A brief history of the FA and ADA.

Through the years, the Field Artillery (FA) and the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) have shared a close association, dating back to the birth of the Continental Army's Artillery on 17 November 1775. During the early years of the country's history, the Coast Artillery (ADA's ancestor) and the FA composed the War Department's Artillery forces. While the Coast Artillery defended the country's harbors from enemy naval attack, the FA provided fire support on the battlefield.

With the rise of airpower in the early 20th century, the Army created Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) as a component of the Coast Artillery to defend ground forces from air attacks. The advent of modern naval guns and aircraft in the 20th century, meanwhile, rendered coastal fortifications armed with heavy Coast Artillery obsolete. The need to modernize the Army's force structure and the out-of-date coastal fortifications ultimately led to the Army Reorganization Act of 1950 that inactivated the Coast Artillery and merged the FA and AAA into one Artillery branch. This lasted until 1968 when the Army separated the two. For almost four decades, the two Artilleries "went their own ways" until 2005 when Congress approved the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission's recommendation to collocate the FA and ADA schools at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Defending the Frontier. From 1775 to 1907, the regimental system governed the country's Artillery organization. In June 1775, the Continental Congress created the Continental Army from provincial regiments in Boston, voted to raise additional units for the Army and eventually formed the existing Artillery units around Boston into a composite Artillery regiment of Foot (a branch of FA where the cannoneers walked beside the draft animals pulling the cannon), Siege Artillery and Garrison Artillery under General Henry Knox.

Following the Colonies' disastrous defeats in New York in 1776, the Continental Congress reorganized the Continental Army providing for 88 infantry battalions and five Artillery battalions--also called regiments. However, only four regiments were created, and they consisted of Foot Artillery, Siege Artillery and Garrison Artillery. Such composite regiments forced Artillerymen to serve on all three kinds of artillery to provide flexibility in assigning officers and Soldiers. (1)

During the next three decades, Congress repeatedly restructured the Army and its Artillery to keep them in harmony with national security requirements. In the spring of 1785, the standing Army consisted of the First Regiment of eight infantry companies and two Artillery companies to guard the frontier. Two years later, Congress permitted Secretary of War Henry Knox to organize the Artillery as a separate battalion to give the Army one infantry regiment and one Artillery battalion with Artillerymen serving primarily as infantry on the northwest frontier.

As the tensions with Native Americans increased on the northwest frontier and with Great Britain over its failure to cede forts to the United States that it had promised to evacuate after the American Revolution, the Army's size grew. Following the disastrous defeats of Josiah Harmer's column in 1790 and Arthur St. Clair's column in 1791--both at the hands of Native Americans in the Ohio River Valley--Congress created the Legion of the United States in 1792 with an organic battalion of Foot Artillery.

Under Major General "Mad" Anthony Wayne, the legion decisively defeated Native Americans at Fallen Timbers in the Ohio River Valley in August 1794. Although the legion had small 3-inch howitzers, the broken terrain covered with fallen trees prevented their effective employment.

Artillery of the day, including the small 3-inch howitzers, was simply too heavy and cumbersome to drag along when campaigning against Native Americans on the trackless frontier. As a result, the Artillery on the frontier existed in name only; Artillerymen functioned mainly as infantry when posted to frontier forts, losing their skills to serve on cannons. (2)

Defending the Frontier and the Coast. With a war looming with Great Britain in 1794 and France in 1798, Congress reorganized the Artillery. Besides funding earthen and masonry redoubts along the Atlantic Ocean, a Congressional act of 1794 created the Corps of Artillery and Engineers that absorbed the existing Artillery battalion from the Legion of the United States and authorized the president to employ the corps on the frontier or the coast as he saw fit, compelling Artillerymen to serve in either Foot or Coast Artillery units as generic Artillerymen and not as specialists.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Later in 1798, the prospect of war with France prompted Congress to create a regiment of Artillery and engineers to augment the corps to give the Army two Artillery units. As with the Corps of Artillery, the newly formed regiment's Artillerymen had to be Coast Artillerymen and Field Artillerymen, but they served primarily in coastal fortifications which were seen as the greatest security requirement.

