50-Year Commemoration: Marine Artillery in Korea.

Ed: This article is a reprint of one by the same name that appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette, November 1952. The author was a Writer/Researcher of the Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, DC. The article features the 11th Marine Regiment of Camp Pendleton, California, and covers most of the 11th Marines' contributions in Korea--a fitting anniversary tribute to the FA in the Korean War, 1950 to 1953.

The Korean War has proved again the truth of Napoleon's remark that "It is by fire...that battles are won....It is with artillery that war is made." Confronted by an enemy who relies upon "human sea" assaults, the UN forces have had to depend on superior firepower to overcome the enemy's superiority in numbers. Artillerymen of the 11th Marines have done their share to stop the mass attacks of the Communists. And the fire of their howitzers has proved invaluable in blasting enemy caves and bunkers. Operating under a great variety of conditions, the Marine Artillerymen carried out an extremely difficult amphibious operation at Inchon; they operated in the mountains of northeast Korea in the dead of winter; and they participated in large-scale land warfare as part of the Eighth Army.

For the 11th Marines, the Korean War began on 2 July 1950, the date the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was alerted for Korea.... Arriving in Korea [with 1/11, organized into four-gun batteries] on 2 August, the brigade was soon engaged in the desperate fighting to hold the perimeter around the port of Pusan.

While this fighting was still in progress, Gen MacArthur was preparing his counteroffensive. As early as 4 July, the UN commander had begun to prepare an amphibious operation to seize Inchon and Seoul, and on 22 July, the 1st Marine Division learned it was to spearhead the Inchon landing. D-Day was set for 15 September, only 54 days away.

On the 25th [of July], the [rest of the] 11th was far from ready for combat.... The regimental commander got a good start on the build-up to war strength when elements of the 10th Marines were re-designated as units of his command. Two 105-mm howitzer battalions, 1/10 and 2/10, became 2/11 and 3/11; while 3/10, a 155-mm howitzer outfit, became 4/11. These units arrived at Camp Pendleton on 5 August.... Very little training was accomplished because all hands were busy mounting out....None of the units received its equipment in time to calibrate guns and radios. In some instances, the gear was not issued to the batteries until after they reached Japan.

Lack of training was a serious problem, particularly in the 3d and 4th Battalions where the urgency of build-up demanded the assignment of many officers and men who were not qualified artillerymen. But all hands were eager and quick to learn, and key officers and NCOs quickly whipped their outfits into shape once they got in combat. This was done so successfully that not a single round fell short on friendly troops.

The 11th Marines, less the 3d Battalion, departed on schedule and landed at Kobe, Japan, on 29 August. A few days later, the regimental commander and his staff were briefed on the division plan. The landing was to be carried out in two stages. At dawn, 3/5 was to land on Wolmi island just offshore from the port of Inchon. Then on the afternoon tide, the main force would land on the main island. At this time, the artillery was to go ashore on Wolmi to support the advance inland. To provide additional general support, the Army 96th FA Battalion, a 155-mm howitzer outfit, was to be attached.

On the basis of this information, the artillery plan was drawn up. Only five days remained to complete the work before the troops embarked for Inchon. To add to the difficulties, suitable maps of the landing area were almost impossible to obtain, the regimental and division staffs were too widely separated for proper liaison, and the Navy tractor area plan did not arrive until the day of departure. Although serial photographs of Wolmi were available, it was impossible to tell whether there were sufficient position areas for three battalions of artillery on the island.

On 9 September, the 11th Marines departed for Inchon in nine LSTs [landing ship tanks] and the AKA [ammunition assault craft] USS Washburn. Six LSTs and the AKA lifted the main body of the regiment from Japan, while the three remaining LSTs carried the 1st Battalion from Pusan. Arriving on Inchon on 15 September, the ships moved to the designated tractor area and prepared to launch DUKWs [open, amphibious, wheeled vehicles] loaded with troops and equipment. Meanwhile, a reconnaissance party landed on Wolmi with assault troops of 3/5...

