1986 Conference on Disarmament sees 'positive and substantive' developments, in-depth discussions held.

1986 Conference on Disarmament sess 'positive and substantive' developments, in-depth discussions held

The Conference on Disarmamenton 26 August concluded its 1986 session in Geneva, with its President stating thet had been both "positive and substantive developments" during the year.

J. Alan Beesley of Canada, Presidentfor the month of August, said: "There was...less antagonism, the atmosphere was healthier, and, as a consequence, perhaps, there was more business-like work, more in-depth discussions, and greater clarification of basic arms control issues, even on such questions as outer space and a nuclear test ban".

Mr. Beesley, who will retain theConference presidency until the 1987 session opens next February, also said that on unresolved nuclear disarmament issues, "deep divergencies remain, but we have at least begun to learn how to structure our work more successfully, which I hope can be further developed when next we meet".

Significant progress, he went on,had been made in negotiations on chemical weapons, and the intensity and pace of work in that area should be accelerated.

During its two-part 1986 session (4February-25 April, 10 June-29 August), the 40-member Conference continued work on disarmament questions drawn from its permanent agenda of 10 items, known as the "Decalogue". Subsidiary bodies were established to continue work on a chemical weapons convention, a radiological weapons ban, prevention of the arms race in outer space and a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Conference members were unableto agree on creation of groups to work on a nuclear test ban, cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, prevention of nuclear war and security assurances for non-nuclear States.

The Conference also recognized theurgency of dealing with the question of expanding its membership, which now consists of the five nuclear-weapon States (China, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States) and 35 other countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

The Conference had previouslyagreed that it might add up to four new members, with two States to be nominated by the Gruop of 21 non-aligned and neutral States, and one each by the Socialist Group and the Western Group. Requests for membership have been received from Norway, Finland, Austria, Turkey, Segenal, Bangladesh, Spain, Viet Nam, Ireland, Tunishia, Ecuador, Cameroon and Greece.

This year, the Socialist Group putforward the candidacy of Viet Nam, and the Western Group nominated Norway. The Conference decided to intensify consultations on the question with a view to taking a final decision in 1987.

Chemical weapons: The Conference, in its 1986 report (A/41/27),stated it had made notable progress in its work on drafting a multilateral convention on the "complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction." The Ad Hoc Committee charged with "development and working out the convention, except for its final drafting" was re-established on 6 February with Ian Cromartie (United Kingdom) as Chairman.

Three working groups were set upby the Committee. Working Group "A" considered issues related to "definitions and criteria" (article II) and "permitted activities" (article VI); Working Group "B" discussed "declarations" (article III), "elimination of chemical weapons" (article IV) and "measures on chemical weapons production facilities" (article V).

Working Group "C" considered issuesconcerning "general provisions on scope" (article I), "national implementation measures" (article VII), "consultative committee" (article VIII) and "consultations, co-operation and fact-finding" (article IX). It was also responsible for discussing herbicides and questions relating to investigation of alleged chemical weapon use.

On 28 August, Mr. Cromartie told,Conference members that in 1986, the pace of progress in negotiations had been further accelerated, and that it was "essential" to continue increasing the momentum to ensure an early conclusion of the convention.

The Ad Hoc Committee on chemicalweapons is to resume work under its present mandate from 12 to 30 January 1987. The chairman was asked to hold consultations between 24 November and 17 December on the issues to be discussed at the January meeting.

Papers on chemical weapons submittedduring the second part of the sessions included a United States text entitled" Chemical stockpile disposal programme" (CD/711), giving details of the location and contents of American chemical weapons sites.

Other proposals regarding verificationof a chemical weapons treaty included United Kingdom recommendations concerning inspection on challege in exceptional circumstances (CD/715), Norwegian papers on methods of identifying arsenic-containing chemical weapons (CD/704), handling of chemical weapons (C/702) and verifying chemical weapons use (CD/703), a Finnish text on "air monitoring" as a means of verifying chemical disarmament (CD/719), and Japan's suggestions on quantitative parameters that might be used to determine such matters as "military significance", in order to ensure consistency and effectiveness in verification and control (CD/713).

