4-27 FA in Iraq: applying [D.sup.3]A to counterinsurgency operations.

Azhar, a young man of 17, looked through the rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launcher site, took aim at the column of three 1st Armored Division high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) traveling down Haifa Street, gently squeezed the trigger and watched as the RPG sailed down from the window of his fifth-floor apartment. The RPG impacted two feet behind the last HMMWV with a thunderous blast that sprayed shrapnel and pavement for yards. Azhar and his cohorts followed the explosion with a sustained volley of AK-47 rifle fire.

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The Soldiers in the two lead HMMWVs quickly recovered the wounded and evacuated them to the combat support hospital (CSH) a few kilometers away. One innocent Iraqi man who had been sitting on a park bench nearby lay dead in a pool of blood, and 12 other Iraqis lay wounded in the street, including a beautiful four-year-old girl.

The ghosts of Sheikh Maruf had struck again!

Within minutes, the battalion quick-reaction force (QRF) and the battalion tactical command post (TAC) arrived at the scene and found that insurgents had set the disabled HMMWV on fire with Molotov cocktails. A large crowd had gathered, angered not at the insurgents who had attacked, but at the Coalition Forces who were conducting consequence management.

The QRF quickly established a 360-degree perimeter to control the growing crowd that included as many as 20 news crews. Battalion leaders conducted onsite interviews with the ever-present press corps and directed the division air QRF (OH-58Ds).

No friction training event at one of our combat training centers (CTCs) could have prepared us for that hot summer day in Baghdad.

This scenario represents some of the many challenges the 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (4-27 FA), 1st Armored Division, faced in the early months of our 15-month deployment for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The enemy conducted hit-and-run attacks on a daily basis using everything from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and RPGs to drive-by-shootings. Our Soldiers were wounded and killed. In most cases, we had no idea who was attacking us or how to prevent the attacks.

As leaders, we asked ourselves: How can we determine who this enemy is? How can we acquire him? What is the best way to kill or capture him?

We were a direct support (DS) artillery battalion performing an infantry battalion mission without the same tools or training. We had limited "own-the-night" equipment, only basic skills in patrolling, limited proficiency in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) and only rudimentary skills in close quarters marksmanship. Our modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) was for a DS battalion in high-intensity conflict.

Initially, we viewed these as handicaps in a zone populated by some of the poorest citizens in Baghdad living alongside a large population of former regime loyalists and a fair number of religious extremists. We later learned that these perceived weaknesses were actually the very ingredients that allowed us to "think outside the box," adapt to our terrain, adapt to our enemy and tame Zone 8-South in central Baghdad.

We used what we had and applied what we knew.

Seeing Ourselves. Our greatest advantage was that, as an artillery battalion, we had no preconceived notions about the best ways to conduct patrolling, area and zone reconnaissance, cordon and attacks, cordon and searches or raids. Fortunately, we retained all our fire support teams (FISTs) and combat observation lasing teams (COLTs). Only the fire support elements (FSEs), company to brigade, remained with their supported maneuver units.

We consolidated our FISTs into separate platoons under the command of the headquarters battery commander. Initially, the COLT platoon served as our task force (TF) scouts and QRF and the two remaining platoons augmented the battery patrols.

We also looked for ways to capitalize on the inherent skill sets of our Soldiers and battle staff. By our very nature, fire supporters have a unique understanding of the targeting process. We leveraged this as we designed our battle rhythm, which was based on a weekly targeting cycle.

We took the basic principles of the normal high-intensity conflict 24-hour battle rhythm but modified it into a weekly battle rhythm because it takes much longer to develop targets in counterinsurgency operations. We called this our weekly effects tasking order (ETO) cycle, and it was nested within the brigade combat team (BCT) battle rhythm. (See Figure 1.)

Our COLTs and FISTs were very skilled at occupying observation posts (OPs), detecting and observing named areas of interest (NAIs) and using tactical triggers. Capitalizing on this, we maximized the use of OP surveillance in our zone and area reconnaissance. This later proved to be one of our most effective techniques.