When the threat of war disappeared, President Thomas Jefferson and Congress separated the Artillerists from the engineers. They created the Corps of Engineers and decreased the number of Artillery regiments from two to one in 1802 with the Artillery's primary responsibility revolving around defending the Atlantic Coast. (3)

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Imitating the successes of the Europeans with Horse Artillery, a branch of FA where the cannoneers rode on horses to give more mobility than Foot Artillery, the Americans subsequently organized the Light (Horse) Artillery Regiment in 1808. Although this action recognized the distinct differences in missions between Light Artillery and Coast Artillery, provided for training and equipping the regiment's batteries and intended to end the practice of rotating officers and Soldiers between Coast and Light Artillery units, it accomplished little.

A parsimonious Congress failed to provide the funds to equip the regiment as Light Artillery except for one battery formed under Captain George Peter. At the Fourth of July celebration in Washington DC in 1808, Peter's battery demonstrated its ability to maneuver and fire its weapons and impressed Congress and onlookers. Because feeding the horses was too expensive, Secretary of War William Eustis, however, dismounted the battery, sold the horses and issued muskets to the cannoneers for duty as infantry on the frontier. (4)

Although the Light Artillery Regiment remained on the books and served with mixed results in the War of 1812, the Reorganization Act of March 1815 recognized its utility. The act created the Corps of Artillery by merging the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Artillery Regiments, formed to defend the coasts, and retained the Light Artillery Regiment with the intention of properly equipping it. In its haste to reduce the wartime Army to a peacetime size and conserve money, Congress permitted the regiment to disappear except on paper. (5)

Forming the Corps of Artillery. Additional restructuring followed within a few years. The Reorganization Act of 1821 consolidated the Corps of Artillery, the Light Artillery Regiment and the Ordnance Department into the Corps of Artillery of four regiments of nine companies each. Of the nine companies, eight were Coast Artillery, and one was designated as Light Artillery. By combining the Ordnance Department, the Corps of Artillery and the Light Artillery Regiment into one organization and creating four composite regiments as a cost-saving measure, the act effectively legislated the first and only Light Artillery Regiment out of existence, even though it authorized Light Artillery batteries and threatened Artillerists with duty in any kind of Artillery unit.

Without an urgent requirement for trained Light Artillerymen, the War Department allowed the Light Artillery batteries to languish until 1838 when Captain Samuel Ringgold assumed command of the first Horse Artillery battery. The following year, the other Light Artillery batteries received their horses, but they were organized as Mounted Artillery (a branch of FA) where the cannon crew rode on the limbers and caissons because it was less expensive than Horse Artillery. (6)

Reorganizing after the Civil War. Although FA performed well in the Mexican War of 1846-1848 and the American Civil War of 1861-1865, Congress established the peacetime Artillery organization at five regiments of 12 batteries each in 1866. Two of a regiment's batteries were FA, and the rest were Coast Artillery. While Coast Artillery batteries stood as the guardians of American harbors against enemy naval attack, the field batteries were scattered on remote posts in the Trans-Mississippi West. With the exception of Major General Nelson A. Miles, most commanders believed that FA hampered mobility and had limited use against Native Americans who relied upon hit-and-run tactics and mobility for survival. As a result, Field Artillerymen frequently were pressed into service as infantry and cavalry and, with a few exceptions, served on a gun, permitting perishable skills to deteriorate. (7)

By dictating officer assignments, the regimental organization also adversely influenced Field Artillerymen. Because of the heterogeneous regiments created after the Civil War and economy measures, the War Department continued the prewar practice of rotating officers and Soldiers between Coast and FA batteries obliterating differences between the two Artilleries and further eroding skills. Not even the School of Application for Cavalry and Light Artillery that opened in 1892 at Fort Riley, Kansas, to train FA officers and units could offset the pernicious rotation policy that created a generic Artilleryman. Personnel shortages and detached service for units, taking them away from training at the school for other more pressing duties further prevented effective training. (8)