Outer Space: The Ad Hoc Committeeon Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, first set up in 1985, was re-established on 24 April "to continue to examine, and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space . . . [taking] into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives as well as developments which have taken place since the establishment" of the Committee. It met 16 times during 1986, under the chairmanship of Luvsandorjin Bayart (Mongolia).

The Commiittee reported that itsdiscussions reflected a "general recognition of the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and readiness to contribute to that objective", and that it had agreed that "no effort should be spared" to assure that substantive work on the matter continued at the 1987 session.

Committee members recognizedthat the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, had played a significant role in the prevention of an arms race in space, and underlined the need to reinforce it. They also stressed the importance of strict compliance with existing bilateral and multilateral agreements.

There was recognition of the "commoninterest of mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposesc, and, in that context, there was recognition of the importance of the notion, set out in the Final Document of the 1978 special General Assembly session devoted to disarmament, that to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

Many delegations supported the notionof the outer space as the "common heritage of mankind", which should be used exclusively for the peaceful promotion of scientific, economic and social development of all nations.

Some countries stressed that anarms race in outer space would undermine existing agreements not only on outer space but also on arms limitation and disarmament as a whole. There was concern that the majority of satellites, although not weapons or weapons platforms per se, served military functions and were integral parts of weapons systems on earth and strategic doctrines associated with the use of nuclear weapons.

A group of socialist countries tookthe view that a ban on space-strike weapons, including anti-satellite weapons, space-based anti-ballistics systems and space-to-Earth weapons, would be an effective way to prevent all possibility of an arms race in outer space. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space should be an alternative to the arms race, they said.

Other delegations, including someWestern nations, said that space was not "immune from utilization by existing weapons" and that some such military activities, in fact, contributed to strategic stability and arms control and, therefore, to international peace and security. The first task was establishing which activities were permissible and which prohibited. Furthermore, issues relating to preventing an arms race in outer space could not be examined in isolation and must be considered in the wider context of global disarmament.

The Conference's main objective,some countries stressed, should be a comprehensive ban on developing, testing, production and deployment of space weapons, with concurrent efforts to adopt partial measures, such as a ban on anti-satellite weapons. A group of socialist countries said they were ready to adopt partial steps leading towards the final goal.

A number of States felt that theCommittee's efforts should be directed towards prohibiting the emergence of space weapons. Some countries focused on "space strike weapons"; others concentrated on anti-satellite weapons.

Some delegations said verificationremained a basic issue, requiring deeper study. Others felt that verification did not post insurmountable difficulties and could be provided by such procedures as opening laboratories for inspection. Some countries proposed that verification be entrusted to an international agency; they referred to the proposal to establish an international satellite monitoring agency to prevent inequitable use of surveillance- and information-gathering satellites against non-aligned and neutral Sates.

Some nations expressed willingnessto consider any measures that were verifiable, equitable and compatible with national security interests, but said that proposals put forth so far did not satisfy those criteria.

Many delegations felt that the taskentrusted to the Committee for 1986 had been completed, but regretted the inability to identify specific measures necessary to prevent an arms race in outer space. They proposed that next year the Committee begin negotiations towards an agreement.

Nuclear test ban: Informal consultationswere held again in 1986 on a mandate for establishing an Ad Hoc Committee to initiate negotiations on a nuclear test ban, but for the third year the Conference failed to achieve consensus. It was widely hoped that agreement on the matter could be reached early in 1987.

Several delegations submittedproposals on the question of a test-ban treaty, but differences persisted in the degree of priority the matter should be given.

The Group of 21 countries againsaid that concluding a comprehensive nuclear test ban was a matter of the highest priority. Continued nuclear weapon testing had intensified the arms race and increased the risk of nuclear war, they felt. They saw no justification for delaying the conclusion of a test ban, asserting that existing means of verification were adequate to ensure compliance.

Group members drew attention tojoint appeals--made by Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania--regarding such nuclear issues as a test ban, verification mechanisms, a freeze in production and deployment of nuclear weapons, and substantial reductions leading to complete disarmament.

