3d ID in OIF: fires for the distributed battlefield: Brigadier General Lloyd J. Austin III Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) for the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

"Mission: On order, the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) attacks in zone to defeat the 11th Infantry Division and seize crossing sites over the Euphrates River vicinity of An Nasiriyah in order to set the conditions for continued attacks north to the Republican Guard Forces. On order, 3d ID (M) attacks in zone to destroy the Medina Division in order to isolate Baghdad from the south and set the conditions for the removal of the Saddam Hussein's regime." Taken from the "3d ID (M) After-Action Review (AAR)," June, 2003.

Big Picture: In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the 3d ID's battlespace was 16,000 square kilometers--four times the size of the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California--with a 720-kilometer route along the western side of the Euphrates River from Kuwait to Baghdad; the division took only 18 days to take the presidential palaces in Baghdad. (See the map on Page 3.)

Q The 3d ID AAR states, "Artillery is key to successful combined arms fires." What is your assessment of the cannon and rocket support in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)?

A The cannon and rocket artillery support was absolutely magnificent. We crossed the berm into Iraq with no reinforcing artillery. We only had our four organic Div Arty [division artillery] assets of three Paladin battalions and our division MLRS [multiple-launch rocket systems] battalion. The 214th FA Brigade with one MLRS battalion was assigned a mission of GSR [general support reinforcing] to the division on 30 March.

Now, ask any infantry man if he has enough artillery, and he always will answer, "No." Before we crossed the line of departure, I asked for more artillery--I am an infantryman.

But we won decisively; so one could argue that we had enough artillery. We made good use of joint fires--CAS [close air support] was on target and available most of the times we needed it, so that was a success story.

Having a lot of artillery really becomes key when you're fighting on noncontiguous battlefield--when you bare brigades employed over vast distances. Their direct support [DS] artillery battalions naturally will follow them. Massing fires is more challenging on that battlefield.

Once again, you could build the argument that we had enough artillery because we won, but I would have liked to have had more going into the fight.

Q During OIF, Paladins and the Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicles (BFISTs) were used in combat operations for the first time. Were you pleased with their performance?

A I was extremely pleased with the performance of Paladins and BFISTs during OIF. Our Paladins delivered responsive, accurate fires, usually within a couple of minutes of receiving a call-for-fire. They provided effective fires from any place, just about any time. They did not need an "artillery position area"--a concept we've grown up with. They shot from the sides of roads and a number of other impromptu positions.

The BFISTs enabled our artillerymen to keep up with their combat arms brethren during the fight that, from time to time, was pretty intense. From their BFISTs, artillerymen could acquire targets with 10-digit resolution and rapidly call for fire by voice.

Artillerymen had to direct fire BFISTs on occasion. Very few vehicles on this battlefield were not engaged by some sort of fire--or both direct and indirect fires. Certainly, the Div Arty TOC [tactical operations center] and my TAC [tactical command post] received indirect fire and were subject to ambushes along fire routes to Baghdad. Fighting distributed operations over a large area requires all soldiers to be prepared to employ all weapons available.

Q How did your FA do in urban operations?

A The Field Artillery did well in urban operations. Once we determined a target would be engaged best by 155-mm fires, we employed Paladin, principally with HE [high-explosive] rounds. We stayed away from DPICM [dual-purpose improved conventional munitions] in urban areas for obvious reasons [potential for unexploded bomblets].

We engaged the enemy in heavily fortified buildings with CAS, using JDAM [joint direct attack munition] as the preferred weapon. When it was more difficult to pinpoint a specific target, then Paladin was the preferred weapon. We were very adept at quickly recommending the best weapon for a particular target. Across the spectrum, the joint fires system worked.

Q The 3d Division used MLRS in close support on several occasions. What are your thoughts on rockets in the close fight?

A Part of our ability to use MLRS effectively in the close fight is our training level. Of course, in training, we did not fire MLRS in close support of our troops. However, during that training, we had sufficient control measures in place and SOPs [standing operating procedures] to ensure we understood what we could and could not do with MLRS safely within risk estimate distances [REDs]. So when we needed to fire MLRS in combat, we could do it safely.

I can remember two instances where we employed MLRS in the close fight. One was at Objective Floyd near the town of An Najaf when the 3-7 Cav [3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry] was heavily engaged with an enemy force and was trying to break contact. We used MLRS close-in [1,200 meters] extremely effectively. MLRS was instrumental in keeping those soldiers alive. I think that if you asked the 3-7 Cav commander about his MLRS support, he would say MLRS saved the day.