Along with indirect fire that was beginning to replace direct fire, the Spanish-American War of 1898 highlighted the Army's dependence upon obsolete field guns and inadequately trained gun and crews. In view of such circumstances, Congress passed the Reorganization Act of 1901. Among other things, the act created a Chief of Artillery to oversee all of the Artilleries' activities. The act also abolished the regimental system for the Artillery and replaced it with an Artillery Corps of 126 companies of Coast Artillery and 30 batteries of FA, recognizing the difference in missions between the two. Yet, the act failed to abolish the long-standing practice of rotating officers.

Preserving such a custom hampered the creation of competent officers for either branch. This particularly was true of FA officers and Soldiers because the Artillery School at Fortress Monroe, Virginia, focused on Coast Artillery training and closed down its meager FA training in 1906. The Mounted Service School at Fort Riley that opened in 1907 to "pick up the slack" never lived up to the War Department's expectations. Concentrating on equitation, the school failed to train Field Artillerymen how to maneuver their guns around the battlefield. (9)

Separating the Coast and Field Artilleries. The dearth of qualified officers and Soldiers created by the rotation policy and the lack of appropriate training prompted successive Chiefs of Artillery during the first decade of the 1900s to campaign for the complete separation of the two Artilleries and specialized training for each. Convinced by this logic, Congress passed an act on 25 January 1907 that created two distinct Artillery branches--the Coast Artillery and the Field Artillery.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Equally important, the act ended the destructive practice of rotating officers between the two Artillery branches and promoted specialization. It also paved the way for reorganizing the Artillery School at Fort Monroe as the Coast Artillery School in 1907 for training only Coast Artillerymen and the founding of the School of Fire for Field Artillery, the forerunner of the Field Artillery School, at Fort Sill in 1911. (10)

Although both branches performed effectively in World War I, the War Department convened a board of officers in April 1919 under Major General Joseph T. Dickman to determine Coast and Field Artillery missions in light of wartime experiences. The Dickman Board believed that the introduction of motor vehicles had given even the heaviest Artillery pieces, such as Coast Artillery, unprecedented mobility to erase the most significant difference between the two branches. As such, the board concluded that Coast Artillery should be a naval function and that heavy, mobile Artillery for supporting the field army should be an FA function. his proposal stripped the Coast Artillery of its historical harbor defense mission by giving it to the Navy. (11)

In his annual report to the Chief of Staff in October 1919, the Chief of Coast Artillery, Major General Frank W. Coe, urged the War Department to reconsider his branch's mission. According to Coe, the day was over when the Coast Artillery should be thought in terms of only maintaining platform-mounted heavy Artillery and mine defenses for harbor defense.

Recognizing that modern naval guns had rendered coastal fortifications obsolete, that tractor-drawn and railway-mounted Coast Artillery guns had performed well during the war as FA to attack strong fortifications, and that thousands of Coast Artillerymen had served in field batteries, Coe suggested merging the two Artilleries. The lack of mobility for heavy Artillery, one of the primary reasons for the separation in 1907, no longer existed, while Coast Artillerymen functioned competently as Field Artillerymen during the war. Together, they blurred the distinction between the two Artilleries and justified merging them. (12)

The debate over the future of the Coast Artillery continued. In 1920 Congress passed the National Defense Act to settle the merger debate. The new law retained the Coast Artillery and the FA as separate branches even though the motor vehicle gave unprecedented mobility to the former to fight on the modern battlefield, defined their missions and preserved the Chief of Coast Artillery and the Chief of FA to supervise their respective branches. Notwithstanding this congressional legislation, the possibility of merging the two arose again in 1927 as an economy measure prompting the War Department to issue General Order 22 to define missions for both Artilleries.

