3-16 FA, 4th ID: conducting elections in Iraq.

Fires and fire supporters have played a key role in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). But in many cases, the task force fire support officer (FSO) has filled other roles in the task force in addition to that of fire support. As replacement units arrive in theater, the role of fires will likely be reduced even further and FSOs at all levels will be filling positions such as information operations (IO) officer (S7) and civil-military operations (CMO) officer (S5). These jobs can be both challenging and rewarding.

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In Task Force 3d Battalion, 67th Armor (TF 3-67 AR), the TF FSO was also the S5. Part of his duties involved overseeing elections at several levels of the Iraqi government.

This article provides an overview of some of the challenges associated with those elections and the ways that they were resolved. FSOs who will be deploying in support of OIF or another theater where democracy is to be established likely will have to deal with similar issues.

The process of establishing democracy in Iraq has been rather problematic. The issues of fairness and legitimacy have been a concern for the Iraqi people in every election conducted by TF 3-67 AR. In an area where a census has not been completed for about 35 years, it is difficult to determine how the voting process should work.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has been working with various groups and agencies to determine the best way to handle the election process. Meanwhile, people across Iraq were clamoring for elections of any kind for Coalition Forces to oversee. The result has been a hybrid of election techniques and procedures that the CPA will have to sort through and incoming Coalition units will have to repair.

The discussion must begin with a clarification of election terms. The words "election" and "selection" both have been used to describe the process of choosing government officials in Iraq. The process was neither a general election like we are familiar with in the United States (not everyone over the age of 18 voted) nor a process where a group of people appointed or selected by a leader are then imposed on the people against their will.

The process was a group of people voting by writing on a secret ballot the names of the people they thought were right for the positions. The people who voted were the respected leaders of the communities whose decisions were trusted by the people in the villages and tribes. The word "election" appears to do more justice to the process than the word "selection."

Three factors made the election process in Iraq difficult: a lack of understanding of the existing governmental structure and its connection to geographic boundaries, a lack of clear guidance from civilian and military authorities who were establishing the new Iraqi government and pressure on unit commanders from the local population to hold elections.

Government Structure. Each local village, town and city has a governing body of some sort, usually the local tribal sheik or other senior leader. Larger than the local municipalities are nahiahs, which are several villages and towns in relatively close proximity--similar to a county in the US. Nahiahs are subordinate to the kada'a, which is made up of several nahiahs. Likewise, several kada'a make up a province.

Due to the lack of modern mapping and proper governmental survey or communications, it is not always clear exactly what villages and towns make up a nahiah. It is easier to determine boundaries higher up in the government structure, but it still can be unclear. It appears that most Iraqi leaders at the nahiah level do not know all the little villages that make up their nahiah. A village that would appear to belong to a particular nahiah, for some reason doesn't, and it is not clear which nahiah it belongs to.

To add to the confusion, the Coalition area of responsibility (AOR) boundaries did not coincide with the existing governmental boundaries. The TF 3-67 AR AOR has parts of three kada'a in it. Of those, only one has the seat of the kada'a government in the TF 3-67 AR AOR. The TF has four nahiah in its AOR. Only two of those nahiah fall under the jurisdiction of the kada'a seat of government in the AOR. The other two nahiah under TF 3-67 AR's control each belong to two other kada'a. It is difficult to conduct elections in such a confusing environment.

Lack of Guidance. For the elections to be legitimate, the results of the elections had to be reported to the next higher level of government. Because other nahiahs within a kada'a were under the control of other US units, their elections were handled differently.

While elections were going on across the country, many commanders knew nothing of nahiah or kada'a levels of government while others thought those were the most important levels at which to establish governing bodies initially. This created confusion within the brigade combat teams (BCTs) because there were no standardized instructions on these different levels of government and issues and no clear guidance on how to proceed with the elections.

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Pressure from Iraqis for Elections.

While the CPA was working on establishing the higher government, the people of Iraq were clamoring for local elections in their towns and villages. Commanders worked out local election rules as best they could by applying the little guidance received from the CPA. This led to non-standardized elections across the country.

While the CPA was drafting a constitution and working to establish the national levels of government, some commanders thought it best to follow the CPA model in holding elections "top down." They thought that because the Iraqi national and provincial governments were being emplaced by the CPA. brigades and battalions should be working on kada'a and nahiah elections and then work on local village town elections later.

Other commanders thought the "bottom up" process best. This created a pool of candidates for elections at higher levels of government that were trusted by the population because the people had elected them.

Elections were held both ways, resulting in a lack of consistency. All the election models had merit, but there was no authority telling commanders which model to use or providing instructions on how to use it.

