A contest of contrasts: the principle of dislocation and the artillery fight at the Battle of Chancellorsville. (The Civil War).

I doubt if the history of modern armies can exhibit a parallel instance of such palpable crippling of a great arm of the service in the very presence of a powerful enemy, to over come whom would require every energy of all arms under the most favorable circumstances.

Brigadier General Henry Hunt, Artillery Chief

US Army of the Potomac 1863

A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 1861-65

It has been said that war is the interaction of opposites. For every action, there is a reaction. For every move, there's a counter move. In 1998, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Leonhard, Infantry, wrote the polemic The Principles of War for the Information Age. In it, he argues that the nine principles of war the Army has inculcated since the 1920s should be altered to better address the technological realities of the 21st century. His most striking principle, "Advantage" (which expands the concept of Maneuver), is coupled with the sub-principle of "dislocation." (1)

According to Leonhard, "dislocation is the art of rendering the enemy's strength irrelevant." Through dislocation, the friendly force temporarily sets aside the enemy's advantages (in numbers, positioning, technology, etc.) and causes those strengths to be unrelated to the outcome of the conflict.

Throughout the history of war, armies have used various means--technology, organization and, very often, maneuver--to dislocate the enemy's strength. Once the enemy's strength was set aside, the friendly force was free to attack through the enemy's weakness to bring about defeat. Dislocation is the theoretical foundation for obtaining advantage in combat. In other words, it sets the stage to ensure the conditions for victory. (2)

One of the best examples of dislocation occurred on May 3, 1863, the day after "Stonewall" Jackson infamously smashed the Federal right at Chancellorsville. It was on this day, the day that I argue was the decisive day of the battle, when Confederate Colonel E. Porter Alexander, commander of the Southern artillery on the Confederate left, totally collapsed the Federal line in a rare textbook action--enfilade fire (a form of dislocation). As such, it was perhaps the best tactical use of artillery in the entire war. It was also a day in which the potentially overwhelming Federal artillery failed due to inadequate organizational tables and an inefficient support system.

Organization for Combat. When Major General "Fighting Joe" Hooker took command of the US Army of the Potomac in January 1863, he stripped Brigadier General Henry Hunt, the army's nominal chief of artillery since mid-1862, of what little authority he had. For example, Hooker "transferred the military command of the artillery to his own headquarters, to be resumed by the chief of artillery only under specific orders and for special occasions." (3) This wasn't bad, as the maneuver commander should have a measure of control, but some room should have been left to allow for the experience and advice of the artillery chief.

For task organization, Hooker chose to sprinkle his precious artillery assets throughout the various infantry corps. Each corps commander, usually an infantryman from the old army, determined how to use his artillery.

Under Hooker's model, Hunt was relegated to simply being the commanding general's artillery advisor. He was still in charge of the respectable artillery reserve of 12 batteries, but the reserve could only be dispatched under the direct orders of the commanding general--not the artillery chief.

To compound the problem, each infantry corps commander organized his artillery differently. Therefore when the artillery was brought into battle at Chancellorsville, sustained massing of fires was nearly impossible. Of the six corps in the army, only half designated an artillery chief: the III, XI and XII Corps. The other three, I, II and VI Corps, simply had divisional artillery chiefs. The highest-ranking artillery officers who had any real command authority were mere captains, and they were strictly beholden to their maneuver commanders.

In striking contrast, the artillery of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, although not nearly as well equipped as its Federal counterpart, made up for its shortcomings by having superior, but not perfect, organizational tables. Robert E. Lee, an offensive-minded general, believed that the artillery should be massed forward. Therefore, he kept only two battalions of artillery in reserve. The bulk of his artillery, all organized into battalions, was assigned to each corps.

Each corps also had an artillery chief--men who held real command authority--and five battalions of artillery each: three were direct support (DS) for the divisions and two were corps general support (GS) on-order DS. Colonel Alexander was Longstreet's I Corps artillery chief, and Colonel Samuel Crutchfield was Jackson's II Corps artillery chief.

