A critical look at PPBS: the unfunded priority list. (Logistics Today).

The Air Force resource allocation process operates within the framework of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.

Prelude to Crisis

The Chinese use two brush strokes to write the word crisis. One brush stroke stands for danger, the other for opportunity. In a crisis, be aware of the danger--but recognize the opportunity.

Richard M. Nixon

PPBS 

The Air Force resource allocation process, to include the unfunded priority list (UPL), operates within the framework of the PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, and BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS). To appreciate the UPL process, one must first understand how the UPL fits into the overall PPBS.

The PPBS produces:

... a plan, a program, and a 2-year budget for the Department of Defense (DoD) with the ultimate objective of furnishing the combatant commanders with the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable to meet the current and future threat within fiscal constraints. (5)

The PPBS sprang from Secretary Robert S. McNamara's Defense Department in 1961 and remains surprisingly effective and resilient for its age.

Prior to the PPBS, there was no integrated central process within DoD for systematically consolidating, reviewing, and analyzing service programs. Formal review at the level of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) usually took place during annual budget reviews. The exercise of management through the appropriation structure required by Congress made it difficult to relate budgets to military missions. To overcome this deficiency, Secretary McNamara established the PPBS. (6)

An integral part of the national planning system, the PPBS consists of three discrete phases that work together to acquire and allocate defense resources: planning, programming and budgeting.

Given the reduced defense spending the department has witnessed over the last 8 years, the President's Budget (PB) Request has been consistently insufficient to address all Air Force funding requirements. (7) Each programming cycle, the shortfall is first realized as the major commands (MAJCOM) work to develop their program objective memorandum (POM) inputs. Each MAJCOM is provided a starting budget allocation-planning figure (bogey), which lately has fallen well below the individual MAJCOM requirements. (8) Those requirements that fall below the available MAJCOM funding allotments are forwarded to the Air Staff with the MAJCOM POM inputs as unfunded requirements. The most significant unfunded requirements are documented in the integrated POM at Force Tab P. At the end of the budgeting process, Tab P is reviewed, and its entries are typically grouped into the following four categories: people, infrastructure, readiness, and modernization. Each of the corresponding lists is then prioritized. (9) The Air Force corporate process then reviews the individual unfunded lists and uses them to develop a single, integrated top-20 list. This integrated top-20 list--along with the four prioritized, segregated lists accompanying it--is then forwarded to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force for review and approval. Once approved, the Chief forwards the unfunded requirements to Congress. This product has come to be known as the Chiefs UPL. (10)

Not Enough Food for the Nest

Most people would succeed in small things if they were not troubled with great ambitions.

Henry Wadsworth Longfellow

There is a euphemism among those who work within the Air Staff resource allocation process that the, "Air Force has never met a requirement it didn't like." (11) Responses to this expression are mixed. Some laugh at it, while others find no humor in it whatsoever. The fact remains that the Air Force's requirements continue to outpace its funding year after year. In such a fiscally constrained budget environment, it is inevitable that tough decisions have to be made, and resources for certain funded activities must be reduced or reapportioned to pay for critical emerging requirements. At issue, however, is the reduction and reapportionment of resources belonging to funded programs to pay for new UPL initiatives that have not been properly programmed and budgeted.

Czelusniak and Rodgers define program instability as:

...the reallocation of funding to other near-term priorities external to a program. These kinds of repeated funding excisions ultimately lead to sizable program cost growth. This growth contributes no added value whatsoever to the system being developed or produced. (12)

This article focuses on the instability funded modernization programs experience as a result of unfunded requirements associated with UPL projects.

According to the Air Force PPBS Training Program Reference Book released in 2000, the UPL is defined as follows:

The UPL is a corporately approved list of unfunded programs within a focus area chosen annually by the Chief of Staff. These programs are designated to receive funding should additional money become available. Prior areas of focus have included modernization, readiness, people, and quality of life. Programs included on the list are those that are completely unfunded. Programs that are underfunded or otherwise impaired are not candidates for the UPL. (13)

Actual performance data indicate not all UPL entries meet this standard. For example, of the 20 initiatives submitted as modernization projects in the FY00 UPL, 7 requested funding to accelerate existing programs or fix those that were impaired. (14) What is more disturbing than the fact the Air Force is not abiding by its own criteria for UPL project consideration is that the definition identifies ideal candidates for UPL consideration as ones that are completely unfunded (not those that are underfunded or otherwise impaired). If followed explicitly, this criterion would be a recipe for program instability.

Overlapping Budget Cycles

The nature of the PPBS is overlapping budget cycles. That is, before a budget for a specific year is approved by Congress and signed into law by the President, the Services are already well down the road to developing the next year's budget (Figure 1). (15) For example, while the FY01 budget is on the Hill being sorted out by Congress, the Services are building the FY02 budget. Continuing with this example, the FY01 budget was forwarded to Congress in early February 2000. The FY01 UPL was forwarded to Congress 8 February 2000. The final decisions concerning which, if any, FY01 Air Force UPL items would be funded were not made until the FY01 Appropriations Conference was completed in September 2000. At that time, the FY02 Budget Estimate Submission (BES) was being submitted for OSD/Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review. In very real terms, this means that for completely unfunded new start programs the Air Force placed on the FY01 UPL (specifically those for which the Air Force did not initially program FY02 funding), by the time the FY01 Appropriations Conference reported out, it was virtually too late for the Air Force to add continuation funding to these programs as a part of the FY02 budget. Therefore, some programs received FY01 congressional plus-up funding to begin work in FY01 but did not have continuation funding budgeted for their second year. In such a case, there are basically three ways to continue these new efforts in their second year:

1. Source the shortfalls out of other funded modernization programs.

2. Depend on Congress to again provide additional funding in FY02 even though the program no longer meets the UPL definition.

3. Stretch the FY01 plus-up funding for these new starts into FY02 (if possible) to keep the programs alive.

Solutions 1 and 3 are inefficient uses of resources, while solution two adds significant schedule risk to programs and raises questions about the ability to meet full funding contract requirements. In each case, modernization programs are subject to actual or potential instabilities.

Analysis Part I: Defining Moments

One who is confused in purpose cannot respond to his enemy

Meng

How big is this UPL challenge? As mentioned earlier, this article focuses on Air Force UPL activity from FY99 through FY01. More specifically, it focuses on the modernization inputs for those years. But what are these so-called modernization projects? The PPBS Reference Guide defines modernization as follows: "Provides the force structure new systems and upgrades to existing systems." (16) Simply put, modernization projects that show up on the UPL are new systems the Air Force is looking to purchase (developmental or commercial off-the-shelf products) and modification or upgrades to existing fielded systems.

Key Terminology

The reader will encounter terms like multiyear project, new start, or multiyear new start. For the purposes of this article, multiyear projects are those modernization efforts that take more than 1 fiscal year to complete. Therefore, funding requirements for multiyear projects span 2 or more years. New starts are those projects that have not been funded previously and no work has begun on the effort due to the lack of available funding. Tying these two concepts together, a multiyear new start project is one that was not started previously or funded and one that will take more than a year to complete once funding is received and work begins on the effort.

Funding Instability

Having defined a few important terms, it is important to next identify the components of funding instability most salient to this research, which is concerned primarily with the two forms of funding instability referred to as somatic and acute. Specific UPL projects that contribute to these forms of funding instability are identified later with specific focus on multiyear new start projects that receive congressional plus-up funding to begin work but are not supported with continuation funding by the Air Force. When this occurs, a continuation or completion bill for these projects is created in the outyears. As a result, the potential is great that other approved and funded programs in the Air Force modernization account will be forced to source some or part of the continuation of these disconnected multiyear new start projects. This continuation or completion bill is referred to as somatic instability (instability that becomes ingrained within the body of the resource allocation process as a result of the ki ckoff of these completely unfunded multiyear new start projects). There are also occasions when the Air Force receives congressional plus-ups for a multiyear new start only to find that, after staffing the effort, there are unplanned and unexpected program costs that exceed the available plus-up funding. The Air Force is then forced to source these areas of cost growth from existing modernization accounts. This research refers to this form of instability as acute (instability resulting from the sudden need to source areas of costs that were not planned but could have been predicted). There is an element of acute instability, of course, resulting from cost that just could not have been foreseen under any circumstances. Instability caused by that type of cost growth is just a fact of life. The only way to really plan for it is to budget some level of management reserve for unknowns. These forms of instability represent the challenge addressed in this article.

The B-2-Specific UPL

In addition to the official Air Force UPLs for FY99-0l, there were other venues through which the Air Force identified its unfunded requirements. In FY99-0l, the Air Force provided Congress with B-2-specific unfunded requirements. Additionally, in FY01, the Air Force forwarded to Congress a supplemental UPL. It is not unreasonable to expect other unofficial exchanges of information that resulted in Air Force unfunded requirements being provided to Congress (for example, congressional inquiries from professional staff members for specific programs). None of these exchanges of information approached the constancy and codification of the official Air Force UPL and B-2 priority list. In fact, to ensure Congress continues to receive the B-2 priorities, the FY01 Authorization Conference Report (Section 131) added the following annual reporting requirement.

By 1 March, SECDEF to submit annual report to Congress on B-2 aircraft identifying and assessing: (1) adequacy of average MC [mission capable] rate; (2) adequacy of technical capabilities; (3) planned development of technologies to enhance B-2; (4) additional capabilities that would enhance B-2 capability and survivability; and (5) a fiscal program for technologies identified in #3 & #4. (17)

Analysis Part II: The Scavenging Predators

They leave us so to the way we took,

As two in whom they were proved mistaken,

That we sit sometimes in the wayside nook,

With mischievous, vagrant, seraphic look,

And try if we cannot feel forsaken.

