A fires battalion in OIF III: supporting decentralized "hot" platoons and other missions.

The 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), Raiders, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), deployed from Fort Stewart, Georgia, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) III from January 2005 to January 2006. The Raider Brigade--the first unit to reach Baghdad during OIF I--again led the Army as the first to reorganize as a modular heavy BCT (HBCT) and deploy to Iraq for a second tour. 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery (1-41 FA), Glory's Guns, deployed as the 1st BCT's organic fires battalion.

During OIF III, Task Force (TF) 1-41 FA fired 5,860 rounds in support of operations throughout the 1st BCT's battlespace, which was the size of Maryland. TF 1-41 FA's Hot platoons located throughout the brigade's large area of operations (AO) fired autonomously in support of their maneuver TFs. 1-41 FA's direct support (DS) mission for the TFs was in addition to several other missions. This article discusses lessons learned during TF 1-41 FA's 12-month tour in Iraq, highlighting Hot platoons in decentralized operations.

1st BCT replaced the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (2/1ID), in Salad ad Din Province in the volatile Sunni Triangle north of Baghdad. The Raider Brigade was attached to the 42nd Infantry Division from the New York National Guard for the first 10 months then to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) for its final two months in Iraq.

The transfer of authority (TOA) and relief in place (RIP) with 2/1 ID was directed by III Corps to be "one for one" down to the platoon level. 1st BCT executed this directive as closely as possible, given that the BCT was replacing a legacy brigade. When the dust settled, 1st BCT controlled seven maneuver battalions and its organic fires battalion plus brigade support and brigade troop battalions.

The BCT partnered with many Iraqi Army, police and special police units and had facilities and infrastructure under its operational control (OPCON). Command and control over such a large and diverse organization in such a large AO was an immense task for the 1st BCT, but it proved up to the challenge.

TF 1-41 FA's Mission and Pre-Deployment Preparations. 1-41 FA had three key tasks to execute in Salad ad Din Province: prosecute the countermortar/rocket campaign across the brigade AO, including augmenting the brigade tactical command post (TAC) at Logistics Support Area (LSA) Anaconda to synchronize joint targeting and counterstrike efforts; command and control Forward Operating Base (FOB) Remagen; and execute the brigade's Provincial Police Partnership Program. Although I do not discuss the last key mission in this article, it involved partnering with and advising the Salad ad Din Provincial Chief of Police, his police headquarters (HQ) and his 10,000-man police force.

TF 1-41 FA also helped and advised the Salad ad Din Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC) in Tikrit that planned and executed the historic constitutional and parliamentary elections. In addition, the battalion provided Soldiers for the 1st BCT's military transition team (MiTT) that worked with the 1st Brigade of the 4th Iraqi Army Division, also in Tikrit.

Before deploying, the battalion established communications from Fort Stewart, Georgia, with the 2/1 ID in Iraq. However, communications were difficult because most information of value was classified, and 1st BCT had only one secure mternet protocol net (SIPRNET) computer in the entire brigade.

Three pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS) were critical for the battalion to understand the mission, environment, terrain and peculiarities of the fluid AO. The surveys, also known as leaders' reconnaissance, helped the battalion adjust home-station training.

Task Organization and Command Relationships. 2/1 ID fielded four firing platoons and provided radar coverage with 10 Q-36 and Q-37 radars, which was crucial to prosecuting the counterfire fight. The 1st Infantry Division Artillery (Div Arty) HQ managed the maintenance and orientation of the radars; the 42nd Div Arty continued this mission during OIF III.

LSA Anaconda, a vital corps logistics hub, was in the BCT's battlespace and the target of frequent mortar and rocket attacks. Disrupting the anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) fires directed at the LSA was a major effort.

The battalion had to conduct split-TOC operations between FOB Remagen and LSA Anaconda. FOB Remagen was home to the 3rd division's internment facility and 350 FOB support civilians, contractors and third country nationals (TCNs) who serviced five other FOBs near Tikrit. The battalion's headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB) (-) was responsible for FOB Remagen force protection and G company (-), 1-41 FA's forward support company (FSC), was in charge of base operations.