The FA supported the other combat arms on the mobile battlefield and included pack, division and corps Artillery with the exception of AAA, and general headquarters Artillery with the exception of AAA and railway Artillery. The Coast Artillery defended the harbors and received the AAA mission. In 1939, an economy drive by the War Department prompted examining the integration of the Artilleries once again. When a staff study revealed that such a measure would produce only minor savings, the War Department dropped the matter for the duration of World War II. (13)

Consolidating Artillery Training. Within months after the end of World War II, Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, appointed a board of officers under Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch to make proposals to streamline organization and save money. After careful study, the Patch Board recommended combining the Coast Artillery with its AAA mission and the FA to form one Artillery.

Although the Coast Artillery's irrelevance in the face of modern naval guns and aircraft undoubtedly influenced the recommendation, other reasons played prominent roles. The fear of losing AAA to the Army Air Force, that was pushing for independence from the Army, and budget and personnel reductions after the war also drove the recommendation. Budget and personnel reductions demanded finding ways to conserve and use resources wisely. In view of this, the War Department urged Congress in 1946 to consolidate the Coast Artillery and the FA as one Artillery branch. (14)

Before Congress could act, the Army combined what it legally could to reduce overhead. Effective 1 November 1946, the War Department redesignated the Field Artillery School as The Artillery School with the Antiaircraft Artillery School at Fort Bliss, Texas, and Sea Coast Artillery School at Fort Winfield Scott, California, as branches of The Artillery School with each staying at its existing location.

In keeping with the need to economize with the attending requirement for personnel flexibility, the three schools created a basic integrated course for all newly commissioned officers where they would learn the fundamentals of the three Artilleries by moving from school to school.

The schools also developed an integrated advance course for officers with three to 10 years of experience for additional training on all three Artilleries. Like the lieutenants, captains would move from school to school for training. Instituted in 1946-1947, cross training, or integrated training as it was called, permitted moving officers from branch to branch (called cross assigning) to husband scarce personnel resources, deemphasized specialized training and created a generic Artillery officer with limited skills in any branch.

Ironically, this consolidation of training, the revival of rotating officers between the Artilleries and training on all the Artillery systems came at the precise time when technology was becoming more sophisticated and required even more specialized training than in the past. (15)

Inactivating Coast Artillery, Merging AAA and FA. Three years later, Congress picked up where the Army had left off in 1946-1947 when it passed the Army Reorganization Act of 1950 that legally recognized the Infantry, Armor and Artillery as statutory combat arms, among other things. The Army inactivated the Coast Artillery and the Sea Coast Artillery Schools, legally merged AAA and FA as one branch to economize, and solidified the practice of integrated training and cross assigning for officers while preserving specialized training for enlisted personnel as either Field Artillerymen or Antiaircraft Artillerymen. (16)

Although much heralded, the merger produced mixed results. It saved money, allowed moving officers easily between the AAA (renamed Air Defense Artillery in 1957) and the FA, and produced a generic Artillery officer. Because of the growing complexity of FA and AAA equipment and weapons, the differing employment techniques and the failure of integrated training to provide adequate preparation for an officer to serve in either Artillery effectively, the Continental Army Command took action.

Believing that the Army no longer could train all Artillery officers in both FA and AAA tactics, techniques, and procedures and that officers should be either FA or AAA (especially second and first lieutenants), the Continental Army Command restructured officer training.

With support from the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff for Training, the Continental Army Command created separate basic courses for the two Artilleries in 1957 and moved all surface-to-surface rocket and missile courses and systems to Fort Sill. In the meantime, the Continental Army Command retained the integrated Artillery advance course for officers with five to eight years of experience because of pressure to maintain flexibility in officer assignments and the shortage of career officers. (17)

Providing Specialized Officer Training. In the 1960s, the drive to abolish integrated training and cross assigning and to separate the two Artilleries mounted. Based on the Army Officer Education and Review Board of 1958, the Continental Army Command reintroduced separate basic officer courses in 1962. The courses provided specialized training for new officers that they were not receiving with the integrated course that had been brought back late in the 1950s to reduce training costs and to create assignment flexibility.