They called on the United States tostop nuclear-weapon tests and requested the Soviet Union to continue its August 1985 moratorium until an agreement was reached on a comprehensive test ban, or "at least" until the next summit meeting between the two countries.

Sweden, in a paper on technicalaspects of nuclear test ban verification (CD/712), concluded that the technology existed to create "reliable seismic monitoring arrangement for a nuclear test ban".

Mexico emphasized that General Assemblyresolution 40/80A, which called for establishing an Ad Hoc Committee with two working groups dealing with, respectively, structure and scope, and compliance and verification of a test ban treaty, involved "concessions of such magnitude" that, if reciprocated even in a small degree, would have permitted the beginning of serious negotiations.

The Socialist Group continued toregard the cessation of nuclear tests as a highly significant and easily achievable measure towards nuclear disarmament, and regretted the Western Group's continued rejection of proposals other than its own for establishing a subsidiary body. The Group welcomed the Sovit Union's repeated extensions of its moratorium on nuclear tests and called on the United States, as well as other nuclear weapon States, to follow suit.

Socialist countries also advocatedthe immediate commencement of multilateral negotiations on a nuclear test ban, to be conducted concurrently with any bialteral or trilateral talks that might be initiated, and expressed readiness to broaden the scope of the 963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial test-ban Treaty) to include underground nuclear weapons tests, as called for by the General Assembly.

A paper entitled "Negotiations" ona Treay on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapon Tests" (CD/701), submitted by the socialist States, suggests that negotiations could be structured around discussion of the scope of the treaty and obligation of States parties, means of verification, and procedures for consultation and co-operation. The Group denied that verification continued to pose a problem, contending that present techniques guaranteed full and credible verification, and stressed that a verification system could only serve as a means to ensure compliance with a test ban, not to monitor continued testing.

The Soviet Union reaffirmed itsproposal to commence negotiations as soon as possible on a complete nuclear-weapons ban without linkage to any other questions. It supported the use of any forum--bilateral, trilateral or multilateral--and any type of agreement in that regard.

The Soviet Union also expressedreadiness to accept the most "stringent" verification, including on-site inspections and the use of all advances in seismology. It proposed (CD/724) that the Ad Hoc Group of Scienctific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events begin to develop a system of operative transmission of Level II (waveform) data to serve as a basis for international seismic verification of a nuclear test ban. It also proposed that the experts conduct an international experiment in 1988 on the exchange of Level II data.

A group of Western countries indicatedtheir willingness to begin work immediately on a substantive examination of essential issues that would be involved in comprehensive test ban treaty, particularly scope, compliance and verification. They continued to support the mandate proposed by Western countries (CD/521) for an Ad Hoc Committee.

Western countries said not all technicalproblems that were prerequisites for a comprehensive test ban--verification in particular--had been worked out, and that further work was required. Some delegations reminded the Conference of proposals for a gradual interim solution. Australia suggested (CD/717) the immediate establishment of a global seismic network as part of a monitoring and verification system for a future comprehensive test ban, stating that to "delay undertaking this essential work until certain political conditions are met" would not hasten the conclusion of the best ban.

The United States reiterated that anuclear test ban remaineded an objective to be achieved "in due course", in the context of significant reductions in existing nuclear-weapons arsenals and substantially improved verification measures. Testing played a role in ensuring the security of the Western alliance, the United States stressed. As for the Conference's activities in this area, more work was needed on seismic verifications and such questions as on-site inspection.

The United Kingdom, too, said anuclear test ban remained an objective of its overall arms control policy, but that verification remained a serious problem. Useful intermediate steps would be: establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to examine issues of scope and verification; enhancement of the work of the Group of Scientific Experts on seismic monitoring; bilateral contacts aimed at ratifying the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Tests (Threshold Test-Ban Treaty) and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty; and, as a confidence-building measure, reduction of nuclear arsenals.