1-41 FA positioned a trained and lethal Hot platoon on four FOBs that fired for at least one and sometimes up to three TFs. The battalion headquarters could not fully control fires in the AO, given the distances to the Hot platoons and unique circumstances of each TF fight.

The battalion ensured each platoon had the means to meet the five requirements of accurate predicted fire, maintain its howitzers and fire direction center (FDC), resupply Class V (each platoon had an attached maintenance section and prescribed load list, or PLL, clerk from G company) and execute its TF commander's scheme of fires nested with the brigade commander's concept for fires.

Fires in the 1st BCT AO. When it returned from OIF I, 1-41 FA focused its training at the platoon level. The policies and procedures instituted by the 3rd Div Arty for certifying howitzer and fire direction sections, platoons and batteries were instrumental in guiding training both at Fort Stewart and while the battalion was deployed. Those procedures remain intact today.

All firing platoons in Glory's Guns were DS to the maneuver TFs they supported. The platoons were on the same FOB as the supported. TFs or on a nearby FOB. The platoons were OPCON to their respective TFs for force protection and under the TFs' administrative control (ADCON) for leave management, etc. These command relationships were easily worked out because the 1st BCT battalion commanders were "team players." The 1-41 FA battalion commander and command sergeant major (CSM) circulated the battlefield, participating in BCT targeting meetings and visiting the platoons and TFs frequently.

To execute the BCT's fires effectively, the TF commanders first had to devise their schemes of fires that nested with the brigade's scheme of fires. Then, given a well trained Hot platoon, executing those fires depended on the TF fire support officer (FSO) in conjunction with the brigade FSO, the TF fire direction officer (FDO) and the BCT fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). This coordination was much easier to do in Iraq, given the decentralized nature of the fight at the TF level.

Each maneuver TF operating in the vicinity of Bayji, Tikrit, Samarra, Balad, Ad Duluiyah and Ad Dujayl had unique circumstances regarding its fight. The TF commanders in those areas were very aggressive in using artillery to prosecute the countermortar/rocket campaign.

Early in our deployment, there were some major deliberate brigade operations involving more than one TF, particularly in the vicinity of Samarra. But after those successes and the reconstitution of the Iraqi police force and introduction of Iraqi police commandos in Samarra, operations reverted to the TF level.

Platoon Operations. Each firing platoon supported one to three separate maneuver TFs and various HQs, to include the brigade HQ, division main and rear HQs, and corps assets at LSA Anaconda. Each battery commander conducted split operations and moved between FOBs with his personal security detachment (PSD).

Generally, the first sergeant was on one FOB with a firing platoon while the battery commander was on another. Sometimes the battery commander and first sergeant were together, depending on the unit's needs.

The TFs used their organic mortar platoons as maneuver elements in order to project more combat power into their AOs. Therefore, the artillery platoons were the sole providers of uninterrupted fire support for the TFs. Close air support (CAS) and attack aviation were available, if the maneuver commander needed it, but artillery was available 24/7 in all weather conditions.

Each firing platoon had to track and execute counterfire missions within its TF's battlespace in accordance with the TF commander's scheme of fires. The platoons fired in response to AIF mortar and rocket attacks and conducted terrain-denial and troops-in-contact (TIC) missions. Terrain-denial fire missions were executed with high explosive (HE) and high-explosive rocket assisted (HER) rounds during the day and, primarily, with illumination rounds at night.

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For deliberate operations, platoons stood up more than one Hot gun, depending on the mission. Each platoon always had one Hot gun ready to fire, 24/7. FDCs also were manned 24/7.

In the southern half of the AO, the AIF mortar and rocket fire proved to be the heaviest, especially around LSA Anaconda and FOB Paliwoda in the vicinity of Balad. The platoon firing in Paliwoda, which had to support three maneuver TFs and LSA Anaconda, was the busiest. So, based on our home-station train up, we put our best firing platoon at this location.