In contrast to the Federals, the Confederates fought their artillery at the battalion level, not the battery level, when the technology of the age called for mass. They held but a small army reserve and pushed most of their guns down to the lowest level possible.

Battle of Chancellorsville. On 2 May 1863, Lee, outnumbered 2.5 to 1, made the bold decision to send Stonewall Jackson with half of the army around Hooker's right and roll up his flank just west of Chancellorsville (See the map.) An hour before dusk, Jackson's men advanced with two divisions on line and two in reserve and proceeded to eviscerate the outnumbered and outmaneuvered XI Corps. As the Federal infantry brigades reeled under the weight of Jackson's assault, the six batteries of the XI Corps under Lieutenant Colonel Louis Schirmer--the only corps in the Federal army to have a unified reserve at the corps level--massed their fires along the pike to impede the Confederate sweep.

Twelve artillery batteries were emplaced in the clearings of Hazel Grove and Fairview Heights, a mile behind the Federal forces, to stop the enemy onslaught. Atop the heights, now the "key-point of the battlefield" and astride the Plank Road, the Confederate main axis of advance, Captain Charles Best, XII Corps Artillery Chief, wheeled 18 rifles and 16 smoothbores--a total of 34 guns--into position. (4) About 500 yards in front of Best's grand battery was Brigadier General "Pappy" Williams' XII Corps division of infantry, the "Red Stars." Because of the proximity of Williams' infantry, the cannons were "stationed so as to reach the enemy by firing over the heads of our own troops...as no better position could be obtained, and the use of the guns was imperative." (5) Best's well-chosen position was, according to Confederate artillerist Alexander, "essentially like the Confederate position at Marye's Heights before Fredericksburg, but on a larger scale." (6)

Some 600 yards farther south in the clearing of Hazel Grove, Captain James Huntington, a divisional artillery chief with the III Corps, formed a "large battery" of 36 guns (24 smoothbores and 12 rifles) with the aid of Major General Alfred Pleasonton, commander of the Cavalry Corps. (7) He placed the 10th New York Battery on the right near the woods and four batteries in the center: his own Battery H, 1st Ohio; the XI New York Battery; 6th New York Horse Artillery from Pleasonton's command; and Battery F/K, 3d US. Battery B, 1st New Jersey held the left of the Federal line. Unlike Fairview Heights that was supported by a division of infantry, Hazel Grove had only artillery units. (8)

As Captains Best and Huntington completed their deployment at dusk, retreating troops from the crushed XI Corps, with the time bought by their "well-handled artillery," swept through and around Best's guns, "carrying off horses and caissons and even overturning one of the guns; but, as a whole, [Best and Huntington] held firm." (9) On the heels of these refugees advanced the brigades of A.P. Hill's Confederate division, Jackson's corps, that erupted from the woods and charged the Federal infantry. About 500 yards back on higher ground, Best's gunners answered with "a storm of canister, first checking and then driving [the Confederates] back into the woods." (10)

Best remembered, "the enemy was in force in the woods between 600 yards and a mile in our front. I was obliged to fire over the heads of our infantry force, ranged in parallel lines about five hundred yards in front. It was an operation of great delicacy, this cannonade of thirty-four guns over the heads of our men, but it was a matter of necessity, and was promptly and fully executed." (11)

Off to the left in Hazel Grove with Huntington's guns, Lewis' New York battery got the worst of it. Seeing that it was about to be flanked by Hill's attacking infantry, Huntington ordered Lewis to pull back about 200 yards while his own battery turned its tubes to the right and raked the wood line with canister to cover the New Yorkers' retreat. The ploy worked, and the Confederates were momentarily thrown back. (12) General Hunt later declared that Huntington's fight "was a desperate combat between artillery and infantry at three hundred yards distance, in which the artillery repulsed the infantry, flushed, as they were, with a great success." (13)

