1st ID in Iraq: the FFA HQ mission endures.

The 1st Infantry Division Artillery (Div Arty) headquarters performed many traditional force FA headquarters (FFA HQ) functions for Task Force (TF) Danger during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II. The Div Arty headquarters executed many nonstandard missions as well.

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As the Army transforms to units of employment (UEs) and modular brigade combat teams (BCTs), we must ensure we retain the capability to perform all these tasks.

In this article, we describe two critical characteristics that our Army must maintain in the transformation from Div Artys to Fires Brigades. First, the Army must continue to consider the human dimension of habitual association. Second we need to retain operational and tactical flexibility.

The mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available and civil considerations (METT-TC) in which the 1st Infantry Division operated in OIF II was almost an exact representation of the contemporary operating environment (COE) for which the transformation of the Army was designed. We engaged many small groups of well trained, loosely connected forces in non-contiguous battlespace. We faced an inventive, resourceful enemy who demonstrated an unsophisticated, yet ever-increasing lethality, adaptability, agility and ability to learn.

Div Arty Functions in the COE. The 1st Infantry Div Arty headquarters executed many of the doctrinal functions outlined in Field Manual 3-09.22 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures [TTP] for Corps Artillery, Division Artillery and Field Artillery Brigade Operations. These include providing command and control ([C.sup.2]) for subordinate artillery units, planning fires and orchestrating the counterstrike fight. Additionally, we were responsible for integrating all lethal and non-lethal effects in support of the maneuver commander's intent.

The successful performance of these functions during combat operations required sound leadership, a well trained staff and a solid working relationship with maneuver commanders at all levels. The procedures required the effective synchronization of collection assets, fires support elements (FSEs) and delivery systems developed over months of training. Just as important, the personal relationships fostered between maneuver commanders and key members of the division staff enabled the FFA HQ to integrate effects across the division's area of responsibility (AOR).

The Div Arty headquarters conducted many other important missions for the division that did not fall into the traditional category and would not be found in FM 3-09.22. These included serving as a brigade combat team (BCT) headquarters for an out-of-sector mission in An Najaf; serving as a division-level [C.sup.2] node in Kuwait to supervise reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) in the winter of 2004; and serving as the division's redeployment headquarters in Kuwait a year later. Additionally, the Div Arty headquarters was tasked with overseeing the collection and destruction of more than 29 million pounds of captured enemy ammunition (CEA).

Functions Today vs Tomorrow. As the Army transforms, there is some risk there won't be an organization in the UE to perform all these vital functions in the future. As currently designed, there is no true equivalent to the Div Arty headquarters in the modular design. Combat division headquarters are replaced by the UEx, organizations capable of commanding a mix of subordinate combat and support BCTs. In the Army's transformation plan, the Div Artys inactivate and a fewer number of Fires Brigades are created with a mix of firing units assigned based on mission requirements. These Fires Brigades, most probably, will not be habitually associated with a given UEx.

The division joint fires and effects cell (JFEC) in the current force structure is replaced by a modular design JFEC assigned to the UEx headquarters. Between the Fires Brigade and the JFEC, many of the current roles and missions of the Div Arty would continue to be performed. A staff of experienced fire supporters remains charged with the synchronization of lethal and nonlethal effects in support of the maneuver commander.

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Similarly, when the METT-TC demands that the UEx will need a Fires Brigade, that brigade headquarters would retain the traditional [C.sup.2] functions over its subordinate firing units and would be capable of training and mentoring the FA units organic to the UEx's BCTs. The critical difference is that the Fires Brigade is not habitually associated with the UEx--potentially compromising all the advantages of living and training together.

It is important to understand the Div Arty commander's current role as both a brigade-level commander and senior division staff officer. The inherent credibility the Div Arty commander has as the senior effects coordinator (ECOORD) and the importance of the relationships he establishes as an organic member of the division's leadership cannot be overstated. In the future, the JFEC will be run by a lieutenant colonel ECOORD as a permanent member of the UEx staff and a Fires Brigade commander will come to the division as a modular addition when METT-TC so directs.

Key to the successful effects coordination in the UEx will be the relationship between the ECOORD and the Fires Brigade commander; in the current construct, they are the same person. Either the lieutenant colonel ECOORD must be empowered by the UEx commander to the same level as the current Div Arty commander or the UEx must take full advantage of the Fires Brigade commander and his colonel-level effects coordination experience.

The modular concept is a timely one that recognizes the challenges posed by the expeditionary nature of modern warfare. Modularity gives the supported commander flexibility, a range of capabilities and a scalable, rapidly deployable force. UEs can quickly assemble a mix of combat and support brigades to meet operational requirements, building a force tailored to METT-TC and the needs of the maneuver commander, encompassing everything from peace-keeping to high-intensity conflict.

In an operation comparable to OIF II, a UEx would be built by drawing brigades from any number of geographically distant home bases and assembling them under a single UEx headquarters. However, this "plug-and-play" flexibility creates some unexamined shortfalls in potential division operations of the sort demanded in OIF II.