Robert Frost

According to Czelusniak and Rodgers,

... in comparison to estimates at Milestone II, major weapon systems have experienced about 25-percent cost growth at program completion .... It has been estimated that as much as half of the cost growth in major weapon systems is due to nothing more than funding instability (reallocation of funding to other near-term priorities external to a program). These kinds of repeated funding excisions ultimately lead to sizable program cost growth. This growth contributes no added value whatsoever to the system being developed/produced. (18)

Czelusniak and Rodgers go further,

One analysis estimated the Department of Defense loses about $5B per year in investment program content due to cost growth. In real terms, this represents the value of material we were unable to acquire for our warfighters. (19)

Resource Allocation Fratricide 

Even funded modernization programs generate instability bills. As DoD endeavors to develop and field cutting-edge technologies, it is an inescapable fact the risks that come with pursuing these capabilities can, at times, generate program cost growth. That is the cost of doing this type of business. What this article concerns itself with are the instances when the Air Force knowingly pursues courses of action that will inevitably drive unfunded instability bills for the modernization account. It is the budgetary equivalent to the concept of fratricide spoken of in warfighting operations. For those unfamiliar with this term, fratricide occurs when the Air Force--through planning, lack of planning, actions, or inactions--inadvertently destroys or neutralizes its own resources with friendly fire. In understanding the nature of the instability caused by inefficient execution of the UPL, it helps to visualize it in terms of resource allocation fratricide (Figure 2). As completely unfunded new start efforts are int roduced through the UPL process, they bring with them somatic and/or acute instability bills. As these bills are sourced from existing modernization programs, there is increased program instability across the modernization account. Through this process, the Air Force, in essence, calls in strikes on its own position.

Air Force UPL (FY99)

The official Air Force FY99 UPL contained 14 entries requesting an additional $2.6B. (20) Of the 14 entries, only 2 were modernization initiatives. Neither entry was a multiyear new start project and, therefore, does not fit the criteria for examination. (21)

B-2 UPL (FY99)

There were several congressional inquiry responses, testimony and hearing question responses, and briefings that helped Congress identify B-2 FY99 unfunded priorities. (22) To that end, there was no single FY99 B-2 UPL. However, when the dust settled, the list of unfunded priorities for the B-2 consisted of five unclassified projects considered for this article. Of those five, three were multiyear new starts, and only one of those received congressional plus-up funding (B-2 deployable shelters). (23) The shelter program received $13.7M to begin this effort, carrying with it a completion funding tail of $25.9M across the FYDP (somatic funding instability). (24) The Air Force has yet to fund any of the completion bill for this effort, leaving it in a risky position. If the program does not receive additional plus-up funding from Congress or the Air Force, it will have to choose from three options:

1. Kill the program (wasting a sizable congressional investment).

2. Take resources from other funded programs to continue the effort.

3. Reduce the requirement for shelters. (25)

Whatever is decided, the fielding of any shelters carries with it an operations and maintenance (O&M) support tail that could be as much as $400K per year (FY02-07). (26) Without congressional add funding, the Air Force will have to source this shortfall from other approved programs. Figure 3 shows how big the potential shelters instability will be if the program does not receive additional congressional funding and the Air Force does not reduce shelter quantities.

Air Force UPL (FY00)

The official Air Force FY00 UPL contained 42 entries requesting $2.59B beyond the PB request. (28) Of the 42 entries, 20 were modernization initiatives. Of those, only two were multiyear new starts receiving plus-up funding from Congress. (29) The two projects were B-52 radar upgrades and a B-2 Link 16. Congress added $9M to B-52 radar upgrades, which accelerated the start of the Situational Awareness Defensive Improvement (SADI) program from FY03 to FY00. (30) While this program was not a completely unfunded, multiyear new start (one criterion for consideration here), it was so disconnected financially in the outyears that it was worth including. The addition of the FY00 funds by Congress forced the Air Force to close the funding gap that existed in FY01 and FY02, while fixing some of the disconnects in FY03-04. (31) The congressional add in FY00, therefore, drove an Air Force bill of $61.9M from FY 01-04, which was taken from other approved Air Force programs. (32)

The Link 16 Center Instrument Display (CD) program, the second of the two Air Force FY00 UPL projects addressed in this article, received a congressional plus-up of $36M to begin work. (33) At the time of the FY00 PB, the potential completion bill for this effort was estimated at $154M across the FYDP (somatic funding instability). (34) The program has since been combined with the in-flight replanner (IFR) program, further increasing the estimate for completion. (35) In keeping with the trend in B-2 plus-up programs, the Air Force has yet to fund the completion of this effort, forcing it to live year to year on congressional adds.

B-2 UPL (FY00)

Through what has become a very interesting push/pull dynamic between Congress and the Air Force concerning B-2 unfunded priorities, the Air Force provided Congress a B-2-specific UPL in FY00. It was promulgated through a series of briefings to Defense Committee professional staff members. (36) There were two unclassified efforts on the list, Link 16 CID and Enhanced Guided Bomb Unit 28 (EGBU-28) integration. Both were multiyear new starts. (37) EGBU 28 received a $16.8M plus-up to start in FY00. The program initiation brought with it a potential completion funding tail of $20.9M spread across FY01 and FY02 (somatic funding instability). (38) The Air Force has yet to fund the completion of this program. Additionally, weapon interface challenges and risk reduction requirements generated $20M in acute funding instability bills in FY00-02. (39) The Air Force has sourced $2M and $3M of this bill, respectively, from other modernization programs in FY00 and FY01. (40) These instability bills equate to deferred or lo st combat capability or program content for other modernization activities.

Before moving on to discussions of the FY01 UPLs, it is worthwhile to talk briefly about the B-2 IFR program, which has been combined with Link 16 CID. It is unique as a multiyear new start program also begun with congressional plus-up funds. However, it was not identified through the official Air Force or B-2 UPL. The prime contractor for the B-2, Northrop-Grumman, has historically forwarded its own UPL to Congress each year. It is believed Northrop's list contained the IFR and other efforts. (41) Details are sketchy as to what the completion funding bill was for IFR at the time it received its initial plus-up. Now that it has been combined with Link 16 CD, it is all but impossible to break it out. The program was started in FY00 with a $20M plus-up from Congress and was again supported in FY01 with another congressional add ($11M). (42) Given that the Air Force has not provided completion funding for this program, if Congress does not continue to support it each year with plus-ups, the Air Force will have to terminate it prior to realizing the capability. The other option is to source its completion bill out of hide (somatic instability). Figure 4 identifies the size of the actual or potential instability bills associated with FY00 UPLs.

Air Force UPL (FY01)

The Air Force FY01 UPL contained 62 entries requesting an additional $3.51B beyond the PB submission. Of those, 37 were modernization projects, of which only 3 were congressionally supported, multiyear new starts. The three were Extended Range Cruise Missile (ERCM), Fixed-Target Miniaturized Munitions Capability (MMC), and Bearing Only Launch (BOL)* countermeasures. (44) Of interest is the fact the Air Force simultaneously funded the completion (or start, if required) of the ERCM and MMC programs in the FY02 budget before knowing definitely if Congress would support the respective UPL requests for these programs. (45) This deliberate planning eliminated the potential and actual somatic funding instability that typically comes with starting multiyear new starts initiated without the means to continue or complete them. While this funding strategy avoided somatic instability, it could not prevent the occurrence of an acute funding bill associated with MMC. The MMC shortfall was a result of Congress providing $5M less than the amount identified by the Air Force to start the program. The program plans to address the shortfall through internal Air Force reprogramming. (46) By definition, the reprogramming of these funds will contribute to modernization program instability.

The F-15 BOL infrared (IR), chaff-and-flare dispenser program was started in FY01 with a congressional plus-up of $34.5M. Of this, $7.6M funds integration of the system on the F-15 A-E models, while $26.9M procures hardware capability for Air National Guard F-15A/ B aircraft only. While the Air Force identified a completion tail of $100.6M across the FYDP, this is not a bill that will necessarily be realized. (47) If it is not funded, it will mean the active Air Force F-15 C/D/E models will not receive the BOL hardware capability. (48) This is not a must pay bill. While this modernization upgrade strategy used to procure BOL avoids somatic funding instability, it does not protect the Air Force from acute funding instability bills. Most likely due to the lack of time available to develop complete program estimates and lack of information at the time the program was costed out for UPL candidate submission, the program failed to plan for the cost associated with procuring expendables (to meet full funding requir ements), higher integration contract costs, trainer and simulator updates, tactics development, and updates to the Air Force Mission Support System. (49) These oversights have generated at least $4.2M in acute program cost growth for FY01-02. (50) In all fairness to the F-15 system program office (SPO), the cost estimates developed to support the BOL entry on the UPL were developed in a hurried fashion, initially to address a telephone inquiry from a congressional staff member. When estimates are put together in such a high-pressure, rapidly moving environment, it is difficult to adequately plan for or foresee all aspects of costs associated with a new effort.

B-2 UPL (FY01)

In March 2000, the FY01 B-2-specific plus-up priorities were submitted to Congress. The list included Link 16 CID/IFR, EGBU-28 integration, extra high-frequency (EHF) risk reduction, and fixed-target MMC. (51) To achieve unity of effort, the B-2 list was consistent with the Air Force UPL, with the exception of IFR. (52) Additionally, the Air Force worked closely with Northrop-Grumman to ensure they did not approach the Hill with differing priorities. (53) With the exception of MMC, each of the programs identified on the B-2 list were either not supported by Congress (EHF) or started with plus-ups in previous years. They, therefore, are not considered new starts for FY01, eliminating them from analysis for that year. MMC's contribution to FY01-based funding instability was discussed. Figure 5 identifies the size of the actual and potential instability bills associated with FY01 UPLs.

