1st ID in Iraq: the new JFEC and targeting.

In preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II, the leadership of Task Force (TF) Danger, 1st Infantry Division (1st ID), realized it needed to transform its conventional targeting team. Many of the participants in the joint fires and effects cell (JFEC) normally train for and operate in high-intensity conflict conditions as part of a deep operations coordination cell (DOCC), planning 24, 48 and 72 hours out. The DOCC had to evolve into a counterinsurgency-focused element that concentrated on effects-based operations (EBO) planning and execution up to several months out.

The division applied similar procedures during several deployments to the Balkans. Many of the problems encountered in Iraq are similar to those in the Balkans, but the complexity of those problems and the violence resulting from them were clearly more intense and presented the 1st ID new challenges. The combination of the sheer size of the battlespace, multiple ethnic fault lines, severe economic ruin and complexity of full-spectrum operations against a violent insurgent required a different approach.

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Considering the problems and seeking to solve them within the constructs of ends, ways and means led to a dynamic and adaptable process that enabled us to mass combat power and many combat enablers simultaneously. The 1st ID transformed the DOCC into a JFEC that synchronized lethal and nonlethal fires, projects and funding to shape the division's operating environment. In the next few paragraphs, we provide an overview of the JFEC and its battle rhythm, processes and products and of the methods employed for measuring success.

The JFEC and Its Battle Rhythm. Comprised of primary, special and personal staff members, the JFEC serves as a bridge between current operations and future plans, focusing one month out. See Figure 1. JFEC operations are overseen by the division artillery (Div Arty) commander/fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) and executed with the combined efforts of the deputy FSCOORD, division information operations (IO) officer and the division targeting officer.

The division targeting officer serves as the key enabler of the day-to-day operations of the JFEC. He gathers data from the major subordinate commands (MSCs), writes initial draft orders resulting from the work of the JFEC and conducts all the legwork to ensure that information continually flows from lower to higher echelons.

Three key venues comprise the deliberate process that serves to coordinate the JFEC's actions: the Working Group, the Nomination Board briefing and the Division Commander/Commanding General's (CG's) Update. The JFEC Working Group meets three times weekly to conduct detailed analysis and develop products. At mid-month, the JFEC briefs the CG at the Nomination Board, a presentation of the proposed prioritization of effects for the next 30 to 45 days.

The results are published in a division fragmentary order (FRAGO), titled the effects tasking order (ETO). The ETO incorporates themes and messages that support taskings to staff and subordinate units. It is based on input from all involved and staffed through the G3 and chief of staff. The CG edits it, ensuring his intent is met.

The CG's Update occurs at the beginning of the month and focuses on assessing the previous month's effects.

Additionally, the JFEC may convene a crisis action team at unscheduled times in response to certain critical situations to help synchronize a specific current operation. The team was instrumental in the division's response to the complex situation in Samarra during the August and September 2004 timeframe, integrating lethal and nonlethal effects as well as funding and projects supporting full-spectrum operations in that city.

In addition to our internal meetings, there are three primary forums by which the 1st ID leadership garners input and conveys important messages to the Iraqis: the biweekly Iraqi Senior Advisory Council, the monthly Sheiks' Council and the monthly Governors' Conference. The JFEC is responsible for these forums and ensures the themes and messages articulated at them are nested with those published in the ETO. The discussions that occur at these forums enable the CG to increase his understanding of the cultural, security, economic and political environment across the area of operations (AO) and address the division's themes and messages.

The Iraqi Senior Advisory Council is comprised of sheiks, imams, businessmen, academicians, government leaders and former military commanders. These participants represent all ethnicities from each of the four provinces in the AO. The CG briefs them on issues currently needing attention; the successes the division has achieved in specific areas; and the progress on efforts, such as preparations for the upcoming elections. The Iraqi Senior Advisory Council also breaks down into economic, political, cultural and security subcommittees to discuss key aspects of the issues at hand in pursuit of useful input from community leaders.

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The Iraqi Senior Advisory Council enabled the CG and staff to see solutions to complex problems through Iraqi eyes.

The Sheiks Council enables tribal leaders in TF Danger's four provinces to bring to light issues affecting them and their tribal constituents. It is also another chance for the CG to engage them with themes and messages that support the effects outlined in the ETO.

The Governors' Conference brings together provincial governors and brigade combat team (BCT) commanders with the CG and his staff. When assembled, this group works to develop a common understanding of political and military issues in the AO and recommends courses-of-action (COAs) for meeting those needs.

Targeting Transformed. The fundamental targeting process of decide, detect, deliver and assess ([D.sup.3]A) is the foundation of the JFEC. Although doctrine laid the groundwork for developing TF Danger's JFEC, non-doctrinal tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) had to be developed and modified to fit the operational environment and promote lethal/nonlethal effects-based targeting.