Another instance was when the 2d Brigade made the initial attack into Baghdad at Highway 8. We knew enemy forces were occupying some fortified positions along the route, so we employed MLRS two kilometers in from of the 2d Brigade to set the conditions for its attack. It was very effective.

Q What should be the balance between FA DPICM and HE in future combat? Does the FA need precision-guided munitions?

A The balance of HE and DPICM is METT-T [mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available]-dependent. And you absolutely need HE in urban terrain.

In terms of precision-guided munitions, we employed SADARM [sense and destroy armor munition, a cannon-delivered precision-guided munition] in Iraq, and it was incredible.

We fired SADARM in a couple of cases--I remember one well. We were just west and north of the town of An Najaf, preparing to move to the Karbala Gap. The enemy kept sending down reconnaissance forces, BMPs and some tanks to try to determine where we were. We killed a number of them quickly with SADARM--that's a keeper.

In the same vein, MLRS has the potential to be even more valuable on the battlefield, even in urban terrain, if there were an HE variant of the MLRS rocket. Further, a precision-guided rocket presumably would reduce risk estimate distances, giving DPICM more versatility for the close fight.

There is need on the battlefield for some artillery precision-guided munitions. Now, the Field Artillery must lead the debate about what the balance of munitions should be.

Q What command, control and communications challenges did you face on such a large battlespace ? What improvements would you recommend for the mechanized force?

A We need to be able to talk, voice, over large distances, and we can only do that with tactical satellite [TACSAT] radios. Fortunately, we had that capability in this fight, which proved to be critical. We could not have prosecuted the fight the way we did with line-of-sight communications.

At one point in time, we controlled maneuver and allocated resources over an expanse of about 300 kilometers from my TAC. I had a brigade in contact around An Najaf and a brigade fighting back at As Samawah, and we were delivering fires with CAS in the Karbala Gap. We had crystal clear communications between all of the headquarters. In addition, using "blue force tracking," another command and control system, I always knew where all our friendly forces were.

We had TACSAT down to the brigade command post level during this fight. I think our FOs [forward observers] and COLTs [combat observation lasing teams] would benefit from TACSAT radios--I want them down to the lowest level I can get them.

The issue is not the radios themselves, but the bandwidth--getting enough satellites with the appropriate bandwidth to support all those radios. We must move forward in this arena.

We also must be able to push data digitally across the battlefield at the speed and distances we need it. In the future, brigades are going to continue to fight with large battlespaces, so their DS battalions must be able to talk digitally to the Div Arty over long distances.

Q What other capabilities would you like the FA to have in the future?

A In the future, we're going to fight the same kind of fight. It might be shorter in duration, but we'll move rapidly and cover great distances. And we will have to be agile enough to fight a number of different threats at one time. Because of the requirements of this future battlefield, we need more radars.

I would like to see two more Q-37s and another Q-36 in the heavy division. We did well with our Firefinder radars in Operation Iraqi Freedom only because the Div Arty commander, myself and all of his great smart guys, worked together continuously to make sure we could leapfrog the radars to maintain continuous coverage--that was a challenge. The distances we had to cover were significant, and maintaining a counterfire capability was critical.

The Iraqis had a lot of artillery. Fortunately, they could not use it anywhere nearly as effectively as we could. They couldn't adjust fires or acquire targets as well. If they'd had those skills, it would have been much more difficult. I mean, they had a lot of artillery.

In a heavy division, if you're going to fight with less artillery, then you need four cannon battalions of artillery organic to the Div Arty. That allows you to resource the division Cav, which in Iraq, got into some pretty intense fighting on several occasions. In Iraq, we took a battery away from a DS battalion to support 3-7 Cav. That's not something we want to have to do in the future.

This is a tough force structure issue, but we're going to have to take a look at it. If we're going to fight with less artillery and move great distances rapidly in distributed operations, then we need more capabilities in the Div Arty.

Q In OIF, what frustrated you the most, in terms of fire support and why? What do we need to do to fix that?

A The enemy frustrated me the most It was tough to figure out where he was and what he was going to do next so we could apply our fires systems effectively enough to neutralize him.

We have some good intelligence processes, but we need more precise information on an elusive enemy for the artillery to engage his formations and more effectively determine the outcome. The enemy in Iraq had learned from being bombed for 10 years. That enemy made it tough to "see" him with our satellite imagery or aircraft flying overhead; for example, he positioned towed artillery underneath highway overpasses and tanks and BMPs under palm trees.