Findings: Seek Eagle

God brings men into deep waters, not to drown them but to cleanse them.

--Aughery

Why has the Air Force chosen to continue allowing Congress to fund B-2 modernization with annual plus-ups? Why does the Air Force place multiyear plus-up programs on its UPL and not lay in funding for program continuation/completion? Why does the Air Force have no method for specifically tracking (through direct links) how one program's somatic and/or acute funding instability impacts other funded modernization programs? While these and other questions could not be answered, there are some interesting findings worth noting.

Unfunded Requirements

Two separate Service Chiefs have spoken to Air University audiences recently about a procurement bathtub or what some might call a procurement holiday. One of the Chiefs spoke of a 10-year period following the Vietnam War during which the DoD's infrastructure and equipment were not properly maintained or replaced (procurement holiday). As a result, the infrastructure and equipment fell into disrepair. At the end of the 10-year spending drought, there was a huge deficit in infrastructure and modernization. This became known as the procurement bathtub or capabilities bathtub. According to one speaker, the Air Force is still trying to overcome that spending deficit today. (55) The Air Force has attempted, through the annual PB request and UPL, to abate these readiness and infrastructure deficits, with the ultimate objective being to reverse them. This must be done while continuing to make the right investments to modernize the force. (56) To that end, the UPL has shown itself to be an extremely valuable tool for highlighting significant unmet needs to Congress.

Quantifying the Challenge

This article has highlighted how certain UPL multiyear new start projects have contributed to acute and/or somatic funding instability within the modernization account. It has also identified the definition of preferred UPL candidates (completely unfunded efforts), which, if followed exactly, would create significant completion funding bills for the Air Force. If the research were to end its discussions on those points, it would be easy for those unfamiliar with the Air Force resource allocation process to assume the existence of a really big problem. The truth is, research did not bear that out. In fact, what was clear from the research is that, across the years examined (FY9901), the Air Force annual UPL request has increased steadily from roughly $2.6B to $3.51B. (57) Similarly, each successive year's UPL grew in the number of projects included. However, interestingly enough, the occurrences of congressionally approved multiyear modernization new starts did not grow at the same pace. The amount of funding requested through the official Air Force UPL stayed roughly the same from FY99 ($2.68) to FY00 ($2.59B). The large increase occurred from FY00 ($2.59B) to FY01 ($3.51B), roughly a 36-percent increase. (58) The number of total items submitted on the official Air Force UPL grew steadily from 14 in FY99, to 42 in FY00, to 62 in FY01. (59) This represented a 200-percent increase from FY99 to FY00 and a 48-percent increase from FY00 to FY01. The number of congressionally approved, multiyear modernization new starts on the official Air Force UPL was zero in FY99, two in FY00, and three in FY01. (60) When examined from this perspective, one can see the problem is not significant or by any means pervasive.

A look at the B-2-specific UPL reflects a net decrease in items identified and funding requested, albeit not steady. In FY99 the B-2 UPL requested $217.5M. In FY00, it requested $61.3M (a 255-percent decrease from the previous year). In FY01, the B-2 UPL requested $108M (a 76-percent increase from the previous year, down 101 percent from FY99). (61) An examination of the number of projects identified by year similarly points to a net decrease. As the numbers descended, they fluctuated from six in FY99 to three in FY00 and back up to four in FY01. The amounts requested for the 8-2 represented only 8, 2, and 3 percent, respectively, of the total Air Force UPL requests for FY99, FY00, and FY01. (62) When placed in this context, one can see, once again, that, while the greater likelihood is the 8-2 list will generate out year bills, actual total numbers of requests and dollars requested is just a small piece of the Air Force's UPL pie. To fully understand the magnitude of the challenge, it is important to examine the causal factors for the two components of funding instability (somatic and acute). The logical question is, what causes these two very different forms of instability?

Causal Factors (Somatic Funding Instability)

Starting multiyear projects before continuation or completion funding can be proactively identified as the primary cause of somatic funding instability. This form of reactive resource allocation undermines the deliberate planning and prioritization that takes place within the MAJCOM POM development and Air Force corporate process, budget formulation.

Causal Factors (Acute Funding Instability)

Again, acute funding instability occurs during the management of a program when a need suddenly arises to source an unplanned area of cost that could have been anticipated. Of course, there are instances when acute costs arise that just could not have been foreseen under any circumstances. To be fair, it should be mentioned that acute funding instability is not unique to multiyear new start UPL projects. It can occur within fully phased, planned, and programmed modernization programs. It seems the component of acute funding instability that can be anticipated is caused more often than not by two factors: incomplete, rushed, or abbreviated phasing of programs and the lack of review of UPL submissions by trained analysts. The UPL projects are not typically fully phased, planned, and programmed when submitted. The funding identified for these projects is most often generated as a rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimates by Air Force program offices or the developing defense contractor. (63)

Managing Congressionally Funded Multiyear New Starts

B-2 instability bills have been termed potential bills because the B-2 program office has taken steps to build in cost-avoidance off ramps for the Air Force should its UPL projects not receive continuation funding. This prevents the occurrences of must pay completion bills for the Air Force. (64)

More in-depth research has revealed the B-2 SPO has done well to adapt to a very uncertain modernization-funding environment. To characterize their challenge, 10 of 18 upgrades (not including low-cost modification projects) presently under way were initiated with congressional plus-ups. Of those ten started with congressional adds, only three have funded completion tails. (65) To that end, the SPOs have been very careful to ensure the existence of off ramps in their multiyear plus-up projects in the event Congress and/or the Air Force does not fund the next year's continuation requirement. The projects can be terminated without the Air Force's owing major termination liability payments to the contractor or completing the entire development initiative, while also allowing the Air Force to receive a deliverable (end product). That deliverable usually takes the form of a study report. (66) This form of contingency program management is a logical evolutionary step given the uncertainty that comes with depending o n incremental annual congressional plus-ups to complete programs. While this form of program management is clearly an attempt to mitigate risk, it is inherently risky. Even programs managed in this way to avoid large somatic instability bills (completion funding tails) at times still contribute to funding instability in the Air Force modernization accounts. Take for example the B-2 satellite communications (SATCOM) and alternate high-frequency materials (AHFM) programs. Both were multiyear new starts that began in FY98 with congressional plus-up funding. (28) Both have been managed similar to the process cited above and experienced tremendous acute cost growth. These areas of cost growth were caused by optimistic cost estimation, contractor rate increases, and a failure to anticipate integration difficulties with other necessary developmental items (for example, SATCOM radio). (67) While efforts have been made to mitigate risk, obtain additional plus-up funding from Congress, and live within available funding , there has been cost growth in both these projects (FY20 and FY01), requiring the 8-2 program to dip into its baseline program to fund a portion of the growth. One recent example of acute funding instability identified during this research showed the SATCOM program to be responsible for the migration of $.074M (FY00) and $1.697M (FY01) from the B-2 baseline account into this plus-up project. The AHFM program was responsible for migration of $1.767M from the B-2's baseline account into this plus-up project during the same time period. (68) While the B-2 SPO should be applauded for attempts to manage its plus-up projects in this uncertain environment, it goes without saying it is less than fiscally responsible and extremely inefficient for the Air Force to manage a program this way. In the case of the Link 16 CTD/IFR program, the Air Force actually has waited as late as possible each fiscal year to obligate congressional plus-up (continuation funds) with the hope of finding out if Congress and/or the Air Force will fund the next year's continuation requirement. This adds risk to program schedules while inefficiently stretching out the program's completion. (69) If Congress fails to continue to provide incremental funding, the Air Force will have to terminate the program. Termination of the program would mean the Air Force would not realize the Link 16 CID/IFR capabilities. In addition to not obtaining the needed capability, it is easy to see how some might view the startup and subsequent termination of the program as a waste of significant congressional investments (FY00-$88.7M and FY01-$11M) just to obtain a study report and/or some building-block technology that can be applied to follow-on programs (EHF). (70)

Why does the Air Force continue to depend on Congress to incrementally fund the completion of B-2 UPL projects given the risks? No definitive answer surfaced during research. There have been those, who wish to remain anonymous, who have speculated the Air Force takes this approach as a shrewd means to pursue and protect as many of its investments as possible in what has been a very lean and constrained budget environment. Since Air Force requirements significantly exceed available funding, it funds those things it must do and, at the same time, identifies unfunded requirements for those initiatives it knows Congress will not allow to go unfunded because of their importance to their supporters. In that purely hypothetical scenario, the Air Force stands a greater chance of obtaining funds for things submitted not only in its approved PB submission but also on its UPL. This discussion of congressional involvement leads us to relations with Congress.

Relations with Congress

Many Air Force development and modernization programs, to include UPL initiatives, have strong lobbies. These lobbyists work hard to encourage Congress to support their respective programs with plus-up funding. The peculiar relationship between these lobbyistS and inherent congressional interests (potential to provide jobs and revenue for congressional districts) creates an interesting dynamic that impacts the funding of UPL projects. It was mentioned that Northrop-Grumman, in years past, forwarded its own B-2-specific UPL to Congress with the hope of obtaining additional funding for the program. Similar lobbying also occurred with the BOL IR program, the joint standoff weapon (JSOW) program, the sensor-fused weapon program, and a host of others. It is the nature in Washington that defense contractors often use lobbyists in attempts to obtain additional funding for programs, even if these programs are not priorities for the Services. While not specifically covered in this article, it is important to highlight this dynamic here so the reader might know there are other sources (not just the Air Force or B-2 UPLs) that contribute to somatic and acute funding instability within the Air Force modernization account.