During the decide phase, the CG's intent; the MultiNational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) lines of operations, MNC-I effects; specified tasks; and the prediction of the future operating environment based on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available and civilians (METT-TC) in the AO all are used to develop effects, tasks, resources and measures of effectiveness (MOEs).

The desired effects are then prioritized, becoming the high-payoff effects list (HPEL). See Figure 2 for an example of a HPEL.

Once the HPEL is established, the JFEC wargames critical capabilities and vulnerabilities to determine the optimal assets and resources to detect targets and deliver the effects. A holistic consideration of all available assets is essential--be it a guided bomb unit-32 (GBU-32), an infantry company conducting cordon and search operations, a civil affairs (CA) team rebuilding a school, a public affairs (PA) team spreading a message to the populace or any combination of these and other methods.

The key to understanding effects-based targeting is an expansion in our task lexicon. Fire supporters and maneuver commanders are very familiar with doctrinal tasks, such as "deny, limit, disrupt and destroy." However, we must now consider the entire joint publication task list (JPTL), paying special attention to IO-centric tasks (influence, inform, degrade, deceive, exploit, etc).

For example, the JFEC may have to develop tasks that support a modification to a populace's behavior or an increase in the operational effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

Often agencies from echelons above division (EAD), such as the Department of State or Special Forces, are approaching the same problems and producing their own solutions. These entities must be incorporated into the team. Ensuring effective employment of nonlethal assets can be just as important as applying lethal combat power.

The weight of decisions, such as those regarding the allocation of funding or exploitation of media assets internal to and separate from the division, cannot be taken lightly.

Incorporating these agencies and factors into the JFEC planning and implementation is vital to ensure unity of effort, coordination and integration throughout the AO.

The assess phase is the most difficult and, in this environment, requires an especially high degree of patience. The division frequently engages in long-term effects that take time to observe and measure, possibly months or years.

To quantify the results, the JFEC determines MOEs and measures of performance (MOPs) associated with each task. (See Figure 3 for sample MOEs for a specific task.)

These MOEs and MOPs enable the division to gauge success or failure. MSCs and their liaison officers (LNOs) provide empirical data to help measure success or failure. This is essential in determining what actions are needed to achieve the desired effects: sustained attack by the same means, re-attack using another means or terminate the task if the desired effects were achieved. Additionally, the MOEs and MOPs are the basis for the CG's Updates.

Twelve months of combat have given the 1st ID JFEC vital insight into what it takes to synchronize and deliver effects to support the CG's intent. The 1st ID JFEC has learned to synchronize, integrate and achieve lethal and nonlethal fires and effects, projects and funding that shape the division's operating environment.

The proficiency that has resulted from these months of combat experience must be sustained while at home station to ensure the 1st Infantry Division's readiness for the next operation. At the same time, the key warfighting tasks the DOCC doctrinally accomplishes cannot fall by the wayside.

In OIF II, TF Danger quickly learned that the transition from high-intensity conflict to full-spectrum operations, or vice versa, can occur in a matter of hours. The agility required of units to quickly and effectively make that transition only can come with practice--be it through realistic training or a deployment, such as OIF II.

In working to accomplish its tasks and seeking to improve its organization, the JFEC continues to enable TF Danger to achieve the unity of effort necessary to gain irreversible momentum toward the safety of and security for the Iraqi people. As our TTPs develop and solidify, the people of Iraq will be the true winners.

* G3
* G3 Plans
* G2
* PCO
* ALO
* SWO
* G3 Air
* ACE
* SJA
* IO
* PSYOP
* CA
* G4
* G5
* G6
* PMO
* PAO
* FSE
* Chaplain
* POLAD
* LNOs

Legend:
ACE = Analysis Control Element
ALO = Air Liaison Officer
CA = Civil Affairs
FSE = Fire Support Element
IO = Information Operations
LNOs = Liaison Officers
PAO = Public Affairs Office
PCO = Projects Coordination Office
PMO = Provost Marshal's Office
POLAD = Political Advisor
PSYOP = Psychological Operations
SJA = Staff Judge Advocate
SWO = Staff Weather Officer

Figure 1: Roll Call--1st Infantry Division Joint Fires and Effects Cell
(JFEC)

1. The credibility and capability of the Iraqi Security Force (ISF) and
   Joint Coordination Center (JCC) continue to improve to achieve Iraqi
   control.
2. Iraqi populace accepts the results of the elections and sup- ports
   the elected officials.
3. The effects of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), vehicle-borne
   IEDs (VBIEDs) and spectacular attacks are minimized throughout
   MultiNational Division-North Central (MND-NC).
4. Perceptions of continuity and enduring commitment are maintained by
   the Iraqi populace during relief-in-place (RIP) or transfer of
   authority (TOA) between the divisions.
5. The attacks against infrastructure are reduced in the MND-NC.