Most of our Paladin howitzer sections were manned with eight personnel. We didn't have the combat strength of an infantry squad or Bradley fighting vehicles as troop transports. We parked our Paladins, removed the ammunition racks from our FA ammunition supply vehicles (FAASVs) and fitted them with bench seats, converting them into armored personnel carriers. This provided our Soldiers some protection from IEDs and small arms attacks and the added firepower of a .50 caliber machine gun.

We developed an intense patrol master training program that centered on movement techniques, hand and arm signals, populace engagement, under-standing the assigned priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), surveillance of NAIs and reaction-to-contact drills. This emphasis later paid huge dividends.

Shifting the targeting methodology to a low-intensity counterinsurgency fight was not as complicated as you might think--our doctrine is sound. The basic model of Decide, Detect, Deliver and Assess ([D.sup.3] A) works and can be applied to a myriad of problem sets. The weekly ETO cycle was the mechanism for applying this model.

Decide. Just as in high-intensity conflict, the Decide function is the first step in the targeting process for counter-insurgency. Likewise, the Detect function provides the overall focus and sets priorities for intelligence collection and attack planning.

In Baghdad, we used two of the traditional visual products from the high-intensity conflict targeting process to reflect these Decide decisions: the high-payoff target list (HPTL) and the intelligence collection plan. The intelligence collection plan answers the commander's PIRs, which became the central focus of all TF operations. Every member of the TF had to understand the next higher commander's PIRs. (See Figure 2 for the BCT commander's PIRs.)

Due to the asymmetrical nature of the battlefield in counterinsurgency, you never know who will find the answer to a commander's PIR. It could be a member of the intelligence section, a battery commander on patrol, a member of a security patrol, a combat service support (CSS) Soldier on a logistics, personnel and administration center (LOGPAC) mission or a member of the civil affairs (CA) team.

Everyone in the TF had to think like an intelligence officer, and every movement out of the forward operating base (FOB) was considered a patrol, a patrol that had to be debriefed by the battery patrol master when it returned to the FOB.

For most of the time, we operated in Zone 8-South. The BCT commander's PIRs listed in Figure 2 helped us form our intelligence collection plan and establish priorities of work for the battle staff and commanders. At that time, all of the targets in PIR 1 were former regime loyalists or religious extremists. Pursuing information related to these requirements ensured we met the commander's intent of identifying, capturing or killing these insurgents.

Prioritizing the HPTL helped us further refine the intelligence plan and allocate our resources as we built our weekly ETO. The BCT commander published his HPTL in an ETO order each week after his Targeting Board (Sunday) and Targeting Meeting (Monday). The BCT commander's published target categories further refined the type of targets that we selected for the following week's TF ETO cycle. (See Figure 3 on Page 12.)

For example, if we developed intelligence about individuals who conducted attacks against Coalition Forces or individuals linked to Al Qaeda, we assigned target numbers, built target folders and developed our reconnaissance and surveillance plan.

We formalized the Decide step of the process in our TF Targeting Board (Tuesday) and our Battalion Targeting Meeting (Wednesday). At the Battalion Targeting Meeting, the battalion commander approved the prioritization of targets and the method of surveillance and attack for each target. This also ensured the TF was operating inside the BCT commander's intent for the coming cycle. The TF S3 then published the TF ETO order to the batteries on Thursday and also back-briefed the BCT commander on the TF reconnaissance and surveillance plan for the next week.

In addition to kinetic operations, during the Decide phase, we determined our nonlethal effects priorities. We prioritized our civil works projects based on the effect of shaping attitudes and sentiments of the population.

For example, if we had a neighborhood that was hostile to the Coalition, we targeted that neighborhood for mosque and school renovations and solved water and sewage problems that had been neglected for the past 30 years. In some instances, we rewarded neighborhoods for good behavior and cooperation.

Bottom-line: we deliberately decided the effect we wanted to achieve and linked it to our kinetic and nonkinectic effects in zone.