The deputy brigade commander led the BCT TAC at LSA Anaconda. HHB/1-41 FA augmented the TAC with the battalion S3 and S2, battalion FDO and fire direction NCO (FDNCO), intelligence analyst, battalion FDC, a maintenance section and communications and supply Soldiers. These Soldiers greatly facilitated the TAC's intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and joint targeting process for the counterfire fight under the control of the deputy BCT commander. However, their absence at FOB Remagen, which was two hours to the north via Main Supply Route (MSR) Tampa, made the task of commanding and controlling FOB Remagen a bit more challenging.

The platoons in the BCT's southern sector fired almost two-thirds of the counterfire missions, which is a testament to their autonomous capabilities and ability to operate within the guidance of the maneuver commander. The battalion fired almost 6,000 HE, HER, illumination and smoke rounds in support of operations during OIF III.

Howitzer Section Fighter Management. Having four sections in a firing platoon was critical to the battalion's success. The fighter management scheme for howitzer sections consisted of a section's being Hot gun for two weeks (one week for a night time rotation followed by a second week during the day).

When coming off a Hot gun rotation, a section conducted maintenance for a week and was tasked with force protection. In the fourth week, the section trained to be a Hot gun again while still being tasked by the battalion for other missions.

Cross training Number 1 Men to be Gunners and Gunners to fill in as Section Chiefs was critical to keeping trained crews in the fight. This was particularly important because the leave numbers allocated to the battalion were not consistent throughout the deployment.

Keeping sections Table VIII certified during the deployment also was important. Table VIII certifications were executed by battery commanders and incorporated as terrain-denial missions by the TF commander and FSO.

Platoon operations centers (POCs) worked 24/7 for 12 months. They were not tasked for force protection or other duties, given their manning. Two of the four POCs were located inside maneuver TF TOCs. Given space constraints, two other POCs were in separate smaller buildings on those FOBs although they maintained constant communications with the TF fire support element (FSE).

Debate Over Terrain-Denial Fires. Many argue that terrain-denial fires are counterproductive. Fire supporters tasked to observe the target area of interest (TAI) containing the target telegraph Coalition presence in a particular area.

It is difficult to measure the success of terrain-denial fires if the AIF is not shooting. It is difficult to measure a lack of enemy indirect fires due to a unit having a well rehearsed and executable counterfire battle drill.

1-41 FA put this notion to the test in consultation with our BCT commander and ceased all proactive counterfire missions for 30 days to see whether or not AIF fires would increase as a result our only shooting when the insurgents shot first. The data collected across the BCT was that AIF fires did increase during this time, so we reinitiated proactive counterfires.

Command and Control and Force Protection of FOB Remagen. The task to command and control FOB Remagen, outside of Saddam Hussein's hometown of Tikrit was a challenging mission, based on the troop-to-task available to the TF. This FOB was centrally located in the northern half of the AO close to the brigade TOC and division HQs on nearby FOBs. This allowed for efficient communications between 1-41 FA Soldiers, the brigade TAC, firing platoons and battery commanders.

1-41 FA had its headquarters, HHB (-), G company (-) and one firing platoon on FOB Remagen and was augmented with elements from a signal battalion, the brigade's forward support battalion and brigade troops battalion. These units were OPCON to the battalion for force protection, and their Soldiers greatly contributed to the protection of FOB Remagen.

Because several of TF 1-41 FA HHB Soldiers were in the BCT TAC on LSA Anaconda, the battalion TOC at FOB Remagen relied heavily on primary staff officers to serve as battle captains. Key NCOs and Soldiers from other units cross trained for TOC operations. The battalion executive officer (XO) and the Assistant S3 (who became the S3 for all practical purposes) managed the manning of these TOC shifts.

With the battalion positioned on six FOBs across Salad ad Din Province, ammunition resupply and maintenance operations were a challenge. The FSC proved invaluable when tasked to execute this mission.

G company provided the battalion the heavy-haul capabilities needed to move ammunition supplies throughout the AO. It also supported the sustainment of FOB Remagen by conducting multiple weekly combat logistics patrols (CLPs) to FOB Speicher and LSA Anaconda to resupply Class I, II, III, V and mail and support Soldier leaves. These CLPs often incorporated large numbers of support trucks that supplied the FOB with vital Class I and III supplies. The drivers and truck commanders participated in the CLP leader's troop-leading procedures and rehearsals.