Meanwhile, the need for flexibility in assignments to offset career officer shortages caused the Continental Army Command to retain the integrated officer advance course for officers with five to eight years of experience. A student thesis written at the Army War College by Colonel William F. Brand challenged the wisdom of this. He argued that integrated training provided inadequate training in either branch. As a result, officers left the integrated advance course without mastering any of the weapons and without any real tactical expertise in either branch. In view of this, Brand urged separate training for each branch.

Dividing FA and ADA into Two Branches. At the direction of the Continental Army Command, the US Army Artillery and Missile School and the ADA School explored the desirability of dividing the Artillery into two branches. In 1963 they recommended separation because of the difficulty of furnishing integrated training, the continued production of inadequately trained officers and the growing technological and tactical differences between the two Artilleries. (18) Expressing concern about integrated training, the authors of "The Artillery Branch Study" of 1966 wrote that it "spawned mediocrity." (19)

The demand for competent FA officers for duty in Vietnam in 1965-1966 finally caused the Army and the Continental Army Command to reorganize the Artillery. Because the one-year tour of duty left little time for on-the-job training, combat in Vietnam required the officer to arrive as a proficient Field Artilleryman not a hybrid FA and ADA officer. In view of this, "The Artillery Branch Study" urged abandoning integrated training and forming two separate Artilleries. (20)

Concurring, the Army split the FA and ADA into two distinct combat arms with their own training programs in 1968. This freed officers to concentrate on becoming experts in their respective branches. Yet, separating the two Artilleries had little impact on the US Army Artillery and Missile School, renamed the Field Artillery School in 1969, and the ADA School because they were already focusing their energies on their areas of expertise. (21)

By separating the two Artilleries, the Army reaffirmed the folly of the 1946-1968 merger and the wisdom of forming two distinct branches in 1907. When both Artillery branches were together in the 1800s as part of a composite Artillery regiment and 1946-1968 as one Artillery branch, mediocrity reigned, especially for officers. Officers simply did not have the time to master the intricate skills of both branches.

Although the FA and the ADA remained separate entities during the next 37 years, national security concerns changed that relationship. Between 1988 and 1995, the BRAC process closed 112 Army installations and realigned 26 others to create more efficiency and effectiveness within the Army's installation infrastructure. In view of this achievement, three successive Secretaries of Defense urged additional BRAC actions to save billions of dollars annually, free up excess capacity, permit funding facilities that actually were required, support warfighting and furnish quality of life improvements for the military services. Yet, the secretaries found little Congressional support. (22)

In the FY02 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress finally permitted a BRAC to be conducted in FY05. As Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld explained in November 2002, BRAC 2005 would permit reconfiguring the Department of Defense's infrastructure to maximize warfighting capability and efficiency. It also would create multi-mission and multiservice installations, optimize military readiness and help create significant monetary savings. (23)

Creating the Fires Center of Excellence. As anticipated, BRAC 2005 produced significant changes with the FA and the ADA. To save money and improve warfighting capabilities, BRAC 2005 recommended relocating the ADA Center and School from Fort Bliss to Fort Sill and consolidating it with the FA Center and School to form the Net Fires Center, later renamed the Fires Center of Excellence (CoE).

This would consolidate FA and ADA training and doctrine development at a single location and functionally align related branch centers and schools at one location to foster consistency, standardization and training proficiency. Creating the Fires CoE also would allow the Army to reduce the number of military occupational specialties (MOS) training locations and support Army transformation by collocating institutional training and would be accomplished by 2011. Yet, collocating at Fort Sill did not mean merging the branches and reviving integrated training and cross assigning officers. The branches would remain separate. (24)

As such, the lessons of the past had been learned. Although the collocation of the two branches and schools would generate monetary savings and provide other benefits, the BRAC process retained the FA and the ADA as separate branches to retain their integrity. Artillery Soldiers would serve in the Air Defense Artillery or Field Artillery, not both.

