3rd ID: a brigade ECOORD in Baghdad for OIF III.

The report came into the TOC [tactical operations center]: a VBIED [vehicle-borne improvised explosive device] had just struck a US checkpoint, killing a Soldier and a large number of Iraqi civilians, including several children. A silence swept over the TOC, and we who had desks elsewhere left the area. I was sitting at my desk thinking about those kids dying when the DCO [deputy commanding officer] came by and snarled at me. "A VBIED just killed a Soldier and a whole bunch of Iraqis! What the hell are you doing about it, ECOORD [effects coordinator]?"

Nothing, I realized, which was his point. I wasn't sure what to do about it, but I knew I'd better start figuring it out. It was my fourth day in the Spartan Brigade.

I went to the IO [information operations] officer, PSYOP [psychological operations] officer, PAO [public affairs officer] and S5 [civil affairs officer] and asked each what we could do. The IO said that he would

craft some event-specific talking points to disseminate to key leaders and individual Soldiers. The PSYOP said we could put a message out over the FM radio station and use a loudspeaker team to disseminate information at the site. The PAO said he would put together a news release for the radio. The S5 said he would call the Iraq Civil Defense Corps and the Baghdad Fire Department and coordinate an emergency HA [humanitarian assistance] drop.

"What the heck is an HA drop?" I asked. He looked at me like I was the dumbest thing walking. Quickly he sketched out what was in various packages and combinations of HA and what was available and on-hand.

I went back into the TOC to gather more facts. The brigade surgeon was briefing the commander on the casualties. "... and, Sir, we're MEDEVACing [medical evacuating] three of the kids to the CSH [combat surgical hospital, pronounced cash]."

"How do we find their parents?" the commander asked. Suddenly, everything the others had told me came into focus.

"Sir, we can put a message out over the radio that the children are being sent to our hospital and give them a point-of-contact," I interjected. He looked at me doubtfully, but said to give it a try.

Later, we found out that two of the families had heard the announcement. One of the children died before the parents could get there, but the other family connected with its child. The family was grateful.

Key leaders contacted their SOIs [spheres of influence] in that area and asked if they thought an HA drop was a good idea. The civilian leaders said they thought emotions were running too high and we needed to hold off for a few days.

SOIs are those local civilian leaders with whom we had established relationships to help accomplish our essential effects tasks (EETs). They were sheiks, government officials, businessmen, religious leaders, Iraqi police and Iraqi Army commanders, or anyone else who could help us understand the population and (or) influence them.

To me, this event captures the essence of what the brigade ECOORD brought to the fight in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) III. We were the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 3rd Infantry Division (3rd ID), transformed into the modular design and engaged in OIF III in eastern Baghdad.

As the brigade ECOORD, I was the guy who initially floated between the various subject matter experts (SMEs) and brought their disparate efforts together in a coordinated, synchronized manner. The ECOORD is not necessarily the lethal/nonlethal effects expert, but he must be familiar with the various means the brigade can bring to bear, from the lethal/kinetic to nonlethal effects, such as IO and PSYOP.

ECOORD Challenges. The ECOORD faces several challenges. However, it is important to remember that BCT operating environments vary greatly, even among brigades that fall under the same headquarters. For example, one of our adjoining units was involved in a very active counterfire fight while we had minimal indirect fire attacks.

So the challenges I am outlining are based on my observations as the ECOORD for the 2nd BCT, 3rd ID, during OIF III.

If the ECOORD is a non-branch-qualified major, one of the biggest challenges for him will be to coordinate the efforts of several other majors to maximize their benefits. I was fortunate in that I joined the brigade staff in Iraq, and it was already well integrated and had a terrific teamwork ethic.

In other units, that may not be the case, and being a non-branch-qualified major could inhibit the ECOORD's ability to do his job. Those circumstances warrant the ECOORD's being a lieutenant colonel. Ideally, the various members of the effects team would fall under him for rating purposes as well.

The current modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) titles the position "Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD)" in the brigade "Command Section" paragraph. The FSCOORD is to be an FA lieutenant colonel, one of three on the brigade staff.

In our brigade, I was a major and called the "ECOORD." The brigade staff lieutenant colonels were the executive officer (XO) and S3; the DCO was a colonel, a wartime-rank only.

By current MTOE, there is also an FA major in the effects section and an FA captain assigned to the nonlethal section. This is a somewhat mysterious delineation, especially when viewing the other members of those sections. The effects section strongly resembles the old fire support element (FSE) while the nonlethal section consists of IO, PSYOP, brigade judge advocate, electronic attack, civil affairs (CA) and a targeting chief warrant officer three (CW3). A CW4 targeting warrant is also in the effects section.