The G company's DS maintenance capabilities kept the operational readiness (OR) rate for each platoon at 95 percent or higher throughout the deployment. The combined efforts of the distribution platoon and the maintenance sections allowed for the timely movement of repair parts from one FOB to another and the timely repair of vehicles and equipment. This further allowed the firing platoons the flexibility to operate without the battalion's direct involvement.

Lessons Learned. During our deployment, we learned several lessons.

Don't let the "fog of war" begin with the commander's intent. Face-to-face and frequent communications with subordinate units were difficult because of the size of the BCT's AO and the distances involved. Battle update briefings (BUBs) were incorporated weekly as were regular visits by the battalion command group to the units. However, the battalion commander could not be everywhere and was not always available, depending on the BCT's missions.

Giving clear guidance and intent to battery commanders was critical. It helped that all commanders in OIF III were OIF I veterans and very experienced and capable. In addition, many of the first sergeants, platoon sergeants and section chiefs had OIF I experience. Also, the firing battery commanders remained in command the entire rotation.

Junior Leaders are vital in decentralized operations. The battery commanders were not always with their platoons. Given the nature of our 24/7 counterfire fight, they relied on their platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, gunnery sergeants, section chiefs and FDOs/NCOs to make the tactical and technical decisions to support the TF commanders.

Junior leaders made many decisions within the framework of the battalion's mission and commander's intent throughout OIF III and demonstrated that a Paladin battalion can be very successful without a direct, centralized headquarters element. The battalion's success validated the training philosophy devised at home station to focus training at the platoon level.

Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) will enhance the counterfire fight. One of our biggest concerns in Iraq was collateral damage. This forced the artillery either to not shoot targets or to shoot offset grids to limit damage in built-up areas. The AIF quickly learned that, when firing near populated and built-up areas, Coalition Forces only responded with maneuver forces conducting combat patrols and air weapons teams, if available.

If PGMs had been available during our deployment, their accuracy would have allowed for immediate responses to AIF indirect fire attacks with smaller collateral damage estimate (CDE) rings.

The proper use of fire support coordination measures (FSCMs) will clear airspace more quickly. Clearing the battlespace was one of the biggest challenges in providing responsive counterfire.

Many times throughout OIF III, missions were canceled due to the inability to confirm that there were no aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flying in the area. An even greater percent of the time, missions were delayed several minutes--time the enemy used to escape from the target area--and fired only after 100 percent of every aviation unit confirmed there were no helicopters or planes along the gun-target line (GTL).

Part of this problem was solved when a Sentinel radar was incorporated into the BCT TOC. Part of the problem was training. If the DS battalion commander at FOB Remagen is not responsible for the brigade FSE, it is difficult to correct deficiencies noted in the FSE. Properly employing and tracking active FSCMs would have accelerated the air-clearance process.

1st BCT used free-fire areas (FFAs) over locations the AIF repeatedly used for attacks on Coalition Force FOBs. Despite the great effort put forth by the TF that owned the terrain where FFAs were located to explain to the local populace that they had to stay out of these FFAs, it was a challenge to get the word to every Iraqi. Battle tracking friendly elements that patrolled these FFAs also was critical. Blue force tracker helped with this.

Informal and formal airspace coordination areas (ACAs) would have been better FSCMs for air units to move through the area and keep GTLs as clear as possible.

Units can task a battery to command and control a FOB's force protection. The HHB commander was charged with force protection on FOB Remagen under the direction of the battalion TOC.HHB ran a 10-day force protection rotation cycle on the entire FOB with OPCON units adjusting to this cycle. Having one commander responsible ensured standards, guard mounts, communications and rehearsals of base defenses were easy to execute.