By 1845, the firing batteries of the 1st and 2d Battalions began crossing the beach, and by 2145, they were in position ready to fire. Lack of space prevented the 4th Battalion from landing until the next day when it went ashore on the mainland. Heavy smoke over the city and lack of targets limited fires to a few rounds during the first night.

Very little opposition was offered by the enemy to the landing, and infantry troops moved rapidly inland. By the 21st, the regiment had advanced about 15 miles and were on the outskirts of Seoul. To support the advance, 1/11 fired in direct support of the 5th Marines, and 2/11 in direct support of the 1st Marines. General support for the 5th Marines was provided by 4/11, while the 96th FA Battalion performed the same mission for the 1st Marines. Artillery units had to displace frequently to keep within range to deliver supporting fires. During these five days, 1/11 displaced six times. The battalions moved forward a battery at a time so there would be no interruption of fire support.

The frequent displacements were not the only problems confronting the 11th Marines. The infantry scheme of maneuver created a wide dispersal of units by calling for a two-pronged advance on Seoul. The 5th Marines advancing north and then swinging around to approach the city from the northwest, was separated from the 1st Marines, pushing directly toward the city on the Inchon-Seoul highway, by as much as eight miles. To assure proper control during this movement, 1/11 was attached to the 5th Marines.

Complicating control problems, communications difficulties plagued the artillery regiment throughout the operation. Untrained communicators and worn out or improperly tuned equipment were largely responsible. For the first five days, control of operations was actually in the hands of the battalion commanders. By the 19th, communications problems had been licked sufficiently so that the regiment could exercise effective control. At this time, 1/11 was detached from the 5th Marines.

During the advance on Seoul, the enemy had offered relatively little opposition. But all this changed when the Marines attacked the capital city and its industrial suburb of Yondong-po. The North Koreans put up fanatic resistance to the 5th Marines on the hills to the northwest and in the city itself, where houses had been turned into fortresses and innumerable blockades had been thrown across the streets. The 5th Marines received excellent support from 1/11 and 4/11 in the attack on the hills west of the city. But when the infantry entered the city streets, artillery was of limited value. There were relatively few good artillery targets. To destroy a house merely made it a better defensive position because the enemy could hide in the rubble; and tanks, with their pinpoint fire, were more effective for destroying road blocks.

Artillery came into its own in delivering defensive fires and, on two occasions, played a major role in breaking up North Korean counterattacks. The first attack struck 2/1 on the night of 20 September and was immediately taken under fire by 2/11. The accuracy of the maps of Seoul and the information on the location of the enemy made it possible for 4/11 to fire unobserved missions with excellent effect.

This performance was repeated on the 26th when 3/1 was counterattacked. Again, 2/11 poured fire into the attacking North Koreans. This time, both medium battalions, 4/11 and the 96th FA, delivered highly accurate unobserved fire.

On the same day, elements of the Eighth Army, which had broken out of the Pusan perimeter, linked up with X Corps troops at Suwon. Seoul fell on the 27th, and by 7 October, the Eighth Army took over from X Corps. But there was to be no respite for the 11th Marines. Plans were already being made for further operations.

To pursue the advantage over a disorganized enemy, Gen MacArthur ordered the Eighth Army to attack directly north toward Pyongyang, the enemy capital, while X Corps made an amphibious landing at Wonsan on the east coast. Before this assault landing could be carried out, rapidly advancing ROK [Republic of Korea] troops occupied the city. On 26 October, the 1st Marine Division landed unopposed at Wonsan and prepared to push onto the Manchurian border.

The large area assigned to the division, with the resulting dispersal of forces, compelled the division commander to attach artillery battalions to infantry RCTs [regimental combat teams]. The 1st Battalion was attached to RCT-5, the 2d to RCT-1, and the 3d to RCT-7. As a result, it was never possible for the regiment to exercise effective centralized control of the artillery fired in support of the division.