Best Employment of the UPL

Earlier, this article identified and explained the overlapping nature of the budget cycle. It pointed out it is all but impossible for the Air Force to take a serial approach to deciding if resources should be invested to continue a UPL program currently under consideration by Congress. By the time Congress makes a final decision on whether a UPL project will be funded (August/September), the Air Force budget has already been submitted to OSD as the BES. At that point, it becomes extremely difficult to make changes to the working budget to account for congressional decisions on the previous year's budget being appropriated concurrently. For completely unfunded UPL initiatives, this means Congress could fund the program start, while the next year's requirement for that program remains unfunded by the Air Force. This, of course, is a recipe for funding instability. It has been said Air Force programmers are told to specifically disallow programs that might drive out-year bills from competing for UPL funding. In an attempt to find official guidance supporting this rumored gatekeeping rule, the author contacted the Air Force Directorate of Programs. It was not possible to find official operating instructions used by programmers to develop the UPL. The existence of this gatekeeping rule of engagement could not be substantiated. Thus, assuming the Air Force will continue to allow completely unfunded, multiyear new starts to compete for UPL funding, the best approach to pursuing them is through a simultaneous effort. When the Air Force places a program on the UPL and simultaneously lays in funding in the next year's budget, that will either allow the program to continue (assuming UPL funding is received) or start (assuming no UPL funding is received) the following year. This approach allows the Air Force to avoid situations where programs are initiated with congressional plus-up funding but do not have funding in successive years for completion. While this does not eliminate the possibility for acute instability, which occurs in both UPL and also planned/programmed Air Force modernization programs, it does all but eliminate the occurrence of somatic funding instability (instability caused by the need to source unfunded completion funding tails).

Completely unfunded UPL projects do not go through the normal process of being planned and programmed through the Air Force POM and resource allocation processes. Therefore, these efforts can be initiated through congressional plus-up funding before adequate tradeoff decisions can be made as to what capabilities will be discontinued to pursue the new UPL initiative. The difference or distinction between starting a program through MAJCOM POMs and starting a completely unfunded program through the UPL is that the POM initiative is done proactively, taking into consideration requirements tradeoffs and funding solutions. Completely unfunded programs started through the UPL tend to be unexpected additions or windfalls to the great requirements table. Once Congress funds their initiation, these UPL initiatives place the Air Force in the reactive position of attempting to determine what must go unfunded to keep the new UPL project alive. In a constrained budget environment, this can force the Air Force into making p remature requirements tradeoff decisions in a sequence of events that may or may not involve all the right agents and stakeholders.

One of the primary causes of acute funding instability is UPL programs do not generate budget-level, cost-and-schedule data, and these projects do not receive the normal review and scrutiny by Air Force budget analysts and program element monitors or OSD comptroller personnel. If simultaneous budgeting occurs (submit first year's funding requirement through UPL while simultaneously funding the program in the next year's budget formulation process), the program has the benefit of the budget data formulation and review processes. This goes a long way toward reducing significantly acute funding instability. In addition to reducing the occurrence of funding instability, simultaneous budgeting also signals to Congress the Air Force commitment to the UPL initiative. Typically, professional staff members for the defense committees forward the Air Force clarifying questions about UPL programs. One of these is, "How much additional funding would be required by the Department of the Air Force to complete the project, either in subsequent fiscal years or to satisfy the fiscal year XXXX (budget year), such as in-house Department of the Air Force costs?" (71) Another is, "Is funding for this project included in the current FYDP? If so, provide the current FYDP quantity and funding profile and provide the best estimate of what the revised FYDP quantity and funding profile would be if the proposal were implemented" (72) These questions point to the fact that Congress is interested in the amount of continuation funding required to completely finish unfunded, multiyear new start projects and the Air Force is willing to commit to addressing the associated outyear bills.

Conclusion: Recover Talon

To every man, there comes in his lifetime that special moment when he is figuratively tapped on the shoulder and offered that chance to do a very special thing, unique to him and his talents. What a tragedy if that moment finds him unprepared or unqualified for that work.

--Winston Churchill

Context

The Bush administration is pursuing a significant federal income tax reduction plan. Further, this administration's defense agenda includes national missile defense, theater missile defense, modernization and bolstering of the bomber force, and a substantial increase in nomenclature security. All this comes at a time when the Pentagon is heavily engaged in tactical air (TACAIR) modernization, pursuing the F/A-18, F-22, and joint strike fighter programs. In addition to TACAIR, the Pentagon has recognized the need to increase its military airlift capability through the purchase of more C-17s. These things are being pursued as the nature of warfare is changing. Over the last decade, society and the global community have become extremely casualty averse. Facilitated by the CNN Factor, there has been an increased demand for the military to utilize more precise, smart, and standoff weapons in order to minimize casualties on both sides. The Air Force's recent involvement in Operations Allied Force and Enduring Freed om provided some indication of the number of weapons that should be on hand to prosecute a sterile and standoff style of warfare. Future operations similar to these will require a significant investment in programs like ERCM and MMC. Even by conservative measures, it is not unreasonable to expect requirements will continue to outpace available resources for some time. This brings one full circle back to the notion the Air Force must continue to be vigilant in its efforts to efficiently allocate and execute its fiscal resources.

Correlation Challenges

This article examined potential and actual instability bills created by Air Force management of the UPL process. It has been impossible to isolate a specific cause-and-effect relationship between one program's instability bills and another's loss of content due to the nature of the Air Force's sourcing process. If a must pay bill is identified, it is distributed to each of the resource panels based on its individual share of the Air Force total obligating authority (TOA). For example, if the Global Attack Panel has been allocated 38 percent of the Air Force TOA for the budget cycle in question, it will be asked to source 38 percent of a must-pay bill that surfaces. Likewise, the Command and Control Panel will be asked to source 5 percent of the bill, given its allocation of TOA for the budget cycle is 5 percent. Within a particular resource panel, several programs may end up contributing to a sourcing drill. Adding to the sourcing drill fog is the fact most drills are typically designed to source several bill s at once. The multiplicity of sources and disconnected programs playing in the same sourcing drill make it difficult to trace one directly to another." For example, assume the following programs have must-pay bills and will be the beneficiaries of a sourcing drill: SATCOM terminals (need $15M), F-22 (need $4M), airborne laser (need $20M), and Joint Direct (need $3M). The following programs are identified as sources by their respective resource panels: F-15 radars ($12M), F-16 600- gallon tanks ($20M), JSOW ($1.5M), Joint Stars ($1.5M), KC-135 modifications ($3M), and common avionics equipment ($3M). From the example, it can be seen that all the sources go into one big sourcing pot and the dollars are mingled together. The disconnected programs draw from this pot to meet their needs. As a result, the impacts of sourced programs' losing their funds (and they typically are negative impacts) cannot be traced to one specific receiving program's need. Therefore, it is next to impossible for Air Force leadership to know definitively that the SATCOM terminals program was fixed at the expense of 12 JSOW missiles. Some might argue that if the leadership were to make a macrorequirements analysis of funding tradeoff decisions the ability to tie a gain in capability directly to a sacrificial loss in another might change sourcing decisions.

So What?

Given the vague nature of sourcing, it was impossible to identify specifically which programs lost what content as a result of somatic and acute instability bills identified. However, to put a face on the effects of instability, actual impact statements were obtained from programs being considered for sources in sourcing drills over the last few years. This will give a better idea how the projected instability bills could affect funded Air Force programs

As can be seen in Table 1, the loss of as little as to a program can result in significant operational impacts. In some instances, like with the WCMD example, the reduction in resources can break established contract minimums, which carry with them hefty penalties. Therefore, sourcing $1.5M out of WCMD may only mean an immediate loss of 60 weapons. In the long run, losing those 60 weapons drops the Air Force WCMD quantity commitment below a negotiated contract amount, further forcing the Air Force to renegotiate the contract in a sole source environment. During the renegotiations, the Air Force can expect to see unit costs for WCMD increase by as much as 15 percent. Given a fixed investment in the program, the Air Force would lose significant quantities of WCMD across the FYDP due to cost increases. But how can this UPL-induced instability be addressed?

Suggested Solutions

Addressing the UPL instability challenge could be accomplished through a three-step process: definition change and discipline in candidate selection, review of candidates by UPL program-phasing working group, and MAJCOM demonstration of commitment to candidates. The Air Force definition of the UPL and its criteria for UPL candidacy do not match actual performance data. According to the current definition, completely unfunded programs may be considered but not those underfunded or otherwise impaired." In practice, the Air Force places accelerations and impaired programs on its UPL, in addition to those that are completely unfunded. The problem exists when completely unfunded programs are placed on the UPL and the Air Force does not endeavor to fund their completion tails. It is important to first change the criteria definition to reflect practice. Further, the Air Staff must let the MAJCOMs know only those completely unfunded projects that will be given funded status in the following year's MAJCOM POM submissi on will be considered for candidacy. The other option is for only those completely unfunded projects without funding tails to be allowed to compete for congressional plus-up funding through the UPL. In either case, discipline must be added to the candidate selection process and specific written instructions provided to those Air Force planners and programmers overseeing the process.

It is evident that UPL projects do not get the same level of scrutiny and review as fully phased programs examined by the Air Force, OSD, and OMB through the PPBS process. This is invariably true. To mitigate this shortfall, it is proposed that resource panels and/or a multidisciplined, integrated product team (working-level participants from Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisition and Financial Management and Comptroller; Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff Plans and Programs, Installations and Logistics, and Plans and Operations; and the Program Executive Office) review UPL candidate programs that make the pre-final list. The integrated product team should troubleshoot each candidate's funding stream and cost-estimate rationales for commonly overlooked areas of cost. For example, does the estimate capture initial and replenishment spares requirements, or does it consider requirements to procure technical data, training, and/or other operations and support? A more robust level of scrutiny, through the use of tools as simple as standard questionnaires and checklists, has the potential to reduce acute funding instability.