At the end of each 10-day cycle, the HHB commander conducted an after-action review (AAR) with all Soldiers coming off of force protection duty to garner lessons learned and determine the resources needed to improve execution. He also ran a weekly force protection meeting to pass information to the FOB support civilians, division internment facility NCO-in-charge (NCOIC), maneuver unit that owned the terrain outside the FOB and all tenant units

The FA needs long-range communications. The distance between the firing platoons and the battalion headquarters increased the need for long-range communications. During the deployment, the battalion relied almost solely on digital non-secure voice telephones (DNVTs), SIPRNET, non-secure Internet protocol net (NIPRNET) and the Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBC[B.sup.2]) for communications. We used the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS) in the two battalion TOC nodes to communicate with the POCs, and it proved to be a fairly reliable communications system, given the distances.

Maintain key battalion systems while deployed. Units should stay proficient on the key systems and procedures necessary to make a battalion function, regardless of the mission and location. 1-41 FA focused on arms room procedures, ammunition handling and accountability, vehicle maintenance and routine dispatching of vehicles, supply accountability and monthly 10 percent inventories, modified command inspections, leader professional development (LPD), promotion boards, health and welfare inspections, awards ceremonies and morale-building events led by the CSM.

Working with the FOB morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) organization, the CSM organized a monthly commander's cup competition built around the battle rhythms of the subordinate units. This usually involved four to five sporting events followed by a monthly recognition ceremony at the dining facility for the winners. He also held a version of better opportunities for single/unaccompanied Soldiers (BOSS) meetings for deployed Soldiers, which was a forum for issues that might improve the quality of life on the FOB and keep morale high.

In addition, the battalion had a set of Soldiers' rules that augmented the Raider Rules published by our BCT commander. The NCO supervisor chain inculcated these rules for the Soldiers' effectiveness and safety. See the figure.

During our deployment, 1-41 FA fought as a true fires battalion, firing artillery in an active counterfire environment in support of maneuver units spread across a large AO. Our Soldiers proved that the battalion could accomplish this primary mission to standard plus offer the BCT commander the flexibility to have us tackle other lines of operation (LOOs) for him during OIF III.

Lieutenant Colonel Patrick M. Antonietti commanded 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery (1-41 FA), 3rd Infantry Division, from July 2003 through June 2006, including deploying with the 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) III. In his previous assignment, he was a Political-Military Planner for Central Europe and Afghanistan in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, J5, on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. He was a Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO) and Battalion Executive Officer (XO) in 1-6 FA and Assistant Fire Support Coordinator, all in the 1st Infantry Division Artillery. While serving as the XO, he deployed for Kosovo Force (KFOR) 1B. He commanded B Battery/2-8 FA and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord, California, and Fort Lewis, Washington. He is an Olmsted Scholar with a degree in Political Science from Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia.

Captain Donald K. Brooks commands A/1-41 FA. Also in 1-41 FA, he served as the Battalion Operations Officer, Assistant Operations Officer and Fire Direction Officer. In September 2005, he was the Squadron FSO for 5-7 Cav while deployed in support of OIF III. He also deployed to Kuwait in August 2000 in support of Operation Desert Spring and to Iraq in February 2003 for OIF I. In 2-4 FA, Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS), 214th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, he was a Battalion Adjutant, Battery XO and Firing Platoon Leader. He is a graduate of the Field Artillery Captain's Career Course, Fort Sill.

By Lieutenant Colonel Patrick M. Antonietti and Captain Donald K. Brooks

* Always meet the five requirements for accurate predicted fire.
* For every operation:
  -- Use troop-leading procedures (TLPs)--they work.
  -- Conduct thorough pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections
     (PCC/PC/s).
  -- Rehearse and conduct after-action reviews (AARs).
  -- Assess risks; think safety.
* Know actions-on-contact battle drills and plan for contact to happen.
  -- Be proficient with your assigned weapon and ammunition.
  -- Know how to render first aid to an injured comrade or civilian and
     call in a 9-line medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).
* The military decision-making process (MDMP) works; know and use it.
* Do physical training (PT) three to four times a week.
* Always have a battle buddy.
* Take pride in everything you do as a Soldier.
* Remember ethics in a combat zone; treat others with dignity and
  respect.

Soldier's Rules for Task Force 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery (TF
1-41 FA), 3rd Infantry Division, for Operation Iraqi Freedom III