Detect. This is the next critical function in the targeting methodology. When artillerymen think of "detection," we immediately envision our Q-36 and Q-37 Firefinder radars with overlapping range fans, carefully planned critical friendly zones (CFZs) and call-for-fire zones (CFFZs) covering templated enemy artillery and rocket positions. We also envision our COLTs with their ground/vehicular laser locator designators (G/VLLDs) in concealed OPs looking for the enemy's forward security elements exiting the Whale Gap at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California. If there is a major adjustment in the targeting process in counterinsurgency operations, it starts with the Detect function.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT). This is the most important component of targeting in counterinsurgency operations. Our enemy was elusive, and he seldom maintained contact. Our enemy in Baghdad also was not concerned about collateral damage. After he shot an RPG, detonated an IED or threw a grenade, he simply melted into the crowd or the maze of blind alleyways. Hence, our moniker, "The Ghosts of Sheikh Maruf."

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To fight this enemy effectively, we built an extensive human intelligence network. At the TF level, we seldom could rely on receiving division assets to augment our intelligence collection efforts. Additionally, there were only two tactical HUMINT teams (THTs) to support the entire BCT. To succeed, we had to cultivate our own sources to augment our reconnaissance patrols.

During June 2003, insurgents attacked our Soldiers on 40 occasions resulting in 12 friendly forces wounded in action and zero insurgents captured--not a very encouraging statistic. In contrast, during October 2003 when our HUMINT network was in full swing, we suffered only 11 attacks and captured 33 insurgents and terrorists. More importantly, in the aftermath of the 11 attacks, we normally captured the attackers within 24 hours.

HUMINT starts with building relationships. Every contact is a potential source and must be looked at for his or her potential intelligence value. This includes local contractors, interpreters, traffic police, coffee shop owners, imams and petty criminals. Soldiers treated them with dignity and respect while gradually working them for intelligence. Any of these sources could be the one who identifies the insurgent who is planning to attack a LOGPAC convoy with an IED.

Evaluation of source information can be tedious and taxing at times. Every person who provides information about the enemy is motivated by something. If you know your source and understand his or her motives, this greatly helps your evaluation of the reliability of the information. It is also good practice to confirm the information with independent sources, if possible. This may preclude you from unwittingly serving the source's purposes instead of vice versa.

As in high-intensity conflict operations, you must emphasize protecting your detection assets; they are most certainly HPTs for your enemy. Commanders must implement control measures to protect sources and protect the methods for deriving information. Most of the measures we implemented involved controlling how information was passed to our staff.

Observation Posts. One of the greatest strengths of our FIST Soldiers is their ability to establish and stealthily occupy OPs and observe NAIs.

We faced two challenges in using OPs in urban terrain. First, it is very difficult to emplace observers in densely populated areas without being detected. Observers must plan their routes and occupation times to avoid detection. Second, to avoid detection, observers often had much longer dwell times at their OPs. This made it imperative that Soldiers occupy their OPs with enough combat power to protect themselves for long periods.

We used observers in the OPs to trigger the execution of raids to capture or kill insurgents. A good example of this was when we captured a division target named "Firyal" (a key Ba' athist financier and operative). Firyal was suspected of financing and coordinating attacks against Coalition Forces throughout the summer of 2003.

Using TF sources, we refined the location of her residence and learned she often moved between three different homes. We conducted surveillance of her home in our zone using a COLT on an OP. After 48 hours of continuous observation, COLT Three observed six males entering the home and reported it to the TF TOC. This met our execution criteria trigger to conduct a raid. Two hours later, we captured our target.

Patrolling. This was our most conventional means of detection. The main challenge we faced was transitioning from mounted operations to dismounted patrols. The learning curve was steep, but within months, the firing batteries were the main assets answering the PIRs.

We quickly transitioned to operating from a patrol base. The patrol dismounted its vehicles at a patrol base that was easily secured and then conducted a dismounted zone reconnaissance for periods of up to four or five hours, attempting to answer specific PIRs. By conducting dismounted patrols, we consistently maintained contact, reduced our risk from RPG and IED attacks and, most importantly, engaged the population.