Finally, it is proposed that the MAJCOMs demonstrate their commitment to UPL items. The responsible MAJCOM should indicate, as it submits unfunded multiyear programs with its POMs, the ones it is willing to commit to funding during the next budget cycle (barring some unforeseen catastrophe). Those items should be placed in the Air Staff POM's Force Tab P and ultimately be considered as candidates for that cycle's UPL. Under this scenario, if Congress does appropriate plus-up funds for a UPL item, continuation funds will be available in the next year and across the FYDP. If Congress does not support the effort with plus-up funds, the program will start the following year with the initial MAJCOM investment. Realistically, it is understood this solution is offered in an oversimplified fashion. Anyone who has worked with POMs and MAJCOM initial unfunded priorities knows it is a complicated process. As MAJCOM POMs are received and considered by the Air Staff, it is not uncommon for must-pay bills to surface at th e corporate level. These bills often displace MAJCOM-funded efforts, further complicating the process. It is acknowledged and should be understood that no solution offered here would be a panacea. However, this would be a step in the right direction to reducing the occurrence of somatic funding instability.

The Last Word

What follows is the ending to the fictional F-15 shootdown story, which has been presented to help the reader visualize the potential operational impacts of inefficiently managing the UPL. While the F-15 story is a work of fiction, it represents an operational crisis that could actually occur. During the FY02 budget formulation, the F-15 Band 1.5 program was considered as a source for a significant POM bill. Of course, it is impossible to know with certainty which Air Force must-pay bill was driving the sourcing requirement; however, it is not hard to imagine a scenario where a multiyear plus-up program with an unfunded completion tail could have driven the need. In any event, the real-life Band 1.5 sourcing drill was looking to reduce overall procurement quantities and push a significant portion of the system's early fielding units to the right. As a result of the sourcing, 48 Band 1.5 systems scheduled to deliver in FY02-04 were to be delayed until FY05-07, and 35 Band 1.5 systems scheduled to deliver FY01- 04 were actually to be eliminated by the drill. (76) The bottom line is 83 aircraft that were to have the system installed by FY05 were going to have to wait, in some cases, indefinitely. Ultimately, Band 1.5 was not used as a source and did not lose the funding. It did, however, lose $10.875M (three systems) during the 2002 BES, and ACC is considering terminating the program completely with the FY03 budget to address higher priority must-pay bills. These are the realities of working within the Air Force Resource Allocation Process during very lean budget years. To that end, the Air Force must be a good steward of its resources to ensure it has maximum warfighting capability.

[Figure 3 omitted]

[Figure 4 omitted]

[Figure 5 omitted]

Table 1

Instability Impact Statements (74)

Source Program            Amount ($M)

F-15 Programmable         9.5 (FY01)
Armament Control Set


F-15 Joint Helmet         5.5 (FY01)
Mounted Cueing System



Wind Corrected Munitions  1.5 (FY00)
Dispenser (WCMD)







F-16 SCU-6                3.7 (FY02), 12.0
                          (FY03), 13.0 (FY04),
                          10.0 (FY05)








Source Program            Impact

F-15 Programmable         Delays production contract award 1 year.
Armament Control Set      Delays smart weapon-delivery capability
                          from FY02 to FY03.

F-15 Joint Helmet         Delays production contract award 1 year.
Mounted Cueing System     Delays fielding of first-look/first-shot
                          advantage in the within visual range
                          air-to-air combat arena.

Wind Corrected Munitions  Will cause an initial loss of approximately
Dispenser (WCMD)          60 tail kits in FY00. Breaks negotiated price
                          commitment curve with contractor. Will
                          force the Air Force to renegotiate WCMD
                          contract in a sole-source environment.
                          Expect unit cost to increase by at
                          least 15 percent. Will result in loss of
                          quantities across the FYDP (amount TBD).

F-16 SCU-6                SCU-6 operational flight program (OFP) tape
                          allows the F-16 Block 25-32 aircraft to
                          employ JSOW, Air Intercept Missile-9X;
                          updates the radar and radar warning receiver;
                          and provides targeting pod improvements. Loss
                          of funds delays the standoff capability
                          afforded to the Pre-Block 40 fleet with the
                          JSOW weapon and follow-on OFP tape by 2
                          years, increasing exposure of aircrews to
                          enemy air defenses.

Notes

(1.) Gen Michael E. Ryan. letter to Congressman Floyd D. Spence, Department of the Air Force, 20 Oct 99, 1.

(2.) Ibid.

(3.) Air University, Nonattribution, AY2001.

(4.) Ibid.

(5.) Capt Stephen H. Ries, USN, Retired, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, Norfolk: National Defense University Joint Forces Staff College, 2000, 2-7.

(6.) Funds Management Department, "The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Process: Program Manager Fact Sheets 2.1," May 96. Reprinted in National Planning Systems and Joint Campaign Planning, Vol 6, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 32.

(12.) Daniel Czelusniak and Phillip Rodgers, "The Kaminski Initiative," Program Manager, Sep-Oct 97, 60.

(13.) Science Applications International Corporation, Headquarters, USAF Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System Training Program Reference Book, Air Force Directorate of Programs, 2000, 10-8.

(14.) Air Force Fiscal Year 1999 Unfunded Priority List, Modernization List, Department of the Air Force, 16 Mar 98, 3-4.

(15.) Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System Training Program Reference Book, 2-11.

(16.) Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System Training Program Reference Book, 1-2.

(17.) Authorization Conference, HR 5408/H Report 106-945, Section 131.

(18.) Czelusniak and Rodgers, 60.

(19.) Ibid.

(20.) Air Force Fiscal Year 1999 Unfunded Priority List, FY 1999 Budget Score Card, Department of the Air Force, 23 Oct 98.

(21.) Ibid.

(22.) Lt Col Darrell Holcomb, FY98 B-2 Procurement Funding Strategy Briefing, SAF/AQPB, 26 Feb 98; SECDEF William Cohen, congressional inquiry response to Congressmen Norm Dicks, Jerry Lewis, Ike Skelton, and Duncan Hunter, OSD, Apr 98; SAF/FML, Air Force congressional inquiry response to Steve Nixon, Department of the Air Force, 19 Feb 98; SAF/FML, Air Force response to Question for the Record HC-04-017, FY99 Air Force Acquisition Program Hearing to the House Appropriations Committee's National Security Subcommittee, Department of the Air Force, Apr 98; SAF/LLW, Air Force congressional inquiry response to Brian Green, Department of the Air Force, Jun 98; SAF/LLW, Air Force congressional inquiry response to Madelyn Creedon, Department of the Air Force, Jul 98; and SAF/FML, e-mail documenting telephone inquiry from Steve Nixon, Department of the Air Force, 22 Sep 98.

(23.) Congressional inquiry response to Madelyn Creedon.

(24.) Maj Scott Neumann and Maj Joe Viereckl, B-2 Modernization Briefing, SAF/AQPB, 6 Oct 00, 15.

(25.) Telephone interview with Sheila Maguire, 5 Feb 01, and Neumann and Viereckl, 15.

(26.) Neumann and Viereckl, 15.

(27.) Ibid.

(28.) Modernization List, Mar 99.

(29.) Ibid.

(30.) Interview with Maj John Bernier, AF/ XORC, 19 Jan 01.

(31.) Interchange meeting with Maj Kevin McGlaughlin, AF/XPPC, 9 Feb 01.

(32.) AF/XPPC, RAPIDS Tracking Chart (SADI), FY01 POM Cycle, Reprinted 9 Feb 01.

(33.) OSD(C), Program Decision Memorandum #1, FY02 Budget Estimate Submission Cycle, Nov 00.

(34.) Neumann and Viereckl, 15, and Modernization List, Mar 99, 3.

(35.) Maguire and Neumann and Viereckl.

(36.) Ibid.

(37.) Lt Col Rudy Blazicko, Lt Col Scott Land, and Maj Mike Ward, B-2 FY00 Plus-Up Priorities, SAF/AQPB, Apr 99, 2, and Maj Scott Neumann, B-2 FY99/00 Plus-Up Priorities Briefing to Madelyn Creedon, Senate Armed Services Committee SAF/AQPB, 11 Jun 00, 9.

(38.) Ibid.

(39.) Interchange meeting with Maj Scott Neumann and Maj Joseph Viereckl, SAF! AQPB, 9 Feb 01.

(40.) Maguire.

(41.) Interchange meeting with Maj Scott Neumann and Maj Joseph Viereckl.

(42.) Neumann and Viereckl.

(43.) Interchange meeting with Maj Kevin McGlaughlin: AF/XPPC, SADI Master TP, 14 Nov 00; AF/XPPC, RAPIDS Tracking Chart (SADI); Neumann and Viereckl; and telephone interview with Lt Col Mark Foster, B-2 SPO, 12 Feb 01.

(44.) Modernization List, 8 Feb 00, 7.

(45.) Ibid.

(46.) Neumann and Viereckl, 10.

(47.) Modernization List, 8 Feb 00, 7.

(48.) Ibid.

(49.) Telephone interviews with Tom Diamanti, F-15 SPO, 31 Jan 01, and Bob Fritschie, F-15 SPO, 31 Jan 01.

(50.) Telephone interview with Bob Fritschie, 27 Feb 01.

(51.) Maj Mike Ward, Staff Summary Sheet Package, B-2 FY01 Plus Up Priorities, SAF/AQPB, 9 Mar 00, Tab 1.

(52.) Ibid.

(53.) Interchange meeting with Maj Scott Neumann and Maj Joseph Viereckl.