As the battle for Hazel Grove progressed, regiments of infantry from Sickles's III Corps arrived to support Huntington's lonely gunners and finally drove the Confederates back for the night, clearing the wood line. (14) The fight for Fairview Heights and Hazel Grove on May 2 lasted "up to near 10 o'clock at night" after which Huntington ordered the guns be entrenched. Lieutenant John Woodbury of Battery M, 1st New York Artillery, XII Corps, remembered "throwing up earthworks by digging down 1[degrees] feet, and placing the earth in front of the pieces. For want of proper tools, [it] consumed nearly the whole night." (15)

As the III and XII Corps improved their positions around Fairview Heights and Hazel Grove, Confederate corps artillery chief Colonel Sam Crutchfield, "partaking of the impatience of Jackson," pushed some guns forward along the Plank Road and opened up with a "random fire" toward Chancellorsville, more than a mile away. This lone battery was savaged by Best's well-placed artillery, however, not only forcing it to withdraw, but also wounding the studious Crutchfield.

The rebel cause soon was dealt another a blow when Jackson, returning from a reconnaissance north of Best's position, was mistakenly shot by nervous pickets from the 33d North Carolina of Lane's brigade, A.P. Hill's division. The Confederate attack, although successful, was costly. Not only had the old master been wounded, but his artillery chief, Crutchfield, and his strongest division commander, A.P. Hill, also were taken out of the fight. This left Major General James Ewell Brown Stuart, Lee's cavalry chief, as the ranking officer on that side of the field. (16)

One of the first things Stuart did upon assuming command of the left wing of Lee's army was to designate Colonel Alexander of Longstreet's corps (-) as its "senior officer of artillery" and send him on a reconnaissance to "select and occupy with artillery positions along the line bearing upon the enemy's position" in order to press the attack the next morning. (17) This would not be an easy task as good artillery positions were almost non-existent in the tangled wilderness of Orange County, Virginia. (18)

After an "all-nighter," Alexander was able to place only two batteries astride the Plank Road, Stuart's planned axis of advance, and another four along the road that ran perpendicular to Hazel Grove under Major John Pegram, the artillery chief of A.P. Hill's division.

"There were but two outlets through which our artillery could be moved," Alexander remembered, "one the Plank Road, debouching within four hundred yards of [thirty-four] of the enemy's guns, protected by breastworks and enfiladed for a long distance by a part of them, as well as by two guns behind a breastwork thrown up across the road abreast of their line of abatis and infantry cover; the second outlet was a cleared vista or lane through the pines [a half mile to the south of the Plank Road], some 200 yards long by 25 yards wide. This opened upon a cleared ridge, held by the enemy's artillery, about 400 yards distant." (19)

Alexander kept the other hundred or so guns in reserve along Plank Road near Dowdall's Tavern due to the lack of availability of artillery positions. From this point, he planned to dispatch them to the decisive time and place of the up-and-coming battle. (20)

May 3 opened with 76,000 Federals facing 43,000 Confederates along the south bank of the Rapidan River north of Chancellorsville. While the Federals held interior lines with superior artillery positions (Hazel Grove and Fairview Heights) and fresh troops (the II, V, and XII Corps), the Confederates held exterior lines with inferior artillery positions and, generally, were scattered.

Even so, Hooker yielded the opportunity to the Confederates when he ordered Sickles to vacate Hazel Grove because he thought it was indefensible. In total disbelief, the combative Sickles, the only non-West Pointer in the Federal high command (he was a Democratic Congressman and a member of the New York National Guard), argued with Hooker to hold the position as it protected Fairview Heights, the key to the battlefield. Hooker insisted, however, and the New Yorker was ordered to abandon the clearing. (21)

On the heels of the Federal withdrawal from Hazel Grove, Confederate artillerist Major William Pegram pounced. Only James Huntington's Ohio battery and two regiments of infantry from Brigadier General Charles Graham's brigade remained in the grove when Pegram let them have it with shell. After a sharp exchange, Brigadier General James Archer of A.P. Hill's division ordered his brigade to charge over the now under-defended breastworks and headed for the Ohio Battery. (22) Faced with overwhelming odds, Huntington ordered his battery out.