The Marines had hardly landed at Wonsan when the intervention of the Chinese Communists produced a brand new war. Only seven days after landing, 3/11 with RCT-7 went into action against the new enemy. Ordered forward to relieve an ROK regiment on the road to Chosin reservoir, the RCT-7 was attacked by a Chinese division in the Sudong gorge. For four days, the RCT was heavily engaged. Throughout the engagement, 3/11 delivered excellent offensive and defensive supporting fires. The most spectacular mission came on the night of 6 November when the Chinese reserve regiment was caught moving into frontline positions and mauled so badly it had to withdraw.

Problems encountered in this engagement were typical of those confronting artillerymen throughout the operation. In the mountainous terrain, good position areas were few and far between, and even though artillery was granted priority, it was often hard to find enough level ground to emplace a battery, much less a battalion.

Artillery operations were restricted even more by the necessity to operate within the infantry perimeter. Operating with regiment-sized or smaller combat teams in enemy-infested territory, this was the only way to provide security for the artillery units. But from within the perimeter of an infantry regiment, many targets were at very short ranges. To provide 360-degree coverage, it was necessary to lay the batteries on different azimuths. In some cases, the howitzers could not be brought to bear without shifting trails. Under these conditions, it was very difficult to mass fires. Short ranges and high hills combined to require a great deal of high-angle fire. Gen Almond, the X Corps commander, who visited 3/11 in position for high-angle fire at Sudong, thought the battalion looked more like an AAA [antiaircraft artillery] outfit.

Following the defeat of the Chinese division at Sudong, the Marines pushed on toward the Chosin reservoir. Enemy opposition was negligible, although there were signs of the presence of hostile forces. By the middle of the month, the Marines were confronted by a new enemy, the cold. Temperatures went down below the zero mark, presenting a whole new set of problems. Truck and bulldozer engines had to be turned over every half hour during the night to prevent them from freezing. The ground was frozen so hard that it was impossible to dig in the trails, and it took several minutes for the howitzer tubes to return to battery after firing.

In spite of the cold, the advance continued, and by 27 November, RCTs-5 and -7 had reached Yudam-ni on the western side of the reservoir. With the exception of H Battery still in Hagaru. the attached artillery elements were emplaced at Yudam-ni to support their RCTs. Under new orders from Gen MacArthur calling for participation in an envelopment movement with Eighth Army, both RCT-5 and RCT-7 were ready to attack west. To give general support to the attack, 4/11 was moved up to Yudam-ni.

RCT-1, relieved by Army units of its security mission to the south, was now deployed at selected strongpoints along the MSR [main supply route] to the coast. Its artillery elements were distributed over a wide area...

But the great "end of the war" offensive never got rolling. On the 25th, the Chinese struck Eighth Army, and two days later, the Chinese attacked X Corps. The 1st Marine Division bore the brunt of the attack, and by the morning of 28 November, all the Marine perimeters were isolated. The two most advanced, Yudam-ni and Hagaru, were under heavy attack by eight enemy divisions.

Typical of these fights was the defense of Yudam-ni. Here the three artillery battalions--l/l 1, 3/11 and 4/11--were in position to support the attack to the west when the enemy struck. It was obvious that the howitzers should be redeployed to provide the best coverage all around the perimeter. But before this could be done, it was necessary to establish some form of centralized control. Regimental headquarters was to have moved forward to Yudam-ni. To remedy the deficiency, an artillery group was formed under the command of the senior battalion commander, LtCol Harvey Feehan of 1/11. Under his direction, the batteries were spotted around on different azimuths to cover all avenues of approach.

Artillery made every effort to meet all requests for fire missions but was handicapped by ammunition shortages. With the MSR cut, airdrop was the only means of resupply. But only about 1,200 rounds of 105-mm ammunition were dropped, and of these, only about 600 were usable. No effort was made to drop 155-mm ammunition, as an equivalent weight of 105-mm was more valuable in the minimum range missions against enemy attacking infantry frontlines. To conserve the limited amount of heavier caliber ammunition, 4/11 limited its fires to counterbattery and heavy troop concentrations. This restriction was justified by the enemy's limited use of artillery.