(54.) Telephone interviews with Tom Diamanti and Bob Fritschie; Telephone interview with Bob Fritschie, 27 Feb 01; and Neumann and Viereckl, 10.

(55.) Air University, Nonattribution, AYOl.

(56.) Ryan and AF/XPPE, Air Force Unfunded Requirements Growth Briefing, Department of the Air Force, 2000, 10-11.

(57.) Modernization List, 16 Mar 98; Mar 99, and 8 Feb 00.

(58.) Ibid.

(59.) Ibid.

(60.) Ibid.

(61.) Holcomb; Cohen; Air Force response to Question for the Record HC-04-017; Air Force congressional inquiry response to Brian Green; Air Force congressional inquiry response to Madelyn Creedon; email documenting telephone inquiry from Steve Nixon; Blazicko, Land, and Ward, 2; Maj Scott Neumann briefing to Madelyn Creedon; Ward, Staff Summary Sheet Package: and Neumann and Viereckl.

(62.) Modernization List, 8 Feb 00; Holcomb; Blazicko, Land, and Ward, 2; Ward, Staff Summary Sheet Package; and Neumann and Viereckl.

(63.) Foster and Diamanti and Fritschie.

(64.) Foster and interchange meeting Maj Scott Neumann and Maj Joseph Viereckl.

(65.) Maj Joseph Viereckl, Point Paper on B-2 Modernization, SAF/AQPB, 11 Oct 00, 1.

(66.) Interchange meeting with Maj Scott Neumann and Maj Joseph Viereckl.

(67.) Foster, interchange meeting with Maj Scott Neumann and Maj Joseph Viereckl, and Maguire.

(68.) Maguire.

(69.) Interchange meeting with Maj Scott Neumann and Maj Joseph Viereckl.

(70.) OSD(C), PBD 161, Air Force Aircraft, Department of Defense, 14 Dec 00, 8, and SAF/FMB, PBD 161 Reclama, Air Force Aircraft, Department of the Air Force, Dec 00, 4-5.

(71.) House Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Information Paper, Department of the Air Force, Spring 2000, Question 5a.

(72.) Department of Defense Information Paper, Questions 4a and 4b,

(73.) Interchange meeting with Michael Dante, SAF/AQXR, 9 Feb 01.

(74.) Maj Clarence Johnson, FY00 Sourcing Drill--Target Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser Procurement, SAF/AQPB, 1999; Maj Bill Ellis, FY01 Sourcing Drill-- Target F-15 Procurement, SAF/AQPB, Feb 01; and Lt Col Lou Spina, FY02 Sourcing Drill--Target F-16 Research and Development, SAF/AQPB, Nov 00.

(75.) Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System Training Program Reference Book, 10-8.

(76.) Ellis.

RELATED ARTICLE: Figure 3. FY99 Projected Instability Bill (27)

* FY00 requirement funded by Congress.

* FY03 & FY047 procurement requirement ($8.6M & $6.8M) may go to zero if FY01 Milestone III decision reduces total shelters quantity.

* FY02-07 O&M support cost must be sourced regardless of shelters quantities.

* Current bill for 12 shelters - $400K year

* EGBU-28 includes actual cost growth for weapon compatibility of $10M FY00/01 & $10M FY00-02 for schedule risk reduction plus FY02 unfunded research, development, testing, and evaluation tail

* Link 16 CID/IFR includes FY02-07 unfunded tail (current as of 6 Oct 00); assumes the Air Force will opt to find resources to complete the program if Congress does not

* B-52 SADI includes resources the Air Force added to support plus-up to accelerate the program (FY01-04); does not include funds added by OSD PDM 

Figure 4. FY00 Projected and Actual Instability Bill (43)

* F-15 BOL does not include out-year funding to procure. hardware for F-15C/D/E (not a must-pay bill); includes conservative cost to modify simulators, procure one load of flares, and unexpected contract cost.

* B-2 MMC includes $5M FY01 bill.

Figure 5. FY01 Projected and Actual Instability Bill (54)

Prelude to Crisis: 1500 Hours

As the four-ship of F-15E Strike Eagles prepared to leave from Kuwait to do its duty for Operation Southern Watch, Major Jeff Gatson could scarcely believe he was back flying again. Just 4 months ago, he was an action officer (AO) for Strike Eagle requirements and funding at Air Combat Command's (ACC) Langley AFB, Virginia. Like most operators, Jeff loathed staff work. As an AO, he was responsible for developing requirements for his aircraft and ensuring budget inputs reflected the warfighter's needs. For his entire tour at Langley, Jeff felt the extreme weight of the job pressing heavily upon him. He knew his buddies out in the field flying were counting on him not to get caught up in all the BS and red tape common to headquarters, rather, to make sure the Strike Eagle's true requirements were well-represented. Jeff did his best. He won a few but lost a great many more. It was the nature of the budgeting and requirements game. All in all, he was glad to be looking at all that bean counting and politics throu gh his rearview mirror. An Air Force Weapons School graduate and instructor, Jeff had excelled in the cockpit and was destined to be a squadron commander. For now, he was just happy to be back flying. Today's mission was fairly routine. His four-ship was to patrol the skies of southern Iraq to ensure Sadaam Hussein complied with the United Nation's no-fly restriction. All the Strike Eagle crews scheduled to fly knew their air package would take them into hostile territory, but they didn't expect to see any action today. The climate in Southwest Asia (SWA) had grown extremely tense over the last few months. Islamic extremists, believed to be affiliated with known terrorist Osama Bin Laden, had been very active on the Arabian Peninsula. It was clear--while US aid, deterrence, and commerce were welcomed by the Gulf States--there were many who despised the American presence on the peninsula. After the bombing of the USS Cole, the State Department had been closely watching developments in the Middle East, cautioni ng American servicemen and citizens abroad to remain extremely alert. The recent incident involving the American Marine who smuggled the Bahraini princess out of the country also served to feed the extremist belief the American presence on the peninsula only brought decadence and immoral influences to the Islamic communities in the region. As a result of the heightened tension, there had been an increasing number of threats against US installations and government facilities in SWA over the last few weeks, but Jeff thought to himself, "So what's new?" For the next 120 days, Jeff would be one of the many US pilots doing his part in support of Operation Southern Watch. Some experts on Middle Eastern affairs and intelligence analysts back home had warned both the Clinton and incoming Bush administrations, as well as the Defense Department, that the increased terrorist activities targeting the government had served to bolster Sadaam's rhetoric against the United States. Experts believed this, combined with the fru stration he was feeling from the multilateral economic sanctions, might embolden the Iraqi leader to either sponsor extremist groups known to use asymmetric weapons and tactics or possibly act out aggressively in a unilateral fashion against the United States.

Major Gaston, "Vapor" as he was called by other flyers, was crewed with a weapon system officer (WSO) named Richey Slade. Slade, like Jeff, had recently returned to flying after a staff tour at the Pentagon's Weapons Requirements shop. The two were old friends, having flown together at Seymour Johnson AFB, South Carolina, and attended the Weapons School together as captains. In fact, Jeff knew nearly everyone in the four-ship from previous tours of duty. At the point was Major Tom "Malibu" Browne with his WSO, Major Nate Jackson. In the other two Strike Eagles were Major Ron 'Toolman" Tinkham and his WSO, Major Bert Morales, and Major Mark "Griz" Grisham and his WSO, Major Jaime Rodriguez. Jeff knew Toolman, Griz, and Jaime from his Air Force Academy days. He knew Nate and Malibu from a tour at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. All were quick-witted and loved to joke, especially Tinkham and Browne. Jeff thought to himself as they prepared to taxi, "If I've got to be out here playing in this sandbox away from my family, at least I'm flying, and it's with some good dudes." Among the guys in the squadron, Jeff seemed to catch more than his share of grief. This was due mostly to many of the funding shortfalls and weapon system fielding delays the Strike Eagle experienced on Jeff's watch at Langley. This was a real sore point with Jeff. He just couldn't seem to get the guys to understand that 99 percent of the funding and requirements decision for the F-15 were made way above his pay grade. But Jeff really couldn't blame the guys. He, himself, was still trying to make sense of the Pentagon's PPBS and unfunded requirements process.

