2-18 FA (MLRS) in full-spectrum operations: combat to collecting ammo and equipment.

As a crowd of civilians approached Sergeant Bloodworth's high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), his anxiety increased. He did not know if they were hostile or just looking for food, water and a better view of the American's equipment.

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As a gunner in a multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) battery, he participated in combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from the familiar confines of his M270 rocket launcher. Now he was exposed, manning his crew-served weapon on the back of his M1026 and navigating through back alleys, crowded streets and treacherous intersections on routes where previous convoys had been attacked by rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), improvised explosive devices (IEDs), small arms and hand grenades thrown from crowded markets.

He remembered the rules of engagement (ROE) that had been reinforced during his convoy briefing and oriented his weapon toward areas from which previous hostile activity had come, always cognizant of suspicious civilians intermingled in the otherwise passive crowd. His focus and attention to detail were essential as US forces were still taking casualties in the surrounding area.

Sergeant Bloodworth soon realized his role as an MLRS gunner was over. His new mission was to provide a safe, secure environment for the people of this war torn country and help keep his fellow soldiers alive.

**********

The 2d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery (2-18 FA), part of the 212th Field Artillery Brigade from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, played a vital role in stabilizing a post-war Iraq and worked tirelessly to provide a safe and secure environment for its civilian populace. The MLRS battalion's efforts helped set the conditions for the success of civilian organizations providing desperately needed assistance to the Iraqi people.

A quick, seamless transition to stability operations and support operations (SOSO) after major combat was essential in preparing for the operations of the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority (OCPA) and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs). By removing hazardous ammunition and equipment (primarily large caliber munitions) from military cache sites in and around Baghdad, 2-18 FA helped stabilize the volatile regions in post-war Iraq.

ConductingFull-Spectrum Operations. With daily firefights erupting around Baghdad, current SOSO more closely resembles combat operations than previous SOSO missions in Kosovo and Bosnia. When the US Army units deployed in support of SOSO in the Balkans, soldiers inherited a more stable environment and focused on peacekeeping operations. These forces did not actively engage in combat operations upon their arrival in theater and had the consent of all major parties involved in the dispute.

SOSO in OIF is quite different. All soldiers who crossed the line of departure (LD) before 1 May 2003--the date President Bush declared an end to major combat operations--participated in the full-spectrum of conflict. After major combat operations, units transitioned to peace enforcement operations (PEO) within hours; PEO authorizes soldiers to use force to restore compliance with a new national political structure (Field Manual 3.0: Operations, Page 9-7).

Coalition Forces in the Iraqi Theater of Operations faced a myriad of challenges. Maneuver units employed more aggressive tactics at checkpoints with increased firepower and armed helicopter coverage during hours of darkness. Soldiers used nonlethal tactics during hostile demonstrations and followed demonstrations with information operations to contradict false information disseminated by local opposition leaders.

Field Artillery commanders tailored force packages to conduct cordon and search operations and other nontraditional missions, to include 2-18 FA's mission to collect enemy equipment and ammunition (CEE/CEA). The battalion developed tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to bridge the gap in transitioning from combat operations to SOSO.

Transitioning to SOSO. 2-18 FA crossed the LD on 6 April 2003 and moved rapidly to a position 25 miles northeast of Karbala. The battalion completed 14 fire plans in support of V Corps operations; however, because the Iraqi forces were beginning to capitulate, the battalion only had to execute two of the fire plans. 2-18 FA executed suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) plans for the Battle of Baghdad, firing Block I and Block IA Army tactical missile system (ATACMS) missiles. Shortly after the President called an end to major combat operations, the battalion downloaded its missiles and rockets and shifted to SOSO, an unexpected divergence from its standard tactical mission.

2-18 FA had trained meticulously on its mission-essential task list (METL) and related TTP before deploying. After combat operations, 2-18 FA had a nonstandard mission and learned lessons to help meet unforeseen challenges. The battalion executed those lessons daily while collecting enemy equipment and ammunition in and around Baghdad as part of V Corps' Task Force (TF) Bullet I. The TF collected, transported and consolidated enemy equipment and ammunition for destruction or redistribution to the new Iraqi Army.

