A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium.

A WORLD OF REGIONS: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium. By Peter J. Katzenstein. Ithaca (NY), London(UK): Cornell University Press. 2005. xiv, 297 pp. US$49.95, cloth, ISBN 0-8014-4359-8; US$22.95, paper, ISBN 0-8014-7275-X.

The limitations of an exclusive focus on globalization themes to understand the contemporary world are obvious. Peter Katzenstein meets the more difficult and demanding challenge of creating an analytical framework that incorporates globalization as part of a larger picture. At the most general level, he is interested in explaining both territorial and non-territorial dimensions of American power. Territorial dimensions of power are the stuff of state-to-state international relations, which can be distinguished from non-territorial forms of power exercised through processes that he calls "globalization." The innovative importance of this work comes in framing issues of globalization and internationalization within Asia and Europe. The first chapter introduces "regional orders" defined by varied combinations of economic, political and cultural traits and connections. These are not separate and sealed from each other, as we might imagine they could have been in earlier periods of history; today, they are porous, which is what allows American power to seep into their construction and transformation. At the same time, political actors in these regional orders can react to American power and shape what is, in the author's conclusion, power that is broad but not deep (p. 247).

The author chooses Germany and Japan for intensive examination because they are the regional powers with which the United States forms close relationships that help to enable its imperium. Political, economic and to a lesser extent cultural features of post-World War II Germany and Japan are examined domestically, in relation to other parts of Europe and Asia, and finally to the United States. The author suggests that his argument would work in broadly similar ways were he to have chosen other countries, China and France, or Singapore and Britain, for example (p. 37). I'll return to this assumption when concluding. For now let us look at the documentation for the thesis.

In brief, Katzenstein shows in chapters 4 and 5 that: (1) policies toward technology and production in Germany and Europe are developed within a formal political framework, but in Asia the Japanese have promoted a regionalization of production that extends what had been domestic policies to a larger spatial scale; (2) for security issues the Germans are part of a European move toward coordinated and integrated policy making, while Japanese and other Asian countries still pursue policies as sovereign states acting bilaterally; (3) the German state pursues cultural policies for political reasons, while the Japanese do so for economic reasons; and (4) the Germans, like other Europeans, seek to regulate and thus limit the impact of American popular culture, while the Japanese have created alternatives with strong market positions within Asia and more generally.

Chapter 6 examines the ways in which the US is connected to Germany and Japan as well as to other parts of the European and Asian regions. The next and final chapter extends the argument of the American imperium in the porous regions of Asia and Europe to other parts of the world. The absence of regional figures like Germany and Japan influence the kinds of relations the American imperium can establish in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

In sum, the book makes a persuasive case for examining American power's relationships to different regions of the world by focusing on the activities of major political and economic actors. Germany and Japan are the key regional actors "that have supported the purpose and power of the United States" (p. 247) after their total defeat in World War II. By reminding the reader of this stark fact in his concluding paragraphs, the author confirms the importance of looking at how the exercise of American power is regionally specific, and shaped in part by the traits of the region's leading actors. He also raises at least some doubt about the effectiveness of this framework to discuss the ways in which other regional actors, China or France for example, do in fact behave, either within their regions or in their engagements with the United States.

R. BIN WONG

University of California, Los Angeles, USA