A dent that counts: how do Republicans win black and Hispanic votes? Well, first you have to ask ...

WHILE Ken Mehlman and Karl Rove raided suburbs and exurbs for unregistered Republicans, a small group of non-party irregulars laid siege to the Democratic citadel: the minority precincts Al Gore carried by huge majorities in 2000.

This year, conservative 527s spent roughly $3 million to run 30,000 broadcast spots courting voters via Spanish-language and black media. On November 3, I reported the results of these efforts to Dan Perrin, executive director of the Republican Leadership Coalition. "Kerry outpolled Bush 84-16 among blacks in Ohio, and 86-13 in Florida," I told him. "And he outpolled Bush 56-44 among Hispanics in New Mexico."

"That's fantastic!" Dan exclaimed. "Let's get out a press release right away!" So it went in the wacky world of Republican minority politics. Bad news was our stock in trade. In 2000, Democrats had taken 90 percent of the African-American vote to the Republicans' 9, and the Hispanic vote went for the Democrats 64-35. Many consultants considered an electoral assault against these bastions of liberal loyalty a waste of time and resources.

In 2004, the good news for Republicans was not that the GOP had won minority support (clearly, it hadn't)--but that it was winning marginal increases. Nationwide, exit polls showed Bush's vote share increasing 2 percent among blacks and 9 percent among Hispanics. In crucial swing states, where conservative 527s waged vigorous campaigns on behalf of the GOP, the president fared better still.

In Ohio, Bush attracted 16 percent of the black vote, up from 9 percent in 2000. That increase represented, according to Congress Daily's Keith Koffler, "... a potentially devastating amount for Kerry. Extrapolating from the exit poll, this would amount to about 50,000 new votes for Bush. If these had gone to Kerry, Bush's 136,000 vote Ohio victory margin would have looked more like 36,000, and we would all be watching Court TV to see who won the election."

In 2000, Bush's meager 7 percent vote share among black Floridians nearly cost him the presidency. He bettered that in 2004, polling 13 percent against John Kerry. The president's performance among Latino Floridians also improved, from 49 percent to 56 percent. The GOP's improved showing among these two groups accounted for roughly 240,000 of the 381,000 votes by which the president carried Florida--63 percent of his total margin.

In New Mexico, one of two blue states that switched to red this year, Hispanics constitute 42 percent of the population, and 25 percent of the electorate. Bush's vote share among New Mexico Hispanics improved from 32 percent in 2000 to 44 percent in 2004. This generated a net Republican gain of 23,000 votes--far more than the 8,000 by which the president carried the state. In Colorado and Nevada, the president's Hispanic vote share increased by 5 and 6 points respectively, thwarting Kerry's best chances for a red-state takeover in the West.

I had a hand in designing the minority broadcast programs that helped generate these shifts--first as political director of the Republican Leadership Coalition, and later as president of America's PAC. My first principle was: Ignore Republican consultants! In 2000, the GOP had woefully mismanaged its appeals to black and Hispanic voters. George W. Bush was the most minority-friendly candidate Republicans had nominated since Abraham Lincoln. He had showcased his concern for minority problems throughout his governorship, both by the appointments he had made and the policies he'd pursued. And he had won unusually high vote shares among black and Hispanic Texans.

But in 2000, none of that history was communicated through the media that mattered. Democratic ads on minority stations accused Bush and the Republicans of intimidating minority voters, of promoting hate crimes, and of incarcerating minority youth en masse. GOP consultants seemed frozen in place. Unwilling to expend the emotional or financial capital to counterattack in the relevant venues, Republicans neither refuted racially charged allegations nor promoted a positive conservative agenda.

By absenting ourselves from minority media, we Republicans gave the Democrats carte blanche to paint us as they chose. And they chose to paint us as bigots. In 2002, pollster Kellyanne Conway measured the consequences. Black voters did not associate the GOP with any of its traditional issues: "Republican" meant bigotry, plain and simple.

Adding irony to angst, GOP platform issues polled well with minorities. Millions of blacks supported traditional marriage and school choice. Millions of Hispanics were pro-life and anti-tax. In fact, there was hardly an issue in the Republican arsenal that did not receive higher approval from minorities than the party itself did. But this gap between minority patterns of thinking and voting mattered not a whit unless conservatives mustered the will to politicize it. I resolved to present the whole Republican platform to minority audiences in minority venues. Our 527s would attack the Democrats as aggressively as theirs attacked us. If I paid scant attention to what Republicans said, I paid respectful heed to what Democrats did. Their entire coalition courted minorities, appealing to them across a full range of issues by dramatizing a broad left-wing worldview.

This year, 527s running GOP issue ads presented a comparable conservative worldview, in the same minority-media venues. We campaigned on social issues. The Republican 527s ran ads criticizing the Democrats for promoting gay rights instead of traditional marriage. They savaged Democrats for promoting abortion, which kills 400,000 black babies each year, and which two-thirds of Hispanics oppose.

"You mustn't run these ads," we were told. "Minorities are not moral sexually."

We trumpeted tax issues. Our ads praised the president's family-friendly tax cuts, and assaulted the Democrats for opposing them.

"Minorities want government programs, not tax cuts," our consultant friends told us.

We highlighted investor issues. Herman Cain of America's PAC explained how the current Social Security system discriminates against African Americans demographically, and how private accounts could help minorities accumulate capital for retirement.

"Minorities don't have financial assets," we were told.

We addressed national security. Why, our commercials asked, were Democrats attacking the millions of African-American and Hispanic servicemen who protected our nation from cold-blooded savages committed to killing us?

"Blacks and Hispanics hate the war," intoned the consultants.

We aggressively championed school choice, excoriating black Democratic leaders for practicing it themselves while denying their peers the same option.

"Vouchers are no longer popular among minorities," the pollsters advised.

Early polling presaged our Election Day success. The Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies surveyed 850 African Americans between September 15 and October 10, 2004. Its report, "Politics and the 2004 Election," summarized a conservative shift in black politics. From October 2000 to October 2004, the percentage of African Americans who self-identified as Republicans increased from 4 percent to 10 percent. The percentage of blacks with household incomes of $60,000 or greater who supported Bush increased from 7.7 percent to 22.4 percent. The percentage of self-described black Christian conservatives planning to vote for Bush rose from 11 percent to 36 percent.

To laborers in this vineyard, these changes were dramatic--but understandable. Among non-black, non-Hispanic demographic subgroups, higher levels of religious observance correlated with higher levels of Republican allegiance. And why not? It was Republicans, not Democrats, who promoted the role of religion in the public square. Among non-black, non-Hispanic demographic subgroups, rising income correlated with higher levels of Republican allegiance. And why not? It was the Republicans, not the Democrats, who resisted tax progressivity, and who sheltered income for savings and investment.

The theory of minority exceptionalism posited that the historical experience of minorities was dramatically removed from the mainstream--so much so that even as they assimilated into normative trends of income, residency, occupation, and religiosity, their political behavior would remain apart, responding to culture rather than class. And as late as 2000, that theory seemed credible, at least to GOP consultants.

But in 2004, "minority exceptionalism" crumpled under the concerted assault of conservative 527s. The election proved that if Republicans communicated mainstream conservative views in black and Hispanic media venues, they could win substantial victories against liberal dominance in these communities.

If the Republican party is courageous enough to follow through on the seminal work of these fellow-traveling 527s, it can reclaim its natural constituents across racial and ethnic divides. So constituted, the conservative coalition of 2004 can do more than win. It can govern--boldly.

Mr. Nadler is executive director of America's Majority, a not-for-profit dedicated to building the demographic base of the conservative movement.