Q What happened in the Mother of All Sandstorms--visibility at 100 meters, winds gusting to 50 knots, Iraqi forces all around fighting fiercely?

A Have you got a couple of hours? Basically, we dealt with it because our equipment and our systems were more capable than the enemy's. Our training is such that our soldiers were confident in their ability to do what they had to do. They have sandstorms in Kuwait where we spent a fair amount of time training before crossing the border into Iraq. So, we knew what to expect.

Ground-based indirect fires were absolutely critical during the Mother of All Sandstorms. The enemy lobbed mortars or artillery at us, and our radars detected his systems for howitzers or MLRS to quickly negate his indirect fire. Also, our tanks fired in that sandstorm.

What a lot of people don't know is that during that sandstorm, we used joint fires very effectively. JSTARS [join surveillance and target attack radar system] acquired targets, and we subsequently engaged them with CAS and other means. When we had good enough target data, high-flying CAS aircraft flew above the sandstorm and engaged targets.

Q Overall, were FA fires effective for the 3d ID?

A We fought for 21 days, including our artillery. We fired almost 14,000 155-mm rounds and 794 MLRS rockets--that's a lot of shooting. We fired 91 counterfire missions, which means the Iraqi forces were shooting at us 91 times in 21 days. On numerous occasions the artillery, both cannon and MLRS, delivered effective fires in very short order and helped bring about positive outcomes.

By the time the major combat in Iraq was over, our soldiers had immense confidence in their artillery's ability to shape future fights, support the close fight, acquire the enemy once he fired and execute counterfire effectively.

Operation Iraqi Freedom was truly a success story for the Field Artillery.

Q What do we need to change in training to better prepare for future combat?

A We have the best training m the world. It prepared us to fight a multi-faceted enemy in a multi-dimensional fight, an enemy who initially surprised us with his ferociousness. It is our training that enabled us to adjust to that enemy very quickly.

In Iraq, I was close to our gunners everyday; my TAC was positioned behind the brigades and just forward of the artillery. Everyday, I saw artillerymen doing exactly what they trained to do at home station and the CTCs [Combat Training Centers]. They didn't hesitate or have to stop and think about what to do. They just fired their weapons very effectively.

Now having said all that, we still can improve our training. We've got to find a way to better replicate the effects of artillery fires at our CTCs--admittedly that's not easy to do. But we must give credit in training for the impact artillery fires have on the outcome of the fight.

And that means not only outgoing artillery fires, but also incoming fires. If the enemy is putting even semi-effective artillery fires on you, it has a tremendous impact on your ability to do what you need to do. We must train to that.

We need to train more with the Div Arty engaged in the CTCs as a headquarters, so we all become accustomed to FA battalions answering the Div Arty's call for massed fires or whatever. We do some of that training now at the CTCs, but we need to take that training to the next level. When the division goes into a fight, the Div Arty is a critical piece of it.

We also need more urban operations training--we need to develop TTPs [tactics, techniques and procedures] to be more effective in this arena. Urban areas are where people live, and that's where we are going to fight in the future.

Q What message would you like to send Army and Marine Field Artillerymen stationed around the world?

A The artillery did a great job of delivering fires in Iraq due to your great soldiers and their NCO leaders. We have excellent equipment, but if we had given our equipment to the Iraqis, we still would have won. That's because of our well-disciplined, well-trained soldiers and their NCO leaders, starting at the top with the 3d Infantry Division sergeant major through the Div Arty sergeant major all the way down to the gun crews and observers.

We need to maintain the high standards that allowed us to adapt and adjust to this elusive enemy. At the same time, we need to understand that "the future enemy" also learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom. In the next war, he will be different, maybe a lot tougher.

There's a place on the future battlefield for well-delivered artillery fires as part of the joint fires system. It takes a combination of fires to have a complete arsenal.

Brigadier General (Promotable) Lloyd J. Austin III was the Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver in the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Recently, he took command of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) at Fort Drum, New York, and deployed the division (minus) to Afghanistan where he serves as the Deputy Commanding General, Combined-Joint Task Force 180. In previous assignments, he served as the Chief of the Joint Operations Division (J3) on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon; and G3 for the 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Also in the 82d Division, he commanded the 3d Brigade; the 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment; and a combat support company. In addition, he commanded a US Army recruiting battalion. He holds a Master of Education from Auburn University in Alabama and a Master of Business Management from Webster University in Missouri.