The battalion received its first TF Bullet I mission just 12 hours after completing its last fire plan. 2-18 FA quickly consolidated its resources and sent 12 heavy expanded-mobility tactical trucks (HEMTTs) to a cache site in the former Iraqi stronghold of An Najaf.

In less than a week, V Corps Headquarters identified many cache sites around Baghdad. Tasked to support logistical resupply in theater, V Corps Support Command (COSCOM) transportation units did not have the assets available to collect and transport equipment and ammunition from more than 20 locations. Due to 2-18 FA's organic hauling capacity, V Corps assigned the battalion and other FA units the mission of removing and transporting ammunition from cache sites scattered throughout the region to temporary ammunition holding areas (AHAs) at different coalition storage facilities.

Identifying the assets required to perform these operations was a vital start for 2-18 FA's post-conflict operations. But coordinating the movement of trucks, ammunition and personnel was not the only challenge in a constantly changing operational environment. Changing the mindset of soldiers was the most significant challenge: focusing soldiers' efforts on establishing a safe and secure environment for Coalition Forces and the local populace. Force protection was the command focus as well: following strict convoy procedures, maintaining long-range communications and situational awareness, establishing disciplined maintenance practices with an emphasis on HEMTTs versus M270 launchers and coordinating with external agencies. Learning from the lessons outlined in this article will help other units transition more smoothly into SOSO.

Changing the Soldiers' Mindset. Of greatest concern for leaders was changing the mindset of soldiers from fighting the Iraqi military and paramilitary forces to helping in PEO throughout the Baghdad region. The pivotal aspect of this change was the soldier's mental transition from being a combatant in a hostile environment to being a stabilizing peace enforcer in a post-conflict scenario.

Maintaining an elevated force protection posture identical to combat operations while conducting nontraditional missions was a daunting task that took focused leadership and disciplined soldiers. They had to remain vigilant about their own safety and keenly aware of the ROE in their operational environment. Rather than drive a vehicle across country or on relatively secure main supply routes (MSRs), soldiers had to convoy through crowded streets, busy market districts and dangerous chokepoints.

Everywhere military convoys traveled, children and adults lined the streets to show their support and satisfy their curiosity. Soldiers had to understand that most of these civilians posed no danger. At the same time, they had to watch for any signs of danger and be prepared to act instantly to handle any potential threat, in accordance with the ROE.

During early operations, a convoy consisting of the battalion commander and his battery commanders entered a village to unexpectedly find hundreds of vendors selling illegal weapons to local civilians. The convoy quickly reacted by conducting a hasty checkpoint and apprehending more than 30 personnel and an array of weapons, including AK-47s, RPGs and hand grenades. Then 2-18 FA conducted a relief-in-place with elements of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized).

The discipline displayed by soldiers ensured Coalition Forces were secure while they created an environment in which the local populace could return to normal daily activities.

Religious zealots, radical nationals and regime holdouts were not the only hazards facing soldiers while they conducted CEE/CEA operations. Soldiers had to remain attentive when handling, transporting and storing captured Iraqi ammunition, tasks that 2-18 FA performed daily. Ammunition at cache sites was not always boxed or crated and ready to transport. In many instances, the rounds, land mines and other munitions were not labeled, so soldiers could not identify if they were incendiaries, such as white phosphorus, or other hazardous contents--potentially chemical.

Transporting different unknown types of ammunition led to unexpected repercussions. On one occasion, another unit, transporting ammunition in a HEMTT had an unknown white phosphorus mortar round ignite due to the desert heat. This started a chain reaction that burned the HEMTT down to the hull and injured two soldiers.

Soldiers and their leaders must remain focused to avoid or react to these operational hazards.

Convoying Procedures. The most hazardous part of any CEE/CEA mission was the convoy to and from the cache site. Driving countless miles through major cities and small towns made HEMTT crews easy targets for the handful of scattered opposition forces remaining in sector. Maintaining a robust force protection package and conducting a thorough convoy briefing prepared members of the convoy for the mission and reduced the risks associated with moving ammunition in that environment.

If nothing else, a robust force protection package to act as a deterrent gave convoys the security and confidence to complete missions in non-secure operational environments. The battalion relied on external as well as internal assets to project a lethal force protection package.