Further to handicap the artillery units in their delivery of fires, they were required to provide infantry replacements. On the 28th, artillery units furnished seven officers and 314 men. The next day, they were called upon to supply an additional four officers and 164 men. As a result, it was not always possible to man all the howitzers. In 4/11, for instance, one platoon (two howitzers) in each battery had to be put out of action, but all the weapons were laid, and the crews shifted from one piece to another, depending upon the direction of targets.

After two days of heavy fighting, the Marines at Yudam-ni were ordered to withdraw to Hagaru. This was to be the first step in a general withdrawal of the whole division to the coast. As a preliminary step, the two RCTs redeployed into a valley running south of the two and astride the road to Hagaru. Artillery and service units were displaced first, followed by the infantry. Then, on 1 December the withdrawal began.

Artillery tactics during the withdrawal called for leapfrogging units. As the main column moved out, it was covered by a unit emplaced at the point of departure. Near the head of the column were other units which would advance about 5,000 to 6,000 yards and emplace to fire both forward and back. At this point, the units at the point of departure would displace forward to repeat the process...

Using these tactics, the 11th Marines continued to support the withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division from Koto-ri to the sea. By 15 December, the Marines had completed outloading and had sailed for South Korea. Following a period of reorganizing and training and a brief anti-guerrilla campaign, the 1st Marine Division was committed to the Eighth Army front.

The Marines were to participate in Operation Killer, a limited objective offensive designed to keep the pressure on the enemy, inflicting maximum casualties and preventing him from mounting a counteroffensive. Jumping off on 21 February, the Marines moved methodically ahead and had achieved their objectives by 4 March. Operation Killer was so successful that it was continued at once under the name of Operation Ripper.

For artillerymen, these operations were war "by the book." The 11th Marines headquarters was able to control the artillery supporting the division, to mass fires, and to deliver TOT (time-on-target) missions. The 105-mm battalions were assigned to direct support of the same regiments they had supported in previous operations. To supplement the general support fires of 4/11, the Army 92d Armored Field Artillery [AFA] Battalion was attached to the 11th Marines until 20 March....For short periods, the 11th Marines also had batteries of 8-inch howitzers of the Army 17th FA Battalion attached. These heavy artillery pieces were powerful and extremely accurate and were used for precision fire against enemy bunkers and artillery positions.

As the Marines moved slowly forward, the enemy conducted delaying actions from successive hill positions. For artillery as well as for infantry, one attack was much like another. Typical of these actions was the attack of the 1st Marines on Hill 166 south of Hoengsong. During the night before the attack, howitzers of 2/11 kept up harassing and interdiction fires to keep the enemy awake and to soften him up. At 0800, an air strike came in and hit the target hill, while the infantry moved up to jump-off positions. When the planes retired, artillery and 4.2-inch mortars fired their concentrations. Infantry and tanks attacked under cover of the artillery and mortar fires. As each howitzer had been individually registered, it was possible to keep the fire on the objective until friendly troops were within 100 yards of the enemy positions. At this point, the artillery lifted to fire on the next ridge, and 81-mm mortars began hitting the reverse sloop of the objective. Under the cover of these supporting fires, the assault troops had no difficulty in seizing the hill.

This pattern was repeated time and again as the Marines moved methodically ahead. After a month of this sort of fighting, the artillery was confronted with an additional problem by the attachment of the Korean Marine Corps (KMC) regiment to the division. With four infantry regiments and only four battalions of artillery, the balance of arms was upset. The ordinary procedure of providing a 105-mm battalion for direct support of each infantry regiment and a 155-mm battalion for general support of the whole division could no longer be used. As an expedient, the division shifted the direct support battalion along with forward observers and liaison officers from the reserve regiment to the KMC's regiment when it was on the line. But there was a very real danger of getting caught short if it were ever necessary to commit all four infantry regiments.

