'd like to hope that we won't be playing again a role of catching-up persons in the sphere of introducing new technologies and surprise solutions into daily routine of the forces.

Col. A.I. NAGOVITSIN (Res.)

Candidate of Military Sciences

Alexander Ivanovich NAGOVITSIN was born on September 25, 1953. Graduate of the Kemerovo High Military Command School of Communications (1976) and Command Faculty of the Military Academy of Communications (1984). Served at various command positions in Signal Corps. From 1984 to 1997 he was occupied with military scientific work. He took part in development and testing of new automated command and control systems for artillery and rocket units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The author of more than 100 scientific publications. At present time, an associate professor of the Troops Control Department at the Mikhailovskaia Military Artillery Academy.

* Mimic resistance--system capability of withstanding input of false information.