Engaging the people is talking to and getting to know as many people as possible without compromising the mission or security of the patrol. This was one of the greatest training challenges for our Soldiers--you won't find the task, conditions and standards for this in any mission training plan (MTP).

Engaging the people offers a unit several advantages. A unit can enhance its detection by meeting new contacts or sources in zone, and by greeting them and conducting the patrol in a respectful, friendly manner, it sends a positive message and facilitates the process. We were not out solely to win the hearts and minds of the people, but we did want their cooperation and assistance.

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Synchronizing Detection. During the weekly targeting meeting, we synchronized our detection assets and developed our collection plan. An important visual tool we used to synchronize our collection assets was the synchronization matrix. (See Figure 4.) The synchronization matrix matched specific PIRs to NAIs, and we could task collection assets accordingly. For example, we listed all of our NAIs for PIR 1 and designated a unit for that particular NAI or some battalion asset to observe the NAI. We also considered other assets that might be available.

Another important aspect of detection is building the case for a target. The PIRs were designed for each target, so if they were answered, we had relative certainty that the target would actually go to prison if we captured him. Physical evidence always served as the optimal manner to build a case (i.e., IED-making materials, documents, cell phones, computers, etc.).

The enemy was adept at hiding contraband and, in most instances, these items were difficult to locate. To counter this problem, we relied heavily on sworn statements from multiple sources. Once we had enough evidence to keep the target in captivity, the statements became execution criteria for a raid.

Deliver. Although it seems the greatest difference between [D.sup.3]A methodology in high-intensity conflict and counterinsurgency would be in the deliver function, there are actually more similarities than differences. According to FM 6-20-10 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) for the Targeting Process, "The deliver function of the targeting process executes the target attack guidance and supports the commander's battle plan once HPTs have been located and identified." It is no different in counterinsurgency operations.

The tactical decisions concerning the deliver function in counterinsurgency ops more or less mirror the tactical decisions made in high-intensity conflict (time of attack, the desired effect and the attack system to be used). The only major difference in counterinsurgency operations is the method of delivery. Rather than speak in terms of volleys of indirect fire, close air support (CAS) sorties or attack aviation missions, we generally spoke of platoon raids or battalion cordons and attacks.

As we transformed from a DS artillery battalion to a maneuver TF, we developed TTPs and battle drills that addressed this fundamental difference. In the early stages, we relied mostly on cordons and searches and cordons and attacks because we lacked precise intelligence. Both of these missions are very deliberate and resource-intensive. If you lack precise intelligence and have the time and available combat power, they are appropriate methods.

However, our targets were often time-sensitive targets (TSTs) or targets of opportunity. The amount of time it takes to set the outer and inner cordon in a densely populated city hindered our ability to capture some of the elusive targets we sought. To address this, we developed a TST force based on our COLT platoon.

Our goal was to be able to attack a TST within one hour after we met our execution criteria for that target. The key to making this a reality was developing a TST raid battle drill and training the force.

This TST raid force provided a flexible combat force postured to quickly execute targets based on actionable intelligence. By the time the TF redeployed, this TST force was responsible for capturing approximately 85 percent of the 450 insurgents the TF captured.

Assess. Assessment during counterinsurgency operations is probably the most difficult task we undertook. The difference in targeting is that we were not assessing a formation or an enemy that we could see. Most of the time, we were assessing covert enemy cells that are adept at disguising their intentions and furtive in the conduct of their operations.

Similar to [D.sup.3]A methodology in high-intensity conflict, many of the detection assets also served as assessment assets. Although we seldom had additional [D.sup.3]A assets from higher headquarters, the assess function was the exception.

We relied heavily on our BCT headquarters and division headquarters to help with assessment. When we captured an insurgent target, our S2 conducted TF level screening of the prisoner and set the conditions for BCT interrogation. If the BCT interrogators thought the individual had intelligence value, he was sent to the division interrogation facility. The division interrogation facility completed the process and published the results on the tactical worldwide web (TACWEB) in the form of summary interrogation reports (SIRs). These SIRs played a vital role in our ability to assess the effects of our targeting and operations in our zone. We used the SIRs to develop relationships between individuals and determine the structure of the cells operating in our zone.