Shootdown: 1615 Hours

About an hour into the mission, the radar warning receivers in all four F-15s lit up. Apparently, a portion of Iraq's integrated air defense system (IADS) had been powered up, and someone on the ground was trying to draw a bead on the four-ship. The aircrews identified the immediate threat as surface-to-air missiles (SAM), surface-to-air missile 2s (SA-2), to be exact. The SA-2 was vintage Soviet SAM technology. The Iraqis learned during the Gulf War that, when they turned on their ground-radar systems, the US aircrews could home in on their positions and deliver munitions much easier. Therefore, when they had hostile intents, the Iraqi ground-based radar operators kept their systems turned off until they were ready to fire on coalition aircraft. Malibu was the first to break silence. "What the hell do those guys think they're doing down there?" The aircrews instinctively began to take evasive actions. While these SAMs were aging systems, the guys knew SA-2s could knock them out of the sky just as easily as t he more advanced SA-7s and SA-10s. As the F-15s began to climb to a safer altitude and radio the hostile activity to the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) in the area, Jeff heard a loud explosion and felt a jolt that shook the entire aircraft. At first, he thought a SAM had just missed their aircraft, but suddenly, his cockpit displays lit up. "Oh, crap, we're hit! Malibu, this is Vapor, we're hit. I'm having trouble controlling her. I think we sustained major damage to our right wing and the aft portion of the fuselage. Richey, how's it look back there?" There was no answer from Major Slade, Jeff didn't know it at the time but soon discovered Slade had been severely injured by the SAM strike and was unconscious. Jeff was surprised at how little time it had taken him to put on his game face. The airwaves were suddenly abuzz with aircrews trying to get a fix on the threat and provide assistance to Jeff. "Malibu, this is Vapor, I've got a dead stick...she's not responding. Oh, God, I think we're going to have to punch out." For all his joking on the ground, Browne (Malibu) was known for his calm demeanor under fire. However, the surprise of the ground-based attack even caught him off guard. Browne was frantic. "Vapor, you're on fire; get out...get out now!" The cockpit was awash with red lights and flashing indicators. Jeff knew there was precious little time left to get his crew out of the aircraft, and with Slade unconscious or possibly dead, it would be up to him to get them out. He instinctively tucked his arms and legs close in to avoid injury as the chair exploded up the rails during the ejection sequence. He prayed the ejection wouldn't further injure his backseater. It was now or never. Jeff reached for the ejection handle down by his thigh. He gave it a strong pull. The next thing he knew, he was looking up at his chute. As near as he could tell, he either passed out momentarily, or things were moving so fast he had been blown free of his cockpit before the event even registered with him. Jeff wa s disoriented. Later, he would recount feeling dazed and thinking odd thoughts as he hung under canopy. He even remembered thinking, "I wonder if my wife remembered to call the garbage service about missing last week's pickup." Jeff's first coherent thought was for his WSO. He looked around and could see a second chute off his 3 o'clock. From his vantage point, he could see Richey hanging lifeless by his parachute straps. Jeff desperately hoped he was okay. He wouldn't know until they hit the ground. About then, he started thinking about what would be waiting for them on the ground. Who was firing at them? Were these Iraqis at work or terrorists operating out of Iraq? The parachute ride lasted only about a minute and a half, but it seemed like an hour and a half. As he hung there, Jeff really started getting pissed off about some of the budget decisions that had been made concerning the Strike Eagle while he was at ACC. Due to must-pay bills identified by a startup UPL project, the F-15 had lost critical fund ing for the Strike Eagle's low-band jammer, known to aircrews as Band 1.5. Band 1.5, when fielded, would provide the Strike Eagle with low-band jamming protection against specific SAM threats. The loss of funding reduced the size of the early production lots and delayed the fielding of the system in any significant quantities by nearly 3-1/2 years. He couldn't help but think if they had been flying Band 1.5 today maybe they wouldn't be in this fix. For the first time, Jeff was realizing the true operational impacts of Air Staff bill-paying exercises. As he braced for the landing impact, he thought, "How on earth does stuff like this happen?"

Nesting Eagles: 1630 Hours

As Jeff hit the desert floor, he was startled back to reality. He was on the ground in Iraq with an injured crewmember. As he instinctively worked to free himself from his parachute harness and secure his ejection seat survival kit, the sound of small arms fire erupted nearby. Clearly in shock, Jeff wasn't sure who was shooting and if they had a fix on his position. His only thought was getting to Slade to see if he was okay. Looking around in the direction of the gunfire, he could hear cheers of victory in Arabic just over the hill from where he was. He had hoped the gunfire was just a victory celebration of the scoring of a kill against the US premier dual-role fighter. scanning the terrain for cover, he spotted his WSO lying face down on the desert floor, lifeless. Jeff knew he didn't have much time. Whatever their intent, whoever they were, the Arabs just over the hill would soon be mounting a search party to find the downed wreckage and any survivors. Doing his best to conceal his chute amongst some rock s, Jeff ran low and fast over to Slade. He was hurt bad but still breathing. Jeff would have to work fast. He first worked to free Slade from his chute and then to secure it so as not to give away their position. For the first time in his life, he felt his heart beating like a reckoning. Each beat represented a second. With every second that passed while his crew was on the ground, their chances of getting out safely diminished. Jeff tried to get control of his fear. It felt as if his heart would jump out of his chest. He was scared senseless, yet he had the presence of mind to know he needed to get it together. Was this what it felt like to be in ground combat? In a sick sort of way, the situation was kind of funny. Given the bravado he normally exhibited as an F-15 pilot flying one of the world's most lethal weapon systems, he was suddenly in a position of disadvantage and scared out of his mind. "We've got to evade until they can get in to pull us out," he thought. "But where could they hide in the middle of the desert?" In Jeff's line of work, it is better to be lucky than good. As he scanned the horizon, he spotted a rock outcropping about a mile from their location. This was unusual for southern Iraq. Northern Iraq tends to be more rocky and mountainous. Whatever the case, he was very happy to see that grouping of rocks. Then, suddenly, it hit him. Slade was unconscious, and he would have to carry him to safety. Jeff could do nothing but laugh to keep from crying as his elation for finding a place to hide quickly turned into anguish. A small guy himself, Jeff couldn't have picked a worse person to have to carry on his back in the middle of a hot desert. Slade was an ex-college football running back weighing in at about 220 pounds. The one thing Jeff did have going for him was his fitness. Working feverishly, he struggled to lift Slade's dead weight into the fireman's carrying position. His knees nearly buckled under the weight. Only able to carry Slade in about 100-yard intervals before having to stop for a breather, it took Jeff nearly half an hour to cover the distance to the rocks. It took him two more trips to collect the parachutes and their ejection-seat survival kits. Jeff knew the other guys in the formation saw them eject safely before the plane was engulfed in flames. He also knew fuel would soon be an issue for the other F-15s, which meant they were probably already on the net talking to the AWACS to either secure more fuel or call in some A-10 aircraft to locate their downed squadron mates. For this reason, he was confident there would be a search and rescue (SAR) effort mounted to extract them. He just didn't know how long it would take.

Taking Stock

Now that they were situated, Jeff took inventory of the resources he would be using. Through these mechanical actions, oddly enough, he experienced a calming effect. He quickly discovered he had a few things going for him. Jeff's survival pack was equipped with a radio. If it was operating okay, he knew it would serve as their lifeline to any search aircraft in the area. He also had a small measure of self-defense capability in the form of their 9-millimeter handguns and a little extra ammunition. They had only the small quantity of water and food that came standard with their survival packs, but he did have a signal mirror; flares; and most important, a signal strobe with an infrared lens cap. Jeff knew, with the approaching nightfall, the infrared strobe might be the difference between getting picked up before morning and getting captured. He thought, "When you're going through survival/evasion/resistance/escape (SERE) training, you never really think about having to use the stuff they teach you." For most guys, SERE training was like car insurance. You take it because you have to, but most of the time, you're counting on never needing it. Now, he would have to rack his brain to try and remember all the stuff he had learned. The thing that kept coming back to him was that he needed to never lose sight of his primary objective--getting out alive. That is, he would have to muster all his resources to help the SAR team locate them while, at the same time, remaining concealed from the bad guys. Slade didn't look well at all. He drifted in and out of consciousness, never really being able to put together any coherent statements. Jeff had no real medical training but recognized Slade had a compound fracture of his left leg and minor burns and lacerations on his face and neck. Jeff was gravely concerned Slade might have also sustained some internal injuries. Scared for the both of them, Jeff hoped the wait wouldn't be long, especially for Slade's sake. Once he had his buddy out of sight in a relatively safe place, he immediately went for his radio to make contact with any search aircraft in the area.

Seek and Find: 1745 Hours

As the shadows grew long on the desert floor, what had once been stifling heat was now becoming somewhat bearable. As near as Jeff could figure, he and Slade had been on the ground for a little over an hour, but it had seemed more like 8 hours. After securing their evasion camp, Jeff went to work. He pulled out his global positioning system (GPS) to get a fix on their location. Relaying their exact position using the GPS coordinates would be crucial to any rescue mission. The challenge would be to relay their position to the SAR team without revealing their location to the Iraqis, who would invariably be listening to nonsecure American voice communications. Ordinarily, this would be a huge obstacle to overcome; however, once again, fate smiled on Jeff and Slade. During their pre-mission briefs, US pilots are provided a coordinate to use as a frame of reference when communicating with their standard nonsecure radios on the open airwaves in the event of a shootdown. Known as SARDOT, aircrews use this coordinate to relay their ground position. They do this by transmitting their heading, direction, and distance relative to the SARDOT. Since any bad guys listening in did not know the coordinates of the SARDOT, even if they overheard the radio communications, they would not be able to pinpoint the downed aircrew. Jeff turned on his radio and was pleased to find it working. He thought, "God bless those life-support bubbas that keep our gear in good working condition. I'm buying them all drinks when I get back...if I get back." Jeff's attention then turned to dialing in the predesignated emergency frequency or freq as they liked to say. The first friendly voice Jeff heard was that of an A-10 pilot, Captain Mark Pruitt, call sign Sandy-13. Mark's wingman, in a second A-10, kept silent while he did the talking. Jeff authenticated Mark and then commenced to relay their position using the SARDOT. Captain Pruitt gave Jeff explicit instructions not to break radio silence again until he contacted Jeff and authenticated his iden tity. These directions would prove important to Jeff and Slade's remaining safely hidden from any hostiles in the area who might be listening in. Sandy-13 then relayed Jeff's coordinate information to the AWACS platform operating in the area. In the final analysis, the AWACS was crucial in providing key command and control information for the SAR effort. Within minutes, Jeff could hear the thunderous sound of A-10s in the distance. When they got within 2 miles of Jeff's coordinates, Sandy-13 worked closely with him to covertly pinpoint his exact location. This allowed the A-10 to confirm Jeff's position without giving it away to the enemy. As the A-10s made their pass, they looked for ground and air threats. What they saw as they popped over a nearby hill would make them glad they had stuck to standard rescue-and-recovery protocols. The situation was graver than they had imagined. There was a ground radar site about a mile south of Jeff's evasion base. Approximately 2 miles to the southwest, there were heavil y armed ground forces parked at a refueling station. The A-10 drivers immediately recognized the small convoy as an Iraqi search team. They, undoubtedly, were looking for the downed aircrew. The A-10 pilots knew the stakes had just been raised for the SAR mission. This would be far from a permissive extraction environment. The A-10s left the area to contact the AWACS with their latest reconnaissance information. With the SAR team at least an hour away at this point, they didn't want to loiter in the area and risk giving away Jeff and Slade's position. They did, however, need to remain close enough to keep an eye on the nearby Iraqi ground element in case they managed to locate the downed Americans. In the event of that occurring, the A-10s would lay down strafing fire to defend Jeff's position. The SAR team would have to work fast to get the guys out before the Iraqis found them. Even though the radio was now silent, just knowing the A-10s were close by gave Jeff a mild sense of comfort. While they waited, Je ff did his best to keep his WSO hydrated. When Slade drifted into consciousness, he would force him to drink a few sips of water. His WSO was in a bad way and needed medical attention in a hurry. Jeff had hoped they would be rescued quickly but was prepared to settle in and wait it out. He recognized that, since they were shot down in southern Iraq, any SAR mission would be mounted out of Al Jabbar by the Air Force Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) unit there. Jeff knew those guys were good at what they did, and if anyone could get them out, they could.