Endnotes:

(1.) Robert K. Wright, Jr., The Continental Army (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1983), 40-42, 52-53, 62, 98, 99, 104; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1967), 67; John C. Fitzpatrick C., editor, The Writings of George Washington, Vol 6 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1932), 40-103; Peter Force, American Archives, Vol 2 (Washington, DC: Peter Force and M. St. Clair Clarke, 1843), 675; Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, edited by John R. Alden, (New York. NY: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 886-96; Willard M. Wallace, Appeal to Arms: A Military History of the American Revolution (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1951), 246-62.

(2.) James A. Sawicki, Field Artillery Battalions of the US Army, Vol 2 (Dumfries, VA: Centaur Publication, 1977), 1219; Annuals of Congress, 1st Congress, col. 2088-90; Annuals of Congress, 2nd Congress, cols. 1055-56; Ebenzer Denny, Military Journal of Major Ebenezer Denny, An Officer in the Revolutionary and Indian Wars, with an Introductory Memoir (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1959), 165-67; William H. Guthman, March into Disaster (Philadelphia, PA: McGraw-Hill, 1975), 238-39; William E. Birkhimer, Historical Sketch of the Organization, Administration, Material and Tactics of the Artillery, US Army, (James J. Chapman, 1884, reprinted by Greenwood Press, 1968), 113, 191.

(3.) Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, Vol. 33, 356; Birkhimer, Historical Sketch, 27, 31, 353; Stephen Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), 11-12; Richard C. Knopf, editor, Anthony Wayne: A Name in Arms (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1960), 429; Annuals of Congress, 6th Congress, cols. 826, 829; Allan R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New York, NY: Free Press, 1984), 99; Annuals of Congress, 7th Congress, cols. 1306-12.

(4.) Sawicki, Field Artillery Battalions of the US Army, 1219-20; James L. Jacob, The Beginnings of the US Army, 1783-1812 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947), 275; Birkhimer, Historical Sketch,. 33-37, 167-68, 193-94, 231; Theodore J. Crackel, Mr. Jefferson's Army: Political and Social Reform of the Military Establishment, 1801-1809 (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1987), 79-80, 82-85; Theo F. Rodenbaugh and William L. Haskins, The Army of the United States (New York, NY: Maynard, Merrill and Company, 1896), 301.

(5.) Birkhimer, Historical Sketch, 199-200; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 139.

(6.) Morris Swett, "The Forerunners of Sill," The Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1938, 453-463; Sawicki, Field Artillery Battalions of the US Army, 1221; Birkhimer, Historical Sketch, 54, 302, 358; Francis B. Heitman, editor, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1903), 54.

(7.) Ibid., 1222-23.

(8.), E.M. Weaver, "History of Second Artillery," Journal of the Military Service Institution, Nov 1893, 1259; Rodenbaugh and Haskins, The Army of the United States, 372; Charles Parkhurst, "Field Artillery: Its Organization and Its Role," Journal of the Military Service Institution, Jul 1892, 266; George M. Wright, "Shall the United States Have Light Artillery," Journal of the Military Service Institution, Jan 1895, 65; Annual Report, US Cavalry and Light Artillery School, 1892, 1-3; Swett, "Forerunners of Sill," The Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1938, 453-63.

(9.) Sawicki, Field Artillery Battalions of the US Army, 1223-24; Annual Report, Chief of Artillery, 1904, 8; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 317; James E. Hewes, From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1975), 386; Annual Report, War Department, 1904, 2:41; Annual Report, Chief of Artillery, 1906, 9; Annual Report, School of Application for Cavalry and Field Artillery, 1906, 7, 43; War Department, General Order No. 152, 29 Aug 1906; War Department, General Order No. 191, 13 Sep 1907; War Department, General Order No. 115, 27 Jun 1904; War Department Circular 23, 3 Jun 1904; War Department General Order No. 124, 28 Jul 1905; War Department General Circular 38, 1 Aug 1905; War Department General Order No. 133, 23 Jul 1906; Annual Report, Chief of Artillery, 1906, 33; Annual Report, War Department, 1908, 2:255; Report, School of Fire for Field Artillery, 9 Feb 1912, 2, 5, 8, 15, 24; Report, The Field Artillery Board, subject: Test of the Efficiency of Modern Field Works When Attacked by the Latest Types of Field Cannons Designed for the United States Artillery, 4-16 Oct 1909, 86.

