3d ID BFIST in OIF: simultaneous direct and indirect fire at the tip of the spear.

"On target! On target! They flattened the damn thing!"

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

These were the first words I spoke across my internal intercom sitting in the turret of my M7 Bradley fire support vehicle (BSFV) as 36 rounds of 155-mm high explosive (HE) fired by 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery (1-9 FA), our direct support (DS) artillery battalion, destroyed an Iraqi outpost 900 meters from the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. Within minutes, our supported infantry company (B/3-15 IN) crossed the border into Iraq and began clearing the passage lanes for the remainder of our 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized).

Passing through the destroyed outpost, we observed the devastating effects of the artillery up close. In an area where two buildings and an observation tower once stood, a smoldering pile of rubble remained. Within an hour of the assault into Iraq, our Bradley fire support team (BFIST) had initiated the first indirect fire mission from Iraqi sand, destroying a BMP (Russian-made armored personnel carrier).

From those first few moments across the border until the day we occupied one of the former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's palaces in Baghdad, our BFSV traveled more than 1,200 kilometers as our team experienced 23 days of sustained combat operations.

The BFSV in Formation. The BFSV proved to be a lethal, reliable platform for the FIST to operate from and transmit quick accurate indirect fire missions. Its maneuverability, armored protection and direct fire system enhanced our ability to provide our company indirect fires throughout the conflict.

The BFSV's weapon systems and armor protection allowed the BFIST to aggressively maneuver on the battlefield to initiate and observe indirect fires. During all movements, we positioned the BFSV near the company commander and behind the lead platoon of the company for the best tactical advantage.

In column formation, this allowed the BFIST to quickly move to the front of the company to observe any targets that appeared. During column movement, alternate observer responsibilities went to the lead platoon. This was because the BFIST could acquire any targets almost simultaneously due to its ability to rapidly maneuver to the front of the company and get "eyes on" the target without assuming any more risk than that assumed by the maneuver Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs) in the lead platoon. When moving in a wedge, the BFIST, again, could move quickly in any direction to support any element in contact needing indirect fire support.

The most important factor is the BFIST's freedom of maneuver on the battlefield. My company commander considered his fire support officer (FSO) his wingman. Although the BFIST traveled in proximity to the company commander's Bradley, the FSO had the authority to quickly reposition in the moving formation to assess the need for indirect fire when an enemy threat appeared or was likely.

The commander considered the assault toward Baghdad as one long movement-to-contact. The rapid assault toward Baghdad consisted of the maneuver formation reaching speeds of more than 30 kilometers per hour sustained for hours at a time while maneuvering through treacherous desert terrain. The BFSV allowed the BFIST to maneuver within the company BFV formation and never have to "catch up," a feat the old fire support team vehicle (FISTV) would not have been able to accomplish.

Hasty Occupation. We established hasty defenses after many long movements in our attack toward Baghdad. We occupied these defensive positions for no longer than 24 hours, most less than 12 hours.

Once the company established its perimeter, the BFIST positioned inside where it could observe any pre-planned targets (and registered with mortars) during the hasty indirect fire planning process. If there were no pre-planned targets, the BFIST positioned to observe the enemy's most likely avenue of approach (AA).

Although we were part of the company's perimeter, we were not included in the company direct fire plan. The team needed the freedom to maneuver within the company perimeter to observe for targets of opportunity.

On 30 March, our maneuver company received a mission to establish several blocking positions along Highway 9, just south of Karbala and approximately 80 kilometers south of Baghdad. As the northernmost element of the brigade, the company's task was to block any enemy attack along Highway 9 and several other high-speed AAs to facilitate the brigade's rapid assault north.

The company quickly established a defense consisting of several key blocking positions spread out over three kilometers. Just after positioning the BFSV along a high-speed AA to observe a preplanned target, a platoon 400 meters away came in contact with snipers from a building. Due to limited visibility, the BFIST quickly moved to the platoon in contact and, after positioning within its perimeter, acquired the target and destroyed the threat with an immediate suppression artillery mission.

The BFIST maintained that position for several hours until it moved 800 meters to another platoon's blocking position when the platoon came into contact. We had assigned a pre-planned target to protect the position.

We continued to occupy the position for the next 12 hours. It was in this position that our BFSV had its first direct fire engagement with enemy vehicles and soldiers attempting to penetrate the platoon perimeter. Although we engaged several targets with direct fire, BFVs in the platoon always overlapped our direct fire sector.

In every perimeter, the maneuver unit clearly understood our BFIST could reposition on a moment's notice and didn't count on us to cover a specific sector with direct fire. The urban environment we often fought from did not allow us to remain static and observe from one location. Our priority to engage and destroy the enemy with indirect fires never changed.

Indirect and Direct Fire Simultaneously. The BFSV's direct fire capabilities and armored protection became extremely evident during the company's most intense battle at a four-way cloverleaf overpass in southern Baghdad along Highway 8, known as Objective Curly. On 7 April, the company received the mission to establish a blocking position to protect the brigade lines of communication (LOC) from enemy counterattack. As the two armor-heavy task forces (TF 1-64 and TF 4-64) from the brigade were making the violent push into downtown Baghdad, we came under a fierce attack as the enemy fought to overrun our position in an attempt to cut the brigade's LOC along Highway 8.

Although dangerously exposed to rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and small arms fire, our BFIST positioned on top of the overpass in the center of Objective Curly while the company fought below. This position afforded excellent observation of most of the surrounding area in all directions.

Our BFIST maintained this position for more than four hours, engaging enemy vehicles with the 25-mm main gun while simultaneously initiating artillery and mortar fire missions. These missions included two danger-close artillery missions at less than 400 meters away from armored friendly forces.

The BFIST occupied this exposed position because it was the most advantageous terrain from which to execute the fire support mission. RPG shrapnel and small arms fire hit the BFSV, but its armor allowed us to maintain our position.

Throughout the 2d BCT, BFSVs sustained direct hits from RPG and small arms fire on many occasions and continued to execute their fire support mission. The armored protection and direct fire weapons on the BFSV allowed the FIST to aggressively maneuver itself where it could tactically occupy and defend an observation post while looking into the teeth of the enemy.

BFSV Battle Drill. Throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the gunner and FSO simultaneously engaged enemy threats with both direct and indirect fires when it was critical to accomplishing the mission. Both need to train extensively in the operation and trouble-shooting of the BFSV weapons. The gunner needs to be able to scan and engage close enemy threats with the 25-mm main gun and coax machine gun quickly. He must be able to switch back and forth from FIST mode to direct fire mode rapidly.

During OIF, we initiated danger-close fire missions and engaged approaching suicide bombers in vehicles with direct fire while waiting for the command of "Shot" from the battalion fire direction center (FDC). This simultaneous execution required extensive coordination between the BFSV commander, gunner and driver. By equipping the driver with binoculars, he served as an additional target acquisition asset.

The FSO's ability to scan from the commander's hatch with binoculars while the gunner scanned from within the turret paid huge dividends during combat operations when engaging with direct fires and requesting fire missions. This allowed the FSO to guide the gunner onto indirect targets, lase the grid with the Bradley eye-safe laser range finder (BELRF), obtain the target location data via the target station control panel (TSCP) and return to scanning for other threats. The FSO then could keep eyes on the target and observe the indirect fire mission.

Our BFIST developed this crew drill during Bradley gunnery tables and live-fire exercises conducted in Kuwait before combat operations.

On Objective Curly, there was a fire mission that, after initiation using the BELRF and TSCP, the FSO observed and adjusted without the help of the BFSV's sights as the gunner continued to scan for other indirect targets and engage the enemy with direct fire when appropriate. However, while under enemy fire, the FSO cannot always provide a second set of eyes, and the BFSV's sight system becomes the team's only acquisition capability.

For combat conditions when fighting buttoned up, the FSO's visibility is severely restricted and the use of binoculars is difficult with such a limited field of vision. The BFIST's proficiency in using the integrated sight unit (ISU) and TSCP is critical in maintaining the ability to acquire indirect fire targets and defend itself. The TSCP proved to be a very user-friendly device that allows the BFIST to retrieve all necessary data quickly to process a fire mission.

The ability to scan and engage targets with both direct and indirect fires simultaneously while under fire was the ultimate proof of the BFSV's combat survivability.

The team must resist the temptation to pursue direct fire targets and abandon its primary mission to provide fire support. With fire support as its focus, the BFSV gives the team the ability to provide its own defense while accurately acquiring indirect fire targets.

The numerous fire missions executed by 2d BCT fire supporters on the offensive assault toward Baghdad were a result of the aggressive positioning of the BFISTs at the tip of the spear.

By First Lieutenant Richard R. Aaron, Jr.

First Lieutenant Richard R. Aaron, Jr., was a Company Fire Support Officer (FSO) in a Bradley Fire Support Vehicle (BSFV) with the 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery (1-9 FA) in support of the 2d Brigade Combat Team in the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) during major combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). He was the FSO for B Company, 3-15 IN, for 19 months, including during combat in OIF. He was awarded a Bronze Star for his actions on Objective Curly and throughout combat operations. He currently serves as a Paladin Platoon Leader in C Battery, 1-9 FA, at Fort Stewart, Georgia. He can be contacted at [e-mail].