"Our infantry support soon gave way," remembered Sergeant Orin Dority, a Buckeye Redleg. "We were ordered to limber to the rear and get to the rear as best we could." All the while, he added, the Rebels were shooting down the artillery horses and calling Out, "Surrender you Yankee so-and-so!" (23)

As the battery made its way northeastward across the clearing, Pelham's able gunners knocked out three limbers--splattering the drivers and their horses--and half of the battery was captured by Archer's advancing men. Once the clearing was secured, Pelham rushed up four batteries of artillery, marking the decisive turning point of the great battle. (24)

Just as Archer and Pelham secured Hazel Grove, the main Confederate attack kicked off down the Plank Road with a frontal assault against Fairview Heights. Major General Alpheus Williams' and Brigadier General John Geary's XII Corps divisions on the south side of the road, Brigadier General Hiram Berry's III Corps division on the north side and Best's grand battery astride the road beat them back, however, with serious losses.

As Sickles had warned, the key to Fairview was now Hazel Grove, and Alexander capitalized on the Federal mistake. Making full use of the superior organizational tables he helped implement, the Confederate artillery chief quickly reinforced Pegram with three batteries from his own battalion and massed 28 guns on Hazel Grove. In one of the rarest instances of the war, Alexander and Pegram were not only able to shoot "near enfilade fire" into a division of enemy infantry, but also Best's grand battery which was posted atop the heights. During the deafening cannonade, Pegram turned to Alexander and exclaimed, "A glorious day, Colonel, a glorious day!" (25)

Even worse, as the Confederate attack heightened, Best's guns ran out of ammunition. Because the army lacked any unified artillery chain of command let alone support system, the separate corps were responsible for resupply. And because the corps were principally infantry organizations, the artillery took a back seat.

To exacerbate the situation even more, the artillery on Fairview Heights came from different commands and nobody had the authority, especially a mere captain of artillery, to pool ammunition from the different corps trains. It must be remembered that the highest ranking artillery officer on the heights, Captain Best, in charge of the very existence of the army at this point in the battle, was outranked by the hundreds of majors in the infantry battalions, let alone the brigade, division, and corps commanders in the area who knew little or nothing about the "long arm."

General Hunt, the artillery chief, was ordered by Hooker to remain miles away from the key point of the battle. When Best sent his request straight to Hooker, pleading for ammunition from any source, the army commander's reply was, "I can't make ammunition!" (26)

As soon as they ran out of shell and shot, Best's guns ceased firing, for they dared not fire canister over the heads of their own troops. With central management of the guns, the sort of command formerly exercised by artillery chief Henry Hunt, batteries lacking ammunition would have been pulled back and replaced by fresh batteries held in reserve. But because Hooker stripped Hunt of this command authority and had ordered him to establish his headquarters along the Rapidan, this didn't happen. (27)

In striking contrast to the steadily collapsing artillery position at Fairview, the Confederate position at Hazel Grove grew steadily stronger. Colonel Alexander rolled in additional batteries from his reserve at Dowdall's Tavern until he had filled every available gun position. The moment a battery ran low on ammunition, it was replaced by another with full chests. Alexander had some 50 guns employed against Best's dwindling 20 or so, with perhaps three dozen firing at any time. (28)

Historian Steven Sears comments in his book Chancellorsville, "the volume of fire delivered from Hazel Grove that morning was never exceeded by the Confederate artillery. The best crews were getting off three rounds a minute, a firing pace equaled of the best-trained infantry. The gunners' single disappointment was (as always) the quality of their ammunition." (29) Alexander complained that there was an "extraordinary large percentage" of shell and case shot that either burst prematurely or failed to burst at all. (30)

Nevertheless, it was the weight of this artillery--and the corresponding weakening of the Federal artillery--that began to steadily shift the tide of battle in the South's favor.