(10.) Sawicki, Field Artillery Battalions of the U.S. Army, 1224; Morris Swett, "The Forerunners of Sill," The Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1938, 453-463; War Department General Order No. 132, 6 Jun 1907, War Department File No. 1242815, Record Group 94, National Archives; Annual Report, War Department, 1907, 2: 189, 216, 217; Annual Report, War Department, 1908, 2:217; Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography (New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1919), 276; Annual Report, Chief of Artillery, 1906, 9; Riley Sunderland, History of the Field Artillery School: 1911-1942 (Fort Sill, OK: Field Artillery School), 30; General Orders No. 72, War Department, 3 Jun 1911.

(11.) Sawicki, Field Artillery Battalions of the U.S. Army, 1227.

(12.) Sawicki, Field Artillery Battalions of the U.S. Army, 1227.

(13.) Sawicki, Field Artillery Battalions of the U.S. Army, 1227.

(14.) Sawicki, Field Artillery Battalions of the U.S. Army, 1244; Study, Army Ground Forces, subject: Integration of the Field Artillery and Coast Artillery Corps into Single Artillery of the Ground Forces, 9 Sep 1946, 4, Morris Swett Technical Library; William F. Brand, Jr., "A Re-examination of the Integration of the Artilleries," unpublished thesis, US Army War College, 1963, 2-9; Letter, Artillery School to Commanding General (CG), Continental Army Command, subject: The Artillery and Guided Missile School, May 1956, in Report, US Artillery Center, subject: Consolidation of the Artillery School, Morris Swett Technical Library; Report, US Artillery Center, subject: Consolidation of the Artillery School, Morris Swett Technical Library; History of the US Army Artillery and Missile School, 1945-1957 (Fort Sill, OK: The US Army Artillery and Missile School, 1957), 17-18, 86.

(15.) Brand, "A Re-examination of the Integration of the Artilleries," 3, 9, 30, 31; Report, The Artillery Center, subject: Proceedings of a Board of Officers, 1 Nov 1949, Morris Swett Technical Library; Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers, "Artillery Integration," The Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 1947, 303; Sawicki, Field Artillery Battalions of the US Army, 1244; Memorandum, subject: Information on the Artillery, 8 May 1956, in Consolidation of the Artillery Schools, Morris Swett Technical Library; Memorandum for CG, Replacement and School Command, subject: Consolidation of Artillery School, 17 Sep 1946, in Report, subject: Consolidation of Artillery Schools, 1956, Morris Swett Technical Library; Memorandum, subject: Integration of the Artillery, 8 May 1956, in Report, subject: Consolidation of the Artillery, 1956, Morris Swett Technical Library; Letter, War Department to CG, Army Air Forces and Army Ground Forces, subject: Enforcement of Economies, 22 Aug 1946, in Report, subject: Consolidation of the Artillery Schools, Morris Swett Technical Library; "Artillery Branch Study," 30-31, Morris Swett Technical Library; History of the US Army Artillery and Missile School, 1945-1957, 17; Memorandum, subject: Integration of the Artillery, 8 May 1956, in Report, subject: Consolidation of the Artillery Schools, Morris Swett Technical Library; Report, subject: Study of Artillery Integration, 1963, 1, Morris Swett Technical Library.

(16.) Maurice Matloff, editor, American Military History (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1985), 540-41; History of the US Army Artillery and Missile School, 1945-1957, 29, 32.