Initially, military police (MP) escorted all convoys in and out of the logistical support area (LSA). With daily sporadic gunfire throughout the Baghdad area, MP vehicles in the front and rear of the convoy ensured the convoy could take an offensive posture, as needed.

The battery also placed its crew-served weapons intermittently throughout the convoy. Before deploying, each battery fielded M1026 HMMWVs with .50-caliber machine guns mounted on them. This paid big dividends as the batteries could field a more robust force protection presence on CEE/CEA missions. These internal assets ensured convoys had the protection to accomplish any mission, even during split-battery operations.

Convoy commanders conducted thorough convoy briefings and remained flexible in adapting to changes in security postures throughout the zones in which convoys traveled. (See Figure 1 for the convoy briefing outline and Figure 2 for the convoy commander's checklist.) Increased enemy paramilitary activity led to the development of additional TTPs. Ba'ath Party and former regime loyalists resorted to emplacing IEDs along the highways and using other unconventional tactics to undermine the peace process and target Coalition Forces in Iraq.

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As of November, Coalition Forces had lost more soldiers in Iraq during stability operations than during major combat operations.

Former regime loyalists continue to target soldiers performing daily nonstandard stability operations. On one occasion, a brick thrown from a Baghdad overpass struck a Coalition vehicle, while in a separate instance, a vehicle hit an anti-tank mine camouflaged by loose trash. In another instance, militants ambushed a unit returning from a routine SOSO mission with small arms fire and multiple RPGs, killing a soldier and wounding others. In all of these cases, Coalition Forces were unable to return fire because the enemy attacked and quickly fled or, in the case of the mine, was not present at the attack. Commanders restricted nonessential MSR convoy movement to the hours of daylight and improved situational awareness to mitigate the risks associated with the enemy's unconventional tactics. Thorough daily convoy briefings conducted before movements ensured soldiers remained vigilant on missions outside of the LSA.

Maintaining Long-Range Communications. As in any operation, maintaining communications during CEE/CEA operations was an essential element of the mission and soldier safety. Traveling beyond FM single-channel ground and airborne radio system advanced system improvement program (SINCGARS ASIP) planning ranges during SOSO operations challenged the battalion's command, control and communications ([C.sup.3]). Providing batteries with assets to communicate with the tactical operations center (TOC) was a challenge but a necessity to perform the mission.

The battalion's SOSO mission in Baghdad stretched the limits of traditional communications platforms. Batteries routinely moved outside of FM radio range in the first 30 minutes of each mission and never regained FM coverage throughout the operation. To solve communications shortfalls, the battalion relied heavily on Spitfire satellite communications (SATCOM) radios, Iridium and Thuraya satellite phones and the mobile tracking system (MTS) for tactical communications while conducting missions.

The Spitfire took five to 10 minutes to set up due to its tactical satellite antennae. However, once in position, it was a reliable primary means of communications. The satellite cell phones gave commanders a redundant means of communications that was reliable on the move.

Batteries also sent updates to the battalion through MTS computer messages. The MTS, a satellite tracking system, was a reliable and effective means of communicating with battalion headquarters.

Redundant commo platforms guaranteed at least one means of communications with battalion headquarters. As routes became increasingly hazardous, it was essential the battalion TOC maintained communications with the convoy commanders performing the CEE/CEA missions.

Maintaining Situational Awareness. Situational awareness while conducting daily operations was paramount for the safety of soldiers in this unstable environment. Giving a thorough risk assessment briefing to convoy commanders before the convoy left the start point (SP) gave them the tools to execute the mission.

Commanders carried smart cards that included "hopsets" with the corresponding channels, call signs and phone numbers of all units in V Corps' area of responsibility (AOR). Additionally, all convoys carried global positioning systems (GPS) that enhanced their navigation capabilities and increased their reporting reliability.

The battalion staff briefed convoy commanders on potential threats, locations of recent attacks along the route of march and tactics used by local militant groups. The battalion S2 reported threat levels along the local MSRs, labeled Green, Amber or Red, coinciding with the threat estimated by the maneuver commander. These reports indicated the enemy activities along the convoy route in the previous 24 to 48 hours. In addition to intelligence reports, the battalion used automation to identify secured routes and the current operational picture, including the command and control personal computer ([C.sup.2]PC) and automated deep operations coordination system (ADOCS).

Situational awareness started in the TOC. On one occasion, unexploded ordnance on the MSR leading to the LSA was identified and higher headquarters closed the MSR. Three 2-18 FA convoys were conducting operations in Baghdad when the TOC was notified the route was closed. The TOC quickly warned the convoys of the situation and held them in place, or directed them along a different route until the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team removed the hazard.

Maintaining situational awareness enabled leaders and soldiers to avoid unnecessary risks and helped them complete their missions.

Pulling Maintenance. The battalion's maintenance focus changed drastically during the transition to SOSO. During normal combat operations, the battalion's maintenance assets focused on pacing items--the M270 improved position determining system (IPDS) launchers and M577A3 [C.sup.2] vehicles. During SOSO, the battalion's HEMTTs and M1026 HMMWVs became the pacing items. Disciplined vehicle maintenance guaranteed the HEMTTs and M1026s remained mission-capable and increased the safety and effectiveness of the missions.

The narrow congested streets and lack of traffic regulations made it imperative that units pay attention to the safety features of their vehicles. Functional lights and mirrors and thorough battery and battalion quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) inspections were the keys to success during CEE/CEA missions.

Maintenance was a command priority with emphasis on operator preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS); commanders spot-checked convoy vehicles daily. Battery commanders and maintenance personnel also enforced daily after-action PMCS of each vehicle. After every mission, battery mechanics conducted a QA/QC of all trucks and HMMWVs, focusing on deadline faults and safety features: brakes, lights, mirrors, tires, seat belts, etc.

Operators and mechanics identified not only existing faults, but also potential faults. This proactive maintenance posture was critical, especially with an immature logistics supply line that slowed the pace at which the battalion received parts.

Coordinating with External Agencies. 2-18 FA coordinated with multiple agencies daily to ensure batteries had the assets to complete their CEE/CEA missions: MPs, EOD personnel and contract Iraqi civilian labor. Synchronizing these assets required constant coordination among the battalion, batteries, parent brigade and individual agencies.

The MPs brought valuable firepower to CEE/CEA convoys. At the onset of operations, the MP force structure in country could not support the many V Corps missions. Units had to coordinate at least 12 hours ahead to guarantee link up times, locations and points of contact (POCs). Eventually the battalion established a habitual working relationship with the MP escorts, minimizing the confusion that accompanied first-time link ups.

As a safety precaution, EOD personnel inspected all ammunition before soldiers removed it from the cache sites. Eventually, Iraqi civilians augmented US forces removing, banding and crating ammunition found in unsecured bunkers. Like EOD, the battalion coordinated for the civilians' arrival and ensured they were on site when US forces arrived. Synchronizing the battalion's arrival with EOD and civilian laborers saved time and minimized personnel exposure to hazards around unsecured cache sites.

After OIF, 2-18 FA learned valuable operational lessons not learned since the end of World War II. Units proactively analyzed their operating environment and determined the tasks necessary to stabilize their areas of operations. Because 2-18 FA was executing a new mission that straddled the fence between combat and peace enforcement operations, the battalion continuously assessed the usefulness and effectiveness of its emerging TTPs.

Although not all SOSO missions are the same, following these lessons learned will enable units to make a more seamless transition to SOSO and preserve the greatest assets the Army has: soldiers. Their soldiers' discipline, dedication and flexibility will enable units to perform complex, full-spectrum operations.