With the lack of adequate artillery support, Alpheus Williams' Federal division deployed astride the Plank Road was thrown back by two attacking brigades from A.P. Hill's division. "The getting away was worse than staying," Williams remembered. "Our line of retreat was over the ravine, up an exposed slope, and then for three-quarters of a mile over an open plain swept by artillery and infantry... Many a poor fellow lost his life or limb in this fearful transit." (31)

Caught up in this maelstrom was Lieutenant Justin Dimick's section of army regulars, Battery H, 1st US Army, on the Plank Road. At first his gunners tried to plug the hole with canister. When it became apparent that all was lost, however, Captain Thomas Osborn, Dimick's chief, ordered the guns out.

Like Huntington's battery in Hazel Grove, the Confederates opened fire on the horses to prevent the battery's escape. Seeing that one of his guns was immobilized and with Confederate infantry close behind, Dimick dismounted and pulled the gun along by prolonge. As he unhitched the piece from the limber, however, he fell mortally wounded when a bullet sliced his spine, disemboweling him. (32)

An infantry officer from Williams division said of the incident: "Not a braver act is recorded in the history of the war." (33) With the withdrawal of Best's guns at Fairview, the entire Federal line collapsed, and the army was once again forced to retreat north across the Rappahannock, allowing Lee to embark on his ambitious Gettysburg Campaign.

Lessons Learned. Great armies learn from their failures. Like the Phoenix rising from the fires of destruction, so too did the artillery of the Army of the Potomac under the guiding hand of Henry Jackson Hunt, father of the modem American artillery. Hunt regained his artillery command authority. He believed that artillery was the decisive arm, that he who used it correctly would win the battle and that he who did not, would not; it was that simple. He also believed that on the offense, if used properly, artillery would clear the way for the infantry. And in a defensive role, its most effective role, it could smash any enemy attack with frightening results. (34)

Countering one infantry officer's attitude about artillery, Winfield Scott Hancock's, who said that artillery was simply there to give "moral support for the infantry with its loud noises and smoke," Hunt said, "What is called the 'moral support' of artillery is proportional not to the noise that it makes, but to its actual destructive effect." (35)

To facilitate the "destructive effect," Hunt once again lobbied Hooker to change how the artillery, the decisive arm, was organized. This time Hooker acquiesced to Hunt's wishes and implemented the system that has continued to be the foundation of today's artillery organization.

Hunt created a seamless web of artillery control, whether centralized or decentralized, that offered the flexibility to apply the right firepower and the right place at the right time. Under the new system, every battery was assigned to a battalion (which Hunt called brigades to elevate their relevance). In all, there were 13 artillery battalions of five to six batteries each. The six infantry corps had one DS battalion and the cavalry corps had two, for a total of eight DS battalions.

These formations fought as battalions. Each commanding officer, usually a field grade, also acted as his corps commander's fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). He was empowered to act as the corps commander's artillery advisor (develop essential fire support tasks, or EFATs) and deploy and command the artillery troops in the corps (develop essential Field Artillery tasks, or EFATs, to facilitate the maneuver commander's intent). Although a corps commander could override his FSCOORD on fire support matters, he could not override Hunt's fire support decisions. Only the commanding general could do that.

The remaining five battalions were kept in the army's artillery reserve commanded by Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler. They would be the army's GS on-order DS assets. (36)

Aside from the fact that Hunt was given the authority to move any gun on the field to achieve mass like Alexander did at Hazel Grove, the most important change was the creation of an independent artillery support system. As was already stated, Federal artillery was handicapped by its quixotic organization at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Because its artillery fought as separate battalions or even batteries, when the guns ran out of ammunition, they were forced to vacate the field. Their divisional or corps trains were not configured to support artillery outfits.

In the new artillery reserve, General Tyler not only commanded the 21 firing batteries of the reserve, but also the army's new centralized artillery support system. No longer would the battery commanders have to beg, borrow or steal from the infantry trains. They could go through their battalion commanders who had a direct line to Tyler who controlled hundreds of ammunition wagons (each holding 250 rounds per gun for the 366 guns) and portable forges.