Those fears were realized on 23 April when the Chinese launched a major offensive and broke through the ROK division on the Marines' left. To refuse the exposed flank, the 1st Marines was ordered to occupy the blocking positions with two battalions, while the other battalion reinforced the 7th Marines. It was necessary to assign 4/11 to a direct support mission, as no other artillery unit was available....Although 155-mm howitzers are not ordinarily used in direct support, Marines of 4/11 fired these missions with excellent effect. On the night of 23 April, they brought fires within 50 yards of friendly troops and helped to break up Chinese attacks. One enemy column of 500 men, advancing through a valley on which the howitzers were registered, suffered an estimated 50 percent casualties.

All along the front, enemy attacks were met by Marine artillery fires. Reinforcing fires came from the Army 213th AFA Battalion, which was attached to the 11th Marines, and from the 92d AFA Battalion, now part of corps artillery. There were so many targets that it was impossible to take them all under fire. But the fires that were delivered were extremely effective. According to the testimony of one Chinese prisoner, artillery fire frequently broke up troop concentrations, making it very difficult for the enemy to mass for an attack. During the period of heavy enemy attacks, 22 to 24 April, the 11th Marines had fired 527 missions, consisting of 12,844 105-mm rounds and 4,008 155-mm rounds. Enemy casualties inflicted by artillery fire were estimated at 5,000.

Although by 24 April, the Marines had beaten off the enemy attacks, still the gap on the left created by the breakthrough remained. In danger of being outflanked, the Marines were ordered by Eighth Army to withdraw. During the next eight days, the division pulled back to successive defensive positions for a distance of about 30 miles before the Eighth Army was able to stabilize the front. This withdrawal required four successive artillery displacements, carried out by echelon, so that the infantry was never without artillery support. By 30 April, the 1st Marine Division was deployed along a new defensive line, and the Chinese attack had been stopped all along the line.

Following the collapse of the Chinese April offensive, Eighth Army ordered defensive positions to be prepared in depth with minefields, wire entanglements, and prepared fields of fire. On 16 May, the Chinese returned to the attack, striking this time at the US 2d Infantry Division and at ROK units on the east. Again, the enemy achieved a breakthrough, but timely shifting of reserves slowed down the attack. As the main enemy thrust struck the UN forces to the east of the Marine positions, the 11th Marines was free to support the hard-pressed 2d Infantry Division. Heavy concentrations were fired in harassing and interdiction missions, but as very few specific targets had been assigned, the effect was merely to saturate the areas with undetermined results.

By the 20th, the enemy attacks had lost their momentum. An immediate counteroffensive was ordered, and by 15 June, UN forces had advanced some 30 miles. At this point, they ran up against the enemy main line of resistance. Both sides dug in, and the war settled down to a stalemate, with neither side willing to attempt a major attack. Shortly after, truce negotiations were started.

As the truce delegates were holding their first meetings to discuss a ceasefire agreement, the enemy opened up with his heaviest artillery fire of the war. From that point on, counterbattery fire became a vital mission for Marine artillerymen. Beginning on a modest scale in July, the enemy gradually increased his fires, both in volume and accuracy. At first, he followed the Japanese practice of firing single weapons from cave positions, but by the end of the month, he was massing battery fires. The 76-mm guns with which the enemy began his effort were soon supplemented by 122-mm howitzers, captured American 105s, and even a few 152-mm weapons. Infantry positions were the first enemy targets, but he soon began firing on the artillery emplacements as well. On 1 November, 2/11 was shelled by [120 rounds of] 76-mm guns and 122-mm howitzers...killing one man [and] wounding four others...

Counterbattery and other fires against the enemy artillery were primarily the responsibility of 4/11. In June, this battalion had devoted a mere two percent of its efforts to this type of mission, but the next month, the figure jumped to 15 percent... [and] gradually increased until it reached 22 percent in April 1952.

More than two years has elapsed since the 11th Marines first arrived in Korea....The end of the war is still not in sight. In fact, the enemy continues to build up his forces. But whatever happens, the 11th Marines stands ready to meet the challenge.