France left that international commitmentsregarding a nuclear test ban could be considered only in relation to ultimate progress in the process of nuclear disarmament. The two countries with the largest nuclear arsenals and greates number of tests must first reach bilateral agreements on reducing nuclear weapons, it said.

China stated that once the SovietUnion and United States had taken the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons, and had drastically reduced their nuclear arsenals, it would be prepared to take corresponding measures. China had not conducted nuclear tests in the atmosphere for many years and would not do so in the future. It supported the establishment of a subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban, and was flexible as to its terms of reference.

Seismic test: In connection with itsconsideration of a nuclear test ban, the Conference received the fourth report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismic monitoring (CD/720), set up in 1976 to facilitate verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The report describes results of a large-scale technical test of seismic data exchange conducted from 15 October to 14 December 1984 (see UN Chronicle, 1986, No. 4).

The Conference agreed that the expertsshould meet next from 2 to 13 March 1987, and that its future work should be directed towards designing an international system for exchange and processing of parametric (Level I) and wavefrom (Level II) seismic data. The Conference endorsed the Group's plan to conduct a large-scale experiment, probably in 1988, to test procedures for exchange of Level II data, using the Global Telecommunications System of the World Meteorological Organizations (WMO) and other communications channels, including satellite transmission.

Nuclear arms race: Consultationswere held throughout the session on the agenda item on "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

The Group of 21 reiterated itsproposal to establish a subsidiary body to submit recommendations to the Conference on initiating multilateral negotiation of agreements with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages, on cessation of qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems; cessation of production of all types of nuclear weapons and means of delivery, and production of fissionable material for weapon purposes; and substantial reduction in existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination.

Such agreements, that Group felt,would create more favourable prospects for negotiations on arms reductions and ensure that any reductions would not be nullifed by the development and promotion of new nuclear weapons. While welcoming the ongoing bilateral negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union, the Group stressed that bilateral and multilateral negotiations should complement one another.

Socialist countries reiterated the importancethey attached to cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and their consistent support for multilateral negotiations within the Coference on Disarmament. Informal meetings on the agenda item, while not a substitute for an Ad Hoc Committee, could be a step towards such negotiations. The Conferece, they said, should elaborate a programme of disarmament as envisaged in the Final Document of the 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The five nuclear-weapon States should set up a Sub-Committee with a negotiating mandate, to contribute to multilateral consideration of the question, they added.

The Socialist Group supported thethree-stage programme for complete nuclear disarmament by the year 2000 put forward by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev on 15 January 1986 (see UN Chronicle, 1986, No. 3). The Soviet Union said that programme showed the "shortest and most reliable road" to elimination of the nuclear threat, not through development of anything new, such as space weapons in particular, but through the elimination of existing weapons.

The Western Group, including threenuclear-weapon States (France, United Kingdom and United States), said that bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and United States offered the best means for progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament. They were not convinced that creation of a subsidiary body on this item would contribute to the cause of nuclear disarmament, nor did they share the view that every item on the Conference agenda was "ripe for negotiation."

Western Countries underscored theimportance they attached to substantial and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons, emphasizing that nuclear arms reduction could not be divorced from conventional arms control and disarmament measures.

The United States welcomed therecognition, in General Secretary Gorbachev's proposals, of the critical importance of verification in negotiating agreements, and reiterated its objective of beginning the arms reduction process with an agreement for a 50 per cent reduction in each side's offensive nuclear forces, along with an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

The United Kingdom said the prioritywas success in negotiating substantial reductions by the two Powers having the greatest number of nuclear weapons and the greater military capability in outer space. Then, the United Kingdom would be ready to review its position and consider how best to contribute to arms control.

France said the proposal for large cutsin the nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States pointed in the right direction, but to require the two major Western European nuclear-weapon States to freeze their nuclear weapons without letting them reach desirable defensive levels would unacceptably jeopardize their security, which was based on "deterrence of the strong by the weak".