In the 2nd BCT, the DCO stepped up and supported me with his rank and position. This was critical; he championed the nonlethal effects process for the brigade.

* There are still challenges ahead to work out the synchronization and integration of nonlethal operations and kinetic (combat) operations. Unfortunately, many maneuver leaders see them as distinctly separate and only modestly related. My role as the ECOORD seemed to be more deconfliction as opposed to integration and synchronization. I expect this to change as more commanders begin to grasp the inherent ties between the nonlethal and kinetic operations.

There is a clearly defined staff planning process for what used to be known simply as "operations." Somehow in the turbulence of the war on terrorism and transformation, we have lost sight of this deliberate process and further convoluted it by creating an artificial separation between nonlethal and kinetic operations. When conducting effects-based operations (EBO), a raid or cordon and search is simply another means of achieving the commander's desired effects.

The ECOORD is the ideal position to straddle both of these spheres and keep them synchronized. As an attendee at the lethal targeting meetings and decision briefs, I ensured that our nonlethal efforts complemented kinetic operations. As the primary organizer and facilitator of the effects meetings (the DCO or brigade commander chaired them), I needed to be fluent in all PS YOP, IO, PAO and civil military operations (CMO) efforts.

Additionally, the ECOORD is well suited to coordinate these areas as force multipliers to achieve the commander's desired effects. Unfortunately, too many maneuver commanders seem to be oriented on combat operations. Clearly the kinetic aspect of our operations was the "glass ball" that cannot be dropped. However, I saw it as the primary effort in only a few instances.

* Another challenge was determining appropriate staff boundaries. The S3 and the brigade ECOORD must create the relationship synergy to make EBO work. The brigade S3 has a clearly defined traditional role. The ECOORD is not nearly as well defined (hence this article).

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In many instances, there was room for misunderstanding between the S3 and ECOORD. Fortunately, I had a superb S3 who was an exemplary team player, and we worked through all issues quickly.

The ECOORD must cultivate a strong relationship with the S3 that facilitates accomplishing the mission. He must understand all the resources the brigade can bring to bear on a problem and help the S3 attack problems on multiple fronts, ranging from raids and airstrikes to tactical loudspeaker teams to mutual back-scratching with SOIs through funding infrastructure projects.

One conclusion that I came away with is that the ECOORD cannot be subordinate to the S3. That would create an untenable relationship that would not facilitate the give-and-take needed to create the synergy for nonlethal and kinetic operations. This line of reasoning goes back to the basic concept of EBO (all efforts support achieving the commander's desired effects). The traditional model of the S3-fire support officer (FSO) relationship for combat operations is still appropriate.

* There is some debate in the field about who is best suited to be the ECOORD in stability and reconstruction operations (S & RO). Some think the IO officer should "wear the ECOORD hat" because he is the SME for IO and PSYOP (clearly major players on the current battlefield).

However, there are two major challenges with an IO officer's serving as the ECOORD. IO officers come from a myriad of backgrounds (ours was Signal) and have little or no experience in synchronizing/coordinating diverse elements across the battlespace. The expertise needed for these types of tasks are difficult to train. Artillerymen train to synchronize and coordinate diverse elements and practice their skills during rotations at the combat training centers (CTCs).

The difficulty facing IO officers is the very nature of IO. Current training for IO officers consists of a three-week course in IO. To compound this, much of the experience to date is of questionable value, at best, due to the evolving nature of IO as the Army continues to "adjust fire" in that area. This lack of synchronizing/coordinating experience combined with the fluid nature of IO doctrine make it very difficult for an IO officer to succeed as the ECOORD.

The S3 already has a full-time job planning and executing ground operations. Just as the brigade FSO coordinates indirect fires to work in conjunction with maneuver, the S3 needs that same expertise applied to nonlethal fires.

Synchronization and deconfliction are the "bread-and-butter" of fire support officers at every level from company to division. Historically, this has involved maneuver, artillery, rockets, mortars, attack aviation, close air support (CAS) and even naval gunfire. In a high-intensity conflict, those again will need to be synchronized and deconflicted. In current operations in Iraq, other things need to be synchronized and coordinated. Institutional knowledge, practice and experience come together to make the fire support officer the ideal ECOORD to coordinate lethal and nonlethal effects.

Without the ECOORD synchronizing and integrating all kinetic and nonlethal efforts, the BCT still would move forward because of the extra efforts of the team members. But just imagine how much faster and more powerful the brigade performance is with the ECOORD coordinating these efforts in a single complementary, reinforcing direction.