The Force FA HQ. The Div Arty headquarters' primary function is to serve as the FFA HQ for the division commander. Its staff develops the procedures and cultivates working relationships vital to the effective synchronization of lethal and nonlethal effects. Nowhere are those relationships more visible and more important than in the execution of the counterstrike fight.

Counterstrike Fight. In the counterstrike fight, the FFA HQ receives, analyzes and attacks by both lethal and nonlethal fires and effects acquisitions of numerous sensors from across the division area of operations (AO).

In the 1st Infantry Division's AOR, this meant positioning more than 25 different radars drawn from both Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) units to ensure all radars were employed to their maximum effectiveness. The Div Arty also incorporated the full suite of collectors, to include radars, observation posts (OPs), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), reconnaissance helicopters and maneuver patrols.

More than simply "orienting radar fans," the counterstrike fight demanded constant attention to radar maintenance--no simple task when temperatures stayed well above 130 degrees for much of the summer. The Div Arty counterstrike officers supervised a proactive maintenance program for all the division's radars, resulting in readiness rates that remained at nearly 99 percent despite the challenges of the Iraqi environment.

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To get a full appreciation for the importance and role of radars in the COE fight, see the article "1st ID in OIF II--The Role of the TAB in Radar Operations" by Captain John J. Neal, et al. in the March April edition.

The counterstrike fight also required expertise in analyzing enemy tactics, adjusting to changes and constantly fine-tuning sensor-to-shooter links. As the FFA HQ in OIF II, the Div Arty maintained a division-level view of the counterstrike fight. Our perspective facilitated recommendations to the division commander on how to best allocate and position assets in support of the division fight. This involved prioritization of limited assets because the size of the AOR, coupled with the nature of the non-contiguous battlespace, precluded any kind of redundant coverage.

With this synchronized acquisition plan, one of every two enemy indirect fire attacks was acquired--the highest success rate of any division since OIF began.

The Fires Battalions of heavy BCTs will have two counterbattery radars. Without a FFA HQ intimately involved in the division-level counterstrike fight, the UEx of the future could find itself fighting separate counterstrike fights in each of its subordinate unit AORs. There will be times when this makes sense and other times when it will not.

Synchronization of Effects. As we know from recent experience, be it a combat training center (CTC) rotation or true combat, synchronizing effects in support of a division in contact is no easy task. Having a dedicated FFA HQ, complete with a JFEC and a well trained staff, is critical to the success of such efforts.

The working relationships formed between this headquarters and other contributors to the fight over months of training are equally important. Developing common situational understanding, employing collection assets available and integrating the contributions of these assets demand a great deal from any command post (CP), especially a maneuver CP consumed with planning the direct fire fight. Without a headquarters habitually associated with the contributors to the maneuver fight, a maneuver staff faces the hurdle of developing relationships with personnel from disparate units for an operation as they meet the personnel for the first time.

Standards of FA and Fire Support. The Div Arty headquarters also addressed variations in unit TTPs during training and standardized the fire support process during execution. With its robust suite of digital communications, connectivity across the division battlespace was quickly established and maintained across multiple unit boundaries.

As the center of indirect fire expertise for the division, the Div Arty headquarters managed the training of subordinate fire support and FA elements, ensuring that Soldiers remained ready to perform their missions. Without such a dedicated headquarters, the training of fire supporters and indirect fire assets falls to the maneuver commanders.

While Fires Brigades would be up to the task of preparing their organic assets for combat, standardization across the Fires Battalions in the maneuver BCTs would pose challenges. The synchronization of lethal and nonlethal effects across the BCTs is challenging at best, particularly with Fires Battalions organic to maneuver BCTs rather than the Fires Brigades. Although efficient in terms of providing the BCT commander his own combined arms team, this structural change places the demand on the BCT commander to train his fires units, a role currently fulfilled by the Div Arty headquarters.

Div Arty as a BCT HQ. The characteristics and capabilities that make the Div Arty headquarters successful in its doctrinal mission also enable it to perform a range of nonstandard missions. Having an FFA HQ available to act as an alternate division- or brigade-level CP and successfully perform nonstandard missions provides the UEx commander an exceptional resource.

The potential of the 1st Infantry Div Arty headquarters as an additional [C.sup.2] headquarters came to light during combat operations in An Najaf. The Div Arty assumed the role of a maneuver brigade CP. The division was tasked by MultiNational Corps, Iraq (MNC-I) to detach a brigade-sized element to bridge the gap between the 1st Armored Division's departure and the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit's (MEU's) arrival in this hotly contested region of Iraq. The mission required temporary subordination of the unit to the [C.sup.2] of MultiNational Division-Center South, commanded by a Polish major general.

Rather than take a committed brigade headquarters out of contact and lose the benefit of its established relationship with local Iraqi leaders, the mission was given to the Div Arty headquarters. For 47 days, the 1st Infantry Div Arty took operational control of a light infantry battalion, an El Salvadoran battle group, an engineer battalion, three Iraqi Army battalions and a 1,200-man Iraqi police force. After assuming control of its AO from the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (subordinate to the 1st Armored Division), the Div Arty staff performed all the traditional functions of a maneuver staff with outstanding results.