China supported a halt to testing,production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons, and reduction of nuclear arms, followed by an international conference with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States to discuss measures for disarmament and destruction of all nuclear weapons. Preparatory work for such a conference could start once the two major nuclear-weapon States made "tangible progress" towards that goal. The two military blocs should also take the lead in substantially reducing conventional arms and forces.

Prevention of nuclear war: Consultationson "prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" were held to consider an appropriate arrangement to deal with the item, including proposals to establish a subsidiary body. No agreement was reached.

Socialist countries and China supporteda Group of 21 proposal (CD/515/Rev. 2), previously submitted in July 1985, for an Ad Hoc Committee that would, as a first step, consider all proposals relevant to the matter, including "appropropriate and practical measures" for preventing nuclear war.

The Western Group said thatalthough it attached great importance to the prevention of nuclear war, and had been prepared to discuss the item in depth since 1983, when it was first inscribed on the agenda, it remained unable to associate itself with the consensus on the draft mandate for a subsidiary body.

Bulgaria submitted a paper (CD/7/10)reiterating socialist proposals for preventing nuclear war through renunciation by both Powers of nuclear and conventional warfare; prohibition of an arms race in space; a ban on all nuclear weapons tests; renunciation of development of new means of mass destruction; substantial reduction of forces in Europe; reduction in military budgets; and the dissolution of military groupings.

Radiological weapons: The Ad HocCommittee on Radiological Weapons was re-established on 4 March under the chairmanship of Carlos Lechuga Hevia (Cuba), "with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".

Again in 1986, the Committeedecided to take a "unitary" approach to the two major questions before it -- prohibition of radiological weapons in the "traditional" sense, and prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities--considering both questions simultaneously without dividing them into separate tracks or giving priority to either. The decision was without prejudice to any "link" between the two questions, the appropriate manner of dealing with them, or any future treaty or treaties.

Three contact groups were set up toconsider: definitions and scope of a radiological weapons ban; peaceful uses of radiological weapons and cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; and compliance and verification.

The ad Hoc Committee consideredits work "useful in terms of the mandate entrusted to it". However, "onsiderable differences of substance and approach continue to exist with regard to both the important subjects under consideration".

The Committee recommended thatit be re-established in 1987, and that the documents before it be considered as a basis for future work. In addition to the contact groups' reports, the documentation includes texts submitted at the 1986 session by Argentina (see UN Chronicle, 1986, No. 4) and Pakistan.

New weapons: The Conferenceheld information discussions on new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, but was unable to reach consensus on a proposal to convene an expert group to identify any new types of weapons and make recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on those weapons. The proposal was supported by the Socialist Group and many Group of 21 members.

It was generally agreed that the inventionand deployment of any new kind of weapon of mass destruction would be a "most serious development" and a "great danger to international peace and security". However, Western countries said that as no new types of such weapons had been identified since 1948, nor was their existence imminent, the practice followed so far of holding information meetings of the Conference from time to time was the most appropriate way to deal with the question.

Security assurances: Consultationswere held under the Conference Presidents to explore ways and means to overcome difficulties encountered in carrying out negotiations on the question of "Effective international agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", including reestablishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the subject.

U Tin Tun (Burma), ConferencePresident for July, said that some delegations had expressed the view that there was no point in resuming discussion unless the position of the nuclear-weapon States had changed or developed in some way. He reported that consultations with those States indicted that their positions had not changed. The Conference was to consider re-establishing a subsidiary body at the beginning of its 1987 session.

Comprehensive programme: TheGeneral Assembly had urged the Conference (resolution 40/152D) to resume work on elaborating a comprehensive programme of disarmament with the "firm intention" of submitting a complete draft to the 1986 Assembly. The Ad Hoc Committee, chaired by Alfonson Garcia Robles (Mexico), continued to concentrate on resolving outstanding issues. Contact groups were set up to iron out differences regarding measures and stages of implementation, machinery and procedures, and an introduction.

The Committee reported that whilethe various texts under consideration continued to reflect points of difference, the areas of disagreement had narrowed and, in some cases, considerable progress had been made. The Committee recommended, therefore, that it be re-established early in 1987 to complete the text.