Major S. Mark McMillion is an Assistant Fire Support Coordinator (AFSCOORD) for the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart, Georgia. In his previous assignment, he taught in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the US Military Academy at West Point. Among other assignments, he commanded A Battery, 1st Battalion, 19th Field Artillery (Basic Training) (A/1-19 FA) at the Field Artillery Training Center, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and served as an Assistant Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO), Company FSO and Platoon Leader in 2-3 FA plus as a Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) Platoon Leader, all in the 1st Armored Division in Germany. He holds an MS from Ohio State University.

By Major S. Mark McMillion

RELATED ARTICLE: 3rd ID: S5 in the 2nd BCT

The 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 3rd Infantry Division (3rd ID), had a civil affairs (CA) officer (S5 or now the S9) as a new position on the brigade staff. He was an active duty major with a CA functional area.

The institutional training for these CA officers is intense. They train for nine to 12 months before becoming a qualified CA officer. This includes regional and cultural training as well as a language course.

The S5 is integral to all parts of lethal and nonlethal operations. In addition to managing the Reserve Component CA company assigned to the brigade, the S5 coordinates all civil-military operations (CMO) for the BCT. Here are some of the key tasks the 2nd BCT S5 was responsible for.

Coordinate with the Iraqi emergency services. This included establishing and maintaining a relationship with the Baghdad Fire Department and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. These emergency agencies coordinated all emergency services from ambulance to fire throughout the city. The S5 met with or talked to these key Iraqi leaders weekly to maintain and foster the relationship.

Work with Iraqi election officials. The S5's role was to establish and foster relationships with key election officials, including the time-consuming development and maintenance of a sphere of influence (SOI) book for the local leaders. The national referendum in October 2005 followed by the national elections in December were the BCT's main efforts. The S5's critical task gave the BCT commander situational awareness of the overall election process.

Our BCT had more than half the Baghdad local civil government within its area of operations. This included five local councils that consisted of a minimum of 20 councilmen each (not including the sub-councils). Managing the individual personalities and each council's unique problems was a challenge.

Manage CMO funds. The S5 had the project purchasing officer (PPO) in his section. The PPO was responsible for all commander emergency response project (CERP) funds. The S5 was the honest broker when it came to managing these funds. Even though the "lion's share" of the funds went to the US Army Corp of Engineers, the S5 shared responsibility with the engineers to ensure that all CMO projects met the commander's intent.

MAJ John H. Stone, IN

S5, 2nd BCT, 3rd ID, OIF III

RELATED ARTICLE: Electronic TFTs Update

The Firing Tables and Ballistics (FTaB) Division has completed populating the artillery and mortar electronic tabular firing tables (ETFT) on Army Knowledge Online (AKO) websites and has created a site for the small arms ETFTs. The next update will be the armor ETFT website.

ETFTs found on other websites cannot be guaranteed to be current--only the ETFTs located on the FTaB AKO website is guaranteed to be current.

The response to the website since its launching in July 2005 has been excellent. As a result, FTaB has implemented a number of suggestions to make the site more user friendly. First, locating the ETFT websites on AKO is now easier.

Second, the subscription process is simpler; however, FTaB will not automatically approve any subscription request. This has been implemented to protect Soldiers and Marines from unauthorized individuals receiving the information and using the information against them.

For the Soldier to gain access to the ETFTs, he must first sign onto AKO and search for the "TFT" site. The subscriber then clicks on the "Profile" for the desired TFT website. When the site opens, he clicks on "Register" on the menu bar at the top of the profile window. A window will open asking him to send a request to the FTaB publications team.

Upon receipt of the subscriber's request for access to the ETFTs, the FTaB publications team will send an email requesting additional information to determine if mission needs warrant access to the ETFTs. The subscriber must respond from his AKO email address. Based on the information received, the FTaB publication team will either approve or disapprove access.

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Once granted, the subscriber can access the ETFTs from around the globe 24 hours a day for the rest of the calendar year. At the end of the calendar year, FTaB will query the subscriber base and request confirmation that access for the next year is required. If a subscriber does not respond, his subscription will be terminated and he must request a new subscription if he requires further access.

The leadership in Marine units can establish access to the ETFTs on AKO by contacting the Marine Corps Detachment at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, at [phone] or 3897 or DSN 639-6498 or 3897.

When new or updated TFTs are available, FTaB will send announcements using the AKO Army-wide announcement system and the respective branch journal publications. Further, the site is set up so that, if a new document is added, subscribers automatically receive an update notification.

Andrew E. Graber

Firing Tables and Ballistics Division

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD