2-18 FA: training the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps.

When the Iraqi man saw the uniform, his eyes widened in shock. "Oh, no. I cannot wear that uniform. That is the uniform of Saddam," the man said through an interpreter.

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A Field Artillery captain approached the man quietly and respectfully. "This uniform is no longer the uniform of Saddam. It is the uniform of the new Iraq and of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps [ICDC]. By wearing it, you will be serving your country."

The man reluctantly agreed, completed his training and today is helping to safeguard the new Iraq as part of the ICDC.

The ICDC was one of several security agencies established by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to help Iraqis assume a greater role in providing for their own security. (See the figure.) The ICDC operates alongside Coalition Forces to provide a secure and stable environment for the Iraqi people.

The Soldiers of the 2d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery (2-18 FA), part of the 212th Field Artillery Brigade, from Fort Sill. Oklahoma, had the privilege of training a battalion of ICDC soldiers who now serve in the Multi-National Division-Central South (MND-CS) area of operations (AO). This article passes along some insights gained by the battalion in operating an ICDC training academy.

Training host nation security forces is certainly a non-standard mission for an multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) battalion. Nonetheless, Army doctrine provided a useful foundation for operating an ICDC training academy. The eight-step training model, first developed by the US Army Europe (USAREUR) Regulation 350-1 Training, 15 May 2003, was ideally suited to plan and execute the training. Furthermore, the six tactical logisties functions from Field Manual (FM) 10-1, Quartermaster Principles, 11 August 1994, were useful for organizing our sustainment efforts.

The Eight-Step Training Model. The steps in this model are 1. Plan the training. 2. Train the trainers. 3. Reconnoiter the site. 4. Issue the order. 5. Rehearse the training, 6. Execute the training, 7. Evaluate the training and 8. Retrain, as necessary.

* Plan the Training. We began planning the training by adopting an established ICDC program started by the 1st Armored Division. Moreover, the Coalition Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) Commanding General had identified a specific program of instruction (POI) for each six-day training cycle. The cycle includes classes on Basic Soldier Skills, Traffic Control Points (TCPs). Squad Tactics, First Aid, Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM), Drill and Ceremony, as well as Rules of Engagement (ROE). Laws of Land Warfare. Civies, Cultural Awareness and Human Rights.

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The newly trained ICDC cadets would help provide a safe and secure environment for the people of Iraq and perform important tasks, such as serving as linguists for translator support and as vehicle drivers, conducting security missions, providing natural disaster assistance and providing security for humanitarian aid operations and for routes and convoys.

The battalion established the six-day training schedule to ensure the training was completed efficiently and to standard. The cadets were organized into two 50-man platoons and initially had a battalion drill instructor per platoon and a Coalition NCO per squad. The drill instructors were the primary instructors at all stations, except for the Staff Judge Advocate and G5 classes. The platoons rotated BRM, drill and classes from Saturday through Wednesday with graduation on Thursday. Tuesday was devoted to BRM retraining.

* Train the Trainers. We then trained and certified a cadre to train this new Iraqi paramilitary force. We faced two challenges in this process. First, we had to train our own senior NCOs to serve as drill instructors for the academy. Second, we had to develop techniques for integrating the Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian and Bulgarian squad leaders from the MND-CS into our training plan. These squad leaders would lead ICDC recruits through their training and then take them back to the MND-CS AO for operational employment.

The battalion command sergeant major (CSM) was the ICDC Commandant and established a certification program to ensure all cadre instructors were technically and tactically proficient. While becoming proficient teaching the POI, the cadre conducted a "right-seat-ride" with the 1st Armored Division cadre.

* Recon the Site. While the battalion's senior NCOs were planning the training and certifying the trainers, the battalion staff began reconning the ICDC Academy. The staff's focus was to ensure that all the resources to train the ICDC were available: computers, printers, identification tag equipment, bedding, beds, wall lockers, sundry packs, military vans, uniforms and individual weapons.

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The staff paid special attention to the security of the training site. Former regime loyalists and other anti-Coalition forces often targeted Iraqis who cooperated with Coalition Forces.

* Issue the Order. Next, the battalion staff issued the order and produced all products to support the ICDC staff. The order essentially tasked subordinate units for the support to establish and operate the ICDC Academy.

* Rehearse the Training. The battalion rehearsed the training using both right-seat-rides with the 1st Armored Division and back briefs to the battalion commanders. The right-seat-rides proved to be extremely worthwhile as the cadre members learned how to handle situations their prior military training had not prepared them for.

For example, the cadre learned that what motivates American Soldiers does not always motivate former Iraqi soldiers. The Iraqi cadets were motivated by calm explanations and reasoning rather than an up-tempo, fast-paced training atmosphere.

Additionally, the right-seat-rides allowed the cadre members to develop their own training tactics and procedures. Back briefs to the battalion commander and CSM confirmed that each instructor understood the commander's intent for the training. Rehearsals, whether executing a fire mission or a non-standard mission, were keys to success.

* Execute the Training. After completing all rehearsals, the battalion executed this six-day training schedule.

* Evaluate the Training/Retrain, as Necessary. All training was evaluated and validated on the fifth day of training. The commandant along with the cadre performed their final inspections and ensured that all trainees had met the standards. For those who did not meet the standard, retraining, reevaluation and validation immediately began.

Sustain the Training. The tactical logistics functions (man, arm, fuel, fix, move and sustain soldiers and their systems) helped us organize our sustainment efforts to ensure we had the resources to conduct the training to standard. The nature of the training provided few challenges in the "fuel" and "fix" categories but more than enough challenges in areas of manning, arming, moving and sustaining soldiers and their systems.

Manning. Recruiting was the most significant manning challenge in operating the ICDC Academy. ICDC recruits had to be motivated to serve their country, be in reasonably good health and pose no security risk to Coalition Forces. Our Coalition partners in MND-CS, aided by US civil affairs (CA) Soldiers, were primarily responsible for recruiting.

CA Soldiers evaluated the motivation of recruits to ensure they genuinely wanted to serve. They also screened potential recruits to ensure they were not associated with former regime loyalists or other anti-Coalition elements. Medical doctors from MND-CS gave recruits physical exams to ensure they were medically fit for training.

In addition to recruiting ICDC soldiers, we also recruited translators. This difficult challenge was complicated by the fact that the Polish and Bulgarian units in MND-CS would employ these ICDC soldiers.

The number of Iraqis who speak English, Arabic and Bulgarian can be counted on "one hand." The services of such skilled translators were in high demand, and we had to compensate them accordingly. However, many of the translators were motivated far more by patriotism than by simple financial gains--Iraqis such as Abbas Khudhair Abbas, who is the lead ICDC translator.

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* Moving. Transporting recruits from their homes to the training site and back involved important security considerations to guard against attacks by Anti-Coalition elements. The attacks not only posed a danger to the individuals targeted, but also had an adverse effect on others interested in cooperating with the Coalition. To prevent attacks on ICDC recruits, we coordinated convoy security for them as they moved to and from the training facility.

* Arming. The primary weapon of ICDC soldiers was the AK-47 assault rifle. These weapons and the ammunition they fire are in plentiful supply in Iraq. The challenges were ensuring they were serviceable and repairing them.

* Sustaining Soldiers and Their Systems. This logistical function was by far the most important one to sustain the ICDC Academy. Taking care of ICDC soldiers' health, personnel and field services requirements ensured they remained focused on training.

The most important personnel action was pay. After graduating from training, each ICDC soldier received $50 in cash. To ensure accountability of funds, each platoon sergeant paid his platoon and witnessed his ICDC soldiers as they signed for their pay. Another senior NCO was also present to provide a double check for financial accountability.

Pay was a significant motivation for ICDC soldiers. Offering recruits a graduation bonus proved very effective in retaining recruits who might not otherwise have completed their training.

Despite the medical screening during recruiting, many ICDC soldiers had minor health problems during training. Foot conditions were by far the most common cause of missed training. Many ICDC recruits had never worn boots before. In rural areas of Iraq, sandals are the most common footwear. Many recruits experienced foot pain when standing or marching for long periods. Having one medic per platoon to treat these conditions minimized the amount of training recruits missed due to injury.

Among field services, the one that proved the greatest cause of concern was clothing. Poorly made boots contributed to the foot problems. When we could get a higher quality of boot, foot injuries dropped off significantly.

The uniforms themselves were a source of unexpected controversy. There are several uniforms that evoke a surprisingly emotional reaction among Iraqis. Giving the recruits a patient respectful hearing and focusing on the importance of the ICDC mission enabled our cadre to defuse these potentially explosive situations.

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At the writing of this article, the training described was the initial training for the Iraqi ICDC to get corpsmen into service rapidly. Obviously, the training plan will evolve as other units take up the mission.

Operating an ICDC battalion was certainly a challenging mission, especially for an MLRS battalion--2-18 FA. But relying on proven Army training and logistics doctrine helped organize the efforts. This Army doctrine, when employed by intelligent and resourceful leaders, allowed the Redlegs of 2-18 FA to excel in a mission none ever imagined he'd be performing.

           Iraqi Police   Iraqi Border and         Iraqi Correctional
Aspects    Service (IPS)  Customs Police           Service

Ministry   Interior       Interior (Department of  Justice
                          Border Enforcement)
Duties     Law            Enforce Customs and      Prison Security,
           Enforcement    Immigration Laws         Welfare and Security
                                                   of Prisoners and
                                                   Detainees
Uniform    Light Blue     Khaki Shirts             White Shirts
           Shirts
Vehicles   Various,       Various                  Prisoner Escort
           Modified                                Vehicles
Weapons    Pistols,       Pistols, AKs             Pistols, AKs
           Shotguns, AKs
Pay        Civil Pay      Civil Pay Scale          Civil Pay Scale
           Scale
Strength   Final Figure:  Final Figure: 10,000     Final Figure: 10,000
           65,000                                  by 2005
           Nationwide

           New Iraqi                      Iraqi Civil Defense
Aspects    Army (NIA)                     Corps (ICDC)

Ministry   National Security Defense      National Security Defense
Duties     Collective Military Tasks to   Individuals, Teams and Squads
           Protect the Territorial        Who Serve As Linguists, Human
           Integrity of Iraq under Iraqi  Intelligence, Fixed-Site
           Military Leadership. Serving   Security, Drivers, Disaster
           Side-by-Side With Coalition    Relief, Humanitarian
           Forces                         Assistance, Route/Convoy
                                          Security Under Command of
                                          Coalition Forces
Uniform    Desert Camouflage              Solid Brown
Vehicles   Wheeled Vehicles               Two Jeeps. 12 Trucks per
                                          Battalion
Weapons    AKs, RPK Light Machine Gun,    AKs
           Mortars
Pay        Special Pay Scale Approved by  NIA Pay Scale
           the Ministry of Finance
Strength   27 Light Infantry Battalions   Initially 18 X 846-Man
           by September 2004: Three       Battalions (One Per Governate)
           Divisions of Nine Battalions   = 15,228 Total
           Each with Combat Support and
           Support Elements to Follow

           Facilities Protection          New Iraqi
Aspects    Service (FPS)                  Navy

Ministry   Work For All Ministries/       National Security Defense
           Governmental Agencies or
           Privately Hired; Ministry of
           Interior Sets/Enforces
           Standards, Includes Security
           for Oil, Electricity, Police
           and Port Facilities
Duties     Fixed-Site Protection of       Patrol and Protection of
           Ministerial, Governmental or   Coastal Territorial Waters and
           Private Buildings/Facilities/  Major Inland Waterway Borders
           Personnel                      Under Iraqi Military
                                          Leadership, Serving Side-by-
                                          Side With Coalition Forces
Uniform    Grey Shirts                    To Be Determined
Vehicles   Provided by Ministries         Various, Including Impounded
                                          Patrol Boats
Weapons    AKs                            AKs
Pay        Civil Pay Scale (Lower Than    NIA Pay Scale
           Police/NIA) or Contract
Strength   Roughly 6,050 in Baghdad and   Patrol Boat Squadron
           14,500 Nationwide              (1 X 550-Man Marine Battalion)

Iraqi Forces Trained by the Coalition

RELATED ARTICLE: 4-1 FA, 1st AD, Live Fires Paladin in Baghdad

For the first time since President George W. Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq on 1 May 2003, Paladin M109A6 155-mm howitzers were live fired in Baghdad. 4th Battalion, 1st Field Artillery (4-1 FA), in direct support of the 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 1st Armored Division (1 AD), certified its howitzers in semiannual Gunnery Table VIII in Baghdad from 6 to 20 December 2003.

A unique feature of this training is that while the rest of Task Force 1 AD's (TF 1 AD's) assets conducted gunnery at Butler Range--approximately 50 kilometers away from the 3d BCT's operations area--4-1 FA fired within the city's borders. The advantage of the certification within the city limits is twofold: it not only certified the unit, but also served as a "show-offorce" for would-be "bad actors." After Operation Iron Hammer, the big guns' firing keeps the enemy confused and demonstrates TF 1 AD's ability to react with counterfire--should the enemy decide to shoot mortars or rockets into any areas controlled by the Coalition Forces.

An open field six miles from the firing site was quarantined to serve as the impact zone for the training. Signs are posted around the perimeter of the impact zone, warning residents to stay out of the area. Also, psychological operations teams inform residents of the "incoming steel."

TF 1 AD's aviation brigade along with the division and brigade fire support elements (FSEs) clear the airspace for the live rounds, including coordinating with the neighboring 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), whose aircraft might need to fly through TF 1 AD's airspace.

The King of Battle is on his throne in the skies of Baghdad.

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Story and Photo by SGT Christopher S. Stanis

TF 1 AD Public Affairs Office, Baghdad

Operation Iraqi Freedom

By Captain Julian T. Urquidez and Major Paul L. Yingling

Captain Julian T. Urquidez is the Assistant Operations Officer in the 2d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery (2-18 FA) (Multiple-Launch Rocket System, MLRS) part of the 212th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. In this position, he was deployed with the battalion to Iraq from March 2003 until November 2003 for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). He also has served as an MLRS Platoon Leader and a Support Platoon Leader, both in the 1-12 FA, 17th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery.

Major Paul L. Yingling is the Executive Officer of 2-18 FA. He joined the battalion in July, 2003, and redeployed with the unit in November, 2003. In his previous assignment, he was the Chief of Plans for the 2d Infantry Division in Korea. He commanded A Battery, 25th Field Artillery (Target Acquisition), 1st Armored Division, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and served as a Platoon Fire Direction Officer with the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) during Operation Desert Storm. He holds a Master of Arts in Political Science from the University of Chicago and is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.