A Case of Conscience.

Garth L. Hallett, Priorities and Christian Ethics. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 202pp. $54.95 (cloth).

I am glad to have read this fine book, and over and above what I have learned from it, I know how I will put it to use in my teaching. Sometimes, and always in my graduate course in Christian ethics, I attempt to describe casuistry as one of the important methods of moral reasoning. When asked for an example, I'll be happy to have this book with me. Hallett's book displays well what casuistry looks like in the hands of a scholar.

The paradigm case that Hallett proposes for our consideration is one that was put forward some decades ago by Cambridge philosopher A. C. Ewing: "It is clear that the money spent by a man in order to provide his son with a university education could save the lives of many people who were perishing of hunger in a famine, yet most people would rather blame than praise a man who should deprive his son of a university education on this account" (1-2). Ewing's case leads to Hallett's seven-chapter work, a careful theological and ethical analysis of how we sort out our priorities in Christian ethics -- specifically, how we assess our moral responsibilities to "the nearest and dearest" as well as to "the neediest."

Hallett is uncomfortable with the fact that most people would probably blame the father for depriving his son of a university education in order to respond to "the neediest." In chapter 1 Hallett calls this "a troubling verdict" (1), and it is clear from the start that he means to call it into question.

This first chapter provides the rationale for the relevance of the case and for the questions it raises. Ewing's case, Hallett argues, is important for both individuals and communities. It causes us to come to terms with how we interpret the Gospel command to love our neighbor as ourselves. Does this mean "parity of self and others"? Does it allow for "self-preference"? Or does it really entail "self-subordination"? (17) Hallett thinks "self-subordination" is closer to the Gospel than the other options. That conviction, acknowledged at the start, lets the reader know where Hallett's reflections are likely to lead.

In chapter 2 Hallett discusses a variety of ways in which Ewing's case can be approached and concludes that the most helpful path to follow is to focus not on what is obligatory, nor on what justice requires, nor on what the competing rights might be between the nearest and neediest. Rather, the most helpful question is "... which alternative -- assisting the son or assisting the starving -- is the better, preferable, more Christian thing to do?" (35) This focus is important, for in the end Hallett's conclusion will concern not what is obligatory or what is justified, but what best expresses "the Christian ideal" (136).

Chapters 3-6 constitute Hallett's dialogue between Ewing's case and some important voices of Christian tradition: the New Testament, Patristic positions, the Thomistic tradition, and contemporary viewpoints. What is most interesting in these chapters is Hallett's account of a dramatic shift from the biblical/Patristic tradition to the Thomistic viewpoint. In a section entitled "Cumulative Emphasis," Hallett concludes as follows: "Insistent in Luke, vehement in James, recurrent elsewhere, New Testament concern for the needy far exceeds any expressed concern about assistance to one's kin" (51). And about the Patristic tradition there is a similar conclusion: "In the writings of the church Fathers, whenever the near and poor appear in competition, as they sometimes do, the Fathers favor the poor" (60).

In contrast to this, Hallett explains that the teaching of Aquinas -- largely unchallenged until this century -- is based on a conviction about the "order of charity": "For well ordered charity puts love of self before love of others" (75). Hallett is unhesitatingly critical of this Thomistic tradition because this "self-preference" principle "lacks scriptural backing" (76); it also uncritically includes one's kin with "self-preference." Finally, Hallett argues that the Thomistic position gives too much consideration to social standing. He objects to the idea that in Ewing's case the father would not be obliged to take extraordinary measures to respond to the neediest because such measures would unfairly threaten his own social condition. The biblical and Patristic positions, to which Hallett gives primary allegiance, suggest that our moral obligations may be more demanding than Thomas seemed willing to admit.

In the final chapter, Hallett discusses again the relevancy Ewing's case. He does so by suggesting that the verdict he has proposed -- that the neediest take precedence over the nearest and dearest -- is a verdict that transfers to the public sphere: "...other things being equal, voters, legislators, presidents, and other office-holders should follow the same standard for private individuals. Within the leeway allowed them, they should, for example, favor the dire needs of foreigners over the much less pressing needs of compatriots" (135). The book ends with Hallett's reminder that his inquiry has been in search of "the Christian ideal," not simple answers to complex problems. He set out primarily to challenge the "common sentiment" that "charity begins at home" (137). He accomplished that task.