The Div Arty's ability to perform as an additional maneuver headquarters required augmentation, including psychological operations (PSYOP) teams, information operations (IO) personnel, a UAV support team, increasing the size of the S2 section, adding a brigade engineer and, although not intuitively obvious, creating a brigade JFEC (the standing JFEC had to continue supporting the division's overall operations with lethal and nonlethal effects).

During the tense stand-off between Coalition Forces and the militia of Muqtada al-Sadr, TF Drumfire planned and executed many combat patrols, maintaining order and discipline in An Najaf. The Div Arty then conducted a deliberate relief-in-place (RIP) with elements of the 11th MEU.

The proven ability of the Div Arty to operate as a BCT headquarters and successfully conduct combat operations provided more flexibility for the division and the corps. The Div Artys of the 1st Cav, 25th Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions also are FFA HQs that have served as maneuver brigade headquarters in both OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan--the COE. This reinforces the need to maintain a versatile FFA HQ.

This situation emphasizes the potential lack of flexibility created by the UE/BCT structure. If the modular organization of the UEx is based on the current or pre-deployment METT-TC, how do we respond to changes in the environment?

The 1st Infantry Div Arty was given a mission not anticipated before it deployed to Iraq. Without the flexibility of giving this task to the Div Arty headquarters, the division would have been forced to either accept significant risk by pulling another brigade out of contact or wait for another unit to be mobilized.

Div Arty as a Division-Level CP. The Big Red One also relied upon the Div Arty headquarters to oversee the division's deployment and redeployment operations. When the division deployed to Iraq, the Div Arty provided [C.sup.2] for RSOI of all TF Danger units. This involved receiving equipment at the port, coordinating the linkup of units and vehicles at many deployment camps in Kuwait and overseeing all required pre-combat training before the move into Iraq.

Having proven its ability to perform as a surrogate division CP during deployment, the Div Arty was the natural choice to perform similar duties on the completion of 12 months in combat. Tapped to oversee the redeployment of the Big Red One, the Div Arty headquarters conducted split-based operations and moved a tactical command post (TAC) to Kuwait, again assuming the role of a division-level CP.

For three months, while simultaneously conducting combat operations in Iraq, it supervised the reception, processing and return movement of more than 20,000 Soldiers and 9,500 vehicles from departure from Iraq until arrival at home station. This large-scale operation involved AC and RC BCTs from the continental United States and Hawaii along with organic division units returning to Germany.

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Synchronizing the division's redeployment required coordinating heavy equipment transport assets, tracking flights from four different airfields, managing port upload operations and ensuring an efficient flow of vehicles through wash racks and sterile yards at several different redeployment camps in Kuwait. Again, the Div Arty headquarters' robust communications network, flexible staff and ability to coordinate with multiple units proved essential to the division's success.

Additionally, the Div Arty provided division-level [C.sup.2] of CEA destruction. This mission, resulting in the collection of some 29.7 million pounds of ordnance, involved constant, close coordination with maneuver commanders, civilian ordnance experts and local nationals. The Div Arty headquarters, with well established communications networks and accustomed to working across unit boundaries, was especially well suited to accomplish this mission.

By performing this demanding [C.sup.2] function, the Div Arty denied thousands of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to the enemy, saving countless coalition and innocent Iraqi lives in the process. Just as important, this critical operation did not require the attention of the maneuver brigade staffs during their own close combat and stability and support operations (SASO).

On a battlefield such as Iraq, where combat operations mix daily with SASO, the ability to assign division-level tasks to the Div Arty headquarters paid dividends. Whether acting as a maneuver brigade headquarters in An Najaf, overseeing divisional RSOI operations, or collecting CEA, the Div Arty headquarters was up to the task. Considered alongside its doctrinal functions of integrating fires and synchronizing effects in support of maneuver operations, there is no doubt that the Div Arty headquarters demonstrated its relevance to contemporary warfighting.

As our Army transitions to the modular design structure, all these capabilities must be considered deliberately and incorporated. The combat power of habitual associations and the human dimension can never be overstated. As we design the force, we must constantly remind ourselves that modularity must account for potential changes in METT-TC. In our drive for efficiency, we must acknowledge the requirement for flexibility in the rapidly changing environments in which we will fight.

The 1st Infantry Div Arty's year in Iraq serves as solid evidence of the relevance of the FFA HQ, both now and for the foreseeable future.

By Colonel Richard C. Longo and Major Michael R. Eastman

Colonel Richard C. Longo commands the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery in Germany. He served as the Commander of the Force FA Headquarters for the 1st Division's deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II. He also served as Chief of Task Force XXI, a future force think tank in Training Command; G3 of III Corps Artillery; and Commander of 1st Battalion, 14th Field Artillery (1-14 FA), 214th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery, all at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He is a graduate of the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

Major Michael R. Eastman is the S3 of the 1st Infantry Division Artillery in Germany. He deployed with the Div Arty in that capacity to OIF II. Among other assignments, he served as an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the US Military Academy at West Point, commanded B/4-42 FA in the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Hood, Texas, and served as Battalion Fire Direction Officer in the 25th Infantry Division (Light) at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He holds two master's degrees, and is a doctoral candidate in International Security Strategy at MIT.