(17.) Letter, HQ Continental Army Command to Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, 9 Feb 1955, in The Artillery Center, Integration of the Artillery Schools, Morris Swett Technical Library; "The Artillery Branch Study," 35, 36, 40, 41, 43, Morris Swett Technical Library; Disposition Form with Enclosures, subject: Integration of the Artillery, in US Artillery Center, "Consolidation of the Artillery," "Army Reorganization," Antiaircraft Journal, Jul-Aug 1950, 27; History of the US Army Artillery and Missile School, 68, 1946-1957; History of the US Army Artillery and Missile School, 1958-1967 (Fort Sill, OK: Fort Sill Printing Plan, 1967), 172-96.

(18.) "The Artillery Branch Study," 41; Letter, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, to CG, Continental Army Command, subject: Training and Assignment of Artillery Officers, 11 Jun 1955, in The Artillery Center, Integration of the Artillery Schools, Morris Swett Technical Library; Letter, Major General Thomas E. de Shazo to CG, Continental Army Command, subject: Integration of the Artillery, 16 May 1956, in US Army Artillery Center, Integration of the Artillery Schools, Morris Swett Technical Library; "The Artillery Branch Study," 45, 46, 93; Brand, "A Re-examination of the Integration of the Artilleries," 31-32.

(19.) "The Artillery Branch Study," 93.

(20.) "The Artillery Branch Study," 46, 93, 95, 96, 99, 118-19.

(21.) "Two Career Fields Formed for Artillery," The Journal of the Armed Forces, 15 Jun 1968, 29; "Air, Ground Artillery Split," Army Times, 19 Jun 1968, 1; Brand, "Reexamination of the Integration of the Artilleries," 24, "The Artillery Branch Study," 52-53; History of the US Army Artillery and Missile School, 1946-1957, 67.

(22.) 2003 US Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), 20-21; DOD Report to the Defense BRAC (Extract), DA Analysis and Recommendations BRAC 2005, Vol III, Executive Summary, 3-17, Historical Research and Documents Collection (HRDC), Command Historian's Office, Fort Sill.

(23.) Ibid., 21.

(24.) BRAC Report (Extract), Vol I, Part 1 of 2, May 2005, Appendix A, p. 36-37, HRDC; BRAC Report (Extract), Vol I, Part 2 of 2, May 2005, Section 1, 22-23, Section 4, 12-13, Section 5, 22-23, 37-38, HRDC; Base Summary Sheet for Defense BRAC Commission Visit, 11 Jun 05, HRDC; Memorandum for Commander, TRADOC, subject: BRAC Manpower Action Plan, 3 Aug 05, HRDC; Talking Points for BRAC Commission Visit, 11 Jun 05, HRDC; Letter, Defense BRAC, subject: Request Comment on Fort Sill Related BRAC Recommendations, 11 Jun 05, HRDC; Briefing, subject: Realignment and Closure Actions, Considerations and Analysis, 11 Jun 05, HRDC; DOD Report to Defense BRAC, (Extract), DA Analysis and Recommendations BRAC 2005, Vol III, Executive Summary, May 05, 3-17, HRDC.

Dr. Boyd L. Dastrup is the Command Historian for the US Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill. He has written The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: A Centennial History; Crusade in Nuremberg: Military Occupation, 1945-1949; King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army's Field Artillery; Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973-1991; The Field Artillery: History and Sourcebook; and Operation Desert Storm and Beyond: Modernizing the Field Artillery in the 1990s. He also has written articles in A Guide to the Sources of United States Military History, The Oxford Companion to American Military History, The U.S. Army in World War II, and Professional Military Education in the United States: A Historical Dictionary and served as a subject matter expert for the History Channel on "Dangerous Missions: Forward Observation" (2001) and the Military History Channel in "Artillery Strikes" (2005) and "Weaponology: Artillery" (2006). He has a Ph.D. in US Military and Diplomatic History from Kansas State University in 1980.