From this point forward, the corps FSCOORDs requested "x" number of replacements from the artillery reserve and, once they arrived, sent their batteries back to Tyler for reconstitution. It became one giant rotating system that was elaborate in its workings but simple in concept.

If the Battle of Chancellorsville had been fought under this system, no doubt the Confederates would have been stopped the day after Jackson made his fateful sweep. On the converse, Alexander, although outnumbered in artillery assets, used his superior organizational tables to the utmost and drove the Federals from the field by using the principle of dislocation.

Through dislocation, one force temporarily sets aside the other's advantage. The Confederates, outnumbered 2.5 to 1, dislocated the stronger Federals at Chancellorsville with Jackson's unexpected attack on 2 May and, more decisively, by maneuvering their artillery assets onto Hazel Grove with Alexander, driving the Federals from the field.

As we move into an era of "lighter but more lethal forces," employing those forces--the art of war, so to speak--must not be overtaken by the science of war.

Endnotes:

(1.) LTC Robert Leonhard, The Principles of War for the Information Age (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998), 64.

(2.) Ibid.

(3.) Henry Hunt, "The First Day at Gettysburg," Battles and Leaders of the civil War (New York: The century company, 1887), Vol. 3,260-61.

(4.) Charles Best, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and confederate Armies, 1861-65 (Washington. DC: Government Publishing Office, 1880-1901), vol. 25, Part 2, 675.

(5.) Hunt, Official Records, 249.

(6.) E.P. Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate (New York: Da Capo Press, 1983), 337.

(7.) Hunt, Official Records. 249.

(8.) L. Van Loan Naisawald. Grape and Canisyter: The Story of the Field Artillery of the Army of the Potomac. 1861-65 (Mechanicsburg. PA: Stackpole Books, 1999), 232-33; Hunt, Official Records, 162-64 and 249: Alfred Pleasonton, Battles and Leaders. 179.

(9.) Hunt, Official Records, 249.

(10.) Ibid.

(11.) Best, Official Records, 675.

(12.) Naisawald, 232.

(13.) Hunt, Official Records, 249.

(14.) Ibid.

(15.) John Woodbury, Official Records, 675.

(16.) Alexander, Military Memoirs, 339-40.

(17.) James Ewell Brown Stuart, Official Records, 887.

(18.) Alexander, Official Records, 823.

(19.) John Pegram, Official Records, 823.

(20.) Alexander, Official Records, 823.

(21.) Leonhard believes "Opportunity" should replace the more narrow principles of "Offensive and Initiative."

(22.) Steven Sears, Chancellorsville (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), 316-17.

(23.) Ibid., 317.

(24.) Ibid.

(25.) Ibid., 320; John Geary, Official Records, 731.

(26.) Naisawald, 241.

(27.) Hunt, Official Records, 252.

(28.) Sears, 333.

(29.) Ibid.

(30.) Alexander, Military Memoirs, 347-48.

(31.) Sears, 335.

(32.) Naisawald, 240.

(33.) Sears, 321.

(34.) Naisawald, 206.

(35.) Ibid.

(36.) Hunt, Official Records, 471-72; Hunt, Battles and Leaders, 256-59; Naisawald, 259-62.

Captain G. James Schreckengost, Pennsylvania Army National Guard (PAARNG), won Second Place in the US Field Artillery Association's 2002 History Writing Contest with this article. He is the Commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 28th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery, Pennsylvania ARNG. Also in the 28th Division, he has served as the Division Targeting Officer; Executive Officer for B Company, 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry; Rifle Platoon Leader in the 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry; and Armor Crewman in the 1st Squadron, 104th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Captain Schreckengostis a graduate of the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and holds a Master of Arts in American Studies from Penn State University. He is a high school American History teacher in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, and is affiliated with the 108th Field Artillery Regiment. His article "'The Fatal Blunder of the Day,-- The Artillery Fight at the First Battle of Bull Run" placed Third in the 2001 Histo ry Writing Contest.