Another important assessment is the number of attacks committed in our zone. The frequency and type of the attacks in zone provided an indicator of the insurgent activity. This can be tricky. For instance, in some cases the insurgents lived in one zone and operated in another. Also, the type of attacks they committed could be a result of friendly forces changing their tactics. As we evolved from mounted to dismounted patrols, IED and RPG attacks decreased dramatically but hand-grenade and small arms attacks increased.

A final indicator came from the attitudes of the population as patrols engaged locals in their neighborhoods.

Each zone in Operation Iraqi Freedom has its own unique challenges. For us, adjusting our established targeting doctrine helped in our fight in Baghdad.

Sun: Brigade Targeting Board
Mon: Brigade Targeting Meeting Brigade Effects Tasking Order (ETO)
     Operations Order (OPORD) Published
Tue: Battalion Targeting Board
Wed: Battalion Targeting Meeting
Thu: Battalion ETO OPORD Published
Fri: Brigade Recon/Surveillance Backbrief
Sat: Battery Commanders' Target Backbrief

Figure 1: Weekly Battle Rhythm

1. Are there paramilitary and terrorist groups operating in our area of
   responsibility (AOR)?
2. What individuals or groups are controlling improvised explosive
   device (IED) attacks in our AOR?
3. Is there a catastrophic attack planned against a BCT forward
   operating base (FOB) or mission area?
4. Is anyone planning a coordinated attack against a BCT checkpoint or
   isolated force (i.e., convoy, patrol, etc.)?
5. Are there any attacks planned to disrupt the power grid?
6. What organized criminal gangs are operating in the BCT AOR?
7. Is anyone planning or executing a civil disturbance in the BCT AOR?

Figure 2: Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Commander's Priority Intelligence
Requirements (PIRs)

With actionable data, engage as acquired:
* Attackers of Coalition Forces Resulting in Serious Injury (SI)/Killed
  in Action (KIA)
* Ansar al Islam/Al Qaeda or Terrorist
* IED Maker
* Black List

With actionable data, plan in ETO cycle:
* Former Regime Loyalist Leader
* Former Regime Loyalist Operator
* Demonstration Agitator
* Demonstration Facilitator
* Ba'ath Members/Meeting Places
* Weapons/Ammo Caches
* Criminals

Figure 3: BCT Targeting Categories of High-Payoff Targets (HPTs)

This article in its entirety is online at the Army's Counterstrike Task Force website: https://counterstrike.army.smil.mil. The article online includes more detailed tactics, techniques and procedures for engaging locals to secure maximum intelligence information, protecting sources and establishing and employing a time-sensitive target force to engage a counterinsurgent threat rapidly.

Ed.

By Lieutenant Colonel Brian J. McKiernan and Major M. Scott Patton

Lieutenant Colonel Brian J. McKiernan commands 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (4-27 FA) which is direct support to the 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Armored Division Artillery (Div Arty) in Germany, and recently returned from 15 months in Iraq. In his previous assignment, he was the S3 of the 2d Infantry Div Arty and S3 of 6-37 FA (Multiple-Launch Rocket System), both at Camp Stanley, Korea. Among other assignments, he commanded B/3-319 FA in the 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. During Operations Desert Shield and Storm, he was an Assistant Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO), also in the 82d Division.

Major M. Scott Patton is the S3 for the 1st Armored Div Arty in Germany. Until recently, he was the S3 of 4-27 FA, deploying with the battalion for 15 months to Iraq. Also in the 1st Armored Division, he was the Brigade FSO for the 2d BCT. Among other assignments, he commanded a Paladin Battery and served as a Battalion FSO and Battalion Fire Direction Officer in 2-82 FA, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. During Operations Desert Shield and Storm, he was a Company FSO in the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division.