Figure 2: October High-Payoff Effects List (HPEL). This is an example of
TF Danger's HPEL that guides production of the effects tasking order
(ETO).

Effect 1: The credibility and capability of the Iraqi Security Force
(ISF) and Joint Coordination Center (JCC) continue to improve to achieve
Iraqi control.
Method: Exploit ISF training and operations with media coverage.
Target Category: ISF, JCC & Populace

Unit/Agency  Task           MOEs                       Status

Division     PAO: Inform    Number of Local and        Local: 24
ISF Cell &   local and      International Media        US: 12
PAO          international  Attendees                  International: 19
             media about    Number & Type of Local     Radio: 16 Local/4
             the upcoming   and International          Int'l
             Media Day at   Broadcast and Publication  TV: 5 Local/9
             ISF.           Representatives            Int'l
                                                       Print: 19 Local/8
                                                       Int'l
                                                       Internet: 7 Local
                                                       /4 Int'l
                            Number of Press            24 News Articles
                            Releases Supporting        Supporting the
                            ISF Published in the       Credibility of
                            Local Media                the ISF

Figure 3: Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs). MOEs are gathered from staff
and subordinate units and help determine what effects will be tasked in
the future.

RELATED ARTICLE: Iraq's Election Day

A Redleg on Patrol in a Tough Neighborhood

On Iraq's election day, I spent from 0330 until 2230 on the streets in our armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) or at election centers from Tikrit to Baqubah. Baqubah is one of the most dangerous cities that we patrol.

It was great to see all the people voting. There were very few polling sites that Iraqis were afraid to go to--all others were filled to capacity. One polling site in a nicer neighborhood next to a police station had 5,000 voters by 1400.

During our patrolling that day, there were some attacks. We discovered three improvised explosive devices (IEDs), heard gunshots all around us and listened to units in and around our sector on the radio fighting it out with small pockets of insurgents. We also heard explosions and were pretty close to a couple of mortar attacks.

But the voters never fled during those attacks. They just stayed to vote--it was really cool.

The Iraqi soldiers in the picture with me were very proud of what they were doing. They kept telling me that the people at the polling site they were guarding did not have to worry because "I shoot Ali Baba!" (They call all bad guys and the enemy "Ali Baba.") They were proud to show me their well maintained weapons and proud they were there to help secure their people's vote.

It was a great experience to be out on the streets on election day in one of the most dangerous towns in the 1st Infantry Division's sector and see that the Iraqi people were not intimidated, that they were going to vote, even if they had to go to other neighborhoods to do it. I am proud to have helped make that happen.

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CPT Jonathan G. Bleakley

Target Analyst, 1st ID, JFEC

FOB Danger, Tikrit, Iraq

By Colonel Richard C. Longo, Majors Marty P. Chavers, Steven W. Nettleton and Michael D. Goains, and Captain Jonathan G. Bleakley

Colonel Richard C. Longo commands the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery and deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II. He was previously the Chief of Task Force XXI in Training Command; G3, III Corps Artillery; and Commander of the 1st Battalion, 14th Field Artillery (1-14 FA), 214th FA Brigade, also in III Corps Artillery, all at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Major (Promotable) Marty P. Chavers is the Deputy Fire Support Coordinator and Chief of the Joint Fires and Effects Cell (JFEC) for the 1st Infantry Division (1st ID) while deployed for OIF II. He also served as the Operations Officer for 1-7 FA, deploying with the battalion as part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) 4B, and Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), both in Germany in the 1st ID. He commanded B/1-319 AFAR, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Major Steven W. Nettleton is the Information Operations Officer in the 1st ID JFEC while deployed for OIF II. He formerly commanded B/2-4 FA, 214th Field Artillery Brigade at Fort Sill. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Major Michael D. Goains is the Information Operations (IO) Field Support Unit Commander and IO Targeting Officer for the 1st ID while deployed for OIF II. He also served as the IO Chief for KFOR 3B/4A and IO Targeting Officer for the Combatant Command Field Support Unit in support of Northern Command (NORTHCOM). He commanded D/3-112 AR of the Texas Army National Guard in Stephenville, Texas.

Captain Jonathan G. Bleakley is a Target Analyst in the 1st ID JFEC while deployed for OIF II. He was the Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) Platoon Leader in the 121st Signal Battalion, 1st ID, and Company FSO for 1-18 IN, 1st ID, both in Germany. He holds a Bachelor's Degree in History from Colorado State University.