Near Miss: 1830 hours

During the radio silence, Jeff worked hard to conceal their position. With the limited brush available, he covered their hiding place in the cleft of the rocks. As he was repositioning their camouflage, he heard what sounded like a truck engine. It was a jeep, and it was close. For the first time, he could see the enemy, and they were Iraqis. The two men in the jeep were close enough that Jeff could hear them speaking in Arabic. The jeep was a scout, and it was heading in the direction of the downed F-15. Jeff could see smoke rising from the lifeless hulk that once was his chariot. The wreckage was about 2 miles north of their position. Jeff knew this was serious. Once the Iraqis got to the wreckage, it wouldn't take long for them to notice the canopy and ejection seats were missing. It would then be an all-out race to find the downed aircrew. Sandy-13 and his wingman were keeping a close eye on the lone jeep. It had stopped within a quarter mile of the Americans' hiding place. The Sandies prepared to take ou t the jeep, but as they did, the jeep moved on toward the F-15 wreckage, oblivious to the fact that their ultimate objective had actually been within spitting distance of them. The Sandies rolled off their target realizing it was just a coincidental near miss. When the sun was going down, the area within a 5-mile radius of Jeff's location was abuzz with activity. The Sandies were doing their best to conspicuously keep a close eye on the Iraqi ground movement in the vicinity. Captain Pruitt would later recount how utterly amazed he was at how poor a job the Iraqis did at locating the downed Americans. They seemed to be looking everywhere but in the obvious location of the rock outcropping that had become Jeff and Slade's sanctuary. That was okay with Pruitt. As long as the Iraqis stayed away from Jeff and his WSO, the Sandies would not have to take any direct action against them. It would soon be dark. Darkness would work for the downed aircrew by providing additional concealment, but it would also complicate the rescue mission. With darkness bearing down on Jeff and Slade about the same rate at which the SAR team was approaching, night vision technology would be crucial to the success of the mission. Recognizing that darkness would be their enemy, the Iraqis pulled out the stops and mounted an all-out search for the downed American pilots. Vehicles appeared to be moving in every direction, combing the desert floor for Jeff and Slade. Who would find them first, the SAR team or the Iraqi patrol?

Recover Talon: 1845 hours

The SAR element was about 20 miles from Jeff's evasion site. They were now in radio contact with the Sandies who had been watching over the F-15 crew like a mother eagle over her nested fledglings. It was important that the A-10s and SAR team coordinate their movements carefully. It would be a tragedy for them to get this close to rescuing the downed crewmembers, only to have them killed or captured by the Iraqis. With all the hostile activity in the area, there would be no room for error. The SAR element consisted of two HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters and two A-10s flying escort. Inside each Pave Hawk, there were two pilots, a flight engineer, a gunner, and three elite pararescue jumpers known as PJs. The PJs were as tough as they come. Each had extensive medical training but was also trained in special forces assault tactics. They were angels of mercy for downed or injured American aircrews but were likewise capable of serving up hellish firepower against anyone who got in their way on the ground. Everyone wh o has ever been around PJs knows their reputation for fearless rescue and survival tactics. The SAR element represented Jeff and Slade's best hope for extraction. The men in the choppers were deadly serious about their jobs. Everyone had on his game face and had come ready to play. They knew that American lives were depending on them to flawlessly execute their skills. The lead chopper, Hawk-43, was flown by Major Charles "Chuckie" Reynolds, and his copilot, Erick "Jinks' Jenkins. They would be the extraction team. The second Pave Hawk (Hawk-52), flown by Major Northan "South Golden and Captain Rich "Doughboy' Dougherty would hover in a patrol orbit about a mile away. This served two purposes. It held a second chopper in reserve to extract the downed aircrew should the primary chopper go down and also to create an element of deception, which prevented Iraqi ground elements from knowing for certain which chopper was hovering over the extraction site. The plan was for Sandy-i3 to help guide Hawk-43 in to Jeff's location. Once Hawk-43 was within 5 miles of the extraction site, Sandy-13 was to contact Jeff and direct him to put his infrared cap over his handheld strobe and use it to guide the chopper in. Using night vision goggles, Majors Speight and Jenkins in Hawk-43 would be able to spot the strobe from several miles out. The escort A-10s and F-16C/Js in the area would then move in to put metal on the nearby Iraqi radar site, while Sandy-13 and his wingman provided suppression fire against Iraqi ground vehicles and troops that threatened the rescue. Hawk-43 would approach from the south, flare just before landing, and set down about 150 feet from the rocks that were hiding Jeff and Slade. The flight engineer and gunner would man the chopper guns to provide cover for the PJs as they moved in to positively identify the aircrew and help them get aboard the chopper. Once airborne with their packages, Hawk-43 would radio the AWACS to indicate it was heading home. Both sets of A-10s would meet up with the choppers and f ly escort for them. As Hawk-43 picked up Jeff's strobe, it was time to execute.

As they approached the extraction site, two Iraqi armored personnel carriers (APC) and two jeeps approached from the west. Initially, it looked as though they might overrun Jeff's position. Sandy-i3 and his wingman moved in and strafed the small convoy, taking out the lead vehicle. The APCs stopped, and five well-armed Iraqi soldiers dispersed from each. They were making their way on foot toward the rock outcropping where Jeff and Slade were hiding. Jeff could hear the A-10s lighting up the vehicles, but he could also hear small arms fire on the ground. He knew this meant trouble. Hawk-43 approached with its GAU-2 minigun lighting up the night sky. They knew they had to stop the advance of the Iraqi ground forces before they overran the downed aircrew. Hawk-43 placed itself between the advancing Iraqis and their objective, laying down suppression fire. The PJs fast-roped the remaining distance out of the left side of the chopper. Once on the ground, the three PJs got busy. Two began to lay down cover fire wh ile the third made his way to Jeff to authenticate his identify and begin prepping Slade for extraction. As the third PJ approached Jeff, Jeff knew he was a friendly. So as not to make any aggressive actions before he could be positively identified, Jeff raised his hands over his head and turned his back with his identification card in one hand. This allowed the PJ to approach and quickly identify Jeff. The other two PJs were catching hell. Severely outgunned, as near as they could tell, there were only six Iraqis still alive and shooting at them. With no real cover to conceal them, the PJs were desperately counting on Hawk-43 guns to pin down and suppress the Iraqis. This worked for awhile, but eventually, the Pave Hawk would need to set down to pick up the F-15 crew. After laying down a burst of machinegun fire, Hawk-43 sat down between the two PJs and the rocks. Fortunately, Hawk-43's gunner was still in a good position to lay down cover fire. Using their night vision goggles and laser sights, the two PJs continued to pick off the advancing Iraqis. Only four Iraqi soldiers remained, but the A-10s could see that other vehicles and troops in the area were making their way to the firefight. Sandy-13 and his wingman began strafing the approaching vehicles to buy Hawk-43 more time. It was amazing that, with all the shooting and threats in the area, not a single American had been killed. Slade was now ready to be moved. The flight engineer moved out of the chopper to assist the third PJ with the litter to carry out Slade. Major Speight knew they had been on the ground much longer than planned. Hawk-43 had taken several rounds during the firefight but was still able to fly. Once Jeff and Slade were safely on board, the two remaining PJs were signaled to get back on board. As they scurried toward the chopper, now hovering a couple of feet off the desert floor, Hawk-43's gunner was dealing some serious heat at the Iraqis. It was just enough cover to allow the PJs time to scurry to the safety of the chopper. Once the te am was on board, Major Speight lost no time getting his team free of what was becoming an extremely hot spot. Sandy-13 and his wingman moved into escort position as Hawk-43 radioed the AWACS they were headed home heavy with two additional packages. That was the signal for Hawk-53 and the remaining Sandies to head for Al Jabbar. The mission, dubbed Operation Talon Recovery, was a complete success. To the credit of the heroic PJs, they quickly transitioned from fighting soldiers to medics and were thankfully able to stabilize Slade long enough to get him into surgery at Al Jabbar to stop his internal bleeding. Jeff sat in the back of the HH-60 and became overwhelmed as he looked around at the faces of the men who had risked their lives to pull him out. Tears began to stream down his face as he watched the PJs work on his WSO. Jeff couldn't remember a time he had been more proud to be an American in the profession of arms.

Major Johnson is a requirements planner at the Joint Chiefs of Staff At the time of the writing of this article, he was a student at the Air Command and Staff College.