1. Situation:
    a. Friendly/Adjacent Units
    b. Support Units
    c. Enemy Situation
2. Mission: Cargo Type, Origin, Destination, Date-Time-Groups, Why, etc.
3. Execution:
    a. Order of March
    b. Timeline -- Start Point, Lineup and Breaks
    c. Routes
    d. Speeds -- Convoy and Catch-Up
    e. Vehicle Gaps (Space and Time)
    f. Locations and Times of Halts
    g. Emergency Procedures
    h. Actions on Contact (Ambush/Sniper, Vehicle Breakdown, Accident
       with Civilian/Military Vehicle)
4. Administration/Logistics:
    a. Control of Personnel
    b. Class I
    c. Refueling
    d. Vehicle Services
    e. Sensitive Items Check
5. Safety:
    a. Route and Weather Hazards
    b. Defensive Driving Principles
    c. Compliance with Civil Traffic Regulations
    d. Obedience to Civil and Military Police Escorts
    e. Critical Points Along the Route
    f. Weapons Status (Red, Amber or Green)
    g. Uniform
    h. Check All Lights
6. Command and Signal:
    a. Command -- Location of Convoy Commander and Actions of Security
       Forces
    b. Signal
       (1) Internal -- Reporting Procedures, Convoy Nets (March Unit/
           Serial/Platoon), Call Signs, and Hand and Arm Signals
       (2) External -- Reporting Procedures, Convoy Nets (Battalion
           Tactical Operations Center or TOC, Administration/Logistics
           Center or ALOC, and Main Command Post), Call Signs/
           Frequencies (Medical Evacuation or MEDEVAC, Military Police
           and Maneuver), Radio and Mobile Tracking System (MTS)

Spacing:
  * Cities/Built-Up Areas          25 Meters
  * Closed Column                  50 Meters
  * Open Column/Likely
    Ambush Areas                  100 Meters
  * Between March Units           >=5 Minutes
  * Between Serials              >=10 Minutes

Speeds: Wheeled Vehicles Only
  * Cities/Built-Up Areas          15 MPH
  * Two-Lane Roads                 40 MPH
  * Limited-Access Expressway      55 MPH

Speeds: Mixed Wheeled and
  Tracked Vehicles
  * Cities/Built-Up Areas          10 MPH
  * Outside Cities                 20 MPH
  Black-Out Driving                 5 MPH
  Catch-Up Speed               Plus-5 MPH

Spacing and Speeds for Convoys. A convoy has one to four serials; a
serial has one to four march units; and a march unit has no more than 25
vehicles.

Figure 1: 2-18 FA Outline for Convoy Briefings for Collect Enemy
Equipment and Ammunition (CEE/CEA) Missions in Iraq. Also, see the
Center of Army Lessons Learned Handbook No. 03-6, Tactical Convoy
Operations, March 2003, at http://callarmy.mil.

1. Start point report and risk assessment prepared?
2. Signs for lead and trail vehicles?
3. Convoy numbers clear and conspicuous on both sides of all vehicles?
4. Commo checks (lead and trail vehicles)?
5. Preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) conducted? 5988Es
   filled out?
6. Cargo and passengers properly loaded? Load plan on hand?
     * Cargo must be tied down and/or blocked and braced to prevent
       shifting.
     * Cargo must be separate from passengers.
     * Warning triangles, first aid kit and operational fire
       extinguishers must be in each vehicle.
     * Vehicle operators and passengers must use seatbelts, if
       available.
7. Personnel briefed on the route of march, traffic regulations, speed
   limits, control procedures, critical points and individual
   responsibilities? Maps issued?
8. Service lights and rotating amber light warning systems (RAWLS)
   operational?

Figure 2: Convoy Commander's Pre-Departure Checklist

Lieutenant Colonel David J. McCauley commands the 2d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery (2-18 FA), part of the 212th Field Artillery Brigade (212th FA Bde), III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He deployed the battalion to Southwest Asia in support of the 41st FA Bde, V Corps, for Operation Iraqi Freedom on 20 March 2003 and redeployed it to Fort Sill in November. Among other assignments, he was the Chief of Plans at the Warrior Preparation Center, Ramstein AFB, Germany, during the Kosovo Air Campaign. He also was the Executive Officer for 4-27 FA and Division Artillery Adjutant, both in the 1st Armored Division, while deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the Implementation Force (IFOR).

Captain Jay W. Berendzen is the Battalion Fire Direction Officer (FDO) in 2-18 FA, 212th FA Bde, and deployed with the battalion to Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom. His previous assignments include serving as Assistant Operations Officer, Company Fire Support Officer (FSO), Battery FDO, and Paladin Platoon Leader, all in 4-27 FA, 1st Armored Division, Germany. While serving as Company FSO, he deployed to Albania as part of Task Force Hawk in support of the Kosovo Air Campaign; as a Paladin Platoon Leader, he deployed to Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo in peacekeeping operations.

By Lieutenant Colonel David J. McCauley and Captain Jay W. Berendzen