Despite these issues, commanders were under pressure from the Iraqi people to hold elections in their AORs. Elections were one of the main topics at every town meeting attended by Coalition Forces. Iraqis wanted democracy, and they wanted it now. The goal of Coalition Forces is to transfer authority and responsibility back to the Iraqi people and what better way to do that than to allow the people to chose their own leaders who would help resolve the many issues of the cities.

This pressure to transfer that authority created some hasty decisions that later led to questions of fairness and legitimacy in some areas.

Ultimately, elections in the TF 3-67 AR's AOR were a hybrid of the top-down and bottom-up processes. The first election was held in the city of Khalis for the kada'a council. A 20-member council was chosen to govern the entire Khalis Kada'a.

All of the known leaders (tribal, religious, community--several dozen in all) came together at a designated time. Of the larger group, a smaller number, about 40, agreed to serve on the council if chosen. The names of those individuals were written on a blackboard, and ballots were passed out to all present. Each person voted for 20 individuals. The 20 with the most votes were the new Khalis Kada'a council. Of those, one was selected to be the mayor.

The mayor's role is much larger than that of mayor of a city. He is responsible for the city of Khalis itself as well as the several nahiahs that make up the Khalis Kada'a. The mayor can be compared to the position of county commissioner in the US.

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This went well, and there were relatively few issues or problems with the process. After that was complete, the focus shifted to the nahiah level of governing council.

The citizens were much more interested in elections at the nahiah level than the kada'a level. Tribal and community leaders had traditionally taken their city's issues and problems to the muhktar or single nahiah leader, which was being replaced by elected nahiah councils. (See the figure.) This was a dramatic change and brought a fair amount of anxiety. The largest obstacle was reassuring the local leaders that the voting process would be as fair as possible.

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During the course of three months, TF 3-67. AR oversaw elections in three nahiahs. Each was handled slightly differently, but the result was the same for all: a council of 20 chosen to represent all the people of the nahiah equally. The process was all similar to the kada'a election in that a group of several dozen leaders came together, a smaller number agreed to serve if selected and the entire group voted by secret ballot with the top 20 vote-getters chosen as the new council. Of that council, one was chosen, again by secret ballot, to be the mayor of that nahiah. The process was a learning experience for TF 3-67 AR, with subsequent elections better than the ones before.

In the last nahiah election, the company commander and CMO officer overseeing that area got involved in the process in the local villages and towns. Applications for the council positions were taken in advance (several hundred of them, in fact). This allowed the S2 to screen the candidates for backgrounds of non-compliance with Coalition Forces directives before they were selected, and it allowed the Iraqi provincial leadership to see the applications and verify that they fairly represented all the separate factions (mainly tribal and religious) of that nahiah. Each town of that nahiah was allotted a number of seats on the 20-member council, based on its population. Because there had not been a census in many years, ration cards were used to determine approximate populations.

Despite the challenges, each nahiah that has had elections now has a functioning governing council that is holding regular meetings and working to improve the conditions of the area.

Recommendations. Units need a comprehensive document that explains the former Iraqi form of government at the town and nahiah level and how it relates to the kada'a and provinces. This will help commanders and CMO personnel understand the Iraqi citizens' feelings about the importance of local government and how it nests with the higher levels of government. This also will help commanders and CMO personnel explain to the Iraqi people how the new democratic process is different from what they are used to. Units coming to Iraq now are already adopting valuable lessons learned by aligning their boundaries along the existing geopolitical boundaries. This will help them understand the old system of government while establishing a new one.

In addition to background information, the CPA needs to issue a clear set of directives and guidance about the election process. These directives need to be prepared with input from the Coalition leadership but with primary contributions from the Iraqi people. The new Iraqi constitution will be the document that outlines these processes.

The specific details of how to handle elections needs to be very clearly articulated to the commanders and CMO personnel, military or civilian, who provide oversight of and help with the elections. Consistency is critical for the process to be efficient and have legitimacy.

By understanding the Iraqi governmental structure and following clear guidance for a consistent election process, there will be less pressure from the Iraqi people on commanders. Commanders will have a clear vision of the end state and be better able to talk to local leaders about the election process and the dramatic changes associated with bringing democracy to a country that has only heard of it.

By Captain Steven L. Miller

Captain Steven L. Miller is the Fire Support Officer (FSO) and S5 for Task Force 3d Battalion, 67th Armor (TF 3-67 AR), 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), currently stationed in Baquba, Iraq, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. At Fort Hood, he has been a Company FSO, Battalion S1, Paladin Platoon Leader and Battery Fire Direction Officer in 3d Battalion, 16th Field Artillery (3